1. Art and Diseño

Iraq
Human Development
Report 2014
Iraqi Youth
Challenges and Opportunities
Iraq
Human Development
Report 2014
Iraqi Youth
Challenges and Opportunities
Iraqi youth draw their dreams
on the T-walls
First Published 2014
Copyright © 2014
Ministry of Planning
And Baytal Hikma
Iraq
All rights reserved. No part of this publication
may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system
or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording
or otherwise, without prior permission.
Disclaimer
The views expressed herein are those of the
authors of the report and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the Ministry of Planning, Baytul
Hikma, or UNDP.
This work was originally published in Arabic. In
cases of discrepancies, the original language shall
govern.
ESCWA
Contents
Preface7
UNDP Foreword
8
Why a National Human Development Report?
9
Acknowledgements10
Iraq NHDR 2014 Team
11
Acronyms12
Preparing NHDR 2014:
13
A Participatory Approach
13
Overview15
Chapter 1
Human Development:
An Action Methodology and a Vision
19
Why Youth?
Focus of the Report
Conceptual Framework
Keeping Pace with Concepts and Measurements
Global Debate on the Post-2015 Development Goals
19
Other Dimensions of Human Development
Political Dimension
Cultural Dimension
Interaction of Dimensions and Dialectic of Exclusion/Inclusion
Chapter 2
The Challenge of Human Development in Iraq
The State of Human Development
Measuring Human Development in Iraq
Human Development Index
Human Development Index in Kurdistan
Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index
Gender Inequality Index
Women’s Empowerment16
Gender Inequality Index by Governorate
Women’s Participation in Governorate Councils
26
Multidimensional Poverty Index
Who Suffers from Multidimensional Poverty in Iraq?
Youth Development Index
The Youth Development Index Measurement
The Youth Development Index Domains
Youth Development Index in the Governorates
YDI as A Tool for Monitoring and Advocating Youth
Progress
Priorities in Economic Empowerment
Chapter 3
Demographic Challenges
Three Demographic Challenges
Slow Decline in Fertility Rates
42
Youthful Population
Population Mobility and Migration
Chapter 4
The Youth and Economic Challenges
The Challenge of Youth Unemployment
Youth Economic Activity
How Do Young People Get a Job?
Youth Unemployment Characteristics
Unsuccessful Measures
Youth Underemployment
Underemployed Young People’s Workplace
Young Women’s Working Pattern Suggests Exclusion
Unemployment and Poverty
51
The Challenge of a Rentier Economy32
The Public Budget as a Tool to Steer the Economy
Utilization of Oil Revenues
National Budget: The Main Generator of Employment Opportunities
The Political Economy of the Rentier State
Unattractive Environment for Entrepreneurship
Young People in Business
Chapter 5
Social and Cultural Challenges
65
Youth and Family
Familial Relations Do Not Limit Youth Choices
Youth Dependence on Family
The Generation Gap and Social Exclusion
Marriage and Starting a New Family: The Road to Social Integration
Discrimination and Violence against Young Women
2
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Discriminative Upbringing
Family Violence Excludes Young Women
Cultural Heritage
Marriage of Underage Girls: a Typical Form of Family
Violence
Religious Values
When Traditions Become Persecution
Protection from Family Violence
Youth and Social Values System
Tribal Values
Crisis of Youth or of Society?
Pluralism and the Iraqi Case
Issues of Concern to Youth
Chapter 6
84
Education Opportunities for the Youth
Is Education a Portal to Social Integration?
Education Opportunities Out of Step with Youth Aspirations
High Illiteracy Rate
Education Opportunities Out of Step with the Labour Market
Low Educational Attainment of the Youth
The Education System Does Not Offer Young Students Appropriate Disciplines
Unequal Educational Attainment of the Youth
Disparities in Enrolment Rates of the Youth
Why do the Youth Drop Out?
Depriving Children of Education
The Education System Does Not Provide the Infrastructure
for a Knowledge-oriented Society
The Youth’s View: How to Make Education Better
Alternative Educational Approaches
Finance: Does It Limit the Youth’s Attainment of
Education?
Institutional Challenges
Public–Private Partnerships
Vocational Education Does Not Attract Youth
Acquisition of Knowledge Beyond Education
Expanding University Education
Young People Do Not Read
Deferred Dreams: Where Do Graduates Go?
A Free Press Attracts Young People
Access to Higher Education Has Increased, but
What about Education Quality?
Media Outlets Favourable among Young People
TV as Entertainment and a Source of Knowledge
Chapter 7
Youth, Participation, and Citizenship
103
Youth Citizenship and National Identity
Citizenship Education
Social Upbringing
Young People’s Political and Social Participation
Youth and Multiculturalism
Are the Youth Reluctant to Participate Politically?
Communication and National Identity
New Opportunities for Communication and Participation
Decentralization Supports Youth Citizenship
The Internet’s Impact on Young People
Chapter Eight
Orientations and Policies
115
Summary and Conclusions
Social Policy Reforms
Towards a Youth-empowering Environment
Young Women’s Empowerment
General Orientations
Education as an Empowerment Mechanism
A Human Development-sponsoring State
Policies for Youth Participation in Political Stability
Policy Recommendations
Building a Culture of Peace and Security and Safeguarding
Social Cohesion
The Economic Policy
The Social Policy
Civil Society and Youth
Annex I
Statistical Tables
Table 1
Human Development Index (HDI) and its compo-
127
nets
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
3
Table 2
(IHDI)
Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index
Table 3
Gender Inequality Index (GII)
Table 4
Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI)
Table 5
Youth Development Index (YDI)
Table 5
Youth Development Index (YDI)
Table 11
Health
Table 11
Health
Table 12
Education
Table 13
Economic activity for Age 15+
Table 14
Indicators of the standard of living of the Iraqi
individual for the year 2012
Table 6 Youth Development Index
Table 15
Environmental Sustainability
Table 7
Table 16
Youth Health
Correlations Matrix between HDI; Consistent Significations;
Table 17
Youth Education
Table 18
Economic activity for youth
Table 18
Economic activity for youth
Table 19
Living Conditions for Youth
Table 20
Political Participation for Youth
Table 21
Environmental sustainability of youth
Poverty Enhances Deprivation
Table 8
Human Development Indicators
Table 9
Millennium Development Goal Indicators
Table 10
Population Trends
Annex II
Youth survey tables
156
Table 1
Education
Table 9
Relationship with Parents
Table 2
Education
Table 9
Relationship with Parents
Table 2
Education
Table 10
Relationship with Parents
Table 3
Education
Table 11
Youth Choices
Table 3
Education
Table 12
Security and Citizenship
Table 3
Education
Table 13
Societal and Political Participation
Table 4
Physical Health and Safety
Table 13
Societal and Political Participation
Table 4
Health and Physical Safety
Table 14
Information Technology
Table 5
Employment
Table 15
Migration
Table 5
Employment
Table 16
Migration
Table 6
Employment
Table 17
Migration
Table 7
Employment
Table 17
Migration
Table 7
Employment
Table 18
Youth future aspirations
Table 8
Employment
Table 18
Youth future aspirations
Annex III
Technical Notes Appendix
184
Introduction
1.5 National Youth and Adolescent Survey (NYS-2009)
1 Implemented Surveys
1.6 Youth Opinion Survey (YOS-2012)
1.1 Iraq Knowledge Network Survey (IKN-2011)
2. Calculation of the Human Development Indicators: the Methodology and the Measurements
1.2 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS4-2011)
1.3 Iraq Household Socioeconomic Survey II (IHSES-2012)
1.4 Iraq Poverty and Maternal Mortality Mapping (IPMM2013)
References and Resources
2.1 Human Development Index (HDI)
2.2 Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index
(IHDI)
MP dimensions and Indicators
196
Notes199
4
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
boxes
Box 1.1
Youth Statement
20
Box 4.3
Successful Measures towards Poverty Alleviation
Box 1.1
Participation in Post-2015 Development [dialogue]
22
Box 4.4
58
National Development Plan 2013–2017 – No Choice but Oil
Box 1.2
New Goals for Post-2015 Development Agenda
22
Box 4.5 The Public and Private Partnership (PPP) Project
Box 1.3
The Importance of Political and Cultural Dimensions
23
63
Box 4.6 Special Contribution
National Development Plan 2013–2017 Advocates Young
People’s Aspirations
Box 2.1
30
Inequality (Gini Coefficient) and GNI Per Capita for 185
Countries
36
Box 2.2
The Multidimensional Poverty Index as a Tool for Fact-based
Planning
Box 2.3
37
Correlation Matrix between Human Development Indices and
Some Economic Indicators
Box 2.4
Differences between HDI and YDI Ranking
40
Box 3.1
50
Population Policy 2013 – No More Neglect of Population Issues
53
Box 4.1
Bridging the Gap between the Labour Market and Education
Box 4.2
Wastage of Youth Potential
55
56
61
Box 5.1 Anti-Underage Marriage An Initiative by Women’s Organizations
74
Box 6.1
Sectarian Conflict Limits Freedom of Choice
94
Box 6.2 Special Contribution
95
The Education Initiative– Fulfilling the Aspirations of the
Youth
Box 6.3
Iraqi Youth Celebrate Books
100
Box 7.1
Hope for Young Women
110
Box 8.1
Jobs Needed in the Next Phase
122
Box 8.2
Innovative Project to Train the Youth
123
Box A3
185
Sources used in computing the Human Development Index
Youth View & Voices
They Are Poor because They Are Deprived of Education, and
Deprived of Education because They Are Poor (Al Nasiriya
Youth)87
Iraqi Youth in Jordan – A Different View
48
Marriage Is a Major Crisis in Our Life (Duhok’s Youth)
68
Family Violence Restrains Youth Freedom (Babil)
72
Religious Discourse and Its Impact on the Youth
78
Marginalized Youth in the Maysan Marshlands: Schools Are
Distant91
The Tribe’s Function Is Continuous: Baghdad’s Youth
79
Print Media versus Electronic Media
Issues of Concern to the Kirkuk Youth –Human Trafficking,
Family Violence, and Sexual Abuse
81
Anbar’s Youth Warn about Drugs
82
99
What hinders young people’s political participation?
110
The Internet Is Indispensable
114
Tables
Table 4.1
54
Distribution of Underemployed Individuals by Age Group and
Educational Attainment
Table 6.1
97
Education Budget per Student and School between 2004 and
2011, Excluding Kurdistan Region
Table 5.1
71
The Opinions of Girls Aged 10–14 Years on Equality between
Them and Their Brothers
Table 7.1
Youth Role in Improving Security
Table 5.2
73
Aspects of Violence against Women – Early Marriage Age
The 2012 Youth Survey
111
Table A-1
192
shows the details of the domains, the indicators, and the minimum – maximum values.
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
5
FIGURES
Figure 2.1
28
Household Expenditure on Goods and Services
Figure 2.2
31
Gender-based Differences in Empowerment Indicators
Figure 2.3
34
Identifying the MPI poor and non-poor
Figure 2.4
34
35
Figure 2.6
36
39
Youth Development Index
Figure 2.8
39
The Youth Development Index Discrepancies by Governorate
Figure 3.1
43
Iraqi Population by Age Group
Figure 3.2
45
Duration of Residency in current place (all population)
Figure 3.3
46
Reasons for Changing the Place of Residence
Figure 3.4 46
Net Migration by governorates
Figure 3.5
47
Reasons for Changing the Place of Residence (15–29 Years)
Figure 3.6
48
52
How the Youth Get Jobs
Figure 4.3
52
Youth Unemployment Rate in Iraqi Governorates and Kurdistan Region
55
Income Poverty for the 15–29 Age Group
58
Iraq’s General Budget 2003–2012 (US$ billions)
Figure 4.6
People Living under the Income and MPI by Spending Category (%)
Figure 2.7
Figure 4.2
Figure 4.5
Iraqi Families with Income Poverty or MPI
51
The Gap in Male and Female Economic Activity Rates (15
years+)
Figure 4.4
Dimensions’ Contribution to the Poor’s Deprivation
Figure 2.5
Figure 4.1
60
Distribution of Family Income by Source
Figure 4.7
60
Working People by Age Group and Sector
Figure 5.1
66
Who Makes Decisions in the family
Figure 5.2
67
Dependence on Family Financial Support
Figure 6.1
84
Youth Priorities
Figure 6.2
86
Educational Status of Youth Surveyed
Figure 6.3
95
How to Make Education Better
Figure 6.4
96
Expenditure on Education and Health, GDP 2012 (Percentage)
Why Youth Want to Migrate
map
Map 2.1
The Multidimensional Poverty Index by Governorate
35
charts
Chart 2.1
MPI Dimensions, Indices, and Weights
33
Chart 2.2
38
Youth Development Index– Areas and Indicators of Each Index
6
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Chart 3.1
The Demographic Dividend Scenario in Iraq
44
Preface
With the Iraqi government’s adoption of the National Development Plan
2013–2017 and before it the National
Employment Policy and National Education Strategy – and with the launch of the
National Youth Strategy and this National
Human Development Report (NHDR)
2014, which focuses on opportunities
and challenges related to youth development – a promising foundation is being
laid for the empowerment of the youth.
These national efforts however depend on
two things: first, actual implementation of
the plans. Second, transforming the role
of the government into a constructive
role that realizes the potential of youth
empowerment. Only then do the youth’s
ambitions remain connected to their own
efforts and perseverance.
Because of our belief in the youth, we
have engaged them in the whole process
of preparing this document and later in the
review workshops. Their contribution has
revealed how much energy, resourcefulness, and literal potential the youth have.
Their observations and interventions have
informed the NHDR, positively affecting
its findings and recommendations. We
firmly believe that engaging the youth in
other activities would reveal this energy,
which has been intently marginalized for
decades and has often been turned into
something problematic rather than something that is part of the solution. While the
role of the youth in the advancement of
Iraqi society was neglected in the past,
today’s authorities should exploit this national wealth and turn it into an effective,
productive resource, as Iraqi people have
proved creative and innovative whenever
decent work conditions are in place.
Through this NHDR, the Ministry of
Planning reconfirms that the freedom of
expression of authors’ and experts’ views
and the absolute transparency with which
youth opinions, visions, and aspirations
have been presented have led to analyses,
conclusions, and policies that will hopefully be useful for human development in
Iraq in general and for the youth in particular.
The ministry’s partnership approach to
the development of this report, including the financing of some events and activities, particularly the panel discussions
with young people in 12 governorates,
highlights the willingness to cooperate in
supporting such great efforts.
We extend our thanks and gratitude
to all those who have contributed to this
report: the chief author, the national coordinator, the Kurdistan Region coordinator, authors, readers, experts, reviewers,
technicians, researchers, and the Youth
Team. We also express our appreciation
for the parties who have supported this
work throughout: the United Nations Development Programme (Head Office and
Iraq Office), the Economic and Social
Commission for Western Asia, and Bayt
Alhikma.
Dr. Ali Yusuf Al-Shukry
Minister of Planning
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
7
UNDP Foreword
The Iraq NHDR 2014 was in its final stages
when the current crisis in the country began. On 9 June 2014 the city of Mosul fell
to the Islamic State terrorist organization
with armed groups taking control of large
swathes of Iraq’s governorates of Ninewa,
Salah Al-Din, and Diyala. Since January
large areas of the Anbar governorate have
been under the control of armed groups.
This has led to massive internal displacement, and Iraq is now contending with one
of the largest Internally Displaced Population (IDP) in the world. Currently the
Office of the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that over
1.8 million people have been displaced
since January 2014. This figure is expected to increase if the crisis is not resolved.
Priority needs of IDPs are shelter, food
and non-food items- water, sanitation,
financial assistance, and health care.
A large portion of the population has
occupied temporary shelters with no
proper water and sanitation facilities.
Large numbers of IDPs are facing competing needs and complete loss of livelihoods, especially those in Anbar, Duhok,
and Erbil governorates. Host communities are also experiencing food shortages,
price increases and livelihoods decline.
The start date of the school year 2014/2015
may be delayed due to the number of
schools that are still occupied by IDPs.
Polio re-emerged in Iraq in early 2014.
There is a critical gap in extending
health services to IDPs and a shortage
of medicine for chronic illnesses and
insufficient medical staff in health facilities, particularly in the Kurdistan
governorates that have received large
numbers of IDPs over the last months.
Despite the magnitude of the crisis, development process in the country must continue. Development partners are already
on the ground and working alongside the
government of Iraq and the international
community to mobilize resources to respond to the humanitarian situation. The
key challenge remains to identify appropriate institutional structures and funding
to allow humanitarian, recovery and devel-
8
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
opment needs to be addressed in parallel.
The Iraq NHDR 2014 is, in essence,
a document for recovery, reconstruction, and development that addresses
the negative impact of many years of
crises. Its analysis, findings, and policy
recommendations remain valid for the
cumulative impact of the successive crises including the recent events, which
could be viewed as a continuation of
the series of crises that preceded it.
The events of 9 June 2014 in Iraq triggered a resolution of the protracted process of forming government following the
stalemate resulting from the April 2014
Council of Representatives election. The
composition of the central government
cabinet is almost completed and the new
government is pledging various policy
reforms. The Iraq NHDR 2014 will find
its right place in this reform climate, as
the core of its messages call for urgent
and candid action. Combined with the recent National Development Plan and the
UN Development Assistance Framework,
the new government possess the tools
they need to restart the development process and address the aspirations of Iraq’s
Youths and indeed the development expectations of the wider population.
UNDP will work closely with the Ministry of Planning to ensure the best possible impact of the report on the recovery
and development process. UNDP would
like to thank the Ministry of Planning
for its efforts in coordinating the development of this important document and
looks forward to future cooperation with
the esteemed Ministry for the benefit of
Iraq’s people in their transition from crises to a sustainable development process.
Jacqueline Carol Badcock
Deputy Special Representative of the
UN Secretary General,UN Resident and
Humanitarian Coordinator and UNDP
Resident Representative for Iraq
Why a National Human
Development Report?
Issued in 2008, the second National Human Development Report (NHDR) succeeded in realizing one of the most important goals of Human Development
Reports: raising a debate on development
policies among government officials, academics, intellectuals, media professionals, and civil society organizations. Today,
with the increasing need to promote the
government’s role as a caretaker of human development, this report focuses on
Iraqi youth.
In a country where young people constitute a high percentage of the population, their success or failure will have a
clear impact on society en masse. The
number of Iraq’s children and youth is
increasing at an unprecedented rate. In
2010, Iraq had 5.1 million children and 6
million young people. These numbers are
expected to run as high as 6.7 million and
9.6 million respectively in 2025, and 8.9
million and 14.9 million respectively in
2050.
This report is important given the data
of the demographic window – that period
of time in a nation’s demographic transition when the proportion of the working
age population is particularly prominent
for a decade or more – which has become
of interest to states. It is an opportunity to
realize development in Iraq, though this
is conditioned on the positive response
of the country’s socio-economic policies.
Advancement is not guaranteed, as the
demographic window can be transformed
into an element of social relapse, shortlived economic growth, increased unemployment, and a disintegrated labour market, which can trigger a raft of problems
if proper development policies and strategies are not in place.
National awareness of youth issues is
on the rise at various policy- and decision-making levels. There is also general
awareness of the important role of this
social group. Despite the growing interest in youth issues after 2003, however,
the projects designed to empower and
integrate the youth and engage them in
development priorities, plans, and strategies have been impeded by violence and
instability.
Through factual analysis and the integration of the vision and priorities of Iraqi
youth, this report develops an integrated
structure that combines youth issues with
various dimensions of the development
process. This will help to develop policies that address the role of the youth in
the current and future human development process. And what makes the recommendations of this report even more
important is that many of them reflect a
reality that our youth teams and field work
groups have explored through interviewing young Iraqis of different genders, ethnicities, education levels, and social and
geographical backgrounds.
Mehdi Al Alaq
National NHDR Coordinator
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
9
Acknowledgements
The authors of this report are deeply indebted to numerous organizations and
individuals for their valuable contributions in the preparation of this report: the
Central Statistical Organization, Ministry
of Planning, Kurdistan Region Statistics
Office, and Bayt Alhikma.
The NHDR team wishes to acknowledge their great debt to distinguished persons who wrote special contributions to
this report and to the National Coordinator, Dr. Mehdi Al Alaq. His deep commitment to independent professional analysis
and to the goals of human development
has been a source of great strength to the
team.
The National Consultation Committee, national readers, and reviewers from
UNDP in particular provided extremely
useful comments and suggestions during the drafting of the report. The authors
would like to express their gratitude to
Adib Nehmeh/ESCWA and Bilal Kiswani,
who supported the statistical team till the
finalization of the report.
The team is indebted to Professor Sabina Alkire and Dr. John Hammond of the
Oxford Poverty and Human Development
Initiative for their distinguished contribution to and facilitation of the Multidimensional Poverty Index for Iraq and
constructing the compound Youth Development Index.
The report has benefited from valuable
comments from distinguished professors at the London School of Economics,
King’s College, London, who participated
in two seminars conducted by the Middle
East Centre at the institute. The team is
grateful to the colleagues in the centre for
hosting the events.
We acknowledge the Youth Team, who
with the core team conducted focus group
10
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
meetings, organized the youth conference,
and prepared materials for the report.
We also acknowledge all the young men
and women who participated in discussion meetings and workshops throughout
a whole year of field work in all the governorates and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
Special thanks are extended to the Kurdistan Region Statistics Office and Departments of Statistics in all governorates for
making data available and for conducting
the special youth survey for this report in
September 2012.
Special thanks are due to the statistical
analysis team in the Central Statistical
Organization for their deep commitment
to supporting the report’s analyses with
statistics and the results of the many surveys and studies they produced in the year
2011–2013.
Acknowledgement is extended to the
UNDP Iraq Country Office for supporting the preparation of the report, namely
the support provided by Dr. Adam Abdelmoula, Country Director, Ms. Rini Reza,
Deputy Country Director, and the UNDP
Team including Peter Batchelor, former
Country Director, Sudipto Mukerjee, Lionel Laurens, Thair Shraideh, Khalid M.
Khalid, and Zina Aliback.
Last but not least, the report’s team is
very grateful to Dhia Muhsin Ismail who
helped edit the Arabic version of the report, and to Edward Miller who edited the
English version.
Amal Shlash
NHDR Lead Author
Iraq NHDR 2014 Team
Advisory Board
Dr. Ali Yousef Shukri, Dr. Mahdi Hafez,
Dr. Mehdi Al Alaq, Dr. Shamran Alejli,
Dr. Amal Shlash, Mr. Serwan Muhyeddine, Dr. Siham Fewri, Dr. Wasfi Taher,
Dr. Wafa Almehdawi
Proofreading (Arabic) Team
Dr. Mahdi Hafez, Dr. Sami Matta, Dr.
Jamal Amin
Lead Author
Dr. Amal Shlash
National Coordinator
Dr. Mahdi Al Alaq
ESCWA Expert
Adib Nehmeh
UNDP Expert
Dr. Bilal Kiswani
Writers of NHDR 2014
Research Papers
Dr. Mahdi Al Alaq, Adib Nehme (ESCWA), Dr. Emad Abdullatif, Dr. Wafa
Almehdawi, Dr. Youssef Hemmeh Saleh,
Dr. Haidar Sa’eed, Dr. Kareem Muhammad Hamza, Dr. Hiza Al Sendi
Background Papers
Dr. Ahmad Ebrihi, Dr. Madhar Muhammad Saleh, Dr. Adnan Yassin, Dr. Ali
Alzubaidi,
Dr. Amro Hisham, Dr. Shaima Abdulaziz,
Dr. Badrakhan Al Sendi, Dr. Hareth
Alkar’aawi, Dr. Hazem Alnu’aymi, Dr.
Usama Alani, Dr. Abdulhakim Jawzal, Dr. Hasan Latif Kadhem, Qassem
Enayat, Ahmad Yassin
Statistical Analysis Team
Dr. Mehdi Al Alaq (Team Leader)
Core Team: Sundus Jawad, Qussay Abdulfattah, Fakhri Hamid, Saad Zaghloul,
Iyad Jawad, Feryal Mahmoud
Support Team: Siham Abdulhamid,
Eman Mahmoud, Basma Abdulwahab,
Dalia Abdullatif, Ali Tareq, Bushra Nassif, Ali Amjad, Abdunnasser Youssef,
Muhammad Adnan Jawad, Asseel Mahdi,
Rafed Haitham, Ali Emad, Marwa Ab-
dulwahab, Noor Mohammad
Kurdistan Region Analysis
Team
Serwan Muhyeddine (Team Leader),
Rezeen Mamend, Soran Habib, Shwan
Abbas
Youth Team
Essam Asaad (Team Leader), Muhanad
Ali, Hussam Hassoun, Sahar Shaukat,
Hussain Abbas, Ahmed Ali, Wassan
Mohsen, Ihsan Ellewi, Haider Jalil,
Hussein Ali, Wasan Abbas, Jinan AbdulKarim, Salma Abdelaziz, Mustafa Qais,
Fouad Bakhit, Maath Ahmed
Administrative Support/Bayt Alhikma
Majed Hameed, Maha Saad
UNDP Team
Adam Abdelmoula, Country Director
Rini Reza, Deputy Country Director,
Programme
Thair Shraideh, Team Leader
Former Managment
Peter Batchelor, Sudipto Mukerjee, Lionel Laurens
Project Managment
Khalid M. Khalid, Zina Aliback
UNDP Review Team
Regional Bureau
Adel Abdullatif, Samah Hammoud
Regional Centre Cairo
Alia Al-Dalli
UNDP Iraq
Adam Abdelmoula, Rini Reza, Saad
Al-Kadhimi, Luay Shabaneh, Shawqi
Younis, Khalid M. Khalid
English Editing
Edward L. Miller
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
11
Acronyms
CSO
EAR
ESCWA
GII
HDI
HDR
IHDI
IHSES
IKN
ILO
KRSO
MDG
MoLSA
MoP
MPI
NDP
NEP
NHDR
NGO
NYS
OPHI
PRS
UNDG
UNDP
YDI
YUR
12
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Central Statistical Organization
Economic Activity Rate
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
Gender Inequality Index
Human Development Index
Human Development Report
Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index
Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey
Iraq Knowledge Network
International Labour Organization
Kurdistan Region Statistics Office
Millennium Development Goal
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs
Ministry of Planning
Multidimensional Poverty Index
National Development Plan
National Employment Plan
National Human Development Report
Non-Governmental Organization
National Youth Strategy
Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative
Poverty Reduction Strategy
United Nations Development Group
United Nations Development Programme
Youth Development Index
Youth unemployment rate
Preparing NHDR 2014:
A Participatory Approach
The report preparation process followed a
participatory approach:
• Participation of the government was
through the Federal Ministry of Planning, the Central Statistical Organization (CSO), and the Kurdistan Region
Statistics Office (KRSO). These statistics offices provided up-to-date surveys,
which included the following:
○○ The Youth Poll on the Status and
Aspirations of Iraqi Youth, which
was implemented through a survey
that took place in September 2012
(see Technical Annex).
○○ Support to the youth-focused group
discussions.
○○ The support provided by the Ministry of Planning to the Statistical Analysis Team that visited the
University of Oxford in the United
Kingdom to discuss the implementation of the Multidimensional Poverty Index and the construction of
the Youth Development Index. The
discussions took place with the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) team, led by
Dr Sabina Alkire.
○○ Participation of three members of
the Statistical Analysis Team in the
discussions that took place at the
London School of Economics in
September 2012 on the conceptual
framework related to dimensions of
human development. The discussions included a group of professors
from the institute and Dr. Sabina
Alkire.
• International participation was maintained through the support provided by
UNDP. The support included technical aspects such the valuable consultations provided by Mr. Adib Nehmeh,
Senior ESCWA Advisor, and Dr. Bilal
Kiswani, who supported the Statistical
Analysis Teams in the Central Statistical Organization and the Kurdistan Region Statistics Office. UNDP arranged
and facilitated numerous activities in
2012, which included strategic planning
and capacity building such as the author
team training and the Multidimensional
Poverty Index training conducted by
OPHI.
• National participation was overseen
by Bayt Alhikma, an independent Iraqi
think tank and research institute based
in Baghdad, which UNDP assigned to
implement the preparation of the report.
Bayt Alhikma mobilized a number of
national teams – Iraqi researchers, university professors, and youth networks
– to contribute to the preparation of the
report.
Preparation Methodology
The report’s author team included 9 consultants, 22 authors, and 3 peer reviewers.
The team members were mostly academics, civil society organization members,
and civil servants from the Iraqi governorates, including the Kurdistan Region.
A few expatriate academics also contributed to the report.
The Statistical Analysis Team consisted
of 25 researchers. CSO led this team and
Bayt Alhikma also provided their support
to the author team and the report in general.
Youth Participation
Youth participation was ensured through
the activities outlined below.
The Youth Support Team included 16
youth members, 5 of which were females.
Three members of this team were selected
to participate in the preparation of the report.
Focused group meetings and discussions were held with the youth. The report’s focus on youth was established
through listening to their voices through
such forums. These included nine in the
central and southern governorates of Iraq
and two in the Kurdistan Region. The focused group discussions covered urban
and rural areas and included male and female youth participants. A remote village
on the fringe of the Iraqi marshlands was
included in the discussions. Each focused
group discussion included 25 to 30 youth,
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
13
encompassing students, media members,
the employed and the unemployed, housewives, and those from slum areas. Additionally, a focused group discussion was
conducted in Jordan to listen to the Iraqi
immigrant youth.
Members of the Author Team participated in the focused group discussions
in order to hear first-hand accounts of the
youth’s experiences and their issues. The
participating youth could decide on the
issues of priority in their governorates,
within the framework of the report. The
issues that the youth raised revealed their
awareness of the issues that affect Iraqi
society and included domestic violence,
such as that found in Babil Governorate,
poverty, such as that found in Dhi Qar,
and human trafficking, such as that found
in Kirkuk. The youth discussed possible
solutions and, while putting the responsibility on the government to address these
issues, did not forget their own role. The
results of the focused group discussions
are presented in the report in special boxes labelled “The Voice of the Youth”.
14
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
A workshop was arranged in Baghdad on 13-14 March 2013, in which 161
young men and women participated. Seventy-five of the youth participants were
from governorates other than Baghdad,
including the Kurdistan Region. Sixty
of the youth participants were female.
The youth were university and secondary school students, journalists, artists,
civil society organization members, and
unemployed graduates. The Author Team
participated, in addition to line ministry
representatives. The report presents this
workshop’s findings in boxes labelled
“Youth’s Opinion”.
The report has identified a number of
distinguished social and cultural initiatives by the youth. These have been included in the text of the report in boxes
labelled “Youth Initiatives”. The report
has also spotted some civil society initiatives related to the youth, and these were
included in the report in boxes labelled
“Initiatives”.
Overview
Since the release of the National Human
Development Report in 2008, Iraq has
made ​​significant progress in human development indicators, with the promise
of achieving further successes towards a
better standard of well-being and prosperity, based on the principles of all-inclusive
democracy and representation. This progress, however, should be looked upon
with caution because the opportunities it
affords for sustainable institutional development are not accompanied by stability.
This is due to the development pattern adopted by the state, which leads to the dissipation of human development gains or
the disruption of their sustainability. Oil
revenues are an enduring threat because,
while economic growth creates ample
opportunities for human development, it
poses challenges that make the sustainability of this development questionable
in the long run.
The basic pillars of the 2008 NHDR
analyse a number of issues which five
years later remain ostensibly unresolved,
and transition has not completed its designated tasks yet. These issues are political
and economic transformation, security,
emigration and displacement, women,
and education.
Reform continues to stumble, while the
delivery of infrastructure, public services,
and education is still unaccomplished. Improvements in living standards have been
confined to the consumer spending associated with increased oil revenues and the
expansion of the related trade, sale, and
transportation services – activities incapable of setting the foundations of sustainable development that the public and
private sectors can jointly, effectively, and
efficiently achieve.
In the field of security, durable civil
peace has not been established, and national reconciliation and transitional justice continue to be unpractised concepts,
given the current terrorism and political
and sectarian conflicts. Although the civil
war came to an end in 2008, the threat of
displacement and emigration persists with
each new wave of violence. In addition,
women’s issues and rights continue to
swing between two positions: on the one
hand, conflicting traditions, cultural heri-
tage, and radical fundamentalist ideologies, and on the other hand the tendency
towards development and the acquisition
of human rights based on the principles of
justice and equality enshrined in the new
Constitution.
The significant changes which came in
the aftermath of the collapse of the totalitarian regime in 2003, including opening
up to the outside world and embarking
on economic reform, have not started the
process of building a new economy or
even resumed the development process
that remained stalled for decades. Given
the high expectations for achieving better standards of living and improved lifestyles, especially among the youth, the
adopted approach to national economic
management and resource allocation has
failed to strike a balance between the size
of unfulfilled needs and the steadily increasing oil revenues.
Moreover, the concept, values, and behaviours of the rentier state, which are
deeply rooted in the minds of society and
government, have not been abolished or
replaced with alternative economic values and behavioural patterns that would
recover broad-based, sustainable economic growth, produce radical economic
reforms, and restructure the public sector.
Oil reserves in Iraq are considered the
world’s third-largest proven oil reserves,
with 143 billion barrels. The 2013 reports
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank, as well as the National Development Plan 2013–2017, expect
oil exports to increase from 3.2 million
barrels per day in 2013 to 6 million barrels per day in 2017, a possibility which
opens up vast development horizons for
the future. However, this development is
conditional on good governance and the
eradication of poverty and corruption.
Some post-2003 changes further weakened the already weak inherited institutional frameworks, pending the end of
the transition to a new economy. But this
transition has not yet led to favourable
structural transformations that enable the
resumption of development and the creation of new opportunities for the youth,
who soon realized that they were stuck in
an indefinite transition period full of chalIraq Human Development Report 2014
15
lenges, albeit with some opportunities.
Indeed, a number of the changes were
associated with positive political and social movements, providing young people
with ample space to play their role. A
number of youth groups demonstrated
positive characteristics in the face of various challenges, taking advantage of the
free space given to them and the affordable state-of-the-art communication tools.
Some came up with important initiatives
to confront challenges, relying on their
own abilities and on the significant support extended by international organizations, over and above the support given by
certain state institutions and civil society
organizations (CSOs). Thus, some young
people found their way out of the chronic
crisis.
1. Human development challenge:
The indices of the Human Development
Index (HDI) have improved, specifically
life expectancy, education, and income.
However, they have not been adequate
enough to boost people’s ability to control
the resources necessary for leading decent
and dignified lifestyles. Many inherited
problems still threaten to impede comprehensive development, undermine sustainable progress, and weaken development
efforts.
The data highlights the mighty challenges facing Iraq regarding human development based on quality, justice, equity, and
sustainability. Individual achievements
in the fields of health, education, and income generation, though significant, are
likely to fail to achieve substantial progress if hampered by the existing circumstances. Human development trends in
Iraq suggest that these achievements are
inequitable and unsustainable. Discrepancies between men and women and among
governorates are too large.
The HDI is a general figure for the
whole population and does not reveal development trends for specific population
groups, such as young males, whose share
of human development is lower than the
rest of population, and young women,
whose share is even lower. These disparities pose significant challenges for social,
economic, and developmental policies.
Chapter 2 elaborates the measurement and analysis of indicators and indices at the three levels of Iraq, Kurdistan Region, and the governorates. It
also details a composite index for young
16
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
people, namely the Youth Development
Index (YDI). This data is quite detailed, given the irregular publication
of NHDRs in Iraq.
2. Demographic challenges: These
challenges are related to the following:
high population growth rates; the younger
demographic architecture of the population, which requires the expansion of educational services and the creation of jobs
for new entrants into the labour market;
emigration; displacement; overpopulation in cities; squatter settlements on the
periphery of cities; and the social consequences of these trends. While Iraq is now
experiencing a ‘demographic window’ – a
period of time when the proportion of the
working age population is particularly
prominent – the country’s GDP still largely depends on natural resources, which
restricts its response to the increased proportion of working age people.
Chapter 3 discusses the demographic
changes as challenges the policies affecting the HDIs are insufficient to address. Cultural and political factors are
key determinants, but are unmeasurable. Three of these are primarily concerned with the youth: fertility rates,
the younger demographic architecture,
and migration.
3. The renteir economy challenge:
Recent years have seen the accelerated
growth of Iraq’s GDP, with the GDP per
capita rising from US$2,860 in 2009 to
US$5,860 in 2012, according to World
Bank figures. Economic growth has been
linked with increasing oil revenues, and
this economic structure has produced two
issues that relate to a failure to accommodate the youth, prompting them to migrate.
The first issue is stumbling economic development programmes and deteriorating
growth rates in job-creating economic activities. The second issue is the emergence
of an incoherent, inadequate, and unintegrated labour market that has turned into
a major reservoir for unemployment and
underemployment, as well as an embodiment of non-existent or ineffective supply
and demand mechanisms.
The obscure role of the state and the private sector during transition, coupled with
the private sector’s growth opportunities
being concentrated in the finance sector
(which is associated with and benefits
from the renteir economy), constitutes
in all cases an obstacle to the growth of
youth-centred economic activities. Therefore, the challenge facing economic policies is how to increase the youth’s economic participation, particularly young
women, since their participation is only
12 percent.
Chapter 4 outlines the economic challenges and their consequences on youth
employment. Two related pillars have
been identified: unemployment and the
renteir economy, which have a causeand-effect interaction and are associated with the adopted methodology for
national economy management and the
pertinent roles of the public and private
sectors.
4. Cultural and social structure
challenges: The degenerative structural
changes characterizing the problem-ridden nature of Iraq’s modern history, as
well as all the complexities produced by
the successive stages – starting with the
totalitarian system, through the series of
wars as of the late 1970s, to the embargo
and the toppling of the former regime in
2003, and ending with the consequent instability – have had multi-level impacts
on all age groups, the youth in particular.
These impacts affect not only the present,
but also the future.
The youth in Iraq are still considered
a mere ‘stage’ confined to a specific age.
This stage has not evolved into the concept of a social group with a project that
holds distinctive features, differentiating
it from the prevailing social project and
making it a promising initiator of change.
The youth are often divided according to
the divisions of society en masse, with
its rivalries and loyalties. Having been
merged into the larger society, they are
indiscriminately identified with these
various components. Furthermore, the
family is no longer the absolute point of
reference when it comes to character formation among young people, given the
increasing influence of media outlets, cyberspace, and social networking.
The youth are witnessing this conflict,
making their empowerment urgent and
necessary. And herein lies the major challenge, because young people only feel
they are effectively integrated when societal institutions – starting with the family
– succeed in empowering them.
Chapter 5 analyses Iraq’s social structure, including the family and the value
system, as institutional elements em-
powering or impeding the integration
of the youth, especially young women.
It also identifies the elements of young
women’s exclusion, which are rooted in
the family, determines people’s outlook
and behaviour towards women in general, and explains the manifestations of
domestic and community violence.
5. Knowledge acquisition challenge:
The efforts made to tackle the problems
of illiteracy, school dropouts, and unequal educational opportunities between
males and females, between urban and
rural areas, and among governorates have
failed to achieve their goals. In addition,
the education system in Iraq could not
change the nature of the social structure
to achieve the youth’s social integration
on the one hand, and change the value
system towards democratic cultural, intellectual, or behavioural transformations,
particularly education for genuine citizenship, on the other.
The education system in Iraq seems
to have failed to achieve youth-related
goals, because of a number of problems
and qualitative and quantitative shortages. Few students have been offered
the opportunity to acquire the knowledge
or skills needed to access a decent job,
particularly because the training system
that facilitates transition from school to
work is still poor. Therefore, increasing
numbers of graduates have become unemployed and poor. In this sense, education has lost its function as an effective
empowerment tool. These shortages have
become, or the education system itself has
become as a result of these shortages, an
indirect means for the social exclusion of
the youth.
Chapter 6 covers the institutional determinants that minimize the opportunities provided by education as a youth
empowerment tool. It also identifies the
inadequacies in the quality of education
and how well the education system responds to youth aspirations and labour
market needs.
6. Transition to democracy challenge: The transition to democracy is a
major challenge, though it provides an
opportunity for the youth to participate
and expand their options. The new decentralized structure under the federal state
and the establishment of representative
bodies and practical local authorities penetrate, albeit slowly, the existing cultures
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
17
of power. The expansion of CSOs similarly moves towards relative autonomy
from the central political authority and its
apparatuses. This trend is interpreted as a
positive development that is in the youth’s
interest.
It may be argued that the new atmosphere of democracy and freedom has
strengthened young people’s ability to
access information and communication
technology (ICT) in a manner unattainable by past generations. The relative
improvement in incomes has upgraded
prosperity levels in general. These new
changes, however, have negatively affected large segments of the youth. Many
of them have been left without jobs that
suit their ambitions, unleash their skills,
and maximize their productivity. The
challenge here relates to the economy’s
ability to create sustainable jobs with equitable income to increase youth participation in the affairs of their communities.
The young people surveyed in this report
therefore called for their empowerment to
better participate in communities, CSOs,
and social networks. With the possibilities that ICT provides, young people are
determined to have a say in the affairs that
influence their lives.
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Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Chapter 7 is focused on young people’s participation in politics and relating this to the concept of citizenship, as
an opportunity for capacity building
and the expansion of options. It identifies the shortfalls connected to ‘citizenship education’, which include the
disintegration of a national identity,
inadequate community participation,
and disregard for political participation.
Chapter 8 concludes that the process
of inclusive development can only be resumed when the potential of the youth
is invested in and that empowering environments can only be created when
the government commits to pursuing
development policies that encourage
and sponsor creativity and provide the
youth with incubating institutions and
supportive legislation and regulations.
This can only be accomplished through
openness, communication, the expansion of freedom and the rule of the law,
and addressing society’s developmental
needs.
Chapter 1
Human Development:
An Action Methodology and
a Vision
Why Youth?
The UN proclamation of 1985 as the International Year of Youth was a major
move towards highlighting youth issues
and promoting their concerns. This inspired a number of countries to prioritize
these issues and target the youth with socio-economic policies.
The recent revolution in information
and communication technologies has
posed new challenges – to the youth and
to governments and societies as well. The
youth, plunging eagerly into mobile communication and cyberspace, became the
first to benefit from this revolution and
also the first to be affected by it, both positively and negatively. With this openness
and convergence, cultural and ideological
debate increased, and we saw some negative trends: nationalist and ethnic fanaticism, intolerance, and violence. The problems surrounding migration were brought
to the forefront, including integration
challenges in host countries.
In Arab countries, the youth-led sit-ins
and demonstrations against political regimes highlighted a newfound political
and societal participation, made possible
thanks to the information and communication technology revolution.
With the ensuing global interest, UNDP
supported a Human Development Report
(HDR) focus on youth issues in 23 countries, including some Arab countries –
Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Qatar, Somalia,
and Iraq.
Focus of the Report
In 2013, the Iraqi children who were born
during the decades of wars, economic
sanctions, and armed conflicts reached
the age of youth. They were brought up in
families that suffered from poverty, fear,
and exclusion. However, they have also
experienced a new climate with broader
opportunities and freedom. It seems that
ten years have not been enough to reap the
benefits of the transition from a totalitarian regime to a pluralistic regime and from
a centralized economy to a free market.
Today, the youth of the nation are facing
transition challenges in politics, the economy, society, and culture. This report will
address the impact of these challenges on
the youth and young Iraqis’ role in facing
them.
In this report, the youth in Iraq are defined as those in the age group of 15–29
years. Youth all over the world face challenges and complications in the journey
towards maturity – a difficult task not
only in societies under transition, but also
in stable societies. It is thus not surprising
that the challenges of a dual transition (societal/political and personal) make young
people stressed, anxious, and uncertain.
Education, health, work, and starting a
family are core issues; managing how to
move to the next stage is a personal matter
for each individual, but it is at the same
time affected by family, society, and state.
In countries witnessing chronic crises
or post-crisis change, like Iraq, the youth
become a vulnerable group; the more the
risks there are, the more intense the exclusion is. Exclusion raises obstacles against
building citizenship and capacities for integration and against human development
as a whole.
Government attention to youth is reflected in such documents as the National
Development Plan 2013–2017 and the
National Youth Strategy 2013–2020. This
report must be seen as complementing
and supporting both those national programmes and the UN initiatives tackling
issues related to the youth as a paramount
development priority in Iraq over the period to 2020.
The UNDP-sponsored NHDRs are nongovernmental reports intended to support
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
19
the decision-making process and are prepared by independent authors who use data
and analysis to express different views –
in this case, the views and aspirations of
the youth. To do justice to the topic, it is
not sufficient to simply examine data or
explore academic literature, though these
are remarkably present throughout this report. Given that young people are a social
rather than an age group, the analysis has
to involve them directly. “Nothing about
us can be made without us,” says one of
them. “We do not want others to speak for
us,” says another.
That is why in presenting and analysing the challenges and opportunities of
human development in Iraq, this report
considers the youth’s priorities, their understanding of their role in development,
their self-awareness of their issues and
problems, and the opportunities available
to them. Indeed, the youth constituted the
starting point in various NHDR issues
and approaches. The exploration touched
on unconventional aspects of the youth’s
choices and values, as well as the way
they perceive the world, while also allowing them to express themselves on these
issues. Their contributions therefore take
up a considerable part of the report.
The acquisition of rights depends on opportunities, and opportunities are not the
result of mere chance nor are they granted
by others; rather, they are created. Consequently, empowering the youth becomes a
priority in all development programmes.
Young women have equal rights, but they
need empowerment policies to realize justice and equity.
Iraq is in transition towards democracy.
Democratic regimes provide freedom of
expression, opportunities for acquiring
knowledge, and awareness of rights, including the right to participate. The youth
have the key to development and are expected to hold governments accountable
for their actions as they meet their obligations towards society.
The report is directed not only towards
how the government can act more effectively with a pro-youth focus, but also
towards civil society at large, the private
sector, the international community as
partners in development, and, above all,
young people themselves as the main element of development. The youth are the
agent of change required to accomplish
development and the key factor for its
sustainability. They are the makers and
heirs of the future and the hope for progress.
This report provides both the youth and
the government with tools for monitoring,
observation, follow-up, and advocacy.
HDRs, the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), and the Youth Development
Index (YDI), in addition to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), will
be useful for policymakers, as well as for
the youth and their advocates.
Box 1.1
Youth Statement
It is with great pleasure that we participated in this NHDR, which focuses
on the youth. We have presented
our concerns and our vision so as
to deliver the genuine message of
the Iraqi youth. We can say that the
NHDR has acquired the youth’s spirit
and addressed our concerns. Our ef-
Conceptual Framework
Development goals relate to achieving advanced levels of well-being for all, developing people’s capacities, and expanding
their freedoms under a safe environment,
democratic institutions, and societal relations based on justice, equality, rule of the
law, respect for human rights, and dignity.
20
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
forts have helped give the authors of
this report insight into our perceptions
and dreams, thereby conveying
them to the wider society and decision makers.
On behalf of the Youth Team,
Issam, Hussam, and Muhannad
In addition, the course of development
should be sustainable; the rights of future
generations should not be compromised
while seeking to meet the needs of current
generations.
Having spread widely since 1990, the
concept of human development is a conceptual framework for these goals in a
planning/action approach that combines
theory with implementation. It is at once
a vision for the future; analysis and measurement tools for understanding the situation; and policy trends, alternatives, and
options that help guide the development
actors who are leading or contributing
to changing the present and meeting the
overall objectives. In a nutshell, it is an
approach that gives priority to the human
role and to goals that ensure the development of their capacities and their dynamic
participation. It bypasses the goals of the
social welfare approach, which sees people as beneficiaries of rather than participants in development.1
This report includes basic assumptions
on human development which have been
developed by HDRs since 1990. It also
adopts an approach that expresses both
national needs and youth needs and assimilates human development dimensions
as they relate to the peculiarities of young
people as a social group. It is thus appropriate to develop the Youth Development
Index (YDI) in this report, since the multiple dimensions of human development
are more related to youth than to other
social groups. The report’s measurement
and analysis has also seen the continuous
development of concepts and standards.
Keeping Pace with
Concepts and
Measurements
The HDR 2010 is particularly important
since it was issued on the twentieth anniversary of the first HDR. It also provides
a theoretical contribution to the concept
of human development and to measurement as well. The report focuses more
on improving the measurement of human
development – the Human Development
Index (HDI) – than on the improvement
of human development itself. Hence it
tackles the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) as an alternative to the Human
Poverty Index (HPI).
The Statistical Analysis Team has been
committed to the amendments made to
the methods used for producing the HDI
and other indices, as well as the indicators
used for measurement, to facilitate international benchmarking (see the Technical
Notes Appendix).
“The human development approach is
motivationally committed to concentrat-
ing on what remains undone – what demands most attention in the contemporary
world – from poverty and deprivation to
inequality and insecurity… those surrounding the conservation of our environment and the sustainability of our wellbeing and substantive freedoms,” says
Amartya Sen, in the introduction of the
HDR 2010. He is the co-founder of this
new approach, one of the most prominent
human development theorists, and a partner of Mahbub ul Haq, who died in 1998.
“The human development approach is
flexible enough to take note of the future
prospects of human lives on the planet.”2
This vision opens the door wide to incorporate changes at the economy, politics, society, and technology levels and
assimilate their impact on people and
people’s impact on them. It also provides
a conceptually solid but procedurally flexible foundation on which to build a development approach for the present and the
future. “Indeed, human development is an
evolving idea – not a fixed, static set of
precepts.”3
The UN Secretary-General’s report Realizing the Future We Want for All4 contained a very important contribution to the
concept of human development and to the
link between it and the United Nations’
Post-2015 Development Agenda, which
will replace the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs).
The report uses the term “people-centred inclusive and sustainable development”. By “inclusive” it means that the
more advanced the development process,
the larger the number of participants in it
and the beneficiaries from it. This means
it is a dynamic process that does not focus on only one population group. There
is also a focus on, among other things, the
concept of consistent policies and interventions. This is a call for more integration between policies and interventions
rather than the fragmented sector-specific
interventions that dominated previously.
Through its action principles and orientation, Realizing the Future We Want for
All directs the activities of development
actors who are leading or contributing to
changing the present to realize this shared
vision of the future. It thus establishes
and paves the way for a new development
plan.
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
21
Global Debate on the Post-2015
Development Goals
Recent major global changes require contemplating the development framework
again. The world has moved beyond the
era when the MDGs were first introduced
in 2001. There are now more pressing developmental needs. In those Arab
countries committed to the MDGs, the
declaration of the Third Arab Economic
and Social Development Summit – held
in January 2013 – called upon Arab governments to address a raft of development
issues, including employment, gender equity, food security, and poverty reduction.
Box 1.1
Participation in Post-2015 Development [dialogue]
Under the UN Development Group (UNDG) support to
consultations in the Arab region on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, the Ministry of Planning (MoP),
supported by UNDP, held three workshops titled ‘The
Future We Want’ in the governorates of Basra, Baghdad, and Erbil to listen to different social groups and
understand their perceptions of the Post-2015 Development Agenda. The workshops brought together
representatives from local governments and governorate councils, university professors, civil society organizations, media professionals, young people, and
members of the NHDR team.5 Discussions were about
the following:
• Poverty alleviation, participatory development,
and employment generation
• Community voices and political participation
• Provision of basic health and education services
and their developmental impact
• Management of natural resources, provision of
environmental services, and dealing with climate
change
Following extensive discussions and presentations of
views and ideas, including those related to the problems hindering the achievement of the MDGs in the
governorates, there was agreement on complementary goals and objectives expressing Iraq’s concerns
and needs, which should be prioritized when determining the post-2015 development goals. From these,
we draw the following messages:
• An assertive position on the importance of education, with an emphasis on quality
• The importance of good and efficient governance
for development
• The empowerment of women and reduction of inequality
• Prioritizing the issues of peace, security, human development, and dignity
• The importance of global partnerships to support
local efforts
• The need for consistent policies and an enabling
environment conducive to the resumption of development.
Current global debate, in short, is about
the need for a new era of development
policies that consider development to
be much more than achieving economic
growth and getting social services. The
wars, conflicts, and instability in Iraq (and
the Arab world in general) suggest an
urgent need for a developmental framework and a new policy that seek to restore
peace, security, and stability based on
broad participation and social cohesion.
Youth should play a leading role and be
an important part of the action to eradicate poverty and inequality, globally and
nationally.
It perhaps goes without saying that
policies, plans, and strategic frameworks
should respond to this evolution. Space
for dialogue is expanding and international endeavours are being accelerated
to shape new developmental policies responsive to the issues of the contemporary
world. And we in Iraq are in urgent need
of them.
Box 1.2
New Goals for Post-2015 Development Agenda
Since the current MDGs have not considered the issues
of security, peace, equality, governance, and democracy, the post-2015 development goals should develop
a clear strategy that takes into account the accelerated
changes in the Arab region and the ensuing obstacles
facing development. This strategy should be based on
a clear theory founded on the human rights framework,
which underlines the need for every person to enjoy all
human rights, human security, equality, and non-discrimination, in addition to the need for monitoring progress
22
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
towards achieving it. It is also important to consider future
challenges we are likely to face in the coming decades
and their impact on development efforts. This requires
institutions to provide social protection and also mechanisms to settle disputes and redistribute resources to enhance equality.
Arab Development Forum: Post-2015 Priorities of Arab
Development, Amman, 13-14 April 2013
Dr. Haifaa Abu Ghazaleh – Jordanian Ghad newspaper, 10 April 2013
Other Dimensions of Human
Development
Some important aspects of the human
experience – such as cultural diversity,
human rights, value systems, and related
social and political practices, which vary
according to the behaviour of individuals, society, and the state – have a major
impact on human development but are
quantitatively immeasurable. This renders them ‘deficient’ dimensions which
the HDI is unable to include, despite their
importance in our countries.
The challenges facing Iraq, the Arab
region en masse, and the region’s youth
make it imperative to give due attention
to the expansion of development dimensions, especially a practical focus on the
economic dimension while dealing with
the other dimensions – social, environmental, cultural, and political – as either
secondary products of economic growth
or tools and means for serving the goals
of this economic growth.
Therefore, this report reviews the political and cultural components of development, which were also the focus of the
discussion meetings with young people.
Both dimensions were included in the
YDI and have had due attention in the
analysis throughout this report.
Box 1.3
The Importance of Political and Cultural Dimensions
We have focused on the political-institutional and
cultural dimensions due to the requirements of community transformation in Iraq and based on what we
have observed in other Arab countries. In other words,
it is the result of a direct national need. We are not the
only ones who deem these two dimensions important
or believe that they have been neglected compared
to the other components of development. Furthermore, we are totally aware of the theoretical importance of rehabilitating and integrating these two dimensions into the core of the human development
concept as a requirement for the advancement of
the concept itself.
In a valuable contribution by Sakiko Fukuda-Parr,
she explores the new frontiers of today’s concept of
human development,6 which are aligned with the
approach of this report. She believes that the future
evolvement of the human development concept will
stress “human rights, cultural identity and political participation”. Although it is possible to review the formation, her analysis directly affects the core of the subject: “In fact, the cultural dimensions of development
have not been sufficiently examined from a perspective of economics, political science or philosophy.”
Political Dimension
The UN Secretary-General’s report Realizing the Future We Want for All stresses
more than once the importance of the political and institutional dimension of development in its two related components
of security and peace and democratic transition, including respect for human rights
and good governance.
“Recent events in the Arab States have
brought to the fore longstanding demands
from civil society, especially from young
people, for a development trajectory
grounded in democratic governance, the
She also believes that Mahbub ul Haq had always
considered that only vesting power in a minority elite
is a huge obstacle to development. He was zealous in
defending political freedoms. His works however did
not focus on the importance of the poor’s political
impact as a goal per se; he rather deemed that its
absence contributes to socio-economic discrimination against the poor.
The first HDRs mainly focused on the socio-economic dimensions of people’s choices and to a lesser
degree on the political and cultural dimensions. This
enhanced the conceptual confusion between major
elements of development (socio-economic choices
expressed by the HDI) and additional choices (political and cultural).
This analysis concurs with the approach this report
has adopted. While the elements of the political dimension were clearer and more mature in FukudaParr’s analysis, her look at the cultural dimension focused more on cultural identity and multiple cultural
choices than on culture as a complete, genuine developmental component equal to the other components.
Adib Nehme, ESCWA
rule of law and human rights. The events
underscore the importance of addressing
democratic governance deficits at the national and sub-national levels to ensure the
legitimacy of development policies and to
support the empowerment of people.”7
The importance of democracy, democratic governance, and respect for human
rights cannot be ignored in development.
The recent socio-political street movements in Arab countries drew attention
to the need to give due attention to the
political and institutional dimensions in
development. Moreover, what has happened over the last several decades in the
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
23
region and Iraq shows that political and
institutional realities (‘governance’) can
be the first obstacle to realizing the goals
of development.
Quite simply, this report focuses on the
political and cultural dimensions because
it is necessary to do so. Had there been better management of the development process through respect for the rules of good
governance and democracy at all levels
and through effective institutions committed to the principles of human rights,
and had citizen relations and positive cultural practices been more established and
widespread, development results in Iraq
would have been much better. Instead,
socio-economic achievements have been
limited and the social, political, and security challenges have been numerous.
Cultural Dimension
The cultural dimension of development
in all its aspects – knowledge and skills
gained through formal education and other means, values and behaviours which
go beyond the cognitive and artistic to
include the individual and societal culture of dealing with others, the prevalent
political culture, the culture of citizenship or affiliations and sub-identities, the
culture of work and production (based
on initiative or dependence), or citizens’
relations with their peers and families
and among generations – is strongly
present in Iraq. Development cannot be
achieved without real cultural change,
a concept that is obvious to the youth,
as this report shows.
Accordingly, there is a need to deal
with the cultural dimension in its totality;8
education, knowledge, values, and behaviours are interrelated. In this context, each
community has a value system that forms
a basis for corresponding positions and
behaviours. Therefore, people-centred
inclusive and sustainable development
necessarily includes an authentic cultural component and a core value system,
which is often referred to as encompassing equity and justice, respect for human
rights, productivity and work, tolerance
and acceptance of diversity, and solidarity rather than fierce competition, among
others things.
24
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Interaction of Dimensions and
Dialectic of Exclusion/Inclusion
The HDI dimensions – economic (income), social (education), and health (life
expectancy) – are interrelated in such a
way that no dimension can be developed
in isolation from the other. This interrelation requires inclusive development with
proper and sustainable political, institutional, and cultural dimensions. In Iraq,
the last few decades have exceptionally
entrenched the volatility and unrest of the
political, economic, and social environment in all its forms. And within this environment, youth empowerment has been
subject to serious damage, tantamount to
a crisis. So many young men and women
have been excluded from education and
work or marginalized in poverty and isolated from the developmental mainstream.
In this report, we have focused on the
youth’s exclusion from core fields that
express all the dimensions of human development.
This report benefits from the efforts
made by many NHDRs that addressed
youth or exclusion/inclusion in countries that experienced armed conflict.
They found that the cultural dimension
was a strong dynamic for triggering economic growth and restoring security and
peace. In addition to the 2004 HDR, Cultural Freedom in a Diverse World, the
2010/2011 Moldova NHDR, the 2005
Serbia NHDR, and the 2006 Kosovo
NHDR, there are also the reports of Lithuania 2001, Croatia 2004, Bosnia and Herzegovina 2007, Kyrgyzstan 2009, Cyprus
2009, and Honduras 2009.
The concept of social exclusion stems
from the idea that “deprivation of human
rights guaranteed by citizenship leads to
a lack of or poor participation of an individual or a group in one or more areas of
social life: economic, social and political.
Social exclusion is associated with citizenship as a social-political concept based
on the two rules of rights and responsibilities and the ensuing feelings of affiliation
and loyalty. Through these rights and responsibilities, social responsibility, with
all it entails of punishment and reward, is
set.”9 This relates directly to youth participation and inclusion.
Exclusion, whether it is due to subjective or objective reasons, involves the total or partial denial of rights. This leads to
imbalance in the social roles people must
play by a certain age and can also cause
frustration, low self-esteem, and behavioural problems.
The concept of exclusion expresses
relative phenomena; accordingly, there
is no such thing as complete or absolute
exclusion. This means that most people,
whether individuals or groups, in any
contemporary society are both integrated
and excluded. For example, an individual
might be out of the labour market and
remain unemployed for quite some time,
but continue to perform their political responsibilities and enjoy their rights as a
citizen by joining a party or participating
in an election.
Social exclusion is of an accumulative
nature, where exclusion from education
leads to exclusion from the labour market and also to poverty and the inability
to start a family. It can also lead to isolation from society and antisocial or deviant behaviour. This view is consistent
with some perspectives and theories from
recent decades, which deemed welfare a
logical product or outcome of the concept
of citizenship and its rights.
It is important to consider forms of
exclusion that have cultural roots, such
as attempts to isolate migrants or ethnic
groups and deny their political, cultural,
and economic rights. In other words, exclusion could be individual or collective.10
The history of humankind is teeming with
examples of forced exclusion.
This report highlights the challenges
of achieving a pro-youth policy, which
implies that the social and economic
indicators for the youth would improve
more rapidly than those for the rest of
society. Young women’s empowerment
should be a priority issue.
The Iraq NHDR 2014, building on extensive experience, attempts to bring the
development issues of the youth to the
forefront of public and policy debate,
through the lens of human development.
Its elaboration on the status of Iraqi youth
will enrich the National Youth Strategy.
The report structure covers three main
components. The first is a review of human development progress in Iraq. This
component is important, as Iraq does not
prepare NHDRs on a regular basis, the
first being in 1995 and the second in 2008.
Chapter 2 combines measurement and
descriptive analysis to provide an overview of human development indicators
and indices. The MPI is presented here as
a newly introduced index. The most important presentation of this chapter is the
Youth Development Index.
The second component, starting with
Chapter 3, relates to challenges. The third
component, beginning in Chapter 6, discusses opportunities. The report’s final
section presents some recommendations
and the skeleton of a possible forward
agenda for all stakeholders.
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
25
Chapter 2
The Challenge of Human
Development in Iraq
The State of Human Development
Using up-todate data has
given Iraq’s HDI
the credibility
needed to meet
international
benchmarks and
may pave the
way for Iraq to
climb the human
development
ladder.
26
In the midst of the controversy which has
been on going for decades now over how
to measure standards of living and ensure
proper levels of welfare, the measurement
and assessment fields took interesting
quantum leaps forward, helped by huge
technological advances in processing databases and a well-informed international
commitment to the importance of developing systems of measurement.
In the early 1990s, UNDP started measuring human development – the latest
episode in the development measurement
efforts. When the late Mahbub ul Haq
(1934–1998) laid the foundations for the
Human Development Index, it did not
occur to him or those around him that
this measurement would last and spread
the way it did, and that – after its initial
process of creation and improvement – it
would remain unchanged a quarter of a
century later, without being subjected to
any weakness or distortion. Moreover,
making the index the basis for certain
quality measurement and the reference
for measurement and comparison makes
it one of the international organizations’
major achievements.
The great efforts that have been exerted
to expand the knowledge base of all national dimensions of human development
are a testament to the sustainability of the
HDI, as are the achievements of many
countries as they improved themselves in
this context, though with different degrees
of enthusiasm. Some of these countries
even moved up the ladder among the categories of low, medium, and high human
development.
Iraq was one of the countries that prepared NHDRs. The latest 2008 NHDR
featured an objective description of the
human development situation in Iraq. It
showed declined values, a lower ranking
in the HDI, and limited achievements of
governorates. That description attracted
the attention of policymakers, academia,
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
and the media, especially since it compared Iraq to countries which Iraq had
been ahead of 25 years earlier, and also
since the report clearly showed declining
development performance during the last
two decades of the twentieth century. This
was also evident after the war on Iraq in
2003, the armed conflicts, and the consequent terrorist events, which made security a priority in measurement and analysis.
The 2008 NHDR focus on the security
factor was evident through its attempt to
build a human security index based on an
opinion poll conducted at the peak of the
sectarian conflict in 2007.
Given that this NHDR focuses on Iraqi
youth, their opportunities for a better life,
and the challenges they face, the Youth
Development Index was calculated based
on an opinion poll conducted in 2012.
Like other indices, this one was calculated
for males and females, and at the governorate level.
The measurement also includes the MPI
introduced in the 2010 HDR as the latest
in a series of poverty measurements.
Measuring Human
Development in Iraq
The HDI, Inequality-adjusted Human
Development Index (IHDI), and Gender
Inequality Index (GII) are the main measures for assessing the progress in human
development dimensions: income, health,
and education. This chapter summarizes
the results and analyses them nationally,
regionally, and at the governorate level.
(For the details of measurement, see the
Statistical Appendix.)
Human Development Index
A chronological review of Iraq’s HDI values suggests that what the country experienced from the early 1990s to the early
2000s was at odds with sustainable development. Iraq ranked 76 when the HDI
was first introduced in 1990 (when the
first HDR was issued). At the time, it was
better than all the neighbouring countries
save Kuwait (see the 1990 HDR). It fell
behind with the outbreak of the Gulf War
in 1991 and the consequent economic embargo, which continued till 2003. It fell to
93 in 1991, then to 100 in 1994. With the
sliding economic and development performance, it reached 126 in 2000 with an
HDI that was lower than the world average of 0.650 and even than mid-level HDI
countries.
The 2013 HDR ranks Iraq at 131 out
of 186 countries with an HDI value of
Iraq
0.590. In this report, the availability of
new data improved the HDI estimate to
0.694, which is close to the world average
of 0.695. However, it is still much lower
than the HDI for neighbouring countries
such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Turkey, and Jordan, but higher than Syria’s,
which is 0.632.
This tangible improvement can be ascribed to advancement in all of the index’s components: health, education, and
income (see Table 1 in the Statistical Appendix).
HDI
Life
expectancy
at birth
(years)
Mean years
of schooling
(years)
Expected
mean years
of schooling
(years)
Gross national income (GNI)
per capita US Dollar
purchasing power parity 2012
0.694
69
8
11
12738
Improvement in health and education is
a major achievement, as income growth is
not necessarily reflected in people’s wellbeing unless it is directed towards investment in people.
In Iraq, investment in health yielded a
short-term improvement in the life expectancy rate, from 68 years in 2007 to 69
years in 2011. The infant mortality rate
declined from 37 to 32, while that for
children under five declined from 42 to
38.11 Better maternity care is associated
with lower maternal mortality rates, declining from 295 per 100,000 women in
the embargo decade of the 1990’s to 84 in
2006 and 35 in 2013. Child delivery under health care specialists increased from
62 percent in 2000 to 78 percent in 2006
and 91 percent in 2013 (see Table 3 in the
Statistical Appendix).
Most people (97 percent) were satisfied
with their health, and 85 percent were satisfied with the quality of health care they
receive, which is accessible within 20
minutes. As for younger people, though
99 percent were satisfied with their health
condition, 54 percent had a negative view
about the quality of health services. More
than half of the young people had good
knowledge about HIV; indeed, there were
only 11 cases, 4 of them females, mostly in Baghdad, according to Ministry of
Health figures.
Education Index
Investment in education has not been left
behind, but it needs a generation, sometimes two, for its outcome to be realized.
Illiteracy levels among the youth aged 15–
29 now is an outcome of biased resource
allocation in the past that was not human
development centred. Current inefficiencies and failures in fulfilling mass literacy
and primary education will similarly have
their impact on future generations.
All indicators in education have shown
some progress. Primary school attendance
has risen to 94 percent, indicating the possibility of fulfilling the MDG related to
primary education by 2015. On the other
hand, a high illiteracy rate has been observed: 18 percent among those over
15 years of age and 15 percent among
young people aged 15–29, with higher
rates among females and the rural population. The more important observation
is the slow improvement in the secondary school enrolment rate (48.6 percent in
2011), which is not yet capturing the level
achieved in the 1980s. A gender gap is apparent: 52.5 percent for males and 44.6
percent for females.
Income Index
Gross national income (GNI) per capita12
has increased significantly due to higher,
more stable oil prices and exports.13 In
2012 it approached US$5,8601014. Although GNP and GNI are not appropriate measures of human development, the
latter does need and depend on income
growth.
Clearly, Iraqi families have enjoyed
better living standards in the past few
years. Individuals’ average monthly expenditure increased by 60 percent from
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
27
146,000 Iraqi dinars in 2007 to 247,ooo
Iraqi dinars in 2012, with an increase of
63 percent in urban areas and 53 percent
in rural areas15 (see Table 13 in the Statistical Appendix).
Income growth with a fair pattern of
distribution leads to better human development performance. Poor families
spend more on health and education as
their incomes rise. With less income, they
spend more on food and calorific intake.
Between 2007 and 2012, expenditure on
food in Iraq decreased from 35.6 percent
to 33.5 percent of total household expenditures. In Erbil in the better-off Kurdistan
Region, the figure was 25.6 percent, while
the figure in Dhi Qar Governorate, which
has high levels of poverty, rose to 40 percent (see Figure 2.1).
“In my opinion, the human development report should not
stress, in its main elements, the level of income but the way
it is disposed. Income itself can be used for buying basic
medicaments; it can be used for buying drugs or for buying
military equipment and tanks.”
Mahbub ul Haq
Figure 2.1
Household Expenditure on Goods and Services
Source: CSO, Household budget surveys
Although education in Iraq is free from
kindergarten to university, families attempt to improve education for their children by enrolling them in private schools
and/or paying private tuition.
Iraqi family expenditure on education
varies according to changes in their standard of living. With more welfare and better living conditions in the second half of
the 1970s, expenditure on “education and
culture”, out of the total household budget, increased from 1.3 percent in 1971 to
2.5 percent in 1976 according to Household Budget Surveys. During the eightyear war with Iran in the 1980s, the figure
decreased to only 0.8 percent, decreasing
further to 0.4 percent in the 1990s, when
the embargo left the households with no
28
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
choice but to spend more on securing
food, which amounted to more than 60
percent of total expenditure. In 2012, “education and culture” gained some importance again by representing 2.7 percent of
total expenditure.
However, the relationship between
education and economic growth is not a
direct one. Progress in education is not always reflected in productivity and income
growth because there might be limited
employment opportunities in dynamic
sectors (as is the case in Iraq). Still, it is
evident that education has a positive impact on human development. Better health
habits, food consumption patterns, family
planning attitudes and practices, relationships within the family, and even youth
perceptions and initiatives, all rely on education, and female education in particular.
Through better education, some countries
have achieved higher levels of human development than countries with a comparatively higher income (2011 HDR). Performance and income aside, from an ethical
standpoint education, health, and nutrition
are valuable unto themselves for enhancing people’s general capabilities.
Disaggregating Measurement at
the Governorate Level
As for the progress achieved in the HDI
in the governorates, though the lower
level governorates have experienced
some progress, they are still far behind
the better governorates, particularly those
in the Kurdistan Region, where , Erbil,
and Duhok, in addition to Baghdad, occupied the first four ranks with an HDI value
higher than the national HDI – Kurdistan
Region’s HDI value is 0.750, while the
national HDI is 0.694. Muthanna, , and
Maysan came last (see Table 1 in the Statistical Appendix). The same applies to
each of the three dimensions of the HDI
– they are highest in the governorates with
the highest HDI.
• The Life Expectancy at Birth Index
(LEBI) increased in all governorates
and is higher than their HDI. For example, the LEBI value in Diyala is 0.74,
which is the lowest among the governorates, while its HDI value is 0.666.
• The Education Index (EI) in all governorates save Diyala and Anbar declined. It is 0.435 in Maysan, which reflects school enrolment rates that have
decreased to 76 percent for primary
education and 31 percent for secondary
school, already diagnosed in the MICS4
2011.
When it comes to income, it is evident
that the governorates’ GNI per capita is
relatively lower than the HDI, except for
the Kurdistan Region.
Human Development Index
in Kurdistan
The security and political stability enjoyed by the Kurdistan Region for most
of the last two decades have led directly to
positive achievements in the HDI’s three
elements of health, education, and income
compared to the 15 governorates of Iraq.
HDI
Iraq
0.694
Sulaymaniya
0.764
Erbil
0.751
Duhok
0.716
Kurdistan Region
o.750
Building More National Capacities
The Kurdistan Region Statistics Office and the Central Statistical Organization
conducted field surveys to calculate the indices and their main indicators in
both Iraq and Kurdistan (see the Statistical Appendix). The solid partnership between the staff of the two bodies to do this work is a good example of sound
cooperation and communication between the institutions of the federal government and those of the Kurdistan Regional Government.
Inequality-adjusted Human
Development Index
The HDI ranks countries based on their
achievements in the three areas of health,
education, and income, and assumes that
the fruits of development are distributed
equally among all the social groups and
geographic areas of each country, which
has not been the case in all countries,
for the total difference between the HDI
and IHDI worldwide is 23 percent. This
development inequality is lowest in very
developed countries (5.6 percent in Norway) and highest in countries with limited
development (52 percent in Chad). The
difference in Iraq between the HDI (0.68)
and the IHDI (0.60) is acceptable at 11.8
percent.
This comparison reflects differences
in the sub-indices’ values – 6.4 percent
for the LEBI, 8.3 percent for the EI, and
19.1 percent for the income index. That
means that differences in income and unequal opportunities are still preventing the
achievement of the highest HDI (see TaIraq Human Development Report 2014
29
bles 1 and 2 in the Statistical Appendix).
The Gini coefficient is used to measure
income inequality, which has a greater
impact than the other dimensions. It in-
creased from 37 percent in 2007 to 40 percent in 2012, but it is still low compared
to other countries (Box 2.1).
Box 2.1
Inequality (Gini Coefficient) and GNI Per Capita for 185 Countries
The scattered points represent
185 countries by degree of inequality (vertical axis) and the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita
(horizontal axis). The sloping line
represents the total negative correlation between the GDP per capita
and inequality.
Source: UNDP, HDR, 2013
The situation revealed in Figure 2
can be explained by the fact that
the countries with a degree of inequality equal to or lower than
Iraq’s are generally more prosperous, such as Sweden (25.0), Norway
(25.8), Finland (26.9), and Germany
(28.3). A large part of this prosperity
can be ascribed to the deep-rooted traditions in those countries for
achieving economic growth and
social justice and providing good
social services (2011 HDR, Table 3,
Appendix).
In general, equality is a good thing, but
Iraq’s situation is different. Using its oil
revenues, the government has depended
on (untargeted) food subsidies, increasing
employment in the public sector, and the
distributive role of the public budget to
achieve equality and increase consumption. It was a compromise that satisfied
neither those on the top nor those at the
bottom of the distribution. But this kind of
social justice lack sustainability unless it
is translated into increased opportunities
and growth.
At the governorate level, the differences
between the HDI and IHDI are very close,
ranging between 6 and 9 points. However,
these differences generally increase in the
governorates with a high HDI value ( , Erbil, and Duhok).
IHDI
Kurdistan Region
30
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Iraq
0.579
Sulaymaniya
0.644
Erbil
0.628
Duhok
0.612
0.629
Gender Inequality Index
The GII captures poor development performance due to gender inequality and
uses three dimensions to do so: reproductive health, empowerment, and labour
market participation. The GII ranges
between 0 to 1, with 0 being 0 percent
inequality, indicating that women fare
equally in comparison to men, and 1 being 100 percent inequality, indicating that
women fare poorly in comparison to men.
Country
Calculations in this report set Iraq’s
GII in the middle between the best and
the worst (see Technical Notes Appendix). However, the progress achieved by
most neighbouring countries in reducing
gender inequality is better than Iraq’s.
The GII in some countries, such as Kuwait, Turkey, and Iraq, improved their
HDI ranking, while the GII worsened the
ranking of other countries: Saudi Arabia
and Iran.Table 2.1: GII in Selected
Countries
GII
Ranking
HDI
Ranking
GII
Decline –
Improvement +
Turkey
0.366
90
68
22
Iran
0.476
76
107
-31
Kuwait
0.274
54
47
7
Saudi Arabia
0.682
57
145
-88
Jordan
0.482
100
99
1
Syria
0.551
116
118
-2
Iraq
0.557
131
120
11
Source: UNDP, HDR-2013 / Table 4
Women’s Empowerment16
Figure 2.2 shows the differences between
males and females in the basic aspects of
empowerment. Women’s representation
in parliament (25 percent) is acceptable,
but the gap is huge in education and economic participation, where the percentage
of men holding secondary school certificates or higher is 28 percent compared to
16 percent of women. Poverty, a shortage
of girls’ schools in rural areas, insecurity,
and traditions and cultural practices such
as the early marriage of girls, among other
factors, limit opportunities for girls’ education.
The gender gap in economic activities
is very wide; 72 percent of men are economically active compared to 13 percent
of women. Women generally have lower
working hours, more underemployment,
and less paid work, but their proportion of
secure jobs to total female employment is
higher than men.
Figure 2.2
Gender-based Differences in Empowerment Indicators
Source: NHDR- 2014, Statistical Appendix -Table 3
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
31
The 2011 HDR shows that the largest
losses from gender inequality are in low
HDI countries, where they have high gender inequality across multiple dimensions.
In South Asia and the Arab states, women
lag behind men in educational attainment,
national parliamentary representation,
labour force participation, and decisionmaking participation. Women’s mere
presence in institutions is not enough to
overcome entrenched disparities — additional changes and flexibility in institutional structures are needed to ensure that
women can participate effectively in decision making. In some cases, the inclusion
of women and other marginal groups is
perceived as a way of maintaining the status quo or adhering to new ‘rules’ rather
than addressing inequalities or achieving
specific outcomes. What matters, then, is
not simply women’s presence, but the nature of their participation.17
In Iraq, women gained the right to hold
at least 25 percent of National Parliament
and Governorate Council seats according
to the new Constitution of 2005. In Kurdistan Region, women have 33 percent of
the total seats in the current parliament.
This is an achievement when compared
to the situation in Arab and neighbouring
countries.
However, there is a consensus that the
performance of parliamentarian women
in the first and second elections has been
inadequate. Women failed to fulfil voters’
expectations, did not stand for women’s
rights, did not use their platform to tackle
key issues, and failed to present initiatives
to enhance their potentially visionary
role. Quite simply, their voices were not
heard, apart from those of a few individu-
als. The governmental report of 2011 to
the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW) ascribes their unsatisfactory
role to “lack of experience and unsatisfactory nominations of women by parties”,
which – aiming to fill spaces given by the
quota (in the 2005 Iraq constitution 25%
of Parliament seats are given to Women)
– was based on ethnic, tribal, or sectarian
considerations rather than the necessary
qualifications. This applies to men as well.
Women’s performance should not be
separated from the performance of parliament as a whole, which was also weak
considering the long list of laws waiting
to be legislated, among them important
laws such as those relating to labour and
social protection, as well as oil and gas.
Parliament also did not tackle their discriminatory approach towards women
parliamentarians, who are excluded from
party leaders’ negotiations on political
and security issues, and from chairing
parliamentary committees, save those on
family and social issues.
Gender Inequality Index by
Governorate
The GII ranking in the governorates is the
opposite of that of the HDI, given that the
GII measures inequality while the HDI
measures development. The lower value
of GII reflects better empowerment of
women in HDI dimensions.
The governorates with a GII value
lower than the national value of 0.5oo are
those of Kurdistan Region, Babil, Wasit,
and Baghdad, reflecting a better status of
GII indicators for women compared to the
other governorates (Table 3, Appendix).
GII
Iraq
0.500
Sulaymaniya
0.422
Erbil
0.406
Duhok
0.421
Kurdistan Region
In general, female secondary school attendance improved in all governorates except Anbar, where both male and female
rates declined due to persistent instability
since 2005.
Kurdistan Region showed better performance in women’s empowerment, with a
female secondary school attendance rate
32
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
0.410
of 79 percent; Maysan was 31 percent,
ranking the lowest after Muthanna and
Wasit. These three governorates are the
poorest in income poverty, while Sulaymaniya has the lowest poverty percentage
in the country (Table 14, Annex).
The fact that women have low economic participation and low education attain-
ment is overshadowed by the relatively
high political participation measured by
the Quota dividend of 25 percent.
Women’s Participation in
Governorate Councils
In the first election of Governorate Councils in 2009, there were 110 women out
of a total of 44o. In the second election in
2013, the number increased to 117 out of
440. Their performance is not better than
those in the national parliaments, as their
admittance was based on the same criteria, and, nevertheless, time is needed for
the whole experience of political participation to mature in an infant democracy
such as Iraq’s. It is important to assess
this experience of women’s participation
as a challenge and breakthrough in itself,
given that it is a society still dominated by
tribal and religious rules.
Multidimensional
Poverty Index
The MPI is an international measure for
poverty developed by the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative
(OPHI) and used globally in the international HDRs since 2010, replacing the Human Poverty Index. The MPI complements
the income poverty index and the Millennium Development Goal measures through
identifying deprivation suffered by individuals in the main well-being indices,
such as standard of living, basic services,
health, and education. In other words, the
MPI calculates individual achievements in
a number of indicators and then calculates
the number of indicators in which individuals are deprived. An individual is considered to be suffering from multidimensional
poverty when they are deprived in 33 percent of the indicators.
Supported by UNDP, the Information
Analysis Unit and the OPHI decided
through consultations that the MPI in Iraq
would be comprised of five dimensions in
line with the priorities of the National Development Plan (NDP) and based on the
results of one survey (IKN 2011). A group
of 21 indicators control these dimensions:
education (4 indicators), basic services (4
indicators), nutrition and health (4 indicators), standard of living (3 indicators), and
employment (6 indicators). (See the Technical Notes Appendix.)
The dimensions were given equal
weight, which suggests that they are
equally important for a family’s well-being. The indices within a same dimension
were also given equal weight, except for
standards of living and job opportunities;
some indices, such as income and unemployment for both sexes, were given
more weight to highlight their relative
importance (Chart 2.1). To identify families with multidimensional poverty, it was
agreed that they should be deprived in at
least 33 percent of the indicators.
Chart 2.1
MPI Dimensions, Indices, and Weights
• Males elementary school enrolment
• Females elementary school enrolment
• Males illiteracy
• Females illiteracy
5%
5%
5%
5%
Education and Knowledge
20%
• Income
• Housing unit
• Crowding
10%
5%
5%
Level of living
20%
• Water
• Sanitation
• Garbage collection
• Electricity
5%
5%
5%
5%
Basic services
20%
• Balanced diet
• Calories
• Quality of health services
• Remoteness of health services
5%
5%
5%
5%
Nutrition and health
20%
5%
5%
2.5%
2.5%
2.5%
2.5%
Employment
20%
• Males’ unemployment
• Females’ unemployment
• Males’ underemployment
• Females’ underemployment
• Males’ protected job
• Females’ protected job
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
33
Who Suffers from Multidimensional
Poverty in Iraq?
Based on a threshold line (‘K’) that differentiates between those who are deprived
and those who are not, individuals are considered to be suffering from multidimensional poverty when they are deprived of
33 percent of their basic needs in terms of
level of income, female’s primary education, health services, electricity, and drinking water, which are the most common
things the poor are deprived of. Accordingly, 13.3 percent of Iraq’s populations
suffer from multidimensional poverty.
Figure 2.3
Identifying the MPI poor and non-poor
Source: Iraq knowledge network survey IKN -2011
Figure 2.3 shows that defining the poverty line is important in analysing the
MPI, especially since the poor’s percentage changes significantly depending on
the value adopted. For example, the poor’s
percentage is 13 percent at a poverty line
of K=33 percent, and 9 percent when K=40
percent. The diagram can enrich policymaking, when targeting, for example, individuals who suffer from abject poverty in
40 percent or 45 percent of the indicators.
One interesting characteristic of the
multidimensional poverty analysis is that
poverty can be divided into indicators that
identify each indicator’s contribution to the
MPI as a whole (Figure 5). Low incomes
(17.2 percent) and low elementary education enrolment rates among females (9.1
percent) contribute the most to the deprivation of individuals. Then come poor health
services (7.6 percent), electricity (7.3 percent), and drinking water (6.9 percent).
Figure 2.4
Dimensions’ Contribution to the Poor’s Deprivation
Source:: Iraq knowledge network survey IKN -2011
34
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Multidimensional poverty varies greatly from one Iraqi governorate to another.
About 30 percent of the population in the
governorates of Maysan and Wasit suffer from multidimensional poverty, compared to 4.3 percent in Baghdad and 1.4
percent in Sulaymaniya (Table 4, Statistical Appendix).
At the national level, more than 50 percent of the poor in Iraq live in Nineveh,
Dhi Qar, Basra, Wasit, and Maysan.
Map 2.1 shows the multidimensional poverty levels in each governorate.
Map 2.1
The Multidimensional Poverty Index by Governorate
Figure 2. 5 summarizes families’ poverty in the Kurdistan Region, Baghdad Governorate, and the other Iraqi governorates
based on four categories:
• More than 90 percent of families in
Baghdad and Kurdistan suffer neither
from multidimensional poverty nor income poverty – a conclusion the abovementioned HDIs also support. The HDI
values of the Kurdistan governorates
and Baghdad exceed 0.7, occupying
the first four ranks: Sulaymaniya 0.764,
Erbil 0.751, Baghdad 0.726, and Duhok
0.716.
• The families which suffer only from
multidimensional poverty constitute
4 percent in the Kurdistan Region and
Baghdad.
• The families which suffer only from
income poverty in the rest of the governorates run as high as 13 percent.
• The families which suffer from both
types of poverty in the rest of the governorates amount to 14 percent, compared
to 3 percent and 2 percent in Baghdad
and the Kurdistan Region respectively.
Figure 2.5
Iraqi Families with Income Poverty or MPI
Source: Iraq knowledge network survey IKN -2011
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
35
Figure 2.6 shows that the highest percentage of those suffering from multidimensional poverty (77.2 percent) is in the
lowest of the five spending categories,
while the remaining 22.8 percent of this
category are deprived in some of the main
well-being indices.
Moreover, 1.4 percent of the individuals in the highest spending category are
still suffering from multidimensional poverty, confirming that monetary measures
are not adequate for addressing poverty in
Iraq, since a household can suffer from a
lack of municipal services, such as refuse
collection and availability of drinking water, even though it has a high income.
Figure 2.6
People Living under the Income and MPI by Spending Category (%)
Source: Iraq knowledge network survey IKN -2011
Box 2.2
The Multidimensional Poverty Index as a Tool for Fact-based Planning
The Iraqi government has shown a growing interest
in developing national poverty measures, as governmental, academic, and civil circles have become
aware that income (expenditure) poverty measurement alone does not adequately represent poverty,
its prevalence, and the multiple reasons for it. As a
result, poverty reduction programmes are not able to
achieve their goals.
The government is committed to adopt, according to the 2005 Constitution, a mechanism that, when
allocating resources to the governorates from the
public budget or the investment budget to implement the development plan, considers both population and the extent of deprivation suffered by people
when attempting to satisfy their basic needs. However, the ensuing political debates have prevented the
adoption of this ‘deprived people percentage criteria’ when setting development priorities or distributing
resources, and only the population of each governorate is considered.
The MPI and analysis of its findings allow for an indepth understanding of the nature and severity of
the deprivation of basic services, a fuller description
of the level of living, and realistic standards for setting
priorities when choosing investment programmes in
the public and private service sectors.
Furthermore, the multidimensional poverty analysis
is very important for UN agencies. Its results not only
enrich NHDRs, but also support local development
programmes and important projects of UNICEF, UN
Women, and other organizations working in Iraq.
The MPI provides a simple methodology of poverty measurement that is capable of complementing income poverty. It
can provide a policy tool and a guideline
for local planning through estimating the
needs for education, health, and other services, which represented the majority of
deprivations of poor people, as the results
36
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
above show. Income was responsible for
17 percent of their deprivation. The second in importance was female primary
education at 9 percent, then unprotected
jobs. These results may indicate priorities
for social policies, of which youth will be
the main beneficiaries.
Box 2.3
Correlation Matrix between Human Development Indices and Some
Economic Indicators
The correlation matrix (see Appendix) between different HDIs and other development indicators shows
a clear consistency among the values of the correlation coefficients between each index and the indices
or indicators adopted in the analysis at the governorate level. In this context, the HDI registers clear relationships (sometimes inverse) with the other indices
and indicators.
• The correlation coefficients in the fifth row of the
matrix suggest that the inequality indicator is inversely proportional to households’ average
monthly spending, the investment allocations per
Youth Development Index
The HDI, IHDI, and GII calculated in this
chapter at the national, regional, and governorate levels reflect the improvement or
stagnation of human development among
the population in general. What young
people have attained is beyond the capacity of those indices. An attempt is made
to construct an index to measure youth
achievements in human development dimensions, with an emphasis on the gender
inequalities.
The Youth Development Index (YDI)
is a complex measure built to explore the
status of the youth by monitoring changes
to gains made towards the youth-related
Millennium Development Goals, such as
universal education, gender equality, and
the empowerment of women.
The YDI also assesses youth distinction in the HDI and measures other dimensions referred to in the first chapter
(e.g. cultural and political dimensions),
thus laying the ground for a development
policy that focuses on the youth through
a database that allows for following their
progress, issues critical to their development, and areas where they are exposed
to risks or are excluded. The database also
brings attention to areas where empowerment is most needed to enable the youth
to perform their role as agents for change
in the transition to democracy; here again,
disaggregation by gender and governorate
is applied, making the YDI and its subindices and indicators a useful targeting
capita, and the IHDI, and directly proportional to
the poverty percentage, the MPI, and the deprivation index.
• The negative value of the correlation coefficient
(-0.61) with the MDG index shows that the declining achievements in gender equality adversely affect the achievements in the MDG indicators.
That the correlation coefficients are generally in line
with what is expected leads to the conclusion that
poverty worsens deprivation and that the improvement of human development is a result of empowerment initiatives.
tool for development programmes at the
sectoral or regional level.
The YDI and its continuous follow-up
enrich decision making and overall social policy evaluation. The government
and other actors can use it for monitoring
youth progress in relation to the priorities
of development plans and programmes
and the National Youth Strategy.
Finally, the YDI advocates youth issues, especially those related to females.
The Youth Development Index
Measurement
An overall national YDI was calculated,
as well as a sub-YDI for young males and
another one for young females to diagnose
the gender gap. This YDI also measures
youth development in Kurdistan Region
and each governorate (see the Technical
Notes Annex).
The Youth Development Index
Domains
The YDI covers the HDI dimensions of
education, health, and employment (instead of income). Two other dimensions
are added: participation and security, and
freedom and communication. Each domain includes a number of indicators that
reflect the level of achievement based on
the available data18 (see Chart 2.2). The
youth development benchmark indicators19 measure the general state of the
youth and the efficiency of youth development policies and strategies.
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
37
Chart 2.2
Youth Development Index– Areas and Indicators of Each Index
Youth Development Index: Visible Differences
• The YDI on the national level was
0.641, which is lower than the HDI
(0.694).
• The YDI suggested a big gap between
young males (0.694) and young females
(0.535).
• The participation and security index
(0.600) was also lower than the YDI.
The health index was the best
(0.808), with the index for females
(0.829) higher than that for males
(0.788).Among the YDI dimensions (Figure 2.7), the dimension
of freedom and communication
was the lowest, at 0.535. Among
the four indicators included in
this dimension, owning a PC was
the lowest (Appendix Table 5),
especially for females. The index
value drops to 0.433 when we
add Internet usage, which is only
10.9 for females compared to
24.8 for males.
Except for the health sub-index,
other development sub-indices
males were higher than those for
males, especially the employment
dex.
38
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
the
for
fein-
Figure 2.7
Youth Development Index
Source: Calculated by the Statistical Team of this Report
Youth Development Index in the
Governorates
• The YDI was highest in the governorate of Sulaymaniya, followed by Erbil (both in Kurdistan Region), Babil,
Baghdad, and then Kerbala, all of which
were above the national YDI of 0.668.
• In the other 13 governorates, the YDI
was lower than the national YDI, with
Maysan, Najaf, and Anbar ranked in the
last three places, with 0.586, 0.572, and
0.534 respectively.
• Figure 20 shows that the lower the YDI
a governorate has, the wider the YDI
gap between males and females. Hence,
females are more affected by poor human development. While the development index for females was 0.680 in
Sulaymaniya, it was less by half in Anbar.
Figure 2.8
The Youth Development Index Discrepancies by Governorate
Source: Calculated by the Statistical Team of the this Report
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
39
However, this order differs from one
YDI dimension to another. The sub-index
of Education was higher in the governorates of Sulaymaniya, Erbil, Baghdad,
Duhok, Kirkuk, Diyala, and Basra than
the national index. Furthermore, the education index for females was lower than
for males in all governorates.
The Employment index also shows a
wide gap between males (0.865) and females (0.457), which suggests a big difference among the elements adopted to
measure this dimension (see the Statistical Appendix). The gap between males
and females was highest in the governorates of Dhi Qar and Muthanna, with the
index for females declining to less than
0.27; these two governorates ranked 15
and 18 respectively in the HDI. The same
applies to comparisons with the IHDI.
Among the five sub-indexes, only the
Health sub-index for females (0.829) was
higher than that for males (0.788). Table
5 shows that this advantage applies to all
the six elements of the health index in all
governorates, which means that young
women focus more on their health than
young men do.
The value of the Participation and Security sub-index was 0.60 – lower than the
previous three dimensions.
The index measured for both males and
females did not register a big difference
(0.623 for males and 0.558 for females),
except for the first three governorates of
Sulaymaniya, Erbil, and Babil. Strikingly,
the female index was directly proportional to the YDI (correlation coefficient
= 0.75).
The Freedom and Communication
sub-index was the lowest, at 0.535, with
a clear difference between males (0.637)
and females (0.405). This value drops to
0.433 when the Internet usage indicator is
added, due to the low number of young
Internet users.
Box 2.4
Differences between HDI and YDI Ranking
• The relation between the HDI and
the YDI suggests that the latter,
though based on relatively different dimensions, focuses on youth
aspirations and empowerment,
but these aspirations are somewhat affected by the circumstances of each governorate. The
correlation coefficient measured
in the governorates’ ranking for
both indexes was 0.544; an average positive correlation that
suggests slight improvement in
40
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
the YDI when the HDI improves in
general.
• Figure 2.9 illustrates that while the
governorates of Najaf and Kirkuk
occupied an advanced rank in
the HDI (6 and 7 respectively),
they went down 11 and 4 places
respectively in the YDI. And while
the governorates of Babil and Dhi
Qar ranked 14 and 15 respectively in the HDI, they occupied better
places in the YDI, going up 11 and
6 places respectively.
YDI as A Tool for Monitoring
and Advocating Youth
Progress
The measurement of YDI identified five
domains which represent three areas for
empowerment, each indicator showing
the needs of each domain. Low value of
the index indicates lack of empowerment.
The measurement showed significant differences between young males and young
females and between governorates, suggesting a road map for youth empowerment policy:
• Social Empowerment: Health Index
and Education Index
• Economic Empowerment: Employment Index
• Political Empowerment: Participation
and Security Index, and Freedom and
Communication Index
Priorities in Economic
Empowerment
Priorities in Social and Political
Empowerment
Raising the secondary school enrolment
rate for both males and females:
Governorates: Maysan, Wasit, Muthanna
Participation and security:
Societal participation is very low, 0.06 for
young men and 0.07 for young women
Increasing the youth’s social and
voluntary activities:
Governorates: Anbar, Najaf, Maysan
Freedom and communications
indicators have low value and
gender differences:
• Increasing the acquisition of computers
• Governorates: Muthanna, Diyala, Dhi
Qar, and for young women in particular
in Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and Najaf
• Increasing access to the Internet
• Governorates: Muthanna, Dhi Qar, Wasit, and for young women in particular
in Muthanna, Qadisiya, Maysan
Raising the youth’s economic
participation rate:
Currently, 0.63 for young men and 0.12
for young women
Governorates: Muthanna, Dhi Qar,
Nineveh
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
41
Chapter 3
Demographic Challenges
Although human development indicators
are affected by population demographic
characteristics, the HDI does not capture
demographic changes. In Iraq, where the
fertility rate is 4.2, demographic variables
cannot be ignored. As in some other Arab
and developing countries, demographic
transition and the accompanying family
change takes place slowly, constituting a
challenge to human development.
A rapid decrease in infant and under five
mortality rates, as well as maternity mortality rates, provides population momentum.
The higher the rate of population growth,
the bigger the families, which increases the
dependency ratio, thereby limiting people’s
choices and enjoyment of life.
Behaviours and decision making within
the family are subject to cultural values and
social norms that determine fertility rates,
population mobility, and age of marriage,
among other things. This is why this chapter
will elaborate on these issues, as they represent the impact of the cultural and political
dimensions of human development. In Iraq,
besides cultural factors, politics have had
numerous effects on population displacement and migration, inside and outside the
country, thereby defusing normal demographic patterns. An overall description and
analysis of demographic changes will help
in understanding important aspects of the
youth’s movement towards playing an important role in political transition.
How much is achieved in the wellbeing of people?
Progress towards achieving the MDGs may
represent success in responding to the demographic challenges to human development, while revealing how development
programmes are consistent with population
changes (see Table 9, Statistical Appendix):
• Some improvement has been achieved in
people’s access to potable water, a safe
environment, and housing.
• The infant mortality rate has decreased to
21 per 1,000, approaching the MDG target of 17 in 2015.
• Primary education enrolment increased
to 93 percent, closing in on the MDG target of 94 percent for 2015.
• Women’s empowerment is improving,
particularly regarding political participa42
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
tion, but is doing so slowly in secondary
education enrolment, economic participation, and the establishment of equal
opportunities in other areas.
• Almost 19 percent of the population are
below poverty line.
Three Demographic
Challenges
Three demographic transformation factors
in Iraq are challenges that are directly linked
to the youth: the changing age structure of
the population, fertility rates, and migration. These challenges will be the main pillars of this chapter, which will discuss how
cultural, social, and even political factors
interact to influence the three dimensions of
human development, without being part of
the HDI.
Slow Decline in Fertility Rates
The Iraqi population has grown rapidly due
to previous demographic policies that supported the increase of population growth
rates since the 1970s. In spite of the burden
of wars, conflicts, and crises over the last 40
years, Iraq’s population continues to grow.
The overall fertility rate in Iraq is still
high compared to that of other Arab countries and also to the international rate of 2
live births per woman, even though it has
been falling slowly over the last three decades, from 6.2 live births per woman in the
1980s to 5.7 in 1997 (latest official census
year) and 4.2 in 2013.20
In trying to uncover the deep cultural
roots behind the slow pace of demographic
transition, it can be seen that young people
are an intricate part of this. There continues
to be a high rate of early marriage, women’s
labour force participation remains low, and
enrolment rates for females in secondary
and post-secondary education are low, as is
made evident in the following chapters. Regarding the rights and reproductive health
issues dealt with in the action programme
of the 1994 UN population conference, the
local data reveals unsatisfactory attitudes.
The fact that 25 percent of women in the
age group 15–49 had married below the age
of 18 can be linked to early pregnancies and
their frequency. Only half of the married
women knew about some kind of contraceptive21 (Table 3, Appendix).
The economic situation nevertheless
seems to have encouraged Iraqis to have
smaller families; the average number of
family members in Iraq fell from 7.7 in
1997 to 6.7 in 2012. This is evident in some
survey results,22 where female adolescents
said they only wanted to have three children.
The average age at first marriage has not
increased over the last three decades: 26
years for males and 23 years for females. It
is slightly higher in the Kurdistan Region,
at 27 and 25.
Iraqi society is still in favour of early
marriages for both males and females.
In 23.4 percent of total marriages in Iraq
and in 22.4 percent of the marriages in the
Kurdistan Region, the bride is under 18. In
5.7 percent of the marriages in Iraq and in
5.5 percent of the marriages in the Kurdistan Region, the bride is under 15. The
proportion of women aged 15–19 who are
currently married is 18.7 percent in Iraq
and 19.1 percent in the Kurdistan Region.
In addition, three out of ten women aged
15–49 who are currently married or have
been married got married for the first time
when they were under 18.
The birth rate for adolescent girls in Iraq
(Table 3) is 59 births per 1,000 females
aged 15–19. Although it has declined from
82 in 2006, it is one of the high rates among
medium HDI countries. For example, this
rate is 46 in Egypt, 53.5 in Palestine, 29.5 in
Iran, and 39.2 in Turkey. However, it falls
in Kurdistan Region to an average of 26 and
differs from one governorate to another, the
lowest being in Duhok (23.5) and the high-
est in Najaf (89).
The adolescent girl’s birth rate is inversely proportional to educational attainment.
The number of births runs as high as 122 for
women with only elementary education and
falls to 45 for women with a middle school
certificate or higher. This rate and the related general preference for early marriage,
among other factors, help to raise the total
fertility rate due to the long fertility period.
In general, when reproduction starts early, it
continues till a late age.
While norms and values can explain youth
attitudes towards early marriage and high
fertility, lack of knowledge on reproductive
health was behind many unhealthy practices
among young girls in particular. Half of the
youth surveyed in the 2009 youth survey
knew nothing about reproductive health.
This fact reveals the shortcomings of school
curricula in youth sexual health and population issues in general.
Youthful Population
The demographic characteristics in Iraq
show that Iraqi society has been a youthful
one for many decades. People aged 15 to 29
in 2011 amounted to 8.7 million, or nearly
28 percent of the population; half of them
were females. The population projections
suggest that the proportion of youth will increase before it becomes stable, then it will
start to fall gradually. The youth population
is expected to reach 17.6 million by 2040
(27.1 percent of the total population).
Sixty percent of Iraq’s population are under 25, compared to 54 percent in the Arab
countries and 48 percent in developing
countries generally.
Figure 3.1
Iraqi Population by Age Group
Source: Iraq Poverty and Maternal Mortality Mapping survey IPMM -2013
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
43
Figure 3.1 suggests a high rate of young
people aged 10–14 compared to the two
older groups, meaning that most young
people are adolescents, challenging the
government to implement certain programmes and projects to meet their specific health and education needs. The needs
of the two older age groups (15–19) and
(20–24) are different, as they stand on the
threshold of a new phase in life that will
focus on finishing their education, seeking work, or starting a family.
Mortality rates represent the third factor
effecting demographic change. The youth
have been the victims of successive wars
for the past three decades. As a result,
which is obvious in Figure 3.1, the male
age group of 45–54 in the population pyramid has shrunk. However, this chapter’s
emphasis on fertility and migration is derived from the importance that should be
given to the youth in human development
and population policy. Further studies are
needed to assess the impact of violent
conflict and immigration of the youth on
the age structure of the population.
Is the Demographic Window a
Real Dividend?
The increased number of young people
imposes developmental challenges but
also provides opportunities when youth
reach the working age. When the population outside the labour force is less than
the population inside it, productivity and
income can increase. The field of demography labels this the ‘demographic
dividend’ (the concept is also called a
‘demographic window’), which can be
seen when fertility rates decrease but
the working-age youth population is still
high. After this, however, population ages
start to rise again and the dependency
ratio becomes high. Population experts
note that this period of 30 to 40 years
with a large working-age population is a
good demographic chance for economic
growth. It however depends on timely, responsive social and economic policies. It
is worth noting that the above-mentioned
age structure transformation is projected
to continue for more than one generation
in Iraq due to slowly decreasing fertility
rates and increasing life expectancy.
The window of opportunity appears
“when the proportion of children and
youth under 15 years falls below 30 percent and the proportion of people 65 years
and older is still below 15 percent”. This
happens when the fertility rate falls to
its replacement rate of 2.1 live births per
woman, life expectancy reaches 73 years,
and mortality rates fall.
Chart 3.1
The Demographic Dividend Scenario in Iraq
Source: NHDR, Box 2-6 / 2008
The youthful population is a developmental challenge, and Iraqi society still
has characteristics that fuel population
growth. Fast decreasing infant mortality
rates, fixed high fertility rates, increased
44
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
life expectancy, and a growing fertility-age
population ensure that the absolute number
of births remains high even if the fertility
rate is expected to fall to its replacement
rate. The significant increase in the number
of youth is a challenge for national development, social, and economic policies, as
it requires more educational services, infrastructure, and decent job opportunities.
Population Mobility and Migration
Internal Migration
Until very recently, Iraq’s modern history
had not witnessed significant migration
waves, due perhaps to a certain culture that
did not encourage migration or the limited
aspirations for migration, not to mention
the legal and administrative constraints
imposed by the government. Though the
relationship between growing populations
and dwindling resources explains many international migration cases, this economic
factor alone is not enough to explain Iraqis’ migration, particularly the youth, early
this century, which is similar to the migrations from Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt in
the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century.
In the absence of a comprehensive official census since 1987 (as Kurdistan Region was not included in the latest 1997
census), population movement (among
governorates or between rural and urban
areas) cannot be monitored adequately,
but it is evident that prevailing imbalances
are the outcome of population mobility,
whether voluntary or forced. One major
phenomenon is the concentration of the
population in the capital and other big cities, which are encircled by shanties. These
areas have non-existent or poor services
and environmental deterioration, in a pattern that is not specific to Iraq, but can be
seen in many developing countries which
followed first-generation development
strategies that focused on capital rather
than human development.
The variation between governorates in
HDI and MPI observed in Chapter 2 (Ta-
ble 1, Appendix) reflects to an extent the
correlation between health and education
needs and the provision of services (see the
correlation matrix, Table 6, Appendix).
The geographic distribution of Iraq’s
population in the governorates has a corresponding effect on the distribution of
youth. With only 1 percent of Iraq’s area,
Baghdad has had the highest number of
youth for the last three decades; they accounted for 28.3 percent of its population
in 1977 and 21.4 percent in 2009. Since
Baghdad is the centre for governmental,
economic, and other activities, it is the
number one destination for internal migration. Indeed, 39 percent of young people
live in the three governorates which host
the main cities: Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra. The governorates of Anbar, Muthanna,
and Najaf, which together account for half
of Iraq’s area, only contain 11 percent of
the Iraqi youth.
The implication of this on social policy
is that more of a burden will be placed on
social services, educational institutions,
health services, and housing in these cities.
The policy response should not aggravate
the already biased pattern of investment
among governorates and between urban
and rural youth.
Forced Migration and
Displacement
According to the UNAMI Newsletter,
there are more than one million displaced
people inside Iraq, most of them in Baghdad, Diyala, and Nineveh.23 There have
been waves of migrants since 2003 fleeing
terrorist acts, organized crime, and sectarian violence.
The displacement occurred within and
across governorates. Figure 3.2 shows that
40 percent of people changed their residence within the ten years prior to 2013 and
21 percent within the past six to ten years
Figure 3.2
Duration of Residency in current place (all population)
Source: Iraq Poverty and Maternal Mortality Mapping survey IPMM -2013
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
45
The reasons given for their displacement included threats and armed conflicts
(25 percent) and accompanying the family (35 percent).24 (See Figure 3.3.)
Figure 3.3
Reasons for Changing the Place of Residence
Source: Iraq Poverty and Maternal Mortality Mapping survey IPMM -2013
Figure 3.4 shows that Duhok is one
of the most attractive governorates for
the population, followed by Salahuddin.
The governorate of Dhi Qar is the most
repellent for the population, followed by
Nineveh, which is still considered the
most troubled in its particular security and
political context.
The displacement statistics relating to
the economic situation (e.g. employment
reasons at 8.6 percent or poor services at
1.2 percent) do not provide sufficient justification by themselves for the massive
movement of people, including the youth.
Armed conflict through the past 10 years
remain the major cause for displacement
(changing residency) for families and
youth alike.
Figure 3.4
Net Migration by governorates
Source: Iraq Poverty and Maternal Mortality Mapping survey IPMM -2013
Indeed, the same survey results show
a similar pattern of displacement for the
youth. Twenty percent changed their
place of residence because of threats and
46
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
armed conflicts and 47 percent accompanied their families. Only 4 percent give
work or poor services as a reason for their
movement (Figure 3.5).
Figure 3.5
Reasons for Changing the Place of Residence (15–29 Years)
Source: Iraq Poverty and Maternal Mortality Mapping survey IPMM -2013
Youth Migration:
Why Do Young People Want to
Loss of Real Wealth
Migrate?
The UN Secretary-General’s report sug-
Decades of instability in Iraq led young
gests that migration enables youth to ben-
people to be strongly desirous of migra-
efit from globalization and increase their
well-being, hoping to get better opportunities. Migration around the world has
increased thanks to the integrated global
economy.
Though the relationship between growing populations and dwindling resources
explains many international migration
tion. Youth migration and its continuity
over the last three decades in Iraq is a response to the failure of successful interaction between the economic and political
structures, which was instead characterized by disorder and violence that largely
targeted the youth. This is apart from the
demographic transformations in the country.
cases, it is not the case for Iraq (with
The 2012 Youth Survey showed that
abundant oil resources). The economic
22.2 percent of Iraqi young people aged
factor is enough to explain Iraqis’ migra-
15–29 wished to migrate (29 percent of
tion, particularly the youth, only in the
young males and 14 percent of young fe-
embargo decade of the 1990s, which can
males; 23.5 percent in urban areas against
be classified as voluntary migration.25
Despite a lack of accurate statistics or
reliable figures (official or otherwise) on
the Iraqi refugees abroad, international
reports and studies reveal that a significant number of young people, especially
males, with varying education levels left
the country.26 Many of those were medi-
19 percent in rural areas).
This rate is higher in the Kurdistan Region (35.5 percent) than in the other Iraqi
governorates (20 percent). This shows
that the motives for migration are compound and not only due to insecurity or
poor living conditions (Kurdistan Region
is more secure and less poor than the other
governorates). Other factors, such as the
cal and educational professionals, and the
ability to meet the requirements for mi-
impact of their loss on the performance of
gration and individual ambition, clearly
these sectors is apparent.
play a role.
27
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
47
Figure 3.6
Why Youth Want to Migrate
Source: Youth survey YS-2012
Among the most important motivations
for youth migration is the search for job
opportunities and a higher income. Nationally, 45.3 percent of the youth (50
percent of the males and 33 percent of the
females) gave these reasons. The highest rate was for the 25–29 age group (27
percent), compared to 20 percent for the
18–19 age group.
How Youth Migrants or Displaced
Youth Assess Their Conditions
During the preparation of the NHDR
2014, in order to incorporate youth problems and the perceptions of the youth, the
youth team conducted focus group meetings and listening sessions. As neighbouring Syria and Jordan were the top Iraqi migrant recipient countries, and security was
deteriorating in Syria, Jordan was chosen
by the team as the best place to conduct
a session outside Iraq. The meeting took
place in October 2012 in Amman.
Youth Voice
Iraqi Youth in Jordan – A Different View
Eighteen young men and eleven young women
attended the meeting. They included high school
and college students, NGO staff, and residents.
Some only had temporary residency, while others
were joining the queue to get asylum in another
country.
It was clear from the dialogue session with this
group of young Iraqi immigrants in Jordan that their
immigration enabled them to distance themselves
and look at their society’s reality differently.
“Living in Jordan opened our eyes to many things
that were either absent from our minds when we
were in Iraq or we simply could not find there,” said
a female immigrant. “Unlike in Iraq, here we can
freely express our psychological and personal feelings of joy, sadness, and depression.”
The other group members quickly concurred with
this view. “Here, there are no religious ceremonies
or sectarian rituals that make you feel that you belong to a certain sect,” said another young woman.
“Here, we feel more nostalgic for each other than
48
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
we did in Baghdad,” commented a young man.
It has nothing to do with the estrangement which
drives immigrants nearer to each other. In the Iraqi
case, it expresses the rejection of political divisions
based on sectarianism, which, they think, is illogical.
“Here in Jordan, the only thing that divides the Iraqi
youth is not sect, race, religion, or political affiliation,
but rather the football teams we support: Real Madrid or Barcelona,” said a young sports fan. “It is just
a way of rejecting the dominant divisions in Iraq.”
This meeting in Amman brought together young
men and women; students and activists; employed
and unemployed; Sunnis, Shiites, Christians, and
Sabians; Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen. It seems that
such a meeting would have been impossible in Iraq.
“Here, we overcome our divisions, and the CSOs
gather the Iraqis despite their differences and diversity,” added a participant. “Meeting is possible outside Iraq and outside politics.”
Each one of them has their own migration or displacement story, and each has its fair share of trag-
edy. A participant migrated at the height of the
sectarian conflict; another was abducted and was
of the view that his friend was involved; the family
members of a third were killed; and another could
not find a job. Each one came from a different area
and environment, but they all had been exposed
to different forms of violence, which forced them to
migrate. “When my parents decided to leave Baghdad, I strongly objected, but they forced me to migrate and I had actually no choice. Now, however,
I am convinced that they were right,” said a female
participant.
Civil activists felt an even bigger difference between the two environments, perhaps due to their
work. “We feel that others, like CSOs and international organizations, care about us,” said a young
participant. “Unlike in Iraq, the voluntary work here
is more organized and respected. And it enables
us to serve Iraqis more than others. It has nothing to
do with evading responsibility; on the contrary, it is
about the need to serve society and about self-fulfilment. Here, it is easy to study and work at the same
time and change jobs freely, which is currently not
possible in Iraq, especially for girls.”
Freedom is the magical word. “They look at me
dubiously and they feel I am a stranger,” said a civil
activist, explaining how she feels when she visits her
relatives in Baghdad. “My relatives and friends do
not even like my veil and I do not know why. I am
religious and wear the veil because I am convinced
about it. I do not understand what all the fuss is
about.”
“They look at us as if we were strangers and not
like them, simply because we live in Jordan,” concurred a young man.
This extreme sense of isolation is common during
hard times and civil conflicts. Now, extremism dominates in Iraq. There is disdain and maybe some hatred towards all people who are different – whether
How Do Policies Respond to
Demographic Challenges?
There seems to be wide awareness within
society and among policymakers of the
demographic challenges that impact on
human development. These include high
fertility rates and their impact on dependency, youth emigration and the need to
sustain ties with them, the instability of
an internally displaced population, and
the necessity of responding to the demographic window.
The National Development Plan
2013–2017 responds through its
goals:
• Integrating population issues into development programmes
• Gradually influencing the high population growth rates
for just being wealthier, having a better job or education, or even for wearing more liberal and colourful
clothes. It is a well-known self-defence mechanism
to fortify one’s convictions and retreat into one’s social milieu, with a narrowing of affiliations – from the
world to the nation, then to the religion, tribe, clan,
party, sect, etc. or to a mixture of these.
We asked the participants which things they
wished could disappear once and for all from Iraq.
The answers were quick and disorderly: “Sectarianism, corruption, poor government performance,
quotas, religious exploitation, oil, ignorance, intervention of neighbouring countries, unemployment,
division, and concrete barricades.” These words do
not form a complete sentence, but they are important priorities for human development.
To complete the picture, we asked another question: Which things do you wish Iraq had? The answers poured out: “A return to what Iraq was like
in the 1970s, once again safe and open; the Iraqi
people become once again cooperative, tolerant,
and united; good services in all areas; a favourable
environment for agriculture; our social life as it used
to be; integrity and commitment to work; Iraq’s rivers
returned to their prime; etc.”
It was not surprising that all wanted Iraq to return
to the 1970s. It is a legitimate nostalgia for security,
welfare, and social freedoms, though these were
actually not guaranteed at the time, as Iraqis then
were also suffering from serious problems related
to freedom, democracy, and equality, though different from the current ones. This nostalgia for the
‘golden past’ is part of crises and culture wars, when
the future is bleak and uncertain. When young people neither see light at the end of the tunnel nor trust
their ability to change the present, their dreams for
the future are projected onto history. The return to
the past, which is impossible in reality, is only considered when a better future seems impossible.
• Increasing the life expectancy rate
In the National Youth Strategy (2013–
2020), the demographic dimension is
prominent as one of the reasons for the
formation of the strategy: “The demographic dividend will require efforts to
build human capital through knowledge,
information, skills, increasing youth participation and productivity, and decreasing dependency rates significantly.” (page
11).In the same context of responding to
demographic challenges, Higher Population Council was established in 2013 (see
Box 3.1).
Though it is one of the government’s
tasks, the realization of the above goals
and their impact on the development of
the youth remains the responsibility of the
youth themselves.
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
49
Box 3.1
Population Policy 2013 – No More Neglect of Population Issues
For many decades, the consecutive Iraqi governments did not pay
special attention to population policies, unlike other countries. Nor were
they enthusiastic about adopting
the recommendations of relevant
international
conferences
and
symposiums. The decisions taken
by the state in the 1970s supported
maintaining high population growth
rates, through providing incentives
for families with high fertility, encouraging early marriage, and providing other kinds of material and nonmaterial support accompanied by
the banning of the promotion and
selling of contraceptives for many
years. They only started to be used
in the early 1990s in reproductive
health and family planning centres.
In brief, population issues were not
linked with development efforts.
Having issued the 2008 NHDR, the
Ministry of Planning (MoP) realized
that the lack of population policies
thwarted development and the
creation of a quality society that
compared with developing countries which lacked Iraq’s financial
capabilities and natural resources.
However, there are challenges to
50
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
designing and implementing clear
population policies in Iraq: a lack of
development strategies and goals
that can be used as the basis for
population policies, an absence of
specific entities tasked with population policymaking at the institutional
and community level, and, due to
the delayed census, a lack of integrated and comprehensive databases that can help develop population policies.
The Higher Population Council
was formed in February 2013 according to the recommendations
of the, which stressed the need
for adopting workable and legally
acceptable population policies
based on a vision to achieve the
national strategic goals to bring
about changes in the quality and
quantity of the population that are
conducive to sustainable development, justice, and equal opportunities as soon as possible, as well as
attain the International Conference
on Population and Development’s
population goals and the MDGs.
Okud Hussein, Director of Population Policies
Chapter 4
The Youth and Economic
Challenges
The Challenge of Youth
Unemployment
The youth’s right to work, equal opportunity, and engagement in social and political activities is an essential component
of the development process. This right is
emphasized in Article 22 of the 2005 Iraqi
Constitution and in state policies referred
to in the National Employment Policy
2010–2014, the National Development
Plan 2013–2017, and the National Youth
Strategy 2013–2020.
Work is not only an economic necessity for meeting one’s daily needs, but is
also assumed to be a life project for young
people, through which they seek to realize themselves, their ambitions, and their
dreams. Work also has an intrinsic and
instrumental value as a tool for achieving
other goals.
Article 22 of the
Iraqi Constitution
First: Work is a right
for all Iraqis to
guarantee them a
decent life.
The National Development Plan 2013–2017: Strategic Goals
Associated with Labour Market Reform
1.Reducing the unemployment rate to 6 percent
2.Raising the economic activity rate to 60 percent
3.Developing labour market institutions
4.Improving labour productivity
5.Providing a decent working environment
6.Expanding the scope of secure work
Youth Economic Activity
The economic activity rate (EAR) measures people’s economic participation by
looking at how many people in a certain
age group are active or potentially active
members of the labour market.
The EAR for the age group of 15–29
was 38.4 percent (63.4 percent for males
and 12 percent for females).There is a
clear gap between women’s and men’s
EAR. The gap runs as high as 76 percent
for the 25–45 age group. This difference,
however, begins to decline after the age of
45 (Figure 13).
Figure 4.1
The Gap in Male and Female Economic Activity Rates (15 years+)
Source: Iraq knowledge network survey IKN -2011
The highest EAR for the age group
15–25 (61 percent) was among
holders Development
of
Iraq Human
Report 2014
51
a diploma certificate or a higher degree.
The highest EAR for males was among
illiterate individuals (76 percent), while
the highest EAR for females was among
holders of a diploma or higher degree (50
percent). This means that higher education is a more important factor in finding a job for females than for males.
How Do Young People Get a Job?
The Youth Survey 2012 shows that young
people got their jobs in the following
ways: family and personal relationships
(52.5 percent), work experience (18 percent), educational attainment (8.7 percent), technical or vocational training (4.5
percent), and other factors (13.4 percent).
The rate of young males who acquired
jobs through family or personal relationships (54.2 percent) was higher than that
of females (36.8 percent). It is evident that
young women’s qualifications for the labour market largely depend on their level
of education, with 32.1 percent compared
to 6.1 percent for males (Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2
How the Youth Get Jobs
Source: Youth survey YS-2012
Youth Unemployment
Characteristics
Figure 4.3 shows the different youth unemployment rates (YURs) between males
and females aged 15–29, with the females
having higher rates. In 2011, the YUR
was 33.3 percent among females and 15.5
percent among males. These rates are
high compared to the overall unemployment rate of 20.7 percent for females and
9.2 percent for males.
The fact that young women’s unemployment rate is twice as high as young
men’s suggests a growing demand for
employment among young women, which
exceeds supply. The discrepancy in unemployment rates between young men and
women (10.1 percent and 37.6 percent
respectively) in the Kurdistan Region is
very large, which reflects a greater need
for employment among young women
in Kurdistan, compared with the rest of
Iraq’s governorates (Figure4.3).
Figure 4.3
Youth Unemployment Rate in Iraqi Governorates and Kurdistan Region
Source: Iraq knowledge network survey IKN -2011
52
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Young men’s overall unemployment
rate was as high as 20 percent in urban
areas and as low as 14.9 percent in rural
areas. However, it should be noted that
concepts related to employment, unemployment, or underemployment could be
different in rural areas when work within
the context of a small or extended family
(with or without pay)and labour hoarding
are taken into consideration.
Similarly, young women’s unemployment rate is higher in urban areas (58.2
percent) than in rural areas (10.4 percent),
though rural women’s economic participation is likely much higher than the officially published figures.
High unemployment rates are significant among educated youth and university
graduates. Education did not adjust to the
changes in the labour market, creating numerous graduates but limited demand for
a highly educated workforce. Such a situation might be expected given the limited
production capacities outside the crude
oil sector, but also the cognitive, technological, administrative, and organizational
backwardness accumulated over three decades.
For the age group of 15–29, the higher
the educational attainment, the higher the
unemployment rate. Out of the total number of unemployed people, 15.4 percent
were holders of primary education certifi-
cates and 31.6 percent28 were university
graduates. Furthermore, the unemployment rate was 13 percent among holders
of high school and lower certificates and
24 percent among holders of higher certificates.
Unsuccessful Measures
Government measures to address unemployment are more or less responsible
for the high rates of underemployment
among young people working in the public sector. These measures include the following:
• Adopting temporary contracts as an
employment method aimed at reducing rates of open unemployment. These
contracts particularly assisted young
graduates, while also helping to reallocate the employees of ministries that
had been closed.
• The public sector employment expansion policy, which was adopted after
2005 with a view to increasing the
number of public sector employees, especially in the security apparatus.
The adoption of short-term policies
to alleviate income poverty by absorbing some of the openly unemployed into
part-time marginal jobs – positions such
as guards, cleaners, or painters of bridges
and pavement – has transformed them
into underemployed persons.
Box 4.1
Bridging the Gap between the Labour Market and Education
The Ministry of Planning is preparing the implementation of a Labour
Market Survey in 2014 for the first
time in Iraq. Early attempts to estimate the labour needs by education level in the public sector have
proved unsuccessful because of
lack of response of ministries. It became evident that both the education system and labour market
were incapable of upgrading their
standards or responding quickly to
Youth Underemployment
Based on the ILO definition of visible
underemployment,29 the rate of workers
aged 15–29 who are in visible underem-
the fast-growing technical skills and
professions needed for the growing
and diversified economy.
MoP is looking forward for this
achievement with the support of
the International Labour Organization (ILO).
Mehdi Alalaq
Head of the Labour Market Survey
Committee
ployment (36 percent) is higher than that
of the total working-age population (32.2
percent). And the same applies to invisible underemployment. In addition, the
rate of young people in underemployment
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
53
is 18.4 percent in rural areas and 21 percent in urban areas.
Underemployment is primarily observed within undereducated groups – illiterate persons, semi-illiterate persons,
and those with an education below the
high school level. The rate is lower for
holders of diplomas and higher qualifications. This means that the higher the
educational attainment, the greater the
likelihood of having access to a secure,
full-time job. A higher rate of illiterate or
undereducated people work fewer hours,
often in seasonal, temporary, and insecure
jobs. It should be noted that the rates are
similar for both sexes at this level (Table
4.1).
Table 4.1
Distribution of Underemployed Individuals by Age Group and
Educational Attainment
Educational attainment
Underemployment (%)
Age 15–29
Age 15+
Illiterate/can read and write
23.4
20.5
Primary/high school
19.0
16.1
Diploma and above
13.9
8.8
Total
20.1
15.9
Source: Iraq knowledge network survey IKN -2011
Underemployed Young People’s
Workplace
Streets are the workplace with the largest
number of underemployed workers; 41.3
percent of young males and 21 percent of
young females work as peddlers and as
drivers of carts or vehicles. Location is not
a big factor, as this rate is 43 percent in urban areas and 37 percent in rural areas.
Construction sites/workshops rank
second, with 28 percent of young males
(four times higher than the rate of young
females) working in them. This suggests a
considerable number of job opportunities
in the construction and building sector,
probably due to the marked boom in the
private construction sector in recent years
(Table 10, Statistical Appendix).
Young Women’s Working Pattern
Suggests Exclusion
Generally, women are more active in agriculture (32 percent of women in general
and 56 percent30 of females aged 15–29),
often as part of their family role. However, women’s activities in rural areas
are largely unpaid. In fact, 86.3 percent
of working males over the age of 15 have
paid work, compared to only 13.7 percent
of working women of the same age group.
Among working women in the age groups
of 15–19 and 20–24, only 2.4 percent
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Iraq Human Development Report 2014
and 6.4 percent, respectively, are paid. In
contrast, paid working males in the same
age groups are 97.6 percent and 93.6 percent.31
Apart from seasonal harvesting crops
in the countryside, young women are engaged in specific jobs, such as operating
date presses and working in brick-making
factories. Despite the work’s material and
human value, the gender pay gap and the
absence of protection and security for
these women are hugely exclusionary.
In cities, although it is widely believed
that females seek work in socially acceptable places such as factories, offices, institutions, and manufacturing plants (19.5
percent), one in five females has a job that
offends their dignity – for example, on the
street or as a peddler. The total distribution of the female workforce in different
workplaces suggests clear marginalization compared to the male workforce: females’ jobs are unpaid, such as working
in the family home (23 percent) and farm
or agricultural work (17.5 percent), and
are unstable, temporary, and insecure due
to the absence of social security systems
(Table 10, Statistical Appendix).
Unemployment and Poverty
Youth unemployment suggests structural
and emergent gaps in the economic sys-
tem and a state of disassociation between
education outputs and labour market inputs. While education systems have been
expanded to accommodate young people,
the lack of coordination between them enhances unemployment. The numbers of
graduates are much greater than the available opportunities for proper training; indeed, training as an intermediate process
that facilitates entry into the labour market is almost absent.
Unemployment is one of the major
causes of tension among the youth and
makes them worry about their uncertain
personal future. This feeling intensifies
among poor young people – the rate of in-
come poverty for the youth comes to 17.9
percent, ranging between 52.4 percent in
Muthanna Governorate and 1.1 percent in
Sulaymaniya (Figure 4.4). Work becomes
an indicator of exclusion when it is forced
and unpaid, thus failing to enhance a human being’s independence, self-confidence, and satisfaction.
While unemployment and the ensuing
poverty have become the embodiment of
inequality, the increasingly widespread
feeling of injustice among young people
constantly fuels the social and economic
polarization that generates impoverishment and exclusion.
Figure 4.4
Income Poverty for the 15–29 Age Group
Source: Iraq household social -economic survey IHSES-2012
Box 4.2
Wastage of Youth Potential
Working hard to earn a living: In the Shorja market
and its surroundings in downtown Baghdad, one
can see successive waves of short and long handcarts made from wood or iron, pushed or pulled by
young men, passing quickly. They leave bystanders
amazed, as their movement is unrelenting, and they
go side by side or one after the other without colliding with each other. On the faces of the workers,
you see no signs of tiredness. You only hear the word
“Allah” with each lift or push.
It is a scene that does not belong to the 21st century. “Such is our daily work,” says a young man. “We
start in the early morning, paying no attention to hot
or cold weather. We have our own carriages, and
we deal with merchants according to the size of the
goods or boxes. We are paid 2,000 dinars for each
box we move. Thank God, by the end of the day,
we get a good daily pay.”
“It is a very tiring job, but we have to take it to provide for our families,” says another. “We tried many
temporary jobs, like construction, but we used to
work one day and stay idle for ten days, waiting for
another opportunity. Thank God, this job is permanent. True, it is exhausting, but we have got used
to it and we now have acquaintances and friends
among the merchants through whom we can find
work. There is high demand for our work in Shorja
because large trucks are not allowed to enter the
Shorja market. Thank God, we earn a good living.”
“Work is not shameful,” says a 20-year-old man. “I
do not care if I work as a porter or a shoeblack as
long as I earn a living. People used to mock porters,
but as you see now, thousands of young men work
here. Unlike other places, there is work here and un-
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
55
employment is unfortunately is on the rise. More importantly, I do not return to my family with an empty
pocket.”
“Most workers here come from other governorates
where there are no job opportunities,” says his colleague. “Some of them are even university graduates. They work from early in the morning till afternoon when the transport activities fade. It is very
tiring and exacting work, but it is better than nothing
and better than staying at home. When we finish, we
tie our handcarts with iron chains in different places,
mostly in Al Rasafi Square, and we sleep in cheap
hotels. Thank God, we can cover our daily expenses,
and keep some money for our families, too.”
Adapted from Abdujjabbar Utabi, ‘They Waste Their Energies
Pushing and Pulling Carts to Earn a Living: Young Men Have Become Horses around Shorja’,www.Almutamer.com
At the end of this chapter, the question
remains: if the generation gap, favouring
boys over girls, the authoritarian culture in
the family, and the dangerous behaviours
of which we have given examples are all
an expression of individual, familial, and
social crises, is it possible to address them
individually without comprehensively
addressing the other social, economic,
and political aggravating factors? This is
what this report is trying to answer as it
makes the argument that development is
an integral, comprehensive, and indivisible process. In the following chapters,
we will address other dimensions of the
process to integrate the youth, including
their roles in education and other development fields.
Fair Opportunity for Young Women
The 2013 public federal budget
has allotted 10,000 jobs in the
public sector to females, with priority given to widows and female
breadwinners.
Box 4.3
Successful Measures towards Poverty Alleviation
• In 2010, Iraq launched a national Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) that included multisector development policies as well as legislative
reform programmes advocating for the interests
of the poor.
• A distinctive feature of the PRSP was that it was not
a mere national document, as it came into effect
immediately after endorsement by the Council of
Ministers, through Resolution 409/2009, and obligated ministries and governorates to include the
PRS activities in their annual plans, in addition to
allocating annual funds from the investment budget earmarked for service ministries and underprivileged governorates in 2012. In 2013, the allocations were increased to cover projects in poor
areas in all governorates, where most of the funds
were earmarked for building low-cost housing
compounds, enhancing primary health care services, demolishing and rebuilding mud schools,
and the Small Loan Fund for the Poor Project. Out
of the 14 projects included in the 2012 investment
budget, the following projects were found to be
more relevant to youth:
• Remove mud schools in Iraq through demolishing
and rebuilding 409 traditional or prefabricated
clay schools in the governorates.
• Increase the numbers of mobile clinics for remote
areas through purchasing three quality mobile
clinics (equipped with an X-ray unit and binocular
microscope to diagnose tuberculosis) and distributing them to the northern, central, and southern
governorates.
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• Provide 21 types of lab equipment and devices
for health centres in the governorates.
• Support the Small Loan Fund for the Poor Project,
which grants a small loan – totalling 5–10 million
Iraqi dinars – according to specific controls and
mechanisms to the following groups in the eight
poorest governorates: the disabled, displaced
returnees, widows, divorcees, female breadwinners, female ex-convicts, those affected by terrorist attacks, breadwinners of financially unstable
families residing near landfills, and beggars.
• Implement projects to build low-cost residential
complexes for the poor and provide the relevant
necessary infrastructure: schools, hospitals, paved
roads, and wastewater networks in Muthanna,
Qadisiya, Salahuddin, Diyala, Babil, and Wasit.
• Build primary health care centres (establish 20
health care sites, each containing a caravan
and a generator within a fenced piece of land
and covering 200–1,000 people, to be distributed
to the districts in Salahuddin Governorate).
• Organize markets in poor neighbourhoods (establish eight souks, each with 32 kiosks, in the districts of Salahuddin, and establish 100 kiosks in
Qadisiya Governorate).
• Take measures to provide infrastructure for the
low-cost residential housing unit projects for the
poor, including public utilities and connections to
the main road.
The PRS Executive Management Director-General
Najlaa Ali Murad
The Challenge of a Rentier
Economy32
After the collapse of the totalitarian regime in 2003, important changes such as
openness to the world and the initiation
of an economic reform process did not
constitute the starting point for building
a new economy nor did they lead to resuming development, which had stalled
for decades. The expectations of a better
standard of living and lifestyle were too
high, especially among the youth; the
management of the national economy and
of the resource allocation policy failed to
meet people’s needs, despite growing oil
revenues.
These changes have actually weakened
the already weak inherited institutional
frameworks, pending the completion of
the transition to a new economy. The transition neither produced structural shifts
conducive to development resumption
nor created new opportunities for young
people, who soon faced the reality that
they were stuck in a long-term transitional
phase with an undetermined destination.
With an average GDP per capita higher
than that of Iraq in 1980, many countries in Latin America, the Middle East,
and North Africa have made significant
progress in the past three decades, while
Iraq has lost growth opportunities. Wars,
sanctions, and armed conflicts have led to
a deficit of infrastructure and production
capacities; poor institutions; and confused
political, economic, social, and cultural
structures. This affected young people
and even the planning and implementation aspects of the development process,
in which young people are supposed to be
central.
At the same time, the population continued to grow, concentrated in the urban
areas. Thus, over four decades, extraordinary circumstances have imposed a catastrophic situation for young people in all
areas. Many young people lost their lives.
Material and financial resources were allocated to internal and external conflicts
under the ‘war economy’ prior to 2003,
and to security issues under the ‘security
economy’ after 2003. The priorities of
successive governments deviated from the
development process and instead focused
on getting independence from the occupation, achieving internal security, fighting
terrorism, and minimizing the corruption
that was spreading in all institutions.
In Iraq the oil sector is the main generator of national income and the mainstay
of the state budget; its revenues affect the
overall economy. The years of sanctions
revealed how fragile the Iraqi economy
was without oil. When oil exports declined and then were blocked, there was a
sharp decline in the GNI per capita from
US$3,812 in 1980 to only US$180 in
1994.
Ten years after the announcement of the
transition from a centralized economy to
a market economy, the pillars of transition
from a rentier state to a production-oriented one (as happened in other rentier countries, such as Norway, Indonesia, Chile,
and Botswana) have not been established
yet. Instead, the rentier state institutions
are consolidated through the public budget policy, which continues to produce a
rentier private sector and a society almost
completely dependent on rent (revenue).
Thus, the idea of a​​ rentier state, established in the mind of government and
society (the youth in particular), has not
been removed.
Iraq’s economy continues to heavily
depend on the oil sector in light of the
steadily declining contribution of non-oil
commodity activities (agriculture, industry) to the GDP. Indeed, the contributions
of manufacturing and agriculture to the
GDP declined to 2 percent and 5 percent
respectively, as opposed to their averages
of 9 percent and 22 percent respectively
five decades ago. The oil sector, with a
contribution of 55–60 percent of the GDP,
only employed 2 percent of the workforce, and the productivity of the remaining 98 percent of the workforce was very
low in commodity and service production
activities, with a contribution of no more
than 30 percent of the GDP in 2011.33
Apart from the oil sector, the current
contribution of services to the GDP is 50
percent at best; the Iraqi service economy
is one of low productivity and diversity,
and is dominated by fragile service activities. Therefore, the nature of the rentier
structure affects the general employment
structure and the number and nature of
job opportunities generated by economic
growth. And national income is directly
affected by increased oil revenues rather
than by increased productivity rates (Box
4.4).
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
57
Box 4.4
National Development Plan 2013–2017 – No Choice but Oil
The NDP 2013–2017 states that “the Iraqi economy
has not witnessed structural changes. The general
trend still confirms the fact that the oil sector is the
largest contributor to the GDP, which is somewhat
temporarily consistent with the NDP investment policy which calls for the temporary acceptance of a
continuous unilateral economy to increase oil production and exports in order to enhance the financial position of Iraq to finance development and
reconstruction programs. Thus, the structural imbalance of the economy in 2009–2011 was intentionally outward, but it is almost internally sustainable for
decades.”
Therefore, “the revenues derived from crude oil
production and export continued to constitute the
largest contributor to the state’s public revenues,
with 97.4% in 2012. Oil revenues are expected to remain at the forefront and continue to influence the
Iraqi economy during the NDP period 2013–2017 in
light of the constant improvement of the productive
capacity of the oil sector, as well as the implementation of contracts signed with foreign companies to
increase production and exports. During 2013–2017,
oil production and oil exports are expected to annually increase by 17.9% and 26.2% respectively on
average and the total public revenues of the state
are expected to amount to IQD 812.263 trillion, 95%
of which are oil revenues and 5% non-oil revenues.”
The Public Budget as a Tool to
Steer the Economy
Increased oil revenues clearly affect the
public budget, which now decides the
movement and trends of the economy.
Figure 4.5 shows the budgets from 2003
to 2013, which rely almost entirely on oil
revenues. Oil exports account for 95 percent of government revenues, and their
contribution to the GDP is nearly 70 percent.
The public budget policy continued to
rely on setting allocations, rather than
on specific developmental programmes.
Therefore, since 2003 the federal budget
has not witnessed any substantial change
towards addressing the imbalanced public expenditure structure, which continued to favour operating expenditure at
the expense of investment expenditure.
This imbalance is attributed to the goal of
promoting consumer welfare, as well as
inefficient investment programme implementation, which clearly affected growth
rates and job creation in the public and
private sectors. The unemployment rate
for young people, especially new graduates, was higher than the overall rate of
unemployment (Chapter 8).
Figure 4.5
Iraq’s General Budget 2003–2012 (US$ billions)
Source: Federal Budget Laws 2004–2013
Administrative and financial corruption and inefficient public expenditure
management affect how the public budget
functions, as well as how the government
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delivers infrastructure and public services, but do not affect households’ share of
oil income, which reached a much higher
level than before the blockade.
Utilization of Oil Revenues
Rising global oil prices and increased
crude oil production and export have led
to an increased average GNI per capita
through direct and indirect channels, most
importantly public expenditure. The government wage bill (i.e. paying the wages
of employees and retirees) constitutes up
to 40 percent of government expenditure.
In addition, there are social welfare remittances, compensation pay-outs, and inkind provisions from the ration card.
There are also other channels for benefiting from government expenditure,
such as public project contracting and
supply contracts. The recovery of trade
and transport activities are also based on
government expenditure in general. Government banks have also extended their
loan services to households. However,
poor families have no access to these oil
revenue channels – namely, working for
the state (or its projects), contracting with
it, or borrowing from it.
It is well known that a rapidly increased
GNI due to higher crude oil revenue is not
necessarily associated with more and better infrastructure and the improved quality and quantity of basic services. This is
because a significant amount of time is
needed to first improve the capacities required for such changes.
The above factors may reduce the positive effects of increased oil revenues on
the population in general and young
people in particular. However, increased
government investment and operational
expenditure, as well as an improved ability to import, lead to higher household
income and consumption, so young people’s lives get better despite their dependence on their families.
With the significant increase in the average GNI per capita (Figure 11), the Gini
coefficient – used to measure income inequality (expenditure) – increased from
29 percent in 2007 to 32 percent in 2012,34
and the disparity in rural areas (34 percent) remained higher than in urban areas
(31 percent).
A more equitable income distribution pattern leads to better performance
in human development; with an income
increase, poor families spend more to
improve their human development indicators: food, health, and education. The
poorer the family, the more this income
increase is spent on food and caloric in-
Approximately 5.9 million
people get benefits from
government allocations
(2.9 million receive salaries,
2 million are pensioners,
and 1million receive
subsidies and social
benefits). Since there are
about 5 million households
in Iraq, it is obvious that
most of the population,
including young people,
somehow connect to this
network.
take.35 The improved children’s education also has positive effects.36 The bigger
the budget of a homemaker, the more the
family spends on food compared to other items, according to field case studies,
which confirms that a family rather than
an individual is the core economic unit.
National Budget: The Main
Generator of Employment
Opportunities
The operating expenditure in the general
budget finances existing jobs and creates
new jobs as well, in light of the weak and
declining role of the private sector in all
areas of economic activity. The average
operating expenditures were 70 percent
of the total expenditures of the federal
budget for the fiscal years 2008–2012,
while investment expenditures were 30
percent.37
According to the federal budget laws,
the workforce of the centrally funded
ministries and departments increased
from 2.06 million in 2007 to 2.468 million in 2010, 2.75 million in 2012, and 2.9
million in 2013.
Assuming that the Iraqi population in
2013 was 34.4 million, and that the economic activity rate (EAR) was 26 percent,
the number of economically active people, including the unemployed, is around
8,944,000. The above numbers show that
civil servants represent one-third of the
economically active population, which is
a high proportion considering the current
orientation towards a market economy
and the state’s movement away from production, save some limited activities that
will soon be wrapped up.
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
59
Figure 4.6
Distribution of Family Income by Source
Source: Iraq household social - economic survey IHSES- 2007 & 2012
The proportion of civil servants in developed countries where the government
plays a major role in the provision of public services, such as the EU countries, is
as high as 10 percent of the population.38
In Iraq, the increased government employment has not been accompanied by
expanded government efforts in provid-
ing services or improving their quality.
The nature of the rentier state imposes
this increase in recruitment, but Iraq is
also oriented towards social peace and
pleasing the groups participating in the
government. Maintaining this policy will
only fuel public pressure to increase government employment.
Figure 4.7
Working People by Age Group and Sector
Source: Iraq household social -economic survey IHSES- 2012
The Political Economy of the
Rentier State
Population studies predict the number of
young people in Iraq to increase by 107
percent by 2040, and significantly decrease in several countries in the region
(by nearly 41 percent in Iran, around 20
percent in Tunisia, and about 27 percent
in Oman). 39
This significant growth in Iraq will
pump large numbers of young people into
the labour market (Chapter 3). This large
youth population is not necessarily negative. In societies with established institutions and a strong economy, young people
can add a lot in terms of production and
vitality. However, in societies that lack
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the social infrastructure necessary to integrate them, large numbers of young
people constitute a burden on resources
and a threat to social stability, especially
if accompanied by ethnic and sectarian divisions. When social and economic conditions are of a radical nature, the youth
response might be radical too.40
Nevertheless, if the state succeeds in
using high oil revenues resulting from increased oil prices and exports to initiate
long-term projects, it may be able to accommodate population growth without it
becoming an acute crisis. These projects
should aim at expanding the productive
base in the agricultural, industrial, and
service sectors, expanding the private
sector, and supporting youth projects and
training programmes that target the youth
as a workforce with the potential to make
a valuable contribution in the current economic and technological environment.
On the other hand, floundering economic policies and total dependence on oil
revenues (which might fall if prices decline), as well as continuous expansion of
the public sector and the resulting reliance
on the state for employment, are likely to
cause future crises. At a certain point, the
public sector will not be able to expand
any more, especially if oil prices fall, and
the economic and social value of government jobs will be higher, making them
subject to more competition. With the
current trend of exploiting appointments
in the public sector as a tool to expand the
authority of political parties, ethnic and
sectarian factors will continue to impact
on employment policies because of the
priority given to loyalty.
A number of political forces complain
of discrimination in appointments in the
public sector based on ethnicity, religion,
and sect. The problem they are identifying is related to the rentier state and the
expanding public sector. Some call for establishing a balanced ethnic and sectarian
system in public institutions, preferring
an institutionalized solution to facing the
risk of having the government employment card used as a political tool. However, even if the argument that an ethnic
and sectarian balance in state institutions
is useful for building a non-exclusionary
political and administrative system is true,
it seems unlikely to end the problem of rivalry for power and resources among ethnic and sectarian forces.
This situation has prompted many
young people to rely on ethnic, religious, and sectarian loyalty as a way to
get employment, which entrenches these
divisions at the expense of a national
identity. The fragmentation and lack of
organization in the government apparatus
is thereby maintained, with several power
centres and their accompanying loyalties,
but weak national loyalty.
If this trend continues, it may strengthen young people’s feeling of alienation
towards the state and its institutions, especially if the economic and social gap widens between those with a public job and
those without.
Such a feeling might generate violent
tendencies in the future. There is also
the possibility that the sense of marginalization will cross ethnic, religious, and
sectarian boundaries, activating a social
movement that works according to a larger Iraqi identity.41
Unattractive Environment for
Entrepreneurship
Public–private partnerships seem to be
the economic management method for the
transition to a market economy adopted by
the Iraqi Constitution in 2005. However,as
noted above, the public sector contribution to the GDP remains high. It was 65.4
percent in 2010 compared to 34.6 percent
for the private sector, which confirms the
latter’s modest role in the management
of development activities. The continued
absence of an institutional environment
attractive to national and foreign private
investment is perhaps the main reason for
this modest role and something that will
keep the private sector from being a youth
employment generator.
The NDP 2013–2017 adopts the public–private partnership model; the contributions of the public and private sectors
in the total NDP investments are 78.6 percent and 21.4 percent respectively.41
Box 4.5
The Public and Private Partnership (PPP) Project
The PPP is very important in creating giant infrastructure projects aimed at generating thousands
of jobs for young people in various sectors and creating inclusive markets, especially in underdeveloped areas. The real value of this partnership is to
introduce modern technology and know-how and
ensure effective implementation procedures. This
requires building government institutions’ capacity
at three levels of the PPP:
1. Policy level: supporting the enactment of a
PPP-regulating law
2. Institutional level: supporting the establishment
of centralized units for the PPP at the relevant
ministries to manage tendering procedures
3. Capacity-building level: developing the capacity of relevant ministries in the management of large tenders and follow-up on the PPP
implementation
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
61
Finally, the PPP and the attraction of international
financing institutions are important aspects of the
capacity-building process.
Review Team/UNDP
Young People in Business
The unclear role of the state and the private sector in this transition phase and the
fact that the latter’s growth opportunities
are concentrated in the financial sector –
linked to and benefiting from the rentier
nature of the economy –constitute in all
cases an obstacle to the growth of young
people’s economic activity. The areas of
work available to young people in Iraq
include small enterprises, non-financial
services, and all aspects of real activity
based on initiative. In a rentier economy,
confining the economic role of the state
to ‘rent distribution’ marginalizes the economic role of youth by pushing them to
work in unsustainable activities which
promote this parasitic behaviour. Thus
young people are deprived of realizing
their actual potential.
Entrepreneurship through small enterprises should be encouraged as a generator of employment and income and as a
means to combat poverty, and is best mainstreamed in those policies proposed to address young people’s problems. Since the
youth are more inclined to independence,
they prefer to be self-employed, which allows them greater freedom and satisfies
their ambitions, but small enterprises have
no supporting infrastructure in Iraq.
The success of this pattern in other
countries, such as those in South and East
Asia, is attributed to the link between
nascent small businesses and microenterprises and large private enterprises (or
privatized public ones) through supplementary relationships based on forward
and backward linkages under an economy
that is locally consolidated and integrated.
These productive opportunities are not
available for young people or anyone else
in Iraq –an inevitable result of the dominance of small enterprise and individual
activity over non-governmental economic
activity, and the public sector possession
and management of large economic enterprises in the sectors of industry, oil, and
construction.
Young people had to resort to individual
economic activities following the blockade in the early 1990s,sincethese were the
only available work opportunities. Generally speaking, this situation is being challenged because activities with easy access
suffer from severe overcrowding, while
individual businesses that require skilled
workers have remained within the range
allowed by the ordinary development of
skills through work. Education has not
succeeded in increasing the number of
skilled people. This has been left to apprenticeships, which operate in an uncertain, traditional, informal environment
that is relational and dependent on the
varying capabilities of the apprentices and
their readiness to work. This is true for
various types of construction, carpentry,
and blacksmithing, as well as the repair of
machinery, equipment, vehicles, etc.
In addition to inexperience, youth entrepreneurship is hampered by a lack of
resources, fear of failure, significant competition, and marketing challenges. Moreover, production technology might be outdated and simple due to limited resources.
An individual enterprise is usually based
on a single product, which increases risk
and heightens the possibility of withdrawal after a loss or difficulty.
Youth View
The soft loans for young people for setting up small
enterprises are not necessarily’ soft’:
•The complex controls and conditions of loans
make youth reluctant to apply for them.
•Youth have a fear of entering the labour market.
•Interest and instalments are not affordable.
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•New mechanisms to facilitate the youth’s access
to such loans are proposed.
(The NHDR Review Workshop, 13–14 March 2013,
Baghdad)
Independence is a strong motive for
young people who choose to engage in
small business voluntarily. These individuals show a willingness to innovate
and create new types of business. Those
who voluntarily choose small enterprises
are usually highly educated and from the
upper middle class, while those who are
forced into it are generally poor people
with a low level of education. The types
of small enterprises vary between hightechnology activities, such as computerrelated business and scientific laboratories, and service activities in retail,
transport, food, and other sectors.
Youth View
•Obstacles to self-employment:
•Fear of entering the labour market
•No capital or fear of losing limited funds
•Insufficient expertise
Opportunities for young women are
fewer than those for young men. The
measures being taken to help males get
suitable jobs, including those related to
small-scale activities, may not be enough
to remove the obstacles to young wom-
•A lack of government banking facilities
•Unstable labour market, with no regulation
(The NHDR Review Workshop, 13–14 March 2013,
Baghdad)
en’s economic participation and entrepreneurship. It should be noted that, among
young women, there is a clear reluctance
to work, mainly for social and cultural
reasons.
The National Youth Strategy 2013–2020
The strategy focuses on youth participation.
Strategic Goal IV: An active young generation in
Iraq participating widely in their communities.
Outcome II: Young people are actively participating in political and social life.
Vital practical programmes are proposed to empower young people:
•A national programme to prepare young leaders,
especially females, from all segments and groups,
according to global standards, able to form youth
groups and organizations in schools, villages, universities, clubs, and civil society organizations, in
accordance with high standards
•A programme adopted by secondary and vocational schools and universities to encourage young
people to work voluntarily in their community
Box 4.6 Special Contribution
National Development Plan 2013–2017 Advocates Young People’s Aspirations
How democratic the political system in a country is
defines the nature of its economic, social, and legal
systems. A dictatorial political system with an improvised economy also determines certain features of
the social system, including plans related to population growth. Over the last three decades, demographic shifts accompanied the wars and political
events in Iraq. The state’s neglect of these shifts and
the limited political and executive interest suggest
that the state is oblivious to population issues and
is not keen on integrating them into development
activities. This has widened the gap between the
goal of improving quality of life and reducing poverty and the goal of economic growth and material
production.
The NDP 2013–201742 emphasizes the importance
of integrating population data into developmental
activities to generate opportunities to measure the
impact of population on development and the im-
pact of development on the population. There was
a need for adopting a national population policy
that was informed and incorporated current trends
in order to promote population growth rates that
are responsive to the requirements of sustainable
growth and the labour market. In addition, the policy would protect the rights of future generations in
Iraq as a whole, ensuring the equal allocation and
distribution of financial resources to federal budgets
and regions’ development programmes in order to
promote decentralization and ensure sustainable
expenditure.
We believe that the adoption of these policies
is too late because the population growth in Iraq
is one of the highest in the world, and tackling this
problem is not an easy task for decision and policy
makers. However, in line with the principles of sustainable human development, the NDP 2013–7032
adopts this vision: “Towards a harmonious popula-
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
63
tion policy integrated with economic and development trends and which effects quantitative and
qualitative changes in people’s lives to achieve sustainable development, justice, and equal opportunities.”
Iraqi society is about to enter the so-called ‘demographic gift’, in which the working-age population
is more than 55 percent of the total population. This
could turn into a problem for Iraq, which depends
on the public sector to create job opportunities. This
sector is burdened with numerous underemployed,
unproductive employees, but their recruitment has
become a de facto systematic policy to silence
voices clamouring for job opportunities. In addition, recruitment in the public sector has become
a weapon the opposition uses to put pressure on
the government. The unemployment situation has
indeed become the most powerful weapon threatening governments.
If the NDP does not invest in the opportunity this
demographic gift represents, it could turn into a
challenge that exacerbates the problems facing the
youth. Comprehensive, progressive policies should
be adopted in the field of employment generation
to turn the growing numbers of young people from
an economic burden into an economic strength.
Although oil revenues constitute nearly 95 percent
of the total revenues projected for 2013–2017 – thus
exposing the NDP to another challenge – the allocation of approximately 40 percent of the total revenues (estimated at 812 trillion Iraqi dinars during the
five years of the NDP) for investment would provide
a historic opportunity to boost job generation to address unemployment and poverty, thereby promoting sustainable equity.
Employment surveys show that unemployment
rates among young people, especially graduates of
institutes and universities, are the highest in Iraq due
to competition from older groups. The unemployment rate (according to the ILO definition) in 2012
was estimated at 12 percent in general and 24 percent for young people. About 25 percent of graduates of universities and institutes are unemployed or
are underemployed in jobs incommensurate with
their educational attainment.
What makes graduates’ unemployment even
worse is that the skill sets produced by the education system are not what the labour market requires.
In addition, young graduates are reluctant to work
in the private sector because they deem the public sector jobs more sustainable and advantageous.
The new pension bill seeks to bridge the gap between the two sectors through considering employees’ period of service in one sector –for the purposes
of promotion, bonus, and retirement – when moving
to work in the other sector, as well as matching the
pension rights in both sectors.
The NDP adopts several methods to realize its goal
of halving the unemployment rate to 6 percent by
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Iraq Human Development Report 2014
2017, including the promotion of labour-intensive
economic activities. Other means of advocating
for the entrance of young people into the labour
market include ensuring an investment environment that is attractive to private capital, adopting
empowerment programmes to develop the skills of
the unemployed, and providing soft loans to unemployed skilled workers and craftspeople.
However, achieving this goal depends on addressing other challenges, most prominently the
non-enactment of a privatization law and the delayed restructuring of public institutions. In addition,
the delayed enactment of social security and labour laws has frozen most of the initiatives and intervention options of the National Employment Plan
2010–2014. Furthermore, the work environment in
the private sector is somewhat discouraging due to
political instability, poor export conditions, and the
limited infrastructure and proper systems related to
electricity, fuel, security, and tariffs.
Although the gender gap in education is closing, with enrolment rates in primary school almost
the same for males and females, the rates for both
males and females in secondary and higher education are declining. This shows that education is being
influenced by cultural systems, social customs and
traditions, and economic and security conditions, as
well as the poor job prospects after graduation. The
university admission rate in Iraq is estimated at about
14 percent of the university-age population (13 percent for females and 16 percent for males), which is
much lower than the world average of 27 percent.
Having identified the problem of poor alignment
between the education system outputs and the labour market, and the low qualitative investment in
improving the university education environment, the
NDP 2013–7032 developed its vision of “creating educational opportunities for every one that meet the
requirements of the labour market and the knowledge economy and promote the values of citizenship”.
The vision coincides with the launch of the National Education Strategy 2012–2020, which emphasizes
the broad development of higher education; the
promotion of internal and external efficiency; the
improving of the quality of all education stages; the
encouragement of scientific research for peaceful
purposes; and the values of excellence, creativity,
innovation, and distinction. This better enables the
NDP objectives in the education sector in terms of
providing the financial allocations required over
the five years, offering scholarships to students in all
stages (including literacy course students), and improving quality. I hope that all these trends will create more opportunities for the youth.
Ali Yousef Shukri Minister of Planning
Chapter 5
Social and Cultural
Challenges
Youth and Family
The youth are a nation’s real wealth.
They constitute a demographic and development opportunity, but, as shown in
Chapter 3, can turn out to be a burden that
thwarts these expectations – unless society succeeds, through appropriate policies, to build their capabilities, expand
their choices, and allow them to participate willingly and efficiently in their communities throughout their lives.
Wasting this opportunity by excluding
the youth and marginalizing their role not
only deprives them of their rights and impedes their ambitions, but it also weakens
society’s ability to establish better conditions for its present and future existence.
Do the constitution, law, and society
perceive the youth as citizens with capacities and rights, such as the right to participate and bear responsibility? Or are they
defined by words such as protection, care,
and guidance, and treated as mere receivers of training and education in order to
perform duties specified by the prevalent
culture and social reality? This chapter
will answer these questions.
Do Iraqi families embrace the roots of
youth exclusion? Or do they facilitate the
social integration of youth?
We shall start with family, since some
roots of youth exclusion begin there and
get deeper when empowerment mechanisms fail at a later stage to facilitate social integration in the public sphere.
Family in essence raises the individuals
in a community. It is through family that
a human being’s character grows and is
oriented, and their first vision of the world
gets defined. And it is within the family
that a person plays their first role in society.
However, family is no longer the biggest influence on children. There are now
larger social influences, let alone the powerfully emerging ‘third domain’, which
has turned, at least in one aspect, from a
domain dominated by real facilities and
institutions into a virtual domain made
by media and communication technology.
Some express concern about the influence
of this virtual domain on the youth’s dissociation from family and society, a trend
which makes the need to empower young
people more pressing. In fact, those communities where the youth feel more integrated are the ones in which institutions,
starting with family, have succeeded in
empowering them.
It is evident from analysing family
structures that a person’s early upbringing produces the values, standards, and
restraints that contribute to behavioural
patterns and attitudes later in life.
The family is the first to set rules, limits,
and constraints and to highlight the values
related to:43
• Social roles and the separate spheres inhabited by the sexes
• Dos and don’ts in terms of behaviour,
ethics, and dealing with others
• Putting adolescents on a track which
will foretell their future achievements
in school, work, and family
Although Iraqi families have experienced profound structural and functional
changes, the traditional value system,
which establishes the roles and authority
for each family member and determines
the manner of upbringing inside families,
is still deeply rooted. It is a paternal (hierarchically male-dominated) social unit at
its centre, and discrimination is still present, based on gender and age. The method
of upbringing is authoritative, with a clear
tendency towards tribalism,44 in a semihybrid model which some researchers call
the new paternal family.45
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
65
Article 29 of the 2005 permanent Iraqi Constitution states:
First: The family is the foundation of society; the
state shall preserve its entity and its religious, moral,
and patriotic values.
The state shall ensure protection during motherhood, childhood, and old age, and shall take care
of children and youth and provide them with the
appropriate conditions to further their talents and
abilities.
Second: Children have the right to a proper upbringing, care, and education from their parents.
Parents shall have the right to respect and care from
their children, especially in times of need, disability,
and old age.
Third: Economic exploitation of children shall be
completely prohibited. The state shall take the necessary measures to protect them.
The values of the Iraqi family seem entrenched in spite of the radical changes it
has gone through as a result of the exceptional conditions of the last two decades.
This resilience is thanks to the place of
family in Iraq’s cultural and religious
legacy, which supports its structure and
enhances its bonds. Also, tribal relations
and values, which have been enhanced
over the past two decades, now have more
influence on individuals’ behaviour inside
their families, especially since Iraqis in
general live within relatively big families.
According to the tentative results of the
2009 census, the average number of family members is around 6.7 individuals (7.8
in rural areas compared to 6.3 in urban areas).
In this context, Iraqi laws expand the
concept of family to include, besides two
parents and their children, the siblings
and parents of these two people. A family
therefore is a group of people brought together naturally by marriage, and includes
relatives to the fourth degree and whoever
is added to it under the law.
In Iraqi and Arab families in general,
the elder the member the more respect
they should be given, and males are superior to females. Thus, the father is the
head of family and its source of wisdom
and of knowledge. He consequently manages family affairs and may even interfere
in his children’s choices and try to influence their stands.
The 2012 Youth Survey makes evident
the importance of the father’s role. Important decisions are taken by the father in
41 percent of families and by the mother
in 6.2 percent; mutually by both parents
in 14.7 percent of families and mutually
by all family members in 35.9 percent of
families.
Figure 5.1
Who Makes Decisions in the family
Source: Youth survey YS-2012
The relational problems the youth have
with adults is fuelled by the fact that
adults’ authority has diminished somewhat, as youth now have numerous sourc66
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
es of knowledge, more independence, and
various personal experiences. However,
adults are holding on to what they consider their traditional social rights in the
context of the prevalent paternal culture,
which takes its legitimacy from different
sources – religion, lineage, the values of
filial piety and compassion, personal fortune, inherited power, strength, etc. This
is why most manifestations and signs of
the crisis between generations are hidden
and take the form of a silent dispute that
has varying intensity in rural and urban
areas, among social groups, and among
families. This dispute is affected by many
factors, such as education, modern sourc-
es of knowledge, social environment, etc.
Youth Dependence on Family
Some changes in power distribution within family happen when a family member
becomes less dependent on the parents.
Through work, young men and women
become materially independent and contribute to their family’s expenses. In this
way, work becomes a source of self-confidence and character building.
“I was satisfied with my family covering my expenses, but now I feel that I am a
burden. I have graduated from university, but am yet to find a proper job. My
elder brother still gives me pocket money, which makes me submissive to him. I
have no faith in the future,” says a university graduate.
Family relations play a core role in Iraqi
society and affect its political, economic,
and cultural behaviour. Moreover, an Iraqi
family is typically large in number and
heavily involved in making crucial decisions concerning its children. It is difficult
for an individual to live independently
from their family, not only because of so-
cial traditions, but also their economic reliance on parents, siblings, and relatives.
The youth’s financial reliance on family is
still significant, whether in Iraq or Kurdistan, with 65.3 percent of the youth aged
18 to 30 years totally or partially depending on the family (Figure 5.2).
Figure 5.2
Dependence on Family Financial Support
Source: Youth survey YS-2012
Though the youth naturally aspire to independence, they still need their family. A
family, and even a tribe, still constitutes a
means of protection and mediation when
it comes to problem solving,46 especially
when society is subjected to successive
crises and the rule of law becomes weak,
as is always the case during transition.
In light of the absent or poor official social protection systems in all their forms
– due to the poor performance of centralized and local government agencies in
many fields, including security and citizens’ protection – family is a safe haven
for offspring, even when they become
adults.
From a family’s point of view, this reliance can help to strengthen family bonds.
In fact, according to the 2009 National
Youth and Adolescent Survey, young people’s relationship with their family seems
to be positive, since 61 percent of them
are happy to be with their family while 33
percent are happy to be with their friends.
About 75 percent of the youth declared
that they had no problem with their family, 13 percent said the family’s insufficient
income was a problem, 6 percent suggestIraq Human Development Report 2014
67
ed that the house was too crowded, and 3
percent said that domestic disputes were
an issue.47 With these relationships better
in rural areas, it would seem that family
ties are stronger in non-urban areas.
The survey however shows some
changing dynamics and a possible generation gap. The older the youth, the more
this positive relationship with the family
tends to regress, which suggests increased
family problems with the increased independence of youth.
Marriage and Starting a New
Family: The Road to Social
Integration
Youth voice
Iraqi society encourages marriage and
starting a family, considering family one
of the most important cultural values. Indeed, Article 29 of the Iraqi Constitution
states that family – rather than individuals – is the foundation of society, and that
both children and their parents have a
right to care and protection, among other
things. The constitution ensures and protects those rights.
Therefore, a family considers the marriage of youthful members a priority, aspiration, and duty and helps them in this
endeavour whenever possible, believing
that marriage protects the youth from deviation – since extramarital relations are
forbidden – and ensures both the youths’
integration and the family’s growth and
continuation. This trend, despite having
some variations, is a feature of traditional
paternal societies, where the community
rather than the individual is the core value.
In 2011, 61.8 percent of the population
aged 15 years and above were married,
and 62 percent of Iraqi women at reproduction age were already married, which
is a high rate compared to most Arab
states. Furthermore, slightly less than half
of males had never been married before.48
According to the Higher Judicial Council 2011 statistics, however, the number of
new marriages was 230, 470, down from
262,554 in 2004, with a decrease rate of
12.2 percent. The divorce rate increased
dramatically from 28,690 cases in 2004 to
59,515 cases in 2011, an increase rate exceeding 100 percent. This increase is due
to a number of accumulated problems,
mostly social and economic – early marriage, violence against wives, and others.
This indicator suggests that the quality of
social life is deteriorating, in addition to
the complications familial relationships
face. It appears that the means for settling
conflicts are deficient, whether these disputes occur before marriage or after it.
In the findings of the latest survey, Iraq
Poverty and Maternal Mortality (IPMM2013, see the Technical Notes Appendix),
20 percent of married males and 32.7
percent of married females are in the age
group 15–29.
Early marriages seem to be unsuccessful; in 2013, 42 percent of all divorced
males and 37 percent of divorced females
were in the age group 15–29.
Marriage Is a Major Crisis in Our Life (Duhok’s Youth)
The marriage crisis was the first subject young participants brought up in the discussion session held in
Duhok Governorate in Kurdistan.
“We all want to get married, but our financial crisis
is the problem. We cannot afford the wedding costs
of the bride-to-be’s jewellery, reception, and other
requirements,” said a participant. “The cause is the
girls themselves, since they and their parents hold
on to customs and traditions, and attach too much
importance to the manifestations of a wedding,”
added another one.
The girls participating in the discussion session
however defended this stand fiercely. “The quantity of gold and money offered by the groom to his
bride-to-be reflects her status and that of her family in society in general, and among her friends and
acquaintances in particular,” said a participant.
“Moreover, the required quantity of gold is a guarantee for her future. In fact, the wife often sells her
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Iraq Human Development Report 2014
gold to buy or build a family house.” It seems the
matter is not related to the opposing convictions of
young men and women, but the influence of prevailing traditions. However, these ‘traditions’ are not
necessarily old. They might be a mix of tradition and
the prevalent culture of consumption, with added
complications brought by unstable situations and
increased economic difficulties.
“The parents and relatives directly interfere in
choosing the husband, and we often find ourselves
obliged to marry men we do not want,” said a female participant. “But nowadays there is a growing
interest in girls’ opinions,” replied a male participant,
but other participants did not seem to think this interest was enough.
An argument then started between the two
groups on girls’ freedom. A young lady challenged
the young men with this question: “Would you approve of your sister having a relationship with a
young man?” Some young men replied positively:
“Complete frankness and mutual trust between
brothers and sisters make them accept this matter
as a natural fact.” Others however refused such a
situation: “The customs and traditions prohibit this,
and this is out of the question.” The discussion on this
point was a dead end.
A young man raised the issue of increased suicide
attempts in Duhok, especially among girls, citing
some figures. “The parents, the parenting methods,
and the increasing openness of society to aspects
of modernity, due to the introduction of communication technology, are responsible for that,” explained a participant.
Another participant narrated the story of a young
girl she knew, which deeply affected her: “A 12-yearold girl burnt herself, and while dying, she confessed
that she did it because she thought her family would
sympathize with her following a problem she had
Familial Relations Do Not Limit
Youth Choices
The broader family still plays an important role in any family member’s decision
to get married, even though this decision
mainly affects that member. And it is not
necessary that these young people, especially the men, meet all the requirements
for marriage, since parental pressure, particularly in rural areas, often forces them
to get married.
Although the paternal family dominates
in Iraqi society, the 2012 Youth Survey
shows significant freedom and participation in issues related to study and marriage, especially for young men in urban
areas, where the rates of those who are
with them. She also said she did not want to die and
did not know that what she did would be so dangerous.” As this case shows, when there is no more
communication among family members, the feeling
of despair can be lethal.
Analysing families in which dialogue and communication are minimal, the participants identified the
causes of such situations and the effects on youth:
• Parents’ negligence of their adolescents, which
makes the latter prefer to spend most of their time
with their friends and also makes them spend a lot
of time using electronic communication
• Feelings of injustice and marginalization, which
negatively affect the psychological state of the
youth, particularly girls
• Low self-confidence and lack of hope and faith
• Suppressed emotions, which result from a fear of
causing aggression or creating a worse environment
free to choose their university major and
marriage partner are 71 percent and 93.3
percent respectively for men and 67.1
percent and 75.7 percent respectively for
women. In rural areas, however, marriage
has a social function that youth can only
submit to.
Given the above-mentioned societal
context, it is not surprising that marriage
is a priority for the youth. Being unable
to start a family is frustrating to them and
a sign of incomplete social integration. It
seems that the youth are highly aware of
the responsibilities related to marriage;
this is why, according to the 2012 Youth
Survey, it is the fourth priority for them
after finishing studies, getting a job, and
buying a house.
Youth voice
I Sold My Cow to Get Married and Please My Father (AbuKhasaf/Maysan)
The group of youth the NHDR team met in the
village of Abu Khasaf in Hawizeh Marshes in Maysan Governorate said that males there get married between the ages of 18 and 22 and females
do so at an even younger age. “Our parents
are used to getting their children married at an
early age in order to see their grandchildren and
ensure their children’s stability through starting a
family,” said one of them. “Usually we marry our
relatives in the village. The father provides for his
family and the family of his newly-wed child due
to unemployment.”
This is the life cycle of the village community.
The function of marriage there is to ensure family
continuity, and children are expected to marry
even if they are not ready or are unwilling to do
so. Early marriage is often a condition for the stability, continuity, and reproduction of the village
community and those connected to it.
“I used to earn a living through selling the milk
of my cow, but I had to sell it in order to get married and please my father. Now, I am unemployed and I am afraid that this might make me
deviate from the right way to make a living,” said
one of the participants. We asked him: “Why did
you agree to that?” He replied: “These are our
customs and traditions. We cannot refuse any
request by our parents, even getting married, although we are neither psychologically nor financially ready for that.”
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69
The Generation Gap and Social
Exclusion
The generation gap does exist in all societies. In developing societies, including
Iraqi society, the generation gap benefits
adults, especially decision makers and
those highly ranked in society. In addition, the older generation holds negative
views and limited expectations regarding the ability of the youth to properly
assume their roles in society. Therefore,
the generation gap is another factor in
the youth’s social exclusion. In response,
young people may become more inclined
to challenge, rebel, and reject, and might
detach themselves from the past and from
the prevailing social values.
Youth views on this issue dominated
most focus group meetings. They believe
that their rights and freedoms have been
denied by the older generation. In fact, the
gap widens when placed in the context of
Iraqi social life, which is divided according to age into two completely different
ways of thinking and facing problems. All
this is due to the social dominance of older people, as a result of customs and traditions which eventually exclude the youth
and prevent them from playing a fuller social role. According to these customs, the
youth have to be obedient and willing to
please, which enhances their psychological and social dependence and weakens
their initiative and independence.
Familial exclusion takes place when
parents inhibit the psychological growth
of their children through negligence, preference of one child over another or boys
over girls (gender exclusion), disparagement, unfair punishment, unfulfilled
promises, etc. The most destructive psychological effect of such practices is low
self-esteem, which consequently triggers
feelings of frustration, revenge, and aggression towards society in general.49
Discrimination and Violence
against Young Women
Measuring the GII in Chapter 2 identified gender inequality and fewer achievements for women in HDI dimensions,
income and education in particular. The
YDI value for females is lower than that
for males. Social and development policies can be blamed for that and can respond through positive interventions. The
cultural dimension which is not captured
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Iraq Human Development Report 2014
by HDI explains the gender gap in human
development. Generally speaking, young
women are marginalized in society, especially with regard to particular social
positions. This marginalization is due to
traditions, mindsets, and negative social
stereotypes. Differences in education and
care still exist in the family in favour of
the boy, and gender-based discrimination in society limits women’s access to
employment, their freedom of choice,
and their ability to make decisions, all of
which are remarkably constricted compared to men.
Discriminative Upbringing
Many of the roots of the exclusion of girls
and young women grow within the family
and enhance their broader marginalization
in society. The indicators of social exclusion appear at an early age. At birth, girls
are not welcomed as boys are. The way
they are brought up often is discriminatory, as they are prepared to play a traditional role, whether in their parents’ house
or later on as mere housewives. They are
sometimes forced to drop out of school,
which excludes them socially and forces
them to get married at an early age.
Family pressure placed on males is
much less than that placed on females,
and young men’s opportunities in the public sphere are more abundant than young
women’s – joining social and sports clubs,
participating in political and recreational
activities, etc. This increases young men’s
knowledge and develops their physical
and psychological potential, thus enhancing their positive perception of themselves
and making them more capable of making
personal decisions independent of family
pressures. Consequently, young men are
more likely to challenge authoritarianism
within the family than young women are,
especially if they have achieved a certain
amount of independence from the family.
In this context, females are often more financially dependent on their families.
Thirty-seven percent of girls aged 10–
24 say that at least one of their parents
prefers boys over girls in terms of education or privileges, whether consistently
or occasionally.50 This rate is probably
higher, as there is a culture of discretion
and girls may not be willing to reveal
family secrets to others. This behaviour
of families towards girls may be related
to the educational level of parents; better
treatment for girls is associated with higher HDI values, as found in Sulaymaniya,
while the lowest levels are in Basra.
Table 5.1
The Opinions of Girls Aged 10–14 Years on Equality between Them and
Their Brothers
Indicator
Governorate with lowest
rate (Basra)
Governorate with highest rate
(Sulaymaniya)
Iraq
They believe they and
their brothers are equal
31.4%
80.9%
49.3%
Source: Iraq woman integrated social and health survey I-WISH 2011
Gender discrimination among the youth
reveals itself in the higher degree of independence for young men, who are sometimes granted a family role that includes
a sort of authority over their sisters. They
also have more responsible roles at work,
especially when it is family owned. Some
young men even assume part of their father’s authority within and outside the
family.
Family Violence Excludes Young
Women
In Iraqi families, young women are exposed to many forms of violence, which
are described as disciplinary or necessary actions for controlling or rectifying
their behaviour. A substantial percentage of girls and women experience this,
as the violence is not meted out to males
alone. The I-WISH shows that 58 percent
of women aged 15–49 believe that their
husbands have the right to beat them once
or repeatedly for one or several reasons.51
Only 38.6 percent believe that men and
women have equal rights. In addition,
55.1 percent and 59.4 percent of them
believe that there is discrimination in
favour of men when it comes to making
decisions within the family and to ownership respectively.52 However, submissiveness and acceptance of inferior conditions
compared to the males of the family could
be some kind of self-defence mechanism
aimed at avoiding violence and cruel
forms of isolation.
Members of the NHDR core team
joined the youth team in their trip to Maysan Governorate, southern Iraq, where
we met a number of families in a village
on the outskirts of the marsh. The girls
were not allowed to talk to us, even to
the women in our team. We were able to
talk to some mothers. All of those were of
the same opinion – that girls, according
to tribal traditions, must get married at 14
and sometimes earlier.
“We agree because we are afraid that
our daughters might get hurt in this time
when honesty and ethics are lost,” said a
mother enthusiastically. “What will they
do if they do not get married? The only
primary school in the area is mixed, and
fathers do not allow them to pursue their
studies after the age of 11. In addition,
there is no nearby middle school they
can later join. I am a 39-year-old literate
mother who has not found any job yet, so
what is the use of school then? Marriage
is safer and better.”
But she went on with evident sadness:
“My daughter is very clever and she was
the first in her school before her father
forced her to drop out.”
It seems that Iraqi youth are aware of
this problem. In the discussion sessions,
they said there is a “taming culture” for
young women that makes them accept
secondary roles besides accepting the
violence to which they are subjected, to
the extent that they defend their oppressors and waive their rights. In addition, a
large percentage of women are unaware
of these rights, which makes them accept without protest the violence against
them. As such, the society’s violence is
enhanced culturally and then reproduced
in daily life.
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
71
Youth Voice
Family Violence Restrains Youth Freedom (Babil)
The dialogue session with Babil youth addressed
the importance of the youth’s role in society and
how to develop and optimally invest in their potential.
“The government is responsible for developing
youth potentials and giving them the opportunity to
play their role in building the future,” said a young
man. The other participants spoke about the problems they were facing, and it seemed that most of
these problems had their roots in family violence.
When asked about the main reasons for disharmony
between parents and children and the extent to
which the relationship between their fathers and
mothers affects them, the youth identified the violence to which they were subjected. Their reasons
were as follows:
• Increased gap between youth and adults due to
the burgeoning communication technology, and
also to youth being affected by their friends
• Low family income, which cannot satisfy the
youth’s increasing needs
Participants complained about girls in rural areas
being forced to drop out of school for an arranged
early marriage.
“I come from a poor village where even the simplest things which citizens are supposed to be entitled to are not available,” said a participant. “Moreover, we cannot go out of the home because of
the customs and traditions observed by our parents.
I was only able to go out of my home in order to
participate in this workshop after severe resistance
by my father. My uncle has forced his daughter to
marry my brother. All the details of our life are decided by our parents, without us having any say in this.”
A Transgenerational Violence Culture
When we asked the young participants about
how many of them had been exposed to violence
during the previous week, all of them replied positively, except for one young man who said he had
been out of his home for nearly one month because
of the violence within his household.
It seems that family violence begets violence.
When asked how many of them had used violence
during the previous week, none of the participants
answered. When a participant was asked whether
she used violence with her 2.5-year-old daughter,
who was present with her in the session, she said she
beat her almost every day when she did something
wrong. From their answers to different questions, it
appeared that most of the participants had used
violence during the previous week.
The youth also said that, in addition to the pressures they faced within the family, the teaching staff
at school treated them in a rather violent manner,
which affected them psychologically. This confirms
that violence is passing from the family to other social institutions.
At the end of the session, the youth asked us to
submit the following recommendations to the competent officials to prevent family violence:
• Enforce compulsory education, especially for girls
• Enact anti-early marriage laws
• Enhance the media’s role in raising awareness
about women’s rights, especially family rights
• Support civil society’s efforts to fight violence
against women
• Increase family income
Youth are under the pressure of customs and traditions, defending the culture
of violence against women. The concept
of ‘family prestige and honour’ seems to
be less related to males than to females.
The 2009 Adolescence and Youth Survey
shows that in the case of fornication, nearly 62 percent of the respondents agreed
that the female should be killed and 33.2
percent agreed that the male should be
killed. These percentages clearly reveal
the gap between the prevailing culture
and the culture of citizenship and human
rights.
Marriage of Underage Girls: a
Typical Form of Family Violence
Early marriage is common in Iraq, especially in the countryside, where most
spouses are relatives, due to inherited traditions and customs that see in marriage a
social and economic necessity. Females in
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Iraq Human Development Report 2014
the countryside do not pursue studies for
as many years as females in the city do.53
This trend, however, started to extend to
cities two decades ago. It is one of the
most serious and obvious social effects of
decades of embargo, wars, disputes, and
insecurity, as well as the disintegration of
state and civil institutions and value systems (Table 6).
The 2011 MICS4 shows that the rate of
women who get married before the age of
15 is 5.7 percent in Iraq and 5.5 percent
in the Kurdistan Region, while the rate of
girls aged 15–19 years who are currently
married is 18.7 percent in Iraq and 19.1
percent in Kurdistan Region54 (18 percent in urban areas and 19 percent in rural
areas).55 The percentage of girls getting
married before the age of 18 increased
from 22.6 percent in 2006 to 24.2 percent
in 2011.
Three out of ten women aged 15–49
who are married or have been married
before got married for the first time and
started their reproductive life before they
were 18. The average marriage age for
women is 22 years in Iraq and around 26
years in Kurdistan Region.56 The percentage of single young women aged 15–19 is
less than that of single young men.
Marriage rates of underage girls are on
the rise, although health institutions warn
that the risk of death during pregnancy or
delivery for women aged 15–19 is double
that of women aged 20–24.
These facts show the dangerous effects
of the violation of females’ rights during
childhood and adolescence. Forcing them
to get married puts an end to their education opportunities and makes them both
unable to raise their children properly
and unqualified to take care of their own
health during and after pregnancy and that
of their children. An underage wife does
not know her rights, neither as a child nor
as a mother, which makes her more exposed to violence. In addition, early marriage is one of the main reasons for family
disintegration, according to the Higher
Judicial Council divorce records. Fertility
rates among underage mothers are high
– on average, there are 82 births for each
1,000 married women aged 15–19 (Table
3).
Marriage of Underage Girls
A field study shows that marriages
of underage girls are greatly
increasing, with 244 marriages
(around 30 percent) out of the 764
registered in the Family Court in
the Shaab District, eastern Baghdad, during the five first months of
2010 involving girls aged 15–17.
Social worker Saja Abdurrida, the
Shaab Area Court, Baghdad
Although the Iraqi Civil Status Law
No. 188 of 1959 is somewhat compatible
with the international laws that set the
marriageable age at 18 (the said law sets
it at 15 and makes marriage of girls aged
15–18 conditional on a judge’s discretion
and the parents’ approval), the legitimacy
given to marriage contracts entered into
outside of the courts, especially those
concluded by offices of imams, helps circumvent the law.
Table 5.2
Aspects of Violence against Women – Early Marriage Age
Indicator
Governorate with
lowest rate (%)
Governorates with
highest rate (%)
Kurdistan
Iraq
Percentage of women who
were under 15 when they got
married
Kerbala (3)
Muthanna (8.4)
Wasit (7.2)
Najaf (7.1)
4.5%
4.9%
Diyala (16.6)
Muthanna (30.4)
Najaf (27.9)
Maysan (26.9)
Dhi Qar (25.6)
19.2%
21.7%
Percentage of women who
were under 18 when they got
married
Source: Iraq woman integrated social and health survey I-WISH 2011
In the absence of laws that deter the
forcible marriage of female minors, and
in an environment where levels of education have largely deteriorated over the
past two decades, protecting young girls
from these childhood violations is not an
easy task.
Human rights activists suggest that
the Civil Status Law is defective or that
certain constitutional or legislative provisions have not been properly interpreted
or implemented. Pursuant to the law, a
judge may conditionally approve the marriage of underage girls, but some judges
use the law and Islamic Sharia to approve
the marriage of a 15-year-old girl based
on the fact that she can have sexual intercourse and bear children, but without
considering her mental, psychological,
and social capabilities.
This issue should be prioritized because
of the huge scope of the problem and its
ongoing transfer from rural areas to urban
centres, but also because it reflects general social and culture deterioration.
The response of parliament and government to this issue has not been positive
yet. Women and human rights activists
are working widely with the support of
international organizations to illuminate
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
73
such practices. Lately they demanded the
revocation of the tribe and clan bill, warning that the bill – submitted by the parliamentary Tribe and Clan Committee to the
Council of Representatives for discussion
– is unconstitutional. It contradicts Article
14 of the Constitution, and Article 45 – related to tribes – does not provide for the
enactment of such a law. It is thought that
the bill, if passed, will make more room
for the impacts of customs and traditions
on society en masse. Activists are concerned because some political blocs have
approved the bill and referred it to the
Council of Representatives for endorsement.
Box 5.1 Anti-Underage Marriage
An Initiative by Women’s Organizations
Under a campaign aimed at curtailing violence against women, Burj
Babil for Cultural and Media Development and Model Iraqi Woman
Organization, supported by UN
Women, found it necessary to
highlight underage marriages as a
means for tackling violence against
underage girls.
The campaign aimed at drawing
the attention of those concerned
with this issue to the ensuing risks of
early marriages and the need to
enact laws that minimize them. A
radio programme was broadcast
over three months, a number of articles were published, and a documentary was produced featuring
interviews with divorced women
who got married when they were
underage. For such women, there
is no official document proving their
marriage (or even their divorce),
because these marriages are usually approved by an imam. The girl
and her parents often do not keep
a copy of the marriage contract,
which completely deprives her of
her rights. When she gives birth to
a child, she will be unable to send
them to school because she has no
relevant official documents.
The above-mentioned documentary film features two women who
When Traditions Become
Persecution
A Real Nightmare for Underage
Girls Who Are Mutilated by
Their Parents on the Pretext of
Purification
Islam does not adopt or support female
genital mutilation (FGM). The Kurdistan Region is the only area in Iraq where
FGM is practiced as an old tribal tradition. Most old women in Kurdistan were
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Iraq Human Development Report 2014
were beaten by their husbands before being divorced 15 days and 6
months, respectively, into their marriage. Neither of them has any document proving marriage or divorce.
They could only seek recourse
through an international organization which follows up on such cases
and tries to obtain the relevant official documents before taking the
matter to courts of law to claim the
affected women’s rights.
In the film, a physician states that
underage girls are not eligible for
the medical services available to
pregnant women because they
cannot prove their marital status.
A family court judge also speaks
about the risks of this phenomenon,
which requires quick intervention
and increased efforts by all involved
parties to curtail it. Such a marriage,
says the judge, “is a mere machine
to produce victims”, namely the underage girls and their children. The
message the film wants to deliver is
that the root causes of this issue are
poverty, the lack of a legal culture,
and poor legal deterrents. The film
also highlights the need to develop
a relevant, comprehensive strategy
to address the problem.
Dhikra Sarsam, Activist
subjected to this kind of violence during
childhood and under duress. Their parents
often initiated it on the pretext of purification or removal of their sexuality.
Young people despise this. However,
the mutilation is sometimes voluntarily
–women over 18 are often subjected to insults and despised if they are not circumcised. This prompts some of them to get
circumcised for fear of being abandoned
by their husbands. According to relevant
reports compiled in a number of villages,
10 to 50 percent of females have undergone FGM; most of them were circumcised during the 1980s. FGM is still quite
widespread, especially in villages and remote border areas.
Activities of civil society organizations and pressure from international human rights organizations have caused the
Kurdistan Regional Government to issue
a law that prohibits FGM, an important
step towards the elimination of this practice. The Anti-Family Violence Law approved by the Kurdistan Parliament on
21 June 2011 criminalizes FGM, globally known as a form of violence against
women. Sentences include imprisonment
of up to three years and fines of a maximum of 10 million Iraqi dinars.
This law is only an initial step towards
eliminating this phenomenon. Uprooting
negative inherited values and traditions,
especially those related to women, requires administrative procedures, awareness, and a culture that responds to the
enforcement of such laws, not just to their
issuance.
Protection from Family Violence
Article 1 of the Iraqi Anti-family Violence
Bill defines family violence as “any form
of physical, sexual, psychological or economic abuse committed or threatened to
be committed by a family member against
another member based on the former’s
authority, guardianship or responsibility
within or out of the private life context”.
Based on Iraq’s international obligations pertaining to accession to international agreements and treaties on human
rights, fighting family violence, and protecting women and children, an anti-family violence law is being drafted.
• The draft law is now being examined
by the State Shura Council, and there
is still a long way to go before its issuance.
• In May 2013, the Iraqi Council of Ministers approved a strategy to combat
gender violence.
• Kurdistan Region issued the Anti-Family Violence Law No.8 of 2011.
The National Youth Strategy 2013–2020
The NYS document accentuates
the protection of youth from family violence and the dissemination
of a culture of gender equality. Its
success, however, depends on how
committed the stakeholders are and
their ability to efficiently reach the
stated goals: “Young people live in a
family and community environment
that helps protect them from individual and family violence, exploitation
and abuse.
Capacities of governmental and
Youth and Social Values
System
A young person’s character develops during their biological, physical, and mental
transformation phases. This transformation happens in a social and cultural context, and the interaction between an individual land the community is fertile land
for their maturing character. At the end of
the day, the full development of a person’s
character depends on the success or failure of the previous development phases.
As children grow, there is a move towards a higher degree of independence
non-governmental institutions working with youth developed to protect
them from individual and family violence, exploitation and abuse.
A national programme aimed
at disseminating a gender-based
equality culture and raising awareness about family violence among
all social groups developed.
Safe spaces for youth in neighbourhoods and educational institutions made available.”
and the roles for the youth inside and outside the family become clearer. For males,
this can include control and authority over
their sisters and significant work responsibilities, particularly if the business is
owned by the family. Some young men
may start taking over the father’s authority inside and outside the family.
Family influence strongly overlaps
with that of the external environment and
peers. Society controls the youth’s behaviour and tries to make them acquiesce to
the cultural heritage and its values by emphasizing three things: vice, damages, and
danger. This happens under the authority
vested in adults to practice social control
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
75
over young people and children. Some,
however, abuse this authority, and others
even turn it into a tool for social oppression.
The social structure problems in Iraq
are closely related to two factors: an assumed transformation from a traditional
to a modern society, which took place over
a number of decades that witnessed three
consecutive wars and armed conflicts, and
a quick openness to globalization. Each of
these factors has its own ramifications on
the youth and on their relationship with
society, the economy, and the state.
Given the country’s large oil reserves
and the consequent political and economic behaviour and values, Iraq did not move
from a traditional economy based on agriculture to an industrial economy and
society based on the ethics of work and
production. In this modernization process,
no major changes were brought about in
family structures, institutions, values, and
social relationships. An individual did not
have a new stand-alone value. A direct relationship governed by the constitution,
laws, or voluntary self-affiliation was not
established between individuals and the
state or the society.
This kind of individualism did not happen for a number of reasons. The largescale migration from rural to urban areas
was not linked to a move from a traditional economy, particularly in the rural
areas, to an industrial one in the cities.
The majority of townspeople are originally country people who had old traditional relationships based on oppression
and exploitation; they migrated due to a
weak agricultural economy. Accordingly,
the move from rural to urban areas has not
led to tangible changes in societal values.
Overwhelmed by commercial and service
activities, the cities have become incubators of rural, traditional values thanks to
these numerous rural in-migrants. The internal structures of the newcomers’ communities have continued to embrace authoritarian values, kinship ties, and tribal,
sectarian, and ethnic relationships instead
of embracing urban values.
Youth development challenges can only
be understood when attention is paid to
the profound cultural and social transformations undergone by Iraqi society over
the last three decades. These led to complicated social and behavioural problems,
most prominently broken social institu-
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tions; limited job opportunities; deteriorated living conditions; poor education
and health systems; and increased numbers of unemployed and displaced persons, including street children, beggars,
disabled people, and other vulnerable
groups with limited capabilities. These
groups often fail to handle life’s challenges and are thus forced to stay at the bottom
rung of society, emptied of any feeling of
belonging. This is coupled with poor official and unofficial social control, which
paves the way for violence and crime.
Continued insecurity, violence, and poor
control mechanisms inevitably caused a
broken-down social value system. That in
turn has led to negative behavioural patterns, a disturbed family authority hierarchy, vandalism of public property, administrative corruption – bribery, forgery, and
embezzlement–the widespread breaching
of social responsibility norms, and other
phenomena and challenges which threaten human and national security.
The young people’s crisis is no longer
their own; rather, it has become a double
crisis combining their own movement to
maturity and the tumultuous transition the
Iraqi society and political realm are currently undergoing. Other countries have
undoubtedly witnessed the same situation, particularly those with long wars and
conflicts or deep societal transformations,
such as Palestine, Lebanon, Yemen, etc.
Some NHDRs touched upon these problems (see the HDRs of Lithuania 2009,
Cyprus 2009, and Kosovo 2006).
Nowadays, young people experience
a violent conflict of values due to the
above-mentioned deep transformations
in society, but also broader changes in the
world, including the spread of media and
communication technology, which have
brought new and different values. The
youth often adapt their behaviour to those
values that seem more contemporary
or exciting. Most adults consider these
changes to be a serious problem, as they
challenge the existent values and social
and moral standards. The older generation
sees these changes in what they perceive
as growing perversion and uncommon behavioural patterns, which in turn threaten
society’s security and stability.
Despite the openness to globalization
and the relatively sudden changes in the
youth’s lifestyles, which have been accompanied by a significant improvement
in the HDIs, a similar transformation has
not happened with regard to negative traditional values. For example, getting rid
of the values of revenge and gender discrimination has not happened with the
same fast pace. Iraqi youth may change
their material lifestyle, but their customs
can remain fixed, untouched, and even
strengthened, allowing them to be passed
on to the coming generations.
In the Kurdistan Region, this conflict
between the old and the modern is there,
but the region’s youth are more inclined
towards modernity. This is evident in the
increased contributions by modernists to
Kurdish literature in recent years. Furthermore, the large-scale migration to Europe
and North America and the easy return to
the region created new bridges between
traditional Kurdish society and modern
societies, making the clash between the
old and the modern less severe than in the
other Iraqi governorates. This clash also
manifested itself in different forms, given
the importance of the Kurdish identity, as
well as a political party structure that is
still in the form of a ‘national liberation
movement’ which has not yet achieved
all of its goals and which the citizens still
support. There is therefore a special relationship among members of the Kurdish
society, but also between this society and
the authorities.
Cultural Heritage
Young people develop their identity by
sorting through a variety of (often competing) religious, linguistic, political, and
cultural dimensions. Their patterns of response to their environment are hugely
informed by their family and their social
network.
Youth culture emerges as a response to
local and international changes. That response may include a rejection of dominant values through alternative forms
of cultural expression. Embracing one
culture and discarding another may lead
the youth to rebel against the dominant
standards and values in society and try
independently to create a special kind of
language, values, conduct, and behaviour.
It is evident from listening to the youth’s
views that they are divided between these
two cultural currents. This division, however, is insufficient to be considered a cultural conflict, as political dimensions play
a significant role in the divisions that exist
among the youth. This is one characteristic of coexisting, multicultural societies
such as Iraq’s.
Thus, heritage, along with its material
and spiritual dimensions, becomes an effective element in the development process and in connecting the past with the
future. Many young people cling to everything related to heritage, while others
call on discarding it altogether to ‘catch
up’ with global progress. Others advocate
fully transforming society through modernity.
Upbringing and education should together help children and youth recognize
the value of their heritage, both as an important human development cycle and as
a history with many contributions to human civilization.
Religious Values
Being religious is a quality shared by
many humans, and in numerous societies
religious people are respected and held in
high esteem. Religiousness is still a quiet,
safe, and socially cherished way for Iraqi
youth to discover themselves, particularly
in a society where traditions and religion
still play a major role.
Youth agree that “religious and spiritual
values represent a major part of our social philosophy and that violence and the
other uncivilized conducts are symptoms
of a psychopathic personality, as they
contradict the most established controls
of the social structure. The religious values inculcated by the family, in essence,
encourage love, peace, and tolerance.”
Linking violence to religion is worrying
for both young people and the social and
educational institutions looking into the
growing number of youth joining the socalled ‘political Islam’ movements.
Psychologists believe that the emergence of this phenomenon in Iraq can be
ascribed to the psychological crisis suffered by many youth, who face numerous
closed doors related to job opportunities,
education, social and moral goals, and
even marriage and starting a family. All
these problems eventually cause one form
or another of suppression, which might
in turn lead to violent responses. At the
same time, the intellectual, spiritual, or
violent counterculture movements that do
exist are actively trying to attract young
people. This link between religion and
extreme political movements is also worIraq Human Development Report 2014
77
rying for other peoples, particularly those
undergoing transition (see Kyrgyzstan’s
HDR2009).
The balance among the various sources of religious consciousness is clearly
flawed, and this is harmful to families,
schools, religious institutions, imams, and
worship houses, which are all part of a
community’s fabric. This flaw makes politicized religious thought one of the most
challenging threats for families and for
the social and traditional hierarchies of
authority and prestige, and it leads to an
unstable youth value system.
In general, those who think that young
people will give up their affiliation to religion or sects are wrong, as these have
existential, human, and historical value
for young people. Thus, religious institutions should focus on making religiousness among young people a moral example and on raising awareness in order
to separate religiousness from intolerance
and extremism. The dimensions of this
responsibility depend ,inter alia, on reforming the religious education curricula
so that religion focuses on the productive
morals and values needed to build a just
state and virtuous society.
Youth View
Religious Discourse and Its Impact on the Youth
•Some youth believe that religious discourse adds nothing new, since it only
humours the audience and is directly or indirectly subject to their wishes
lest it should lose their support.
•Others see this discourse as highly influential when a proper environment
is available to spread its ideas; it can serve as a form of pressure on the
government to tackle certain issues in society.
Youth Discussion of the NHDR Workshop, Baghdad, 13–14 March 2013
Tribal Values
The modern civil institutions represented
by the state and its economic, political,
and social system was unable for more
than half a century to cancel, replace,
or weaken the role of traditional institutions such as the extended family and the
clan in a harmonious way that would help
transform the community structure and allow it to adopt civil values. Thus, primary
allegiances thrive, interact in the social
arena, and overlap with the political one.
Despite a changing environment with
respect to work, education, and social
status, young people are still controlled
by their communities’ primary authority.
Nepotism is still the easier way to obtain
benefits, make gains, and secure social
and work positions (see Table 7, Youth
Survey Appendix).
The 2012 Youth Survey In the
absence of objective systems and standards, a large
percentage of youth (54.2
percent of males and 36.8
percent of females) only
has access to jobs through
favouritism.
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Iraq Human Development Report 2014
When Iraqi youth face these choices, a
lack of social and economic security will
tip the scales in favour of the family and
the clan. These traditional institutions not
only provide needed human and psychological security, but also the social and
economic guarantees which the state and
its modern institutions are still unable to
provide. They also provide protection in
case of any conflict with the law or the
authorities.
The demographic changes in Iraq were
not the result of natural conditions, since
wars and armed conflicts played a major
role in reshaping urban and rural areas
through displacement and migration. In
February 2012, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
estimated that 51 percent of the families internally displaced by the wave of
violence in 2006 went to live in governorates other than their original ones.
The rural/urban duality is still enhancing.57
The rural/urban duality is still enhancing clans’ roles and strengthening their
established values. It also explains an important aspect of the youth’s different behavioural patterns. The major migration
waves in Iraq from rural to urban areas
have transformed city life itself, and not
only in terms of the growing number of
those coming to the cities. For example,
in the 1987 census, 35 percent of Baghdad’s population and about 12 percent of
Sulaymaniya’s were not originally from
these two cities. This demographic reality affected economic activities, housing
patterns, forms of expression, politics,
culture, arts, and social life, as those who
came to urban areas did not fit into and
were not integrated into the urban environment’s civil socio cultural paradigms
and dynamics. As a result, the youth
found themselves dealing with a double
culture in which traditional and tribal elements continue to grow.
Youth Voice
The Tribe’s Function Is Continuous: Baghdad’s Youth
The discussion session with young people in Baghdad (Rusafa) included an opinion poll about tribes
and tribalism and their attitudes about these issues.
Their answers were compound and multifaceted,
expressing ideas about the overlapping social, political, and cultural functions of clans. They also noted the overlapping of traditional functions with new
ones resulting from the new situation after 2003. The
opinions varied and were not always in agreement.
The majority of the youth agree that tribe influences their social relationships “because the Iraqi
society’s structure is composed of a group of clans”.
This perception of the social structure was undisputed among the participants, regardless of their various negative and positive attitudes towards clans.
In general, they believe that “the clans’ role was
established and increased during the post-2003
insecurity and crises. The decreased ability of the
state to impose security led clans to fill in the gap
and become the protector of their members, since
location affects a clan’s domination; their authority
in urban areas is more acquiescent to the rule of
law and institutions, unlike in rural areas.”
“The weaker the state’s authority, the greater the
clans’ role and vice versa,” said a young man.”
Generally speaking, however, the clans’ role is important and supportive of the state’s work.”
“Politicians play the clan card to obtain political, electoral, and party gains. Hence the distorted
state structure. Do we live in a civil and institutional
state or a state of tribes? I believe that political parties are using clans to strengthen their authority,”
commented another one.
This oscillation between two views is quite natural,
and it is difficult to have a clear-cut stance on either
a modern, civil state or a tribal one. Upon closely
examining the youth’s views, it is evident that
they realize that the political parties’ use of clans
is a temporary one not linked to clans’ traditional
functions. The clans’ traditional influence is used to
achieve current party goals – an additional overlap
between the state and the clans in both authority
and politics.
From a social and cultural point of view, the youth
believe that a lot of “tribal practices, such as blood
money and the marriage of a girl from the murderer’s family to a man from the victim’s, are incom-
patible with basic human rights, religious teachings,
and Islamic sharia.” On the other hand, “some tribal
practices are positive and contribute to stability, especially since Iraq has newly come out of a conflict and a sectarian fight. Tribal traditions achieve
reconciliation and appease grudges and hatred. A
clan includes members of the two main sects and
thus can achieve reconciliation inside the clan itself.”
“It is the state, its institutions and laws that regulate life, rather than clans,” said another young
man, disagreeing. “Otherwise, what is the use of
courts, police stations, and other state institutions?
In some previous times, there was a need for such
things, but now things are different. In practice,
some clan heads issue orders based on their whims
and desires without any logical or religious bases or
agreed-upon principles.”
The participants agreed that young people are
affected by each other more than by adults. They
listen to their peers when they feel that those agemates are experienced and can handle problems
and find appropriate solutions: “Technological advances have reduced the significance and role of
the clans in enhancing youth relations. As a young
man, I establish my relationships and friendships
through my place of study and work, through travelling, or through social networks such as Face book
and Twitter, and not through clans,” said a young
participant.
“But clans have a major role in strengthening relationships among the youth of different clans. My
opinion is based on a life experience: when my
cousin had an accident with a man from another clan, many of the latter’s relatives came and I
got introduced to many of them and we became
friends,” said another one, disagreeing.
Such assessments and opinions are often anecdotal and subjective, but they are definitely
common among the youth. However, differences
among the youth on other issues are far fewer.
When asked if they want to be a ‘clan head’, they
were surprised and gave amusing responses. “If a
young man became a clan head, he would not be
able to impose his vision and views due to adults’
negative views towards youth,” said a young man.”
Thus, he would not be respected by clan members,
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79
as we are living in a patriarchal society which only
accepts the opinions and views of adults. Young
people embrace whatever is new; therefore, adults
may accuse them of disobeying dominant social
values, making them in constant disagreement with
them, and that what is called the generation gap.”
“Young people are energetic and adventurous
and love exploring things. This is why old people believe they discard conventional things,” said another, disagreeing. “Many young people rebel against
social and political situations which do not provide
them with adequate opportunities to play their role
and achieve their ambitions.”
Crisis of Youth or of Society?
There is a huge gap between the youth’s
aspirations and their ability to choose new
social values and behaviours responsive
to the challenges of transition. This causes
a young individual to feel anxiety, internal
conflict, frustration, and dissatisfaction
and leads to a failure to play socially assigned roles. In other words, this creates a
gap between the ideal picture and the real
behaviour.
The answers of the participants in the
discussion sessions give many examples
of people’s reactions to crises since “wars
destroy some moral rules and permit some
taboos to the extent that they become preferred or even obligatory”.58
The answers also reveal the fear and
pessimism that correlate to the many
concerns felt by young people in daily
life. Iraqi society’s general ‘perversion’,
as some participants put it, has created a
new situation characterized by insolence
and a lack of fear of legal and moral repercussions, which is complicating things
in the short term and restraining the government’s movement towards reform and
reconstruction.
Many youth believe that not adhering to
values has made many people influenced
by previously unacceptable tendencies.
Material affluence has become a much
higher value than honesty, and closeness
to authority is a measure of prestige more
important than integrity. The values of
solidarity, faithfulness, and sharing have
changed and been replaced by new value
systems that honour fraud, cheating, lying, etc. As a result, young people have
become confused –in theory, positive
values and ideals are praised and corrupt
conduct is rejected, but on the ground
these negative values and acts are common and acceptable.59
Young people are unable to have selffulfilment in legitimate labour markets,
forcing them to be involved in illicit social and economic activities. The majority
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of these changes have been mixed with
inherited value systems that have negative aspects. The injustices visited upon
Iraqis may be the reason for such negative values, and a lot of these habits and
social practices are now common. Some
people do not even scorn those who violate the law, break street lamps, refuse to
queue up, or help thieves. Some may even
respect them and consider them strong
people who challenge the government and
do not fear it.60
Wars and crises are a real test for society’s institutions. One indicator of their
failure is that each major institution generates a parallel shadow one. In the economic institution, for example, financial
corruption, forgery, illegal branding, and
others become a shadow institution. In the
family institution, prostitution and extramarital relationships become a shadow
institution. The situation becomes more
dangerous when the shadow institution
overlaps with the official one, such as
when a family forces its female members
to prostitute themselves or get married
for commercial reasons, or when a family
(parents and children) becomes beggars.
Pluralism and the Iraqi Case
Iraq is one of the first countries in the
Middle East to recognize racial, religious,
and sectarian pluralism. Kurds, Turkmen,
and Assyrians enjoy full freedom to speak
their languages and practice their cultures,
which is good, but the degree of acceptance of and interaction among Iraq’s
various cultures is another thing.
The Kurdistan Region’s youth believe
that pluralism and tolerance are more
stable and fixed in that region than in the
other governorates. The region’s media
played a major role in this regard, particularly after the intolerance the area experienced during the conflict, which has now
become a lesson well learned; nobody
wants to go back to such circumstances,
and all actors now stress tolerance, both
at the political level and within society en
masse.
The freedoms given to Iraq’s cultural
groups were in fact the political result of
a long struggle which all the groups took
part in, particularly those that had their
rights violated in previous eras. However,
these achievements are not enough; the
degree of openness and interaction between different ethnicities is still substandard.
Arab youth in Baghdad could not build
real bridges with the other Iraqi cultures.
Their schools, media, and culture were
negligent in this regard, while non-Arab
intellectuals learned about the Arab culture and read and write in Arabic.
Issues of Concern to Youth
Young people discussed two issues of major concern to them, namely the extreme
family disintegration in Kirkuk and the
proliferation of drugs in Anbar. While this
report includes quantitative and qualitative research aimed at understanding and
analysing the situation and identifying
how better to deal with existing problems,
examining the aforesaid two extreme issues can clarify to some extent the societal conception of these problems and
how youth view the causal relationship
between the reasons and the results.
Examining these two issues reveals the
dangerous behaviours and consequences
that can result from authoritarian familial
and social relationships and poor or minimal dialogue between generations. Although these extreme cases are relatively
limited when compared to other widespread but less dangerous issues, they are
in fact the tip of the iceberg. Such cases
can only exist when enhanced by a huge
raft of other problems, which have not yet
produced their full negative effects, but
which must however be treated without
delay.
Youth Voice
Issues of Concern to the Kirkuk Youth –Human Trafficking, Family
Violence, and Sexual Abuse
The youth participating in the dialogue session in
Kirkuk related many stories of sexual abuse and the
organ trade and said these cases resulted from family violence. They believe that poverty and family
and social disintegration are the key drivers.
However, such extreme issues usually result from a
number of correlated reasons rather than only one.
In Kirkuk, such phenomena are found in the city’s
growing slums, which are still receiving large numbers of displaced families fleeing conflict in other
regions in Iraq. These displaced families are mostly
poor, and some of them have lost identification
documents, which makes it difficult for them to get
jobs or even food aid.
The slums’ demographic composition is a hybrid
mix of different regions and ethnic groups, mainly
displaced persons. This means that the traditional
bonds between families and their original environment have been broken – forcibly in most cases –
and are not being replaced by any urban or civil
bonds that may exist.
At the household level, there is poverty and a lack
of resources, coupled with the family disintegration that results from non-existent parents and from
displacement. The traditional family hierarchy has
been diminished; if the father is present, he is likely
unemployed and cannot provide for his family. In a
new environment and under difficult circumstances,
extreme cases of violence, sexual abuse, and human trafficking are not unusual, particularly when
there are no external deterrence measures.
The opinions expressed by the youth on this subject blame economic factors, noting that households are struggling with price inflation, unemployment, and skyrocketing house rents.
According to the youth, the social and familial
reasons for such behaviour are as follows:
1. Family disintegration, family violence, favouring of
certain children, and drugs. Family violence, such
as beating, burning, torture, and depriving children of food, pushes young people to flee home,
while the children of drug addicts suffer from numerous psychological and social problems.
2. Customs and traditions, specifically a culture
of authority and forcefulness. There are related
practices such as early marriage and choosing
husbands for girls. In addition, society can traditionally be intolerant, for example by not allowing
ex-convicts to reintegrate.
3. Parents who are not understanding, which makes
it impossible for young people, especially young
women, to tell the truth. This pushes children to
commit suicide or run away from home, in which
case they might be abused by other parties.
4. Some families make a deal with criminal gangs
and use the their younger members in illegal
activities in order to make money (this was addressed in the previous chapter).
5. Inability to properly understand religion, and using
misinterpretations to justify immoral activities.
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81
6. Blame for delinquent children is placed on the
mother; the parents do not take equal responsibility.
7. Alarmingly fast-growing slums in the governorate
due to migration from other governorates, and a
lot of the inhabitants trade in women and human
organs.
8. Families are large but are disintegrating; meanwhile, the youth find it too expensive to get married, resulting in unusually high rates of unmarried
people, especially women.
9. Women’s poor awareness of their rights and the
increasing illiteracy rate among them.
The way these reasons are viewed and prioritized
differs among the youth and within society.
Some of the youth believe that it is Islam that forces women to stay at home and makes society reject
their employment in many fields. Others argue that
it is not religion itself but the rigid interpretations by
some persons that are to blame. However, a large
and influential social group still believes that the
home is the right place for women.
Since Kirkuk accommodates multiple ethnic
groups and sects, there are different views on the
role of customs and traditions in causing this situation.
A certain understanding of religion has become
so prevalent, it appears that popular culture affects
religion more than religion affects popular culture.
People often mix up religion with customs and traditions, and confuse customs, which have been recently formed, with traditions, which are supposed
to have some historical roots. Incoming harmful
customs are often considered part of the tradition,
though they are not.
While the youth had different opinions concerning
the above-mentioned points, they agreed on other
aspects – acknowledging, for example, that there
are inadequate procedures and mechanisms to
eliminate the problems. For instance, anti-trafficking
laws only impose financial penalties on violators, with
no sentence. The youth also agreed on the need
to review adultery laws so as not to discriminate
against women. They however disagreed on who to
blame for this dangerous behaviour: is it the whole
family, the father, the mother, the husband, or the
young woman herself? They also expressed doubts
about the use and sustainability of treatment. It was
as if they believed that change was almost impossible or as if they were unable to recognize the signs
of change.
Youth Voice
Anbar’s Youth Warn about Drugs
The youth who participated in the dialogue session in Anbar complained that the country has had
a drug trade with neighbouring countries since the
mid-1990s. Drugs have permeated society due to insecurity and the series of wars and disputes in Iraq
over many years. Departure, forced displacement,
and the introduction of numerous satellite channels
after 2003 played a role in bringing practices inconsistent with the traditions of Anbar’s closed tribal society.
One of the youth said nine persons of one family
were killed because of a television serial, while another serial caused many divorces. A lot of problems
have emerged between couples and between
parents and children due to watching such serials.
Although this interpretation appears simplistic because it omits more complex factors behind the
family and social problems, it reveals how fragile
the bonds and basics of marriage and family are.
Marriages are often arranged by the parents and
not based on a real relationship or understanding
between the spouses, which makes them shakeable
– even because of a television serial.
The youth also expressed resentment about the
spread of ecstasy and alcoholic drinks among
young people, which some of them publicly boast
about. This, say the youth, reflects despair, a lack of
confidence in the future, poor religious and moral
deterrents, and the influence of bad company.
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It is an attitude that defies the family and society,
through which the abusers express their rejection of
being deprived of their rights, especially decision
making. Through drugs, they escape to an imaginary world.
A participant said ecstasy – an empathogenic
drug of the phenethylamine and amphetamine
classes of drugs – is popular among the youth. Many
of those youth are under the effect of these pills
most of their time. Gangs and individuals who are
generally well known to society sell these pills in coffee shops, casinos, and clubs, and even in broad
daylight. Some have even been sold in universities,
with officials neglecting to address the issue. Intoxicants have also become widespread because they
are easy to buy and because governorate officials
are turning a blind eye or even promoting them.
Some of the youth underlined that the reason behind the rapid spread of this problem is poor legal
deterrents and weak health and border controls.
Others argued that unemployment is the cause. A
participant said that the law was only applied to
the weak, and that family turbulence and social violence in Anbar, including murders, forced displacement, violence, limited rule of law, and the growing
influence of tribal customs, were the most influential
factors.
The youth also believe that the spread and easy
use of digital satellite receivers have an important
role in encouraging this behaviour among the
youth. Many young people are emulating celebrities in their behaviour, their relationships, and the
way they deal with others. Another main reason behind the addiction is young people’s unorganized
spare time.
A participant stressed the need for government
institutions and civil society organizations to develop awareness programmes. All the participants expressed their fear of the consequences of addiction
on youth and society.
Youth Recommendations
The youth believe that fighting this problem should be
made not only through a security/legal approach,
but also through a comprehensive approach that
includes social awareness and the promotion of a
culture of health. Their recommendations in this re-
spect were as follows:
1. Coordinating the efforts of the Ministries of Health
and Interior and the governorate councils in order to develop a database on the addicts, and
cooperating with the anti-drug centres run by
security services in order to minimize the trade in
drugs.
2. Enhancing synergy between the ministries dealing with youth, education, health, justice, and internal issues, with the goal of holding awareness
workshops in education institutions.
3. Coordinating with religious institutions in order to
explain the consequences of drug abuse.
4. Activating the role of the Ministry of Health and
its affiliated departments in monitoring pharmacies and medicine distribution outlets, especially
those dealing with psychiatric drugs.
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
83
Chapter 6
Education Opportunities for
the Youth
Right to education
in the 2005 Iraqi
Constitution:
Article 34
First: Education is a
fundamental factor
in the progress of
society and is a
right guaranteed
by the state.
Primary education
is mandatory,
and the state
guarantees the
eradication of
illiteracy.
Second: Free
education is a right
for all Iraqis in all its
stages.
For two generations61 of Iraq’s youth and
perhaps for one more generation to come,
empowerment has not been easy or satisfactory. The previous chapters reveal the
significant challenges that young people’s
exclusion manifests. Ten years after the
end of successive wars and international
sanctions, the education system still suffers certain imbalances that make it fall
short of two key goals: providing basic
knowledge to young people, and establishing a cognitive basis for developing
the adequate and proper skills to empower
them.
Education is a human right and an opportunity for empowerment and capacity
building. The Iraqi Constitution guarantees this right to the youth.
What do youth want first?
Education is still a top priority of the
youth: approximately 30 percent of the
youth in the central and southern Iraqi
governorates and 39 percent in Kurdistan
Region consider education a priority.
One explanation for this is that education is almost exclusively associated with
improving job prospects. For Iraqi youth,
access to job opportunities is the second
priority after education and before housing and marriage.
This could mean that Iraqi youth do not
regard education as a source of knowledge, culture, freedom, and character
building, but rather as an obligation to
ensure the material needs of life. These
priorities are organically interrelated, as
Figure 6.1 reveals.
Figure 6.1
Youth Priorities
Source: Youth survey YS-2012
Getting an academic degree is a goal of
the youth, but it is related to a more important one. According to the 2009 National
Youth and Adolescent Survey, 63 percent
of youth aged 15–29 want to have a university degree, which goes in line with the
youth’s positive perception of education.
Further, 60 percent believe that acquiring
a university degree helps them both get a
job and improve their social status, while
29 percent believe that it only helps them
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Iraq Human Development Report 2014
get a job opportunity, and 12 percent think
it only enhances their social status.
About 37 percent of males and 27.7 percent of females believe education helps
them get a job opportunity. However, the
rate of females who believe that education
helps improve social status is higher than
that of males, which might confirm the
assumption that professional status (rank
and achievements at work) is more important to males than familial or kinship
status. Acquiring a high academic degree
appears to ensure a respectable social status for females within their family and
community or among their friends.
Therefore, the youth’s motivation to
pursue academic studies is great even
though they are aware that job opportunities are rare – 43 percent of university
graduates are unemployed, according
to the 2011 IKN Survey. Indeed, in the
current situation each additional year of
education only raises the hourly wage by
2.6 percent(the international equivalent is
nearly 6 percent).62
Is Education a Portal to
Social Integration?
As a basic dimension of human development, education provides, through the acquisition of knowledge, opportunities to
integrate into or improve various aspects
of social life: work, professional/social
status, cultural awareness, political participation, etc. It also plays an important
role in social mobility, especially when it
ensures equal opportunity and succeeds
in providing people with basic knowledge and skills.63 But this is not always
the case, as many young people are excluded from their right to education either
because of family or institutional barriers.
The following indicators shed light on the
situation.
High Illiteracy Rate
In spite of efforts decades ago to eradicate
illiteracy among adults, illiteracy is continuing in the new generation. The rate
of illiteracy for the age group of 15–29 is
15.3 percent (19.7 percent among females
and 11.1 percent among males).64
The 2012 Youth Survey shows that illiteracy rates, while high, are generally
lower among males and lower in Kurdistan Region.
The 2012 Youth Survey
Illiteracy rates
for those aged
15–29 (%)
Iraq governorates
Kurdistan
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
10.3
18.5
13.9
4.6
11.6
8.0
These high illiteracy rates among young
people are due to economic factors, which
make a family neglect its children’s right
to education.
Low Educational Attainment of the
Youth
Educational attainment among the youth
is low: 33.4 percent of the age group 15–
29 are illiterate or semi-literate, 32 percent
have completed their primary education,
approximately 28 percent have completed middle or high school, and 7 percent
have finished post-secondary education.
These rates are incommensurate with the
requirements of the labour market and development programmes in general.
Unequal Educational Attainment
of the Youth
While the primary enrolment rate is improving generally (94 percent for males
and 90 percent for females), the gap between males and females in secondary
education enrolment is still wide (52.5
percent against 44.6 percent respectively), although female enrolment improved
in all governorates save Anbar, where it
decreased to 35.5 percent in 2011 from 38
percent in 2006.
The lowest enrolment rate was in Maysan Governorate, at 31.4 percent, followed
by Muthanna and Wasit, while the highest
rates of secondary education enrolment
in 2011 were in Kurdistan Region, where
Sulaymaniya Governorate ranked first at
79 percent.
Disparities in Enrolment Rates of
the Youth
The overall enrolment rate of the youth
at the secondary education level varies
across the Iraqi governorates. It was 15.4
percent in Maysan, 20 percent in Muthanna, 20.9 percent in Basra, and 21.2 percent in Naynawa. The highest rates were
in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, where it
reached 42.3 percent across the governorates.
In university education, young women’s participation has increased noticeably. The percentage of female students
in the University of Baghdad reached 59
percent. It is even higher in Kufa Univer-
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
85
sity in Najaf Governorate, where it approached 61 percent. In Maysan University it is 62 percent, and it is 65 percent in
Babil University. Dhi Qar University has
70 percent female students, whereas their
presence is low in Naynawa University at
40 percent.65
These high percentages are mainly
due to the low enrolment of male youth,
who drop out of universities to join the
labour force. Overall, most of the youth
who complete their education all the way
to universities are from middle income
groups or higher.
Dropping Out
Young people’s education enrolment rates
are low (21 percent in high school and 14
percent in higher education). In addition,
there is a clear discrepancy in the education enrolment rates between males and
females (44.4 percent for males against
33.5 percent for females).
Figure 6.2
Educational Status of Youth Surveyed
Source: Youth survey YS-2012
3.4 million youth
turn their back on
education
86
The gender gap in university education,
however, is diminishing. The percentage
of young women in the academic year
2012–2013 was 54 percent, while in technical education it was 40 percent, and in
private universities it was 35 percent.
The youth opinion poll conducted in
2012 showed that the percentage of school
dropouts reached 60 percent (57 percent
male and 65 percent female), as shown in
Figure 6.2.
The school dropout rate was highest in
Najaf, where it reached 75 percent, closely
followed by Naynawa at 74 percent. In
Basra it was 66 percent and in Wasit 65
percent. In the Kurdistan Region, dropout rates were the lowest nationally: Erbil
37 percent, Sulaymaniya 46 percent, and
Duhok 56 percent. The order closely follows that of the poverty rates and the Human Development Index by governorate
(see tables in the Statistical Annex).
The available data, however, does not
show what the students who dropout or
do not enrol do. It is not clear how many
have joined the labour market, how many
are unemployed, and how many are simply being supported by their families. It
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
is difficult to estimate who among them
was forced to drop out. Also not known is
whether girl students dropout to get married.
In the absence of such specific information, the sheer number of school dropouts
is a substantive issue of great importance.
There is a need to evaluate the sufficiency
and efficiency of the educational system
in terms of policies and plans that are in
place.
Why do the Youth Drop Out?
As noted, the data does not answer certain questions: What are dropouts doing?
How many of them work and how many
do not? How many are dependent on their
family? Have they dropped out voluntarily or have they been forced to? Have
young women dropped out for marriage?
The high rate of dropouts is a major
concern at the level of education-related
policymaking and academic research.
The Iraq Socioeconomic Household
Survey 2012 might help in clarifying the
reasons behind such high dropout rates.
This survey shows the following in the
same order of importance: unwillingness
to complete education, social reasons,
working for the family, and the inability
of the family to bear education expenses.
Depriving Children of Education
A number of complex factors keep a family from sending its children to school.
Some of these factors have a certain degree
of continuity, while others are temporary.
For example, poverty and family carelessness (or disinterest in education) have a
historical and cultural dimension and thus
a relative continuity, while insecurity and
non-availability of schools are factors that
can change when situations improve.
Enrolment rates are similar in rural and
urban areas, which suggests that attitudes
and approaches to education do not radically differ. However, specific factors do
differ, some of which lead to the radical
exclusion of females in particular, while
others are related to the non-existence of
schools. In addition, poverty pushes families to force their children to drop out and
get a job to increase the collective income.
Moreover, the higher the grade/class, the
higher the cost. Primary education’s direct
costs amount to 6.3 percent of an individual’s average monthly expenses (5.5 percent
for the poor and 8.9 percent for the rich).
The higher the educational attainment of
the parents, the greater the probability that
they send their children to school. Furthermore, if the father is educated, it increases
the possibility of sending the boys in the
family to school, while if both parents are
educated, the probability of sending the
girls to school increases.66
Data resulted from the 2009 National
Youth and Adolescent Survey unveil that
dropping out is an involuntary choice; 21.2
percent of dropouts or those who did not
enrol in education said it was due to poor
financial conditions, while 19.5 percent
said they wanted to work. Thus, economic
factors constitute at least 40 percent of the
reasons.
Questions linger about why the youth do
not wish to continue with their schooling.
The available data does not answer that
clearly. Some reasons given by dropouts
relate to the quality of education, such
as the unavailability of a nearby school,
mistreatment by educational staff, and the
inflexibility of school hours.
From the above, the conclusion could
be made that the regression in education
is mainly the result of the reducing interest in education within Iraqi society’s current culture. Families do not nurture the
importance of education in their children,
while schools do not attract interest due to
deteriorating school buildings, unhealthy
relationships in school, the chosen academic subjects, and the traditional teaching methods. This situation constitutes a
big challenge to the education system.
Additionally, the disconnect between
education and employment opportunities
outside the government has discouraged
youth from putting value on education.
Students do not feel that schools will
provide exclusive knowledge that they
could not get through information technology, which is now in direct competition with schools in providing knowledge.
As a group of young salespeople said, “It
is enough for us to learn what is needed
[through] a mobile phone and the Internet
for our personal benefit, because these are
the skills needed for the employment opportunities that are available in the market, which basically have the capacity for
employing more youth.”
Youth in the slums say: “We do not need
the formal education that teaches us to
read and write in Arabic. The heavy subjects that they teach are not useful for us
in our future because the job market does
not require the knowledge that the school
subjects provide.” Dhi Qar is one of the
poorest governorates in Iraq. In its centre,
Al Nasiriya city, the youth have a different opinion. They think that the poverty in
the city is the result of lack of education.
Youth Voice
They Are Poor because They Are Deprived of Education, and Deprived
of Education because They Are Poor (Al Nasiriya Youth)
The youth of Al Nasiriya are concerned about
poverty among young people, and they have the
conviction that dropping out is mainly due to poverty, since most dropouts are from the poorest fami-
lies. Thus, the lower the income, the higher the possibility of dropping out. They consider education one
of the most powerful weapons against poverty and
unemployment, and they believe that the eradica-
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
87
tion of poverty can only be achieved through ensuring
a good, proper education.
The youth who participated in the discussion pointed
out that if the schools and institutions which were supposed to be a protective umbrella for children had done
their work properly (improving education standards and
controlling the dropout rate), poverty would have surely
decreased. They also stress that most children who work
or beg in the streets are dropouts who have lost education opportunities and will not have society’s respect
when they grow up. Some of the youth put the blame
on family for not taking control of this problem, while
others hold schools responsible, as they appear not to
have a clearly defined plan or work programme that
encourages students to continue their education.
The youth demand that government education programmes target dropouts who now work, especially
young women in rural areas who mostly work in the informal sector. They also call for improving the quality of
education, not merely eradicating illiteracy, as well as
providing educational opportunities to all Iraqis throughout their life.
The issue that needs to be addressed at
the government and social levels is the
negative attitudes of the youth towards
education. Such attitudes contradict the
high status of knowledge, education, and
educators in Iraq and within the Arabic
cultural legacy in general. The quality of
education has negatively impacted on the
youth’s vision and will certainly have its
effects on future generations.
We have to note that the youth might
not be interested in benefitting or able to
benefit from the current traditional education approach. This requires considering
various innovative educational approaches that are designed to meet the needs of
the youth and the shifts in their perceptions. Such an education would address
their growing interest in modern technology and at the same time be sensitive to
the local culture and the particular attitude
towards girls. One of the main reasons for
the dropout of girls from schools in rural
areas is the unavailability of girls’ schools
(see Youth Voice 9).
Encouraging initiative might help to
address this situation. The government
has to recognize the risks inherent in the
high dropout rates, and it should encourage families and their children to enrol in
schools and complete their education. The
Ministries of Education and Higher Education actually started a programme in
2013 to provide cash to students in public universities, where each student gets a
monthly payment of US$90. The Ministry of Education will start giving US$27
to each student in primary and secondary
levels starting in 2014.
The National Youth Strategy 2010–
2012 suggested a programme which, if
implemented, could be an important instrument in understanding youth issues
and addressing them in order to achieve
higher enrolment of the youth and change
their attitudes towards education. The
programme implementation will depend
on state spending trends, the private sector’s desire to do their part, and families’
ability and willingness to prioritize education.
However, the situation requires an urgent search for more innovative alternatives.
Programmes Suggested in the NYS 2013–2020
The National Youth Strategy suggests an expanded programme to provide the youth with
education:
1. A national programme for youth-friendly schools
designed and implemented in a number of Iraqi
areas, especially the most disadvantaged areas
2. A national programme to engage schools, communities, and NGOs in defining issues and concerns related to youth needs in society and in
encouraging them to conduct scientific research
related to their issues of concern implemented
3. A national programme for developing the life
skills of young people, especially those living in
the most disadvantaged communities and those
with special needs, to help them develop positive behaviour and enable them to participate in
education and learning as well as decision mak-
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Iraq Human Development Report 2014
ing that affects their lives and communities implemented
4. A national programme involving policymakers,
local leaders, communities, and parents to enhance the enrolment of youth in educational institutions, particularly females and youth with special needs, in an equal manner in all areas and
among all social groups and ensure their completion of school, vocational, and university education programmes implemented
5. A national programme for erasing illiteracy and accelerating the learning of young male and female
dropouts funded and implemented to allow them
to gain access to new education opportunities
Alternative Educational
Approaches
Alternate educational approaches are not
difficult to find, and the experience of
many countries provides successful models that could be followed. International
organizations such as UNESCO and UNICEF provide very useful resources for the
benefit of governments and civil society
institutions. Mobile schools, remote learning, the Internet, television, and mobile
phones are widely used and could be effective channels for knowledge. The most
suitable model to be applied depends on
the educational targets and cultural nature
of the society.
Alternative educational approaches are
not restricted to educational institutions.
In fact, this relationship between the service provider and the recipient should be
reviewed in order to find possibilities for
innovative approaches. It is worth listing
here some local initiatives by families
dedicated to their children’s education:
• In a Nahiya (area) in Kerbala Governorate, an agriculturalist donated some
land and other locals contributed money
to construct a school in their town. They
requested the local government to arrange for the teachers and their salaries.
• In Khan Beni Saad town in Diyala Governorate, the locals leased a house and
have pledged to pay the rent while the
government pays the salaries of the
teachers.
Institutional Challenges
Evaluation reports indicate that the education system itself poses a major challenge
to young people’s educational process.
Several factors combine to enhance the
irregularities in the structure and performance of the education system. These
factors vary depending on geographical
location, gender, and state of transition.
They also vary according to whether or
not schools meet the requirements for
quality education (availability and operation of science labs, experienced teachers,
etc.). These requirements are more often
met in Baghdad and in governorate centres than in rural areas and small towns.
This situation deprives many youth of a
large number of educational opportunities.
The National Education Strategy 2011–
2020 identifies a raft of challenges facing
secondary and higher education, as outlined below.
Education Sector Challenges
Item
Major challenge
Institutional context
Obsolete administrative, financial, and legislative
systems (or components thereof) and poor
administrative practices
Infrastructure
Severe deficit in the number of school and
university buildings and an inadequate regulatory
system and education environment
Available opportunities
Decreased number of quality education
opportunities (enrolment, equality, and efficiency)
at all educational levels
Quality
Poor quality control and limited application
Financing and
spending
Low budget allocations to the education sector
and poor management of such allocations
Scientific research
Poor scientific research capacities, activities, and
products
Source: National Education Strategy/Iraq 2011–2020
Limited Capacity of Secondary
Education
Quantitative educational indicators, such
as the number of students or schools, are
often deemed useful indicators of empowerment opportunities (scientific, profes-
sional, preparatory, and training-related),
which are of course required for getting a
job or simply acquiring knowledge. These
indicators in Iraq reflect imbalanced institutional structures, infrastructure, and
course content. This is aggravated by
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
89
The low coverage
of the education
system and the
irregular distribution
of educational
services have
helped decrease
youth enrolment
in educationally
marginalized areas
and have affected
their opinion about
the benefits of
completing their
education.
The disparity in
the provision
of educational
services among
regions and
also among
educational
levels enhances
discrepancies in
the net enrolment
rate.
The persistent gap
among the three
stages suggests
a structural
imbalance, since
the number of
students enrolled
in middle school
accounts for less
than half of those
who finished the
primary stage.
90
the unequal distribution of educational
services between urban and rural areas,
between males and females, among governorates, and among educational stages.
Secondary education coverage in 2010–
2011 was as follows:
• The number of secondary schools in
Iraq totalled 5,472: 2,396 boys’ schools
(43.7 percent), 1,863 girls’ schools (34
percent), and 1,213 mixed schools (22
percent).
• The number of students for this stage
reached 1,953,766: 58.8 percent male
and 41.2 percent female, and the average number of students per school was
358.
• The number of secondary school teachers amounted to 136,446: 59,923 male
teachers (43.9 percent of the total number) and 76,523 female teachers (56.1
percent). The teacher–student ratio was
1:14.3, which is acceptable according to
international standards.
Gender Disparities
Data for 2004–2012 reveals a disparity
between the enrolment rates of males and
females, which suggests that the education system has failed to bridge this gap.
The net enrolment rate for primary school
and intermediate school is 93 percent and
40 percent respectively for males compared to 83 percent and 34 percent for
females.
As for secondary school, the rate was
a low 18 percent for both sexes. This is
attributed to the continued influence of
social traditions which impede girls’
completion of education, and also to the
increased engagement of males in the
labour market after the age of 15. Those
who continue to university generally
come from middle and upper class families, especially in urban areas where differences between the enrolment rates of
males and females are socially, culturally,
or economically based.
In spite of the high HDI in the Kurdistan Region compared to the other Iraqi
governorates, there were still genderbased discrepancies in the enrolment rates
in Kurdistan’s three governorates: out of
the total number of students, the female
enrolment rate was 46 percent in Erbil and
Duhok and 48 percent in Sulaymaniya,
according to the Kurdistan Educational
Statistics Report 2011–2012.
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Rural–Urban Disparities
There is a clear degree of educational
deprivation in Iraq’s rural areas, both in
terms of distribution and quality. Primary schools in rural areas account for 51
percent of the total number of primary
schools, while the rural population only
constitutes 31 percent of the Iraqi population. This is not a positive indicator. It
is a result of the geographic remoteness
of villages and rural communities. While
urban schools can have 6, 12, 18, or 24
classrooms, rural schools usually have 6
classrooms – a very limited capacity.
Other indicators suggest other inequalities. About 34 percent of Iraqi teachers
work in rural areas; this region tends to
act as an expeller of the accumulated education expertise, since teachers prefer to
move to urban areas two years or less into
their service. Official data also suggests a
lack of teaching aids and school labs in
rural areas, and some schools even lack
basic needs such as drinking water.
Disparities in Education Stages
If primary and secondary schools are
evenly distributed, it ensures a smooth
transition from one stage to another. This
is a basic pillar that helps improve education quality, ensure equal educational
opportunities, and promote the continuation of students’ education. The uneven
distribution of schools, on the other hand,
paves the way for dropping out.
There is relative improvement in the
primary school to middle school rate,
which was 29.6 percent in 2004/2005 and
increased to 34.4 percent in 2011/2012
(although the enrolment rate in middle
schools did not improve). However, this
rate differs among the governorates: it
was highest in Baghdad/Karkh/3 (47.4percent), Baghdad/Karkh/1 (45.9 percent),
and Baghdad/Rusafa/2 (39.5 percent) and
lowest in Naynawa (21.8 percent), Maysan (21.9 percent), and Muthanna (22.1
percent).
As for the overall middle school to high
school rate, it remained approximately
the same in 2004/2005 and in 2011/2012
at 69.2 percent. There was a fair amount
of variance in the governorates. In
2004/2005, it was highest in Baghdad/
Karkh/1 (92 percent) and lowest in Najaf (54.7 percent), while in 2011/2012 it
was highest in Baghdad/Rusafa/2 (83.2
percent) and lowest in Dhi Qar (57.4 percent).
The gap between middle school and
high school is not as large, but remains
significant. This means that between
one-third and two-thirds of the students
in each stage will not be able to access
the subsequent educational opportunities
within the scheduled time limit.
In the Kurdistan Region, the education
system focuses more on basic education.
This is why high schools constitute only
4 percent of the total number of schools
in Kurdistan, with the highest rate in Erbil
(7 percent) and the lowest rate in Duhok
(1 percent). This is a weakness in the education system. It seems that the difficult
geographical terrain affects the distribu-
tion of schools. Schools are unevenly
distributed among the governorates: Erbil
has 69 percent of them, followed by Sulaymaniya with 17 percent. This distribution will adversely affect children’s future
educational attainment.
The 2004 Living Conditions Mapping
Report indicates that the development
pattern in Kurdistan has a centralized and
urban nature, which explains the great
disparity between the region’s cities and
rural areas, a situation reflected in the concentration of schools. These development
indicators require a long time before they
change, expanding the development plan
to cover areas outside the urban centres.
Youth Voice
Marginalized Youth in the Maysan Marshlands: Schools Are Distant
The village had no schools prior to 2003;a primary
school was established in 2006. Education levels are
low: the youth who participated in the dialogue
session included six illiterate individuals, seven dropouts, two primary school graduates, and four middle
school graduates.
When asked about the reasons for dropping out,
participants said that, due to poverty, students prioritized work. Another reason mentioned was the
remoteness of the middle and high schools and the
youth’s inability to afford the commuting costs – the
closest middle school is 15 kilometres away, while
Vocational Education Does Not
Attract Youth
The number of students admitted to vocational education programmes has decreased since 2008, though the number of
dropouts has also decreased.
The number of students admitted to vocational education industrial programmes
was 11,626 males and 870 females in
2012/2013; in commercial programmes,
2,404 males and 3,378 females were
admitted. There is a preference for this
programme because of the possibility to
enter colleges later – mostly private colleges, with very limited access to state
universities. However, this limited access
is an important factor behind the youth’s
unwillingness to attend vocational programmes, as there is a chronically negative view towards jobs associated with
vocational education. The education system is to blame for this as well.67
Additionally, there are 261 educational
units nationwide that provide certificates
there is no high school in the whole region.
The participants also brought up the poor academic performance of students in general. The
number of students who pass exams is very low; one
year, only 17 out of 200 students passed the primary
education exams. The youth also pointed out the
prohibitive costs of school supplies and tutors. In
addition, since the village did not have any school
before 2003, the students in the primary school are
relatively old compared to their peers around the
country.
that are equivalent to those of the Ministry
of Education and the Ministry of Higher
Education. Eighteen of these provide a diploma that is equivalent to the Technical
Institutes Certificate, 50 are nursing and
midwifery preparatory schools, and the
remaining 185 are religious institutions
that provide primary and secondary education certificates.68
Despite the increase in the number of
vocational schools from 289 to 298 and
the increase in the number of teachers
from 12,426 to 12,745, the number of
vocational education students decreased
from 61,091 in the year 2008/2009 to
58,689 in the year 2012/2013. Vocational
education also shows high dropout rates.
However, the number of dropouts has decreased from 5,029 in 2009/2010 to 2,820
in the year 2012/2013.69
The reluctance of students to pursue
secondary vocational training (trade, industrial, and agricultural) is actually a
chronic phenomenon and is not the result
of the current situation in Iraq. Some of
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
91
the reasons are the result of higher education policies that do not allow graduates
of these institutes to complete university education. Other reasons relate to a
market that is unwelcoming to these specializations, despite their importance for
development in Iraq. Another reason is
cultural. Such specializations are looked
down on because they are the only options
available to those who do not have many
choices in secondary and university education.70
The youth’s aversion to these specializations is not restricted to the reasons
mentioned above. The vocational training
system itself suffers from obsolete programmes and curricula, and has a slow
response to technical developments in the
job market. It faces difficulties in modernizing its training equipment because of
limited resources and has an inability to
develop the capacities of the educational
staff in line with the technical advancements. It is also too inflexible to upgrade
its teaching methods.
Expanding University Education
Private universities:
a promising
channel for youth
empowerment
92
Additional public universities have been
established in Iraq, bringing their number
from 19 in 2009 to 31 in 2012. In addition,
the number of colleges increased from
249 public colleges and 22 private colleges in 2009 to 273 and 45 respectively
in 2012.
These universities, however, do not
have enough room and lack the quality to
accommodate all high school graduates,
which presents a major challenge to the
education system if it is to be a means for
youth empowerment.
In 2010/2011, 157,469 students were
admitted to Iraq’s public and private universities and technical institutes. This
number has remained above 100,000
since 2003, except for 2006/2007 when a
large number of students refrained from
attending due to insecurity. The number
of students at this level of higher education has effectively tripled in less than
two decades.71 Similarly, the number of
graduates from these universities and
institutes also increased by around two
and a half times within the same period
(1993–2010).
Private Universities
Private universities are a promising option
for secondary school graduates who are
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
not lucky enough to get admission to public universities, either because of their low
marks or because these universities only
admit limited numbers in some majors.
They are also a good option for the graduates of vocational institutes – commercial,
technical, and agricultural – as public universities will not admit these individuals.
(This and the fact that the labour market
does not accept vocational specializations
despite their growing importance in Iraq
have discouraged students from enrolling
in vocational education.)
Private universities seek to accommodate these graduates of vocational schools,
especially industrial schools and schools
of commerce. Schools of commerce have
high female numbers because it is the
only vocational specialization available to
them and the most likely to be accepted
in private and public universities, though
only in colleges of related majors such as
business administration and economics.
Expanding Undergraduate
Education: Equitable Opportunities
for Young Women
The number of students admitted to public and private Iraqi universities and institutes increased by 41,252 students between 2003 and 2011. Out of this number,
the proportion of females increased from
36 percent in 2003/2004 to 44.6 percent
in 2010/2011 – an important step towards
bridging the gap between the two genders.
In 2010/2011, 80 percent of students
attended morning courses and 20 percent
attended night classes, which provided
education opportunities for those who
quit university due to the difficult circumstances after 2003: forced displacement,
violence, sectarian conflict, harsh living
conditions, and the increased cost of living for youth and their families.
About 30 percent (9,467 students) of
the total number of students attending
night classes in 2010/2011 were females.
Although such a percentage is relatively
low, it suggests willpower and a desire to
meet challenges and make changes.
Deferred Dreams: Where Do
Graduates Go?
The large numbers of young graduates
from public and private universities and
technical institutes represent a big challenge for the labour market, which has
failed to provide decent work opportuni-
ties. The economy and society are responsible for the education expenses, which
are covered by non-renewable oil revenues.
The number of graduates from Iraqi
universities increased from 38,054 in
1992/1993 to 74,676 in 2003/2004, and
then decreased to 73,988 in 2009/2010
only to rise again to 98,673 students in
2011/2012.
The proportion of females increased
from around 32 percent of the total graduates in 2003/2004 to 44.9 percent in
2011/2012.
Access to Higher Education
Has Increased, but What
about Education Quality?
Education Opportunities Out of
Step with Youth Aspirations
The ability of public and private universities to accommodate more students has
not been paralleled by a qualitative expansion that takes into consideration the
specializations of secondary school graduates. Although 60 percent of students
specialize in the sciences and 40 percent
specialize in the arts, only half the former pursue scientific majors at university.
They are denied the opportunity to realize their scientific aspirations and their
right to choose their future career due to
university laws and regulations, deficient
education infrastructure, and the education system’s failure to keep abreast of
scientific developments.
A 2011 exploratory survey conducted
in business administration and economics
colleges suggested that the curricula are
poor. The following are the key results of
the survey:72
• Some students said defective curricula
were largely responsible for the deficiency in skills, while newly graduated
employees said the curricula were not
entirely responsible.
• Most new graduates said official and
unofficial on-the-job training was the
best way to acquire the necessary skills.
• Seniors pointed out the need to develop
students’ skills in the field of software
and specialized databases.
• Poor English language proficiency was
the most common deficiency among the
majority of surveyed students, teaching
staff, and bankers.
• The deficiencies included’ direct’ skills
and ‘indirect’ skills, the latter referring
to social and moral/cultural skills such
as knowledge of a code of ethics, negotiation skills, leadership skills, etc.
About 72 percent of youth aged 15–24
do not practice any skill, while 9.7 percent practice technical skills; the remainder practice skills in the commercial, industrial, and agricultural sectors. Nearly
24 percent of the youth have talents and
capacities that their families have often
helped to develop. This is a remarkable
fact: a family’s material and moral support enhances enrolment for remedial
courses and tutorage, thus enabling youth
to be integrated into the education field –
but not into the education system.
Education Opportunities Out of
Step with the Labour Market
The Education System Does Not
Offer Young Students Appropriate
Disciplines
Any education system must incorporate
the latest knowledge and research and be
able to accommodate both students’ desires and the requirements of the labour
market. While insecurity, the accumulated
destructive impacts of the UN sanctions,
and wars over the last few decades have
led to a resurgence of illiteracy, an inefficient education system has given birth to
a new problem – digital illiteracy. This is
evidenced by the high rate of unemployment among graduates with a variety of
majors; the labour market rejects them for
not having the required skills, most prominently advanced technological abilities
and English language proficiency.
Education reflects certain aspects of social integration, and examining student’s
majors can help us understand this situation. The contemporary world is more
interested in natural and applied sciences
than in human and social sciences, despite
the complex problems humanity is facing.
In Iraq, however, more students study
the human and social sciences than the
applied sciences such as engineering and
information technology, with the exception of medicine. Although the youth can
achieve their right to an education and are
thereby better integrated socially, the education system does not provide the theoretical and practical skills required in the
The education
system does not
help young people
build their skills.
The education
system does not
respond to young
students’ desires.
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
93
labour market.
A large proportion of students aged
19–24 pursues studies in the arts and
social sciences, as follows: humanities (20.2 percent); educational sciences
(14.8 percent); and economics, business
administration, and general management
(12.9 percent). On the other hand, only
7.5 percent of students study information
technology, computer sciences, life sciences, physics, engineering, architecture,
construction, agriculture, and veterinary
medicine.73
The number of technical colleges and
institutes remained 16 and 27 respectively
in 2009 and 2012. However, five colleges
of applied studies were created.
In an initiative to correct the
situation, new science colleges
and sections have been
created in the public universities
(2012/2013):
• 30 colleges, including 25 science colleges, of which 22 are in the governorates
• 45 science sections, of which 11 are in
the governorates
• 1 technical institute
The Education System Does Not
Provide the Infrastructure for a
Knowledge-oriented Society
Iraq lacks the integral infrastructure for
information and communication systems, and this has limited the ability of
its schools and universities to incorporate
knowledge elements into their curricula.
In 2011, there were 24 students per computer, 21 postgraduate students per computer, and 7 teaching staff per computer.
Box 6.1
Sectarian Conflict Limits Freedom of Choice
Following the escalation of sectarian violence in
2006, educational services in Iraq became even
more inequitable. In addition to the pre-existing administrative and institutional reasons, social factors
came into play as a consequence of doctrinal, sectarian, and regional rivalries, bringing the country to
the brink of civil war.
Before that, no secondary school student from
Wasit or Anbar, for example, would hesitate to consider an engineering college in Naynawa, Basra, or
Salahuddin as an option for further studies. Today,
however, the sectarian factor affects options to the
extent that students prefer to join an institute rather
than joining a university in a governorate where the
majority of the population is of a different sect.
Therefore, after overcoming the shortages and
problems in the education system itself, educationrelated human and economic development efforts
should aim at building the concept of Iraqi citizenship, which is not a geographical concept, but
rather one that involves opportunities for harmony,
exchange, and better living among all citizens, and
better connections between citizens and the state.
Education policy should consider building this
sense of citizenship before examining the issue of
creating livelihoods; otherwise, the education system could be turned into a huge machine that produces scientific competencies but at the same time
boosts the brain drain that has been ongoing over
the last three decades.
Such circumstances are tantamount to the inefficient use of Iraq’s economic and human resources.
It is incumbent on the government, should it want
to follow a rational course and use the available resources optimally, to reconsider its options and management patterns and work at creating an ideal situation that strikes a balance between disseminating
education and improving its quality, and ensuring
young people’s equal access to education.
Ali Alzubaiydi, background paper
The Youth’s View: How to Make
Education Better
According to the 2009 Youth and Adolescent Survey, only about 61 percent of the
youth were satisfied with the quality of
education. Respondents in the 2012 Youth
Survey (see Figure 6.4) believe that the
most important steps towards improving
the quality of education are the development of teachers’ skills (51 percent) and
the provision of technology and better
curricula in schools (19 percent). Indeed,
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Iraq Human Development Report 2014
traditional teaching methods involving
dictation and memorization negatively
affect education quality; methods that
give importance to analysis and deduction
would help promote the spirit of initiative
and creativity among the youth.
Considering that 9 percent of respondents in the 2012 Youth Survey mentioned
factors such as teaching methods and the
number of teaching hours, a total of 60
percent believe that the problem centres
around teaching efficiency. This is striking, as other factors are often considered
more important, and due attention should
be given to this aspect.
An additional 9 percent saw school infrastructure, such as buildings, furniture,
and the availability of books, as most
important; and 7 percent said it was the
family’s participation in education. The
order and relative importance of these
factors are the same by gender and age
group. The improvement of education
quality also clearly depends on education
budgets, as well as the funds earmarked
for research, development, and capacity
building.
Figure 6.3
How to Make Education Better
Source: Youth survey YS-2012
The development of students’ knowledge will not result from merely providing
the material resources. It requires updating existing systems according to modern
scientific and knowledge developments.
Knowledge and science are now universal.
There are global standards which students
and universities try to achieve through a
process of certification that is also global.
Long years of war and sanctions since the
1980s have deprived generations from
studying abroad. Youth who participated
in the focus group discussions identified
the difficulty of obtaining a scholarship to
study abroad among other factors related
to the development of education.
It is worth noting that the Ministry of
Higher Education and Scientific Research
is increasing the number of educational
missions, in addition to launching the
initiative of the Office of the Council of
Ministers in 2009, to increase the number
of scholarship missions to 10,000 (see
Box 6.2).
Box 6.2 Special Contribution
The Education Initiative– Fulfilling the Aspirations of the Youth
The Education Initiative was launched in 2009 with
the objective of sending students to study in recognized international universities in all scientific and
humanitarian fields related to the strategic needs
for the country’s development. The initiative started
with a pilot scholarship programme in 2010. This programme included 500 scholarships in recognized
universities in the United States of America. The institution in charge, the High Committee for Education
Development (HCED), adopted the latest methods
in implementing the programme. Applications for
scholarships are submitted online to the committee’s website (www.hcediraq.org). Applicants can
follow up on their applications online, and the administration of interviews, lectures, and instructions,
prior to the students’ departure, could all be performed through the website. The inquiries of the
students and their needs are all addressed according to established rules and regulations. The HCED
has also assigned representatives in the countries of
study to respond to any eventuality that might arise.
Application criteria and conditions have been es-
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
95
tablished and are applied objectively and fairly to
all the applications, irrespective of the political or
sectarian affiliation of the applicants. The scholarships covered all Iraqi governorates, including the
Kurdistan Region, and are distributed in proportion
to the size of population in each governorate. The
HCED has established the conditions to select students with the highest grades in the various educational levels, as this reflects on their performance in
the scholarship universities. These conditions have
resulted in good feedback from the universities,
which have often commended the outstanding
performance of the students sent and were grateful
for the successful selection process. In the last two
years, the HCED has launched a programme for
staff development in Iraqi ministries. In its first stage,
50 scholarships were allocated to the Ministries of
Health, Oil, Education, Agriculture, and Foreign Affairs, as well as the Central Bank. The programme
will be expanded to include other ministries in the
coming stages. The latest statistics reveal that the
number of applicants to the fourth stage of the programme in 2013 reached 2,722, out of which 28 per-
cent were females. These applicants will compete
for the available 1,000 scholarships. The number of
the programme graduates so far is 150, representing all 18 Iraqi governorates. All the graduates have
returned to the country, and those who are employed in the ministries have returned to their office
with a higher level of technical and administrative
capacity, which will contribute to the development
of their ministries. The HCED has also supported those
graduates who were not assigned work to find jobs
in the ministries and institutions that need the newly
gained knowledge. The HCED’s ultimate objective is
to reach 10,000 scholarships in all humanitarian and
scientific fields. The HCED’s advanced operational
methodologies, the good work of its staff and their
team spirit, and strong channels of communication
with the applicants and the scholarship institutions
make the Education Initiative a centre of excellence and an example of a best practice that can
be followed by other government institutions.
Dr. Hamid Khalaf Ahmed
Finance: Does It Limit the
Youth’s Attainment of
Education?
There is an urgent need to examine education-related expenditure according to
the two indicators of education spending,
namely percentage of GDP and general
government expenditure. The allocation
mechanisms and the way it is spent must
be examined and the entire system carefully controlled. Rentier economies such
as Iraq’s often have a sense of financial
abundance resulting from the income of
the rentier source (in this case, oil), which
weakens the relationship between government spending and its efficiency or
returns thereon. However, from a human
development perspective, it is necessary
to learn efficiency in the process of building a solid foundation for youth education
and creating a strong system.
96
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Figure 6.4
Expenditure on Education and
Health, GDP 2012 (Percentage)
Source: CSO, National Accounts Statistics -2012
During the 1970s and until 1983, the
education budget was over 20 percent of
the total general budget. This is why the
education system was able to accommodate all school-age children and the net
enrolment rate was 100 percent; the total
enrolment rate even exceeded this percentage when dropouts started re-joining
school. But this bright picture began fading when the budget allocations for public
education went down from 11.2 percent in
1990 to 10.8 percent in 1997 and 5.7 percent in 2002. They went up again to 6.5
percent in 2010 and 7.8 percent in 2011
before going down to 6.9 percent in 2012.
Higher education was not better off, as
its allocation out of the total general ex-
penditure was 3 percent in 2010, going
down to 2.7 percent in 2011 and then to
2.6 percent in 2012.
From a human development perspective, successful education spending
should do the following:
• Strike a balance between the needs of
the present generation and those of future generations.
• Ensure equal access to education,
whether geographically – between urban and rural areas, for example – ethnically, etc. This can help to bring the
education system in line with the needs
of the national economy, redistributing
job opportunities and boosting growth.
Since the education costs are totally
covered by the government, it is natural
for the education budget to be affected
by the ups and downs of social and economic indicators at the macro level, and
by the importance the government gives
to education. Despite this proportional relationship, public education expenditure
should not be less than a specific minimum, which is determined by various
factors (population, number of school-age
children, etc.).
Table 6.1
Education Budget per Student and School between 2004 and 2011,
Excluding Kurdistan Region
2004
2007
2011
General Education Budget
1,239,832
2,289,079
7,762,290
Number of students in all grades
5,218,737
5,854,949
7,037,236
Annual share per student of the Education Budget
0.238
0.391
1.103
Number of schools in all levels
15,053
17,390
20,540
Share per school of the Education Budget
82.4
131.6
377.9
Annual share per school of the Investment Budget
1.9
20.6
31.4
Source: Ali Alzubaidy, background paper
Despite increased education allocations
over the last few years (allocations per
student and per school have almost doubled), the education indicators have not
become more positive. On the contrary,
the number of dual-shift schools has multiplied more than four times from 1,049
in 2006/2007 to 4,451 in 2007/2008, and
likewise for triple-shift schools. This
means that the education system has
failed to fully benefit from the increased
allocations, either because of defective financial operations or inefficient spending.
It is incumbent on the relevant officials to
examine the reasons for the problem that
are specific to the education system, not
just the reasons that are in common with
other sectors/ministries, such as the delayed issuance of the budget, implementation-impeding contractual terms, and
inefficient disposal of available resources.
The structural defects in the budget prevented the education system from making
full use of its financial allocations during
the 2004–2011 period, which amounted
to 29,090,963 million Iraqi dinars (29.1
trillion), of which 27,053,060 million dinars is current budget and 2,037,903 mil-
lion dinars is investment budget. Adding
other financial resources, such as international donations or the other allocations
earmarked to education from the budget
of the Governorate Development Project
and the Reconstruction Project – both
launched in 2006 – shows the size of lost
opportunities for reforming the education
system and expanding its capacity to accommodate all school-age children.
Public–Private Partnerships
Education is an attractive sector for both
investment and human resources. There
are many retired staff – teachers and academics – or those who want to make extra
income. The investments of the private
sector have noticeably expanded since
2003. However, it is still a weak partner
to the public sector in terms of school
education services, since there were only
1,128 private elementary and high schools
in 2008/2009 – 816 schools in the main
Iraqi governorates and 312 schools in the
Kurdistan Region. These schools had only
63,070 students or 0.1 percent of the total number of students in Iraq’s main 15
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
97
governorates and those in the Kurdistan
Region.
• The number of private schools increased from 286 (125 kindergartens,
87 elementary schools, and 74 high
schools, with a total of 4,999 students)
in 2009/2010 to 558 (223 kindergartens,
156 elementary schools, and 176 high
schools, with a total of 63,070 students)
in 2010/2011.
• The number of private university students went up from 13,973 in 2009/2010
to 20,631 students in 2010/2011, with
an absolute increase of 47.6 percent.
• The rates of male and female students
admitted during the 2009–2011 period
were 65 percent and 35 percent respectively.
The situation at the university level is
no different from the lower levels. The
number of colleges increased from 249
public colleges and 22 private colleges in
2009 to 273 and 45 respectively in 2012.
Although the number of private universities doubled between 2009 and 2012,
they only constituted 16.4 percent of the
total number of universities in 2012. This
rate suggests that the accommodation and
other capacities of private universities fall
short of what is required to establish a
genuine partnership with public universities and tackle the challenges the higher
education system is facing.
The 2005 Iraqi Constitution:
Education is a guaranteed right.
Article 34 (Fourth): Private
education is guaranteed and shall
be regulated by law.
Acquisition of Knowledge
Beyond Education
Humanity stands at the threshold of a
new era, variously termed the knowledge
age, the information and communications
technology revolution, or the electronic
era. This age is distinguishable from previous eras by its foundation in shared
knowledge and new technologies, the various follow-on economic characteristics,
and new methods and opportunities for
employment, education, and innovation.
Today, the education indicators of total
and net enrolment rates and educational
attainment are no longer enough. Globally, efforts to improve education quality
are rapidly being stepped up towards a
knowledge-based economy and towards
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Iraq Human Development Report 2014
including its mechanisms and tools in education systems, thereby promoting youth
knowledge, developing their skills at all
stages, and harmonizing education outputs with the new labour market requirements. In Iraq, these objectives have not
yet been achieved.
Knowledge influences the youth’s personalities. Education systems and teaching methods are largely responsible for
this transfer of information, but they are
no longer the only source of knowledge.
Knowledge is renewable, and its sources
continuously increase. Even when it is
effective, normal education cannot monopolize knowledge dissemination. Of
course, the situation gets worse when
these formal systems are unable to cover
all school-age children and slow to develop curricula and tools, as is the case
in many Arab countries, including Iraq
(Chapter 4). Thus, young people seek
knowledge from non-traditional sources
such as the ‘information technology revolution’.
However, knowledge acquisition itself
and its importance and quality are historically and socially conditional. In the
case of Iraq, the challenges inherited from
decades of successive wars, the massive
challenges and costs of transition, and
the concomitant crises, have placed education at the bottom of the national priorities. This has deprived young people of
formal knowledge accumulation, which is
the cornerstone of the democratic project,
and has also led to a wide, multifaceted
knowledge gap that delays the youth’s
integration into the knowledge community – a situation shared by all of the Arab
countries.
The desire for new knowledge is a feature of human society; knowledge itself
is expanding rapidly and has become a
development necessity.74 The successful
employment of knowledge products in
all areas of economic and social activity
contributes to the expansion of people’s
options, setting new frontiers for their
freedom and aspirations.
Young people are aware of this fact, but
they do not always distinguish between
knowledge that requires learning and information received from various media
and the internet. This issue can widen
the generation gap between parents and
teachers and the youth. It is controversial and complicated because it relates
to attitudes, opinions, and approaches to
academic research. The problem in the relationship between traditional knowledge
sources – especially books and other written sources – and new electronic sources –
television, film, and the Internet – relates
to the actual content being provided by
the various sources, as well as the social
divisions resulting from the ability to use
or access them, which varies from one
generation to another and from one socioeconomic situation to another.
Young People Do Not Read
Reading is an accessible traditional source
of knowledge. However, young people do
not read; they appear not to be oriented to
the activity, nor does it seem to meet their
psychological and cognitive needs.
The IHSES 2007 shows that 79.5 percent of young people do not read daily
newspapers and that 73.3 percent do not
read other materials. This is an important
indicator, suggesting low interest in this
kind of knowledge and a declining cultural and social awareness among young
people. These written sources are arguably still the most important knowledge
and information source in Iraqi society,
given that the use of computers and the
Internet is still limited, particularly in
fields other than entertainment and social
networking.
Teachers now complain that most young
people have completely abandoned fruitful reading and prefer the new media, especially that related to entertainment and
recreation rather than science and education. Consequently, young people often
lack a solid cultural base that builds their
personalities. Many youth now do not
know certain intuitive basics and appear
to make silly mistakes. Though this view
might seem extreme, there does appear to
be a major cognitive gap resulting from
the neglect of a key traditional source of
knowledge (books). The view is also a
manifestation of the generation gap, as
adult intellectuals commonly look down
on the new knowledge sources. They believe that these sources do not have the
standards that can distinguish between the
good and the bad.
This move away from reading is not
only because of the dominance of the new
media, but also because parents, caregivers, and others do not instil the practice in
children. Sometimes young people find it
difficult to read or understand textbooks
and other books, which makes them hate
reading even more.
A Free Press Attracts Young
People
In the Kurdistan Region, there is a common complaint by teachers and educated
parents that the current generation of
youth has almost abandoned reading and
devoted most of its time to the Internet.
This is a global phenomenon and looks
logical: the easier the access to information, the greater the demand for it. Though
the Internet is faster, broader, and more
able to provide information, the press in
the Kurdistan Region remains very active,
with an opposition press and a multiparty
press. This tug-of-war between the two
types of press undoubtedly boosts journalistic production. Young people throng
to read these articles and monitor current
events. In addition, there are many magazines that are targeted at and attractive to
young people.
The Youth
Workshop
“No subject satisfies
our orientations or
desires or attracts
us. Elite writers write
for themselves, and
what prevails is an
elitist literature that
neither addresses
our minds nor
touches our
hearts.”
Youth View
Print Media versus Electronic Media
• Young people prefer electronic media, viewing it
and the topics presented as different and interesting.
• The cost and unavailability of books make the youth
prefer electronic media.
• The attractiveness of the print media has declined
because the youth prefer electronic reading, which
provides information more quickly.
• Young people are reluctant to read due to the elitist
writing of some writers, who address topics unattractive to them.
• Few writers have literary abilities that impress the
youth.
• Young people are unaware of the role of reading in
the development of their own personality and wider
culture.
• Iraqi youth are exposed to a kind of cultural alienation through the torrent of outside material presented in the media. This is why there should be both print
and electronic media that address the historical,
cultural, and social heritage of Iraqi society, keeping young people away from the negative impact of
such influences.
Youth Discussion of the NHDR Workshop, Baghdad, 13–14
March 2013
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The study also shows that upon graduation, secondary school students will
have spent nearly 15,000 hours watching TV, and no more than 10,800 hours
in the classroom at best. In addition, the
attendance rate at university is 600 hours
per year, while TV watching amounts to
1,000 hours per year on average.
Such comparisons may sometimes
be overwhelmed by a prejudice against
such apparent passivity among the youth.
However, we must not compare the number of hours spent in the classroom to
those spent in front of a TV screen. Who
says the former should be longer than the
latter or than the hours spent on any other
recreational activity?
TV is a school itself, and so is the Internet and the cinema. These are information
sources and, at their best, windows into
the human experience. It may be true that
some programmes are harmful, and that is
why guidance and the role of the family
are important. Off-school hours are free
time, when a student experiences other
aspects of life; they should not be an extension of school hours – a fact confirmed
by civil education.
Box 6.3
Iraqi Youth Celebrate Books
During the preparations for the celebration of
Baghdad as the 2013 Capital of Arab Culture, and
with the widening gap between books and the Iraqi
youth, some young people launched the ‘I am an
Iraqi, I read’ campaign in order to boost both the
reading culture and the wider culture.
Four young people who are attendees of the
cultural activities and book market on Mutanabbi
Street launched the idea on a Facebook page,
which had the name of the campaign and the following slogan: ‘A rally in Baghdad for reading. We
will meet to demonstrate to the world our ability to
start all over again to educate ourselves.’
The initiative was launched on 8 September 2012,
which marks International Literacy Day, in the Abu
Nuwas Street gardens. It aims to reach 10,000 readers of various religious affiliations and political orientations to prove that reading unites rather than
divides. This event is neither politicized nor biased towards any party or group. It is a purely Iraqi initiative
with no ethnic, sectarian, or class discrimination. It is
seeking to include many governorates and address
all those willing to be part of the initiative.
Those in charge of the campaign have collected
books from benefactors, including writers or bookstore owners, and bought others with their own money.
In gardens, streets, and public vehicles, they have
made books available to everyone. Young people
and adults have interacted with them, and Baghdad has regained some of its relationship with culture, literature, and art. The campaigners have
turned reading into a social activity.
The initiative and its events have spread to public
parks in Kirkuk, Najaf, Nasiriyah, and other places all
over Iraq.
The initiative marked its first year on 21 September
2013 at the Scheherazade and Shahryar statues on
Abu Nuwas in order to keep pushing for the dream
of a widespread celebration of books and culture.
The presence of thousands of young people from
different cities at this reading festival was the best
response to the extremism that produces violence.
With such initiatives, Iraqi youth are devising new
methods to face radicalism and close-minded people. Iraq belongs to young people who read.
Media Outlets Favourable among
Young People
It is not surprising to find that most media programmes are directed at children,
adolescents, and the youth – they represent the largest audience. Due to the spectacular and rapid development of various
means of communication, the electronic
media now have the undeniable authority
and ability to shape behavioural patterns,
attitudes, and aspirations. The media promote a global youth lifestyle and culture,
and the youth can move beyond family and
community and access things common to
their wider generation, thus enhancing a
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sense of belonging. Media outlets in this
sense can empower the youth to make important transitions in their lives.
Prior to 2003, the state monopolized
mass media, and the regime exploited this
monopoly to build its ideology of dominance. However, the post-2003 youth are
no longer subject to that dominance. They
now live in a completely different information and media age. The formal media
platform can no longer be a monopolist,
imposing one official value system ​​on the
youth.
Voicing different points of view is allowed now, and the information revolution, TV, and the Internet have increased
the options for communication. These
tools play a major role in forming young
people’s personalities and building their
value systems and sense of identity. The
information revolution could contribute
to a positive political and social culture
among the youth, making them more
aware of diversity and the plurality of
ideas and more able to think critically.
TV as Entertainment and a Source
of Knowledge
Media outlets of various technologies
provide daily information that significantly influences youth trends and attitudes.
The 2009 Youth and Adolescent Survey
shows that around 87 percent of young
people mainly watch TV,75 while 4.3 percent listen to the radio – mostly FM stations because their programmes are in line
with the youth’s preferences and tastes
and young people can participate in their
contests via mobile phone or the Internet.
That TV ranks first is in line with the impact of images; people are more inclined
towards images than linguistic symbols.
In addition, TV meets young people’s entertainment and leisure needs, often playing the role that a hobby might play. Since
there is relatively easy access to TV, the
numbers of TV viewers in urban and rural areas are similar. TV’s role as a source
of information is limited compared to its
entertaining role. The more leisure time
young people have and the more difficult
it is for them to have hobbies, the more
time they spend watching TV. There is
more time spent in front of the TV in rural areas than in urban areas, and females
spend more time watching than males.
Studies show that 44 percent of young
people aged 15–24 are interested in sports
programmes, nearly 31 percent in cultural programmes, 26.5 percent in religious programmes, about 22 percent in
scientific programmes, 19.3 percent in
contests, and only 6 percent in political
programmes. This order reveals that TV’s
entertainment role is likely the most important for young viewers.
The 2009 Youth and Adolescent Survey also reveals that TV is favoured as
a source of new knowledge, whether in
rural areas (71.8 percent) or in urban areas (63.7 percent).This is due to the weak
spread of or poor interest in other sources
such as newspapers and magazines, and
also to illiteracy, the easy use of TV sets,
and the multiplicity of satellite channels.
“Even long power outages do not prevent us from watching TV. The smallest
and cheapest source of electricity – an
inverter running off of a car battery – enables us to turn on a TV set,” said a young
man.
Certain issues need to be investigated
here. The knowledge young people look
for in the electronic media is not necessarily of a scientific, theoretical, or researched nature, but of a practical nature
related to life skills. Such knowledge and
skills are not available in schools, due either to societal taboos or inflexible curricula and education programmes.
Information on health, especially sexual
health, is an example. The 2009 Youth and
Adolescent Survey shows that 81.8 percent of respondents believe that television
is the most effective means to raise awareness about sexually transmitted diseases.
The proportions of males and females who
prefer TV as a source of health knowledge
are similar – 67.7 percent and 63.5 percent
respectively. However, more females than
males prefer accessing health knowledge
from other sources. These sources include
primary health care centres (13 percent
for females compared to 8.7 percent for
males), newspapers and magazines (18.2
percent and 15.7 percent), and family (8
percent and 4 percent).
“We do not want to be like our mothers
who continued to conceive until exhausted. I bought a contraceptive injection I
heard about in a movie from a pharmacy
in the city. Its effect lasts for six months,”
said a young woman from a southern village.
Strikingly, a young woman or man
tries to pick up useful information from
any channel – talk shows, movies, or series – rather than from health education
programmes or awareness programmes,
which are few in number and often boring, especially those produced locally or
in the Arab countries.
An improved education system
will contribute to young people’s
empowerment, which will hopefully be attained through the
National Education Strategy
2011–2020.
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National Education Strategy 2011–2020
Strategic Objectives
1. Equal access to education: Education in all its stages should be
available to everybody and
should ensure equal enrolment
opportunities and equal treatment with regard to gender;
urban and rural areas; various
national characteristics; and citizens’ aspirations and psychological, social, and economic needs.
2. Quality education: Education
should be true to the nature of
Iraqi society and should benefit
from the best international practices so as to develop the concepts of scientific thinking and
creativity and make Iraqi society an active contributor to the
production and dissemination of
knowledge.
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3. Education conducive to comprehensive development: Education
should help achieve citizens’
well-being and comprehensive
and sustainable development in
all human, social, and cultural
domains.
4. Education satisfying the requirements of a civilized society: Education should help develop a
civilized society and realize the
principles of good citizenship,
democracy, human rights, and
peace.
5. Active and dynamic education
system: It is necessary to reform
and develop the education system, especially with regard to the
optimal use of human, financial,
and material resources.
Chapter 7
Youth, Participation, and
Citizenship
In a democratic society, youth can participate in choosing the organizational models they deem appropriate for their needs
and which support efforts to achieve their
goals. However, their ability to influence
the course of their life and their community or society depends on their own capacities, how well they are engaged in social
events and institutions, and the extent of
participation objectively allowed by these
institutions. Building youth capacities is a
prerequisite for their success in these endeavours.
‘Participation’ in human development
literature has changed from the concept
of gaining membership in contemporary
society to the idea of empowering this
membership through the provision of
education, training, and health service
to ensure an ability to work, earn an income, and play a political role. This is in
addition to establishing employment policies, providing recreational facilities, and
improving access to groups such as civil
society organizations to promote young
people’s contribution to public affairs.
However, these empowerment measures rarely give young people sufficient
power to actually influence public affairs.
In the eyes of society – and perhaps in
their own eyes too –young people need
guidance (and correction)from adults because adults have gained maturity through
years of practical experience.
This means that participation alone is
not the decisive factor in determining the
extent, nature, and effectiveness of the
youth’s role, but must be combined with
removing the constraints, obstacles, and
prejudices which prevent them from engaging in activities in which they make
full use of their capabilities.
The concept of politics itself has undergone a profound transformation. In
the last two decades, politics seems to be
no longer confined to the state, or the socalled political authority; rather, it now
means society’s capacity to manage itself
without state intervention, as well as so-
ciety’s role in governance. In one sense,
this means practicing politics that do not
go through the state or the traditional political authority, and this has expanded the
areas of youth participation.
Therefore, global development literature, including the definitions adopted by
the UN and international organizations,
has expanded the concept of participation
beyond political participation. It now encompasses four pillars:
• Economic, including labour and production
• Political, including decision making,
society management, state-building,
and political systems
• Social, including all aspects of societal
life and social formations, from family
and community to assembly and civil
action
• Cultural, including arts, cultural values,
all means of expression, and the system
of values ​​and norms governing or supporting societal activity
Thus, participation extends from decision making within a family to political
decision making at the national level and
beyond.76
On the other hand, the public sphere
itself is no longer limited to a traditional
context following the formation of the
virtual sphere and its rapid spread among
young people in particular, as noted in the
previous chapter.
Youth Citizenship and
National Identity
The positive influence of a state can be
seen when citizens feel they belong to
it rather than merely hold its nationality. When sectarian and ethnic polarization increases, this feeling of belonging
to a joint culture and history lessens. On
the other hand, a continuous civil peace
can create a collective national culture
in which citizens feel that they are unified and that the interests and fate of the
citizens and the state are the same. This
process in Iraq was disrupted by its long
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history of conflicts and wars, which destroyed individuals, the social fabric, and
any sense of citizenship. This experience
has resurrected traditional sub-identities
at the expense of a single national identity.
The 2005 Iraqi Constitution and official
political discourse adopted the ‘liberal
citizenship’ principle, which refers to respecting civil and political rights, protecting individuals’ choices and private lives,
and securing freedom of expression, association, and participation in elections. At
the same time, individuals must respect
the law and observe their obligations towards the state.
However, this concept has not been attained. Division and political and societal
instability in recent years has led to a political and social polarization which has
prevented young people from developing
a positive character with better professional, administrative, and organizational
capabilities. It appears that the youth fell
victim to the dominant intellectual and
cultural viewpoints that came together to
produce the current crisis.
The confused view many youth have of
the concepts of ‘homeland’, ‘citizen’, and
‘state’ and the conflict between sub-identities and a single national identity are part
of the above-mentioned vicious circle.
In a 2009 report compiled by Columbia
University’s Centre for International Conflict Resolution, in cooperation with Iraqi
civil society organizations, Iraqi youth are
described as “a generation that has lost
not only its sense of identity within Iraq,
but also its confidence in the country and
its future”.77
It is these contradictions experienced by
Iraqi youth, as well as their family, societal, and political upbringing, which have
led them to the current situation.
Social Upbringing
The social upbringing confusions contribute to an identity crisis within large
sections of the youth. With continued
insecurity and disintegrating institutions,
radical movements have influenced the
youth with narrow-minded ideas derived
from sub-identities. The Columbia University report referred to this point: “The
current feelings of a lack of direction and
a sense of hopelessness felt by many Iraqi
youth often makes it easy for extremists
to shape their minds and rogue groups to
recruit them.”78
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It is obvious that the Iraqi youth will
continue to grapple with opposing forces
during their upbringing, especially since
the state, which is still the main representative of the Iraqi nation, faces disparate
currents that undermine its ability to produce an inclusive and open national identity. In a diverse and multicultural society
such as Iraq’s, the effect of these various
forces on the youth is potentially dangerous.
Youth and Multiculturalism
A 2004 study covering 132 countries
found that only 11 countries had uniform
societies. Iraq is a diverse society ethnically, linguistically, and religiously. Many
groups in the country are convinced that
the absence of democracy throughout history has deprived minorities and vulnerable groups of their cultural rights and
caused feelings of oppression. The emergence of a strong state has decreased the
sense of belonging among minorities.
As can be seen in this analysis of the
country’s youth, Iraqi society’s pluralism
is culturally and socially present but politically absent, which is the most serious
problem in diverse societies. Arab and
other pluralistic societies suffer from this
paradox; namely, recognizing diversity
and calling for cultural freedom, while rejecting political pluralism.
In fact, any form of democracy in any
diverse society can only be achieved
through recognizing both that pluralism
and human rights. Language is a cultural
right many ethnic groups and minorities
have struggled to protect. The recognition
of pluralism in the Constitution should be
present in politics too. A political regime
with all its components, mechanisms,
and structures should engage all citizens
to form institutions democratically and
fairly and allow political expression at all
levels, so youth voices can be heard.
Communication and National
Identity
Communication helps to form social identities. Historically, most national identities were formed through and concurrently with communication systems and
their infrastructure; the birth of mass media was important to this process. A major
way to enhance national identities at the
expense of sub-identities is to attempt to
make inter-group communication greater
than intra-group communication.79
Due to wars and international sanctions
since the 1980s, Iraqi transportation infrastructure has hugely deteriorated and its
growth has not been proportional to population growth. Consequently, fast and effective movement among governorates,
which would maximize communication
among localized groups and develop untraditional relationships, is hampered.
Limited movement inevitably leads to
weak communication and makes intragroup communication stronger than intergroup communication. The poor transportation and communication infrastructure
and the subsequent restrained movement
has indeed resulted in social recession,
community divisions, continued emotional barriers, and a weakened sense of
belonging to one national space. This reality has been very influential in forming
young people’s identities.
Decentralization Supports Youth
Citizenship
Democratization is consistent with decentralization and broadening the base
of local governance. The transfer of
decision-making centres from the central authorities to smaller administrative
units – closer to citizens – consolidates
the concept of participation and increases
everyone’s contribution to the governance
process. The Constitution supports this
trend and laws strengthen it, notably Governorate, District and Sub-district Council
Election in Kurdistan Law No. 4 of 2009,
which allows people above the age of 25
to run.
The National Youth Strategy 2013–2020
The strategy focuses on the promotion of a national identity among
young people.
Strategic Goal III: The young Iraqi
generation enjoying their rights and
their national identity.
Outcome I: Young people play an
important role in enhancing the values ​of citizenship and civil rights and
promoting a culture of peace and
respect for other opinions:
• Concepts of human rights and
citizenship incorporated in educational curricula and extracurricular activities in schools, col-
Education System
A unified education system is a key pillar of national identity. It exposes children and youth, regardless of their backgrounds, to a holistic system of values and
standards.
Many interpret nationalism and a national identity as an attempt by the state
to instil its own values at the expense of
other traditional allegiances. However,
the state is supposed to represent public
interest, and this is clearly embodied in
the education system, which champions
certain morals and values and certain interpretations of history, politics, and the
concepts of the nation, citizenship, rights,
and duties. However, a serious problem
in Iraq is the wide gap between official
leges, and universities and in the
activities of youth centres, clubs,
care institutions, and civil society
organizations
• A youth national programme to
enhance their awareness of their
political and social rights and responsibilities funded and implemented
• Institutional and community rules
and procedures to help young
people, especially dropouts and
the disabled, exercise their citizenship rights safely
discourse and actual political practices.
While the state represents the main modernizing apparatus and the main tool for
national identity building, those in control
have been behaving according to traditional allegiances and exclusive, discriminatory views that dismantle rather than
unify.
While children and young people learn
modern values and lessons at school, a
lot of them are exposed to a different
upbringing in their cultural environment
(family, area of residence, friends, colleagues, etc.). While Iraqi society has been
influenced by modern achievements and
developments and many of its traditional
lifestyles have changed, its modernization has been incomplete, distorted, parIraq Human Development Report 2014
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tial, and in many cases superficial. There
is now a wide gap between what students
learn at school about their country and
what they learn in their social environment. The official school version mostly
expresses the general national sentiment,
often according to the ideology of the political ruling class, while the people’s version is based on an unofficial, traditional
heritage which is often incompatible with
the official version.
The contradictions young
people experience
enhance their clash with
the adults’ world – they
get more education but
fewer job opportunities,
more information but less
authority, more moral
autonomy but fewer
financial choices.
Citizenship Education
Citizenship education has three main components: knowledge of civil concepts and
systems; civil life processes, including
human rights and democracy education;
and civil participation skills and public
conduct, which include the commitment
and belief in belonging to the nation and
the shared ethics and values.
Many factors contribute to the formation of the values and skills that build a
democratic society. These include formal education, extra-curricular activities,
and the general cultural environment in
schools. Civic education, which includes
citizenship education, is a component of
public education in the Arab region.
The political, social, and economic factors affect educational systems in general,
particularly citizenship education. The
need to prepare the youth to become participating citizens in an open society is
emerging persistently. This preparation
process starts in education.
• Civil principles, such as human rights,
which were added to the educational
curricula, often contradict other principles in the curriculum.
• The typical educational practices do
not support the formation of modern
citizenship skills and participation.
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Citizenship education encourages the
routine recitation of the material only.
Classes are led by the teacher, who endorses the official, political, and religious points of view.
• Teachers, who are the most important
element in the education process, often
lack the necessary training, support, and
social status to embrace the challenge of
educating youth on citizenship matters.
• The opportunity to put citizenship
teaching to practice through extracurricular activities inside and outside
school has been missed. This deprives
students from real experience in citizenship matters and stunts the development
of their citizenship skills and behaviour.
• The school environment in most Arab
countries is commanding and oppressive in general and does not develop
students’ civil and youth leadership
skills.
A recent study conducted by the Carnegie Endowment (Education in the Arab
World, 2013) reveals interesting information about citizenship education in public
schools in Arab countries. It shows that,
though there are efforts to introduce topics related to democracy and human rights
in the civil education subjects, the teaching methods and practices do not promote
the required skills and participation needed for modern citizenship. This wide gap
between the declared objectives and the
application represent the core challenge
that faces citizenship education.
The study sees that educational bodies in Iraq identified at an early stage the
importance of reforming educational systems and curricula. They made efforts to
introduce concepts such as democracy
and human rights in textbooks and curricula.
School textbooks in Iraq completely
endorse the concept of democracy and its
practice. Three-quarters of the teaching of
‘national education’ is a presentation of
the Iraqi Constitution and the functions
of the various legislative, executive, and
judicial systems in the country. There is
a complete chapter on civil society and
its organizations. By Grade 7, most of
the curriculum relates to democracy. The
first chapter on this subject focuses on political systems and emphasizes the democratic administrations. The last chapter
discusses good citizenship. The book
includes many references to verses from
the Qur’an and tradition that support the
concept.
Schoolbooks in Iraq endorse the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
provide explanations of its items. They
also discuss international agreements and
charters related to women’s and children’s
rights. For example, in the Grade 11 curriculum there is a chapter about human
rights in Islam, very similar in content
and presentation to the material taught in
Egypt and Bahrain.
Iraq schoolbooks support freedom of
belief, though with some implicit reservations. The social structure of Iraq is presented in ‘national education’ in Grade 7.
Iraqi schoolbooks are exceptional among
the Arab countries in that they present the
“diverse ethnicities and religions” in the
Constitution. However, the book in Grade
9 refers to the item that states “Islam is the
religion of the majority”.
Learning involves the development of
new knowledge, skills, and behaviour.
Knowledge then is an important element
in citizenship education, but it is not
enough, even when the curricula are very
well prepared. Students need to develop
citizenship skills through practical exercises and extra-curricular activities. They
need to participate in decision making in
their schools and join political and social
activities outside them. The practical component is either short or completely missing in citizenship education in Iraq, as in
other Arab countries. The extra-curricular
activities that are actually practiced are
few and non-political in nature.
Civil activities outside the school are
not considered an educational requirement. Schools do encourage students to
volunteer in social activities and services
in their free time or during the summer
holidays. However, this does not translate
into systematic and constructive activities. This represents a missed opportunity,
as political activity outside the school is
no longer prohibited.
Young People’s Political and
Social Participation
The youth’s political and social participation in Iraq was traditionally viewed with
the youth’s vision of politics in mind,
which centred around the state, political
parties, and political practices. At best,
it meant the youth’s participation in primary political activities such as elections.
While an established school of thought
deems elections a good way for individuals to participate in political decision
making,80 elections remain a mechanism
for building political power and a tool of
the political system, neither of which epitomizes the concept of real participation.81
The large numbers of young people
who participate in elections may prove
that they consider it an effective way to
bring about political change. However,
high participation in elections is a characteristic of Iraqi society generally, not only
of the young generation. This is found in
all countries emerging from authoritarian
periods or civil wars, where elections are
seen as a means of reshaping the political
system.
The 2009 National Youth and Adolescent Survey shows that 70.4 percent82 of
young people participated in the 2005
national elections,83 while 68.5 percent
of university students participated in the
March 2010 parliamentary elections.84
These percentages are similar to the public
participation rates in the first parliamentary elections in January 2005 (79 percent),
the second parliamentary elections in December 2005 (79.6 percent), and the 2010
parliamentary elections (62.4 percent).
The 2012 Youth Survey shows similar
results, which enhances the analytical
conclusions of previous studies.
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107
Figure 7.1
Youth Political Participation
Source: Youth survey YS-2012
Iraqi youth in general, according to the
results the Youth Survey of 2009, claim
that their voices are not heard and that
they are excluded. Their ultimate influence is confined to their circle of friends
(88 percent), family (85 percent), neighbourhood (59 percent), tribe (34 percent),
political organizations (5.8 percent), and
unions (4 percent).
We Are Excluded from Dialogue and Community Participation
“Despite the advantages after
2003, community dialogue is still
limited. Our greatest concern is
the absence of mechanisms for
dialogue, participation, and interaction where we can apply our
thoughts, concerns, and ambitions.
Parents and other adults do not
participate in the dialogue with us,
which is often a fruitless internal dialogue. The public sphere in which
Despite their participation in elections,
there appears to be a reluctance among the
youth to invest time in politics and public
affairs – this is an empirical result derived
from field research. This reluctance might
have limited previous efforts to explore
the youth’s unique political vision.
Though political participation is a
means for inclusion, measuring this solely through voting trends is misleading. In
Figure 7.1, young women’s (aged 18–29)
participation in the last election does not
match with other forms of their interest in politics, suggesting that they may
have been under pressure from the family
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Iraq Human Development Report 2014
we speak and express our opinion,
through the media, social networking websites, or the press, is in fact
our special world and a space far
from institutions. However, the issues
and questions we raise are inseparable from the society-wide issues
we share with all people and all
groups, despite our exclusion.”
Youth Workshop
(father, brother, or husband). Sometimes
they are forbidden from voting where
tribal values dominate, as in Anbar Governorate where young female participation is the lowest. The bottom line is that
female voting is not necessarily a choice,
because it is not necessarily a free vote.
No consideration has been given to the
role of the youth in policymaking; their actual contribution to decision making; their
influence in political institutions such as
political parties; the nature of their loyalties, attitudes, and political alignment and
perceptions that direct their behaviour in
the public sphere; and their position on
political conflicts in which sub-identities
play a key role. In other words, young
people are not seen to be an active part of
the political structure. Almost all the Iraqi
data confirms this view, as do regional
studies, reports, surveys, and statistics
that deal with the youth.
However, the above observation must
take into account some important variables related to the Iraqi context. The attitude of the youth is derived from their
own or their families’ experiences under
the pre-2003 totalitarian regime: no real
political life, no political development, no
party life, no free elections, no means of
participation, no accountability, no popular control, no free media, etc.
Hence, the youth refraining from political involvement is not so much a generational feature, but rather a feature of
Iraqi society in general. As a country in
transition from a totalitarian regime to a
pluralist one, it has clear variations in its
distance from the minimum global standards for a stable democracy.
Are the Youth Reluctant to
Participate Politically?
The reluctance of young people to participate in the existing political institutions does not mean they have no desire
to practice politics.
The 2009 National Youth and Adolescent Survey shows a clear difference
between the youth’s desire for participation and their trust in established political institutions. While the proportions of
young people who trust in politics, believe that parties are important in public
life, or believe that they have a chance to
voice their opinions in political organizations are only 41.4 percent, 33.9 percent,
and 5.8 percent respectively,62.2 percent
of young people believe that they should
participate in political activities.85
Moreover, only 28.7 percent of young
people are interested in participating in
student unions.86 This is perhaps because
they consider these unions to be part of
the traditional institutions, as they were
previously associated with political parties, especially those in power.
The 2012 Youth Survey supports this
assertion. Party affiliation is very low in
the 15 main governorates of Iraq (4.5 percent) compared to the Kurdistan Region
(33 percent).This can be attributed to the
Kurdish cause and parties’ relationships
with the so-called ‘national liberation
movements’, which blur the lines between party affiliation, tribal identity, and
national political activism.
Figure 7.2
Youth Participation in Social Activities
Source: Youth survey YS-2012
Affiliation to civil society organizations was low (1 percent and 4 percent),
and young people’s views of their activities have not changed much, though these
fledgling organizations have only had a
short life that began with the fall of the
former regime.
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Youth View
What hinders young people’s political participation?
• The level of popularity of political parties
• Political corruption and failure to apply the principle of ‘the right person in the right position’
• Unequal opportunities
• Overlapping political and government action
• Unprogressive political culture
• Limited national identity and sense of responsibility
• Misinterpretation or misuse of religion by some political parties for personal interests
• Negative customs and traditions and social sanctions imposed on individuals, which especially affect females’ willingness to participate
• The poor economic situation
Youth Discussion of the NHDR Workshop, Baghdad, 13–14
March 2013
As discussed above, young people in
Iraq refrain from political activity. It is
clear from the discussion sessions with
youth in all the Iraqi governorates, including the Kurdistan Region, that they
explicitly disapprove of employment discrimination based on party affiliation and
say that access to job opportunities is not
a sufficient incentive for them to join influential parties in their governorates. In
addition to the effects of the current transition period and the previous regime, the
political parties’ models and activities
have had an effect on the youth’s reluctance to get politically involved. Both
adults and youth have had negative experiences as members of the parties.
“Traditional parties did not better understand young people’s aspirations,” said
the head of a winning bloc in the governorate council elections in 2013. “They
wanted to imprison them in that old spirit
of the past struggle. Some young people
who led our election campaign were only
ten years old when the former regime was
toppled. They are a completely different
generation who do not understand the past
as we do and are not captive to it. A boon
to our electoral bloc, young people introduced a different reality to the traditional
parties: that people want to keep abreast
of the spirit of this age without compromising their spiritual values.”
Box 7.1
Hope for Young Women
In this troubled environment, there is hope for
women’s participation based on equal rights, even
despite the progressive quota system which grants
women 25 percent of seats.
Out of the 378 winners in the 2013 governorate
council elections, 99 were women. The proportion
of women’s representation in governorate councils
was therefore 26 percent, with the highest percentage in the governorates of Najaf, Diyala, and Salahuddin (27.5 percent) and the lowest in Diwaniyah
and Wasit (25 percent).
The Independent Higher Electoral Commission
was able to achieve the women’s quota of at least
25 percent in all governorates –unlike the previous
elections in 2009, when only some governorates
achieved the quota.
In the context of the closed list system, 66 female
winners belonged to major lists, and 33 female winners were from 31 smaller lists, each winning 1 to 3
seats.
Iraqi youth have also associated political action with sectarianism. In Iraq, the
problem of sectarianism is not so much
the existence of different religious or ethnic communities and their various ways
of expressing themselves, but rather the
trend of trying to give those communities
a closed and absolute identity and confer
on them specific political functions and
interests, particularly with regard to the
other communities. This hinders integration.87
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Young people are aware of this fact. In
Baghdad, where the security situation is
worse, they say they do not feel satisfied,
secure, or reassured when it comes to the
housing (20 percent) or general security
(53 percent) situation. They think that they
can be highly effective in improving security. The proportions in the 15 Iraqi governorates and the Kurdistan Region are similar, with the highest in Diyala, Kerbala,
Qadisiya, and Muthanna (95 percent) and
the lowest in Kirkuk (78 percent).
Table 7.1
Youth Role in Improving Security
Youth aged 15–29
(15 Iraqi governorates)
Indicator
Those believing that the youth can
have an effective role in improving
security (%)
Youth aged 15–29
(Kurdistan Region)
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
90.4
90.3
90.4
89.2
88.5
88.9
Source: Youth survey YS-2012
In most identity-based conflicts, political leaders and militants use identity
themes as an effective tool to mobilize
people and achieve political gains. In a
society such as Iraq’s, where young people aged 15–29 constitute one-third of the
population, these discourses are directed
at them to mobilize them, to recruit them
as fighters in militias, or to win their votes
in elections.
Such mobilization largely addresses instincts and is based on simplified perceptions and efforts to direct social discontent
towards the opponent – ‘the other’. Ethnic
or sectarian leaders can impose a kind of
order within their group on the pretext of
facing a threat posed by the other group.
They then ignore the most pressing social
problems around them in favour of mobilizing the youth and engaging in an external conflict. Unfortunately, many young
people easily fall into this trap.
Young people in a youthful, divided,
and unstable society such as Iraq’s often
face acute life and moral crises. Unemployment, poverty, economic inequality, weak civil society, and poor sports
and art institutions are factors leading to
these crises. In such a complex situation,
many young people may be unable to consciously deal with such crises and understand the real reasons behind them. Thus,
they accept simplistic narratives that focus on conspiracy and the risks facing
the subgroup and that suggest that their
group’s victory over its opponents is morally motivated and ensures its members of
a better life and a sense of superiority. All
this is at the expense of the broader national identity. Weak, fragile, and socially
ineffective state institutions strengthen
this type of radical mobilization.
The political system established after
2003 was unable to solve the political
conflict. Conflict in fact was aggravated,
leading to continuous violence driven by
identity divisions and fuelled by social fissures. A large portion of young job seekers
engaged in the new military and security
institutions or in the bureaucratic apparatus, which fluctuated in size. Another
portion is still alienated and politically
isolated because they are unconvinced
of the newly adopted political structures.
Eventually, large groups of young people
became engaged in these conflicts.
Many young Iraqis joined violent
groups because of the correlation between
weapons and power. Some were driven by
revenge after psychological and physical
abuse by security men.88 Iraq’s power and
government institutions are built on the
basis of consensus, and any breakdown in
this consensus results in a further failure
of state institutions and the promotion of
ethnic or sectarian discourse that mobilizes followers on different sides of the
political conflict. This is usually called
the ‘security dilemma’.89 A lack of active
institutions able to build trust and oversee political competition makes certain
groups feel insecure, which prompts them
to mobilize their members against the
other group.
Many young poor people, orphans, internally displaced persons, and even disabled people were exploited by militias,
insurgents, and organized gangs, which
provided them with financial resources
and a sense of power as they carried out
illegal activities and engaged in armed
conflict.
The levels of violence have declined
significantly since 2008 following the
blows suffered by the militias and armed
groups active outside the state framework,
at the hands of American and Iraqi forces.
Nevertheless, the political and social roots
of the violence have not disappeared and
will allow the continuous exploitation
and mobilization of young people in this
context. In addition, a significant number
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111
of the young people who have been involved in militias and armed groups find
it difficult to return to normal civilian life
because they lose the social status they
gained as fighters responsible for the protection of the group, thereby losing some
power and self-esteem, which have been
difficult to attain through other means.
The state has introduced important programmes to reintegrate and accept these
young people as positive actors, socially
and politically, in the official security
forces, in state-funded semi-official fighting groups such as the ‘awakening movement’, or even in state institutions. Some
of these programmes were carried out
with foreign advice. The Coalition Provisional Authority – the civil administration
of the US occupation after 2003 – initiated such programmes when it issued Directive 91 in June 2004, which included a
plan to integrate the militias.
These programmes, however, have
been stalled due to lacklustre official bodies, both military and civilian. Therefore,
the state should consider new ways of
integration and not reduce this process
to employment in state institutions only.
With growing numbers of young people
(especially graduates), intense competition for jobs, and overly bureaucratic state
institutions, there is a need to search for
effective alternatives to accommodate
young people and ensure that they are not
attracted by violent groups and ideologies
based on hatred and rejection of the other.
The National Youth Strategy 2013–2020
The strategy focuses on youth participation
Strategic Goal IV: An active
young generation in Iraq participating widely in their communities.
Outcome II: Young people are
actively participating in political
and social life.
Vital practical programmes are
proposed to empower young people:
• A national programme to prepare young leaders, especially
females, from all segments and
The focus on youth participation in politics only, including the opportunity for
top administrative positions, constricts the
concept of participation and ignores the
value of broader involvements. Though
political participation is important, young
people’s impact on policies and decisions
regarding their living conditions, issues,
and community ties depends on how engaged they are in social institutions and
groups, according to global standards, able to form youth groups
and organizations in schools, villages, universities, clubs, and civil
society organizations, in accordance with high standards
• A programme adopted by secondary and vocational schools
and universities to encourage
young people to work voluntarily
in their community
activities. The ideal economic and social
systems promote and accommodate individuals’ capabilities through providing
opportunities in diverse professions and
other social and economic roles, all within
a context of human rights. This theme was
the pillar of discussion among 28 young
Kurdish men and women in Erbil, and
they showed high awareness of their various roles.
Youth Voice
Erbil Youth’s High Political Awareness and Enthusiasm for Participation
The following are the views of a group of young
people on social participation:
Challenges
• Gender-based discrimination, inequality, and social inconsistency
• Parents’ use of domestic and social violence
against children, especially females
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• Family objections when a young man chooses his
career and social life
• Society’s adherence to outdated customs and
traditions and rejection of young people’s new
approaches
• No justice and unequal opportunities for healthy
and disabled young people
• A lack of attention to public health and poor performance of health institutions, especially regarding the mental health of young people
• Society’s and some competent authorities’ indifference towards young people’s demands,
marginalization of youth, and disregard for the
youth’s hopes and dreams, which produce unproductive, dependent individuals
• Uneducated individuals and families
• Some social constraints and poor awareness
• Poor education system in terms of teachers, curricula, and educational institutions, and substandard university admittance system
Obstacles
• Gender-based discrimination, which everyone
agrees does exist; males are preferred over females and are given more opportunities, as Kurdish society, like any Middle Eastern society, is patriarchal
• Social obstacles that form a strong barrier to
young women’s social participation, particularly
in rural and remote areas
• Weak initiative of young women to engage in collective or voluntary work in certain areas, as well
as poor women’s limited engagement in society
• A lack of credibility and intellectual compatibility
between the sexes
• Significant control of the tribal system within some
families in cities, but particularly in rural and re-
New Opportunities for
Communication and
Participation
The public sphere (in the traditional sense,
with its cafés, mosques, markets, cultural
councils, and direct dialogue sessions)90
no longer ranks third after the home and
the workplace as the main arena for human interaction. Successive social and
technological developments have produced something beyond the public sphere
– the virtual sphere, which expands the
public sphere and creates opportunities to
participate in social and communicative
activities that do not require a personal relationship. This includes the Internet and
computer networks, as well as a variety of
other means of modern communication.
E-governments are a form of virtual institutions open to all citizens without the
need for face-to-face interaction.
Along with modern communication
technology, this new virtual sphere has
had a considerable effect on Iraqi society, particularly given the unprecedented
openness to the outside world after 2003.
Such a transformation contributes to the
mote areas
• A lack of self-confidence and self-reliance
• Poor livelihoods and living conditions
• Negative cultural elements, poor quality education, and incorrect interpretations of religion,
leading to an intellectual imbalance among
young people, which reduces engagement in
political and social public affairs
Opportunities for social participation
• There are more opportunities for social than for
political participation.
• Young people are optimistic about the country’s
progress and more openness in the future regarding social issues and women’s issues.
• Competent authorities pay more attention to
those with special needs.
• Young people are motivated when they seeing
their peers in government and political positions,
which stimulates a spirit of perseverance, competition, and hard work.
• Young people treat each other in a smoother
and more flexible way than adults do.
• Kurdish young people have become more aware
and educated compared to the previous generation.
• Security, stability, and the rule of law in Kurdistan
have a positive impact on the youth’s effectiveness and participation in all fields.
development of new forces and spaces
which are in huge contrast to the previously very closed social and political
situation. At the same time, this sudden
openness subjects young people to a new
package of conflicts.
The extent to which the youth engage
in the public sphere is not only related to
their abilities or desires, but also to the
facilities available to them. The public
sphere derives its distinctive nature from
the characteristics of the community in
which it appears, especially in terms of
existent freedom, good governance, flexible value systems, social awareness, opportunities for coexistence, just laws, and
respect for citizenship.
The Internet has only been introduced
to Iraq recently. The use of satellite dishes
and mobile phones had been prohibited
under the former regime, and computers were limited. After 2003, when that
regime was toppled, Internet cafes, Internet access at home, and mobile phone
services became widespread. This has facilitated communication among citizens,
especially after the telephone exchanges
were destroyed and the conflict and terIraq Human Development Report 2014
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rorist operations divided cities and isolated neighbourhoods.
The Internet’s Impact on
Young People
Families complain that the Internet isolates young people from the family. This
has pros and cons: it makes them less
interested in the issues and problems of
their families, but may make them feel
more free and independent, allowing them
to acquire new knowledge that their family may not approve of because it is of an
adult nature. Naturally, opinions about
this incoming technology will be widely
variant.
Young people in Kurdistan were introduced to the new electronic media and
technologies long before young people in
the rest of Iraq. Although some imams in
their Friday sermons express reservations
about some Internet programmes, Internet
usage by the youth has not been officially
prevented, hampered, or criticized. On the
contrary, the Internet has started to spread
in Kurdistan’s schools, and there is a huge
market for all the modern means of communication.
Youth View
The Internet Is Indispensable
• The Internet reshapes concepts and ideas among
young people (regardless of whether the influence is positive or negative).
• The Internet eliminates restrictions on social communication, especially for females.
• Online communication replaces face-to-face
communication, which is a negative effect of the
Internet.
Obstacles to the spread of the Internet among
young people
• Poor services by some providers
• Refusal by some households to subscribe to the
Internet
• Internet and computer illiteracy
Youth Discussion of the NHDR Workshop, Baghdad, 13–14 March 2013
Many expect that the Internet and the
so-called ‘new media’ will provide space
that is free from the dominance of the
authorities and political forces and more
reflective of individual and social needs.91
The growing role and impact of social
networks have strengthened these expectations. They have acted as tools for social mobilization, solidarity, and political
movements, especially during the Arab
Spring.
Over the last four years, Iraq has witnessed the emergence of youth groups
that criticize both the political class and
sectarianism and intolerance, and try to
revive the Iraqi national identity. These
groups played a major role in the protests
from February to September 2011, which
were inspired by the Arab Spring youth
movement. With the slogan ‘reforming
the regime’, these protests made the government adopt the ‘100-day time limit’
reform programme, granted by the prime
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minister to the ministries to improve their
performance.
Although this movement used the Internet and protest as an effective means for
political participation, it has not turned
into a force with real political weight. The
movement might have an elitist base or be
limited to the educated classes, or it might
have turned into a rhetorical and oratorical forum.
Despite the positive potential noted
above, the media openness experienced
by Iraq after 2003 – represented by the
large number of newspapers, satellite
channels, news agencies, radio stations,
and websites – may enhance societal divisions and recreate cultural fissures. A significant proportion of the media expresses
fanatical or sectarian opinions, addressing
specific segments of the public and certain cultural identities.92
Chapter Eight
Orientations and Policies
Summary and Conclusions
1.Measuring the HDIs in Chapter 2 shows
some progress in the two dimensions of
income and health, with a lesser degree
in education. However, this development is inequitable, given the large
disparity among governorates and between males and females. The Multidimensional Poverty Index and the YDI
support that fact, which leads to an
important conclusion that the levels of
human development are connected not
only to income, which is important, but
also to the economic and social policies
that direct or influence the index dimensions of income, health, and education,
as well as the other influencing dimensions, especially the cultural and political dimensions. These are key determinants for, inter alia, the performance
of individuals in general, and young
people in particular, especially young
women, in terms of their choices; capacity building; how much they acquire
in terms of income, health, and knowledge; and how they participate in family, social, economic, and political life.
○○ The HDI is lowest in Maysan with
0.655, and highest in (Kurdistan
Region) with 0.764, followed by
Erbil with 0.761 and Baghdad with
0.726. The Gender Inequality Index is lowest in Erbil (Kurdistan
Region) with 0.406, and highest in
Muthanna at 0.623.
○○ The MPI differs significantly among
the Iraqi governorates. More than
50 percent of those who are multidimensionally poor live in the governorates of Naynawa, Dhi Qar, Basra, Wasit, and Maysan; 30 percent of
the population of Maysan and Wasit
are multidimensionally poor. This
percentage is only 4.3 percent in
Baghdad Governorate and 1.4 percent in Sulaymaniya Governorate.
○○ The major causes of deprivation
among individuals are a low income
(17.2 percent), followed by the declining number of females with pri-
mary education (9.1 percent), poor
health services (7.6 percent), limited
electricity (7.3 percent), and poor
access to drinking water (6.9 percent).
○○ The impact of the cultural and political dimensions is evident in the
YDI value because when they are
included in its calculation, it declines. These dimensions are sharply low for young women, but the
Education Index for women is close
to that for men, and the Health Index
even higher for women.
2. Other dimensions are influential but
unfortunately immeasurable, such as
the demographic variables. In Iraq,
dependency rates remain high and
weigh heavily on the economically
active population, adversely impacting the welfare level of children,
teenagers, and adults. The encouraging policies of population growth in
the 1980s led to high fertility rates,
which is among the highest in the
world now. The latest surveys has
also shown poor reproductive education and ignorance by married youth.
The impact of years of wars, embargos, and insecurity, leading to displacement and emigration, which has
affected society in general and the
youth in particular, remains beyond
measurement. Chapter 3 presents the
following important facts:
○○ Iraq has a young population whose
characteristics yield considerable
momentum for population growth.
The rapid decline of infant mortality
rates, with early marriage and fertility rates remaining high, in addition
to an increased life expectancy average and rising numbers of the population at reproductive age, ensure
that the absolute number of births
will remain high even with the expected decline of the fertility rate
to replacement level. This is likely
to pose a developmental challenge,
unless school enrolment levels increase, considering the significant
It is necessary to
assess human
development
losses or profits
between internally
and externally
displaced people.
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
115
impact of education on the family’s
reproductive behaviour.
○○ The striking rise in the numbers of
young people is also a challenge
facing development policies, given
the demand for more educational
services, infrastructure facilities,
and decent work opportunities.
○○ Youth migration, which has been on
the rise over the past three decades
due to a persistent desire to migrate,
as shown by surveys and opinion
polls – adopted by this report – is
one of the youth’s reactions to the
disturbed economic and social infrastructure and to violence, which
often targets young people.
3.Iraq has not achieved ​​significant progress in the past three decades (the GDP
per capita in 1980 was higher than that
in most countries of South America,
the Middle East, and North Africa). It
lost the opportunities for development
because of wars, sanctions, and armed
conflicts, which caused a deficit in infrastructure and production capacity;
institutional underperformance; confusion in the political, economic, social,
and cultural structure; and failures in
the planning and operational aspects of
the development process.
○○ Transition has failed to achieve the
desired development of infrastructure and public services, or improve
the performance of bureaucratic institutions. It has been accompanied
by a concentration of wealth, a huge
disparity in terms of distribution of
income, and increased investment in
sectors aligned with the rentier state
pattern, such as financial and service
activities, which are incapable of establishing the dynamics needed for
sustainable development, all at the
expense of declining investment in
agriculture and industry.
○○ The reform process has stumbled
and Iraq has missed the opportunity
to bring about radical economic reforms, restructure its public sector,
and embark on consolidating alternative economic values ​​and patterns
of behaviour to replace those of the
rent economy after 2003. This is aggravated by the absence of institutions responsible for effecting and
ensuring the success of the transformation process, as has occurred in
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○○
○○
○○
○○
○○
○○
countries such as Malaysia, Brazil,
South Korea, China, and India.
The youth unemployment rate has
reached 18.6 percent.
With increased income and expenditure resulting from oil revenues,
nearly one-fifth of the population
and 12.2 percent of young people
suffer from income poverty in the
sense that they are excluded. This
however does not mean that the
other 82.8 percent are better off and
integrated, because they might face
other forms of exclusion, such as
being deprived of education, housing, services, or even the ability to
exercise political and cultural rights.
Regardless of their educational attainments, areas of residence, and
age groups, young people are increasingly aware that the most important forms of their exclusion are
related to their economic and living
status. Youth unemployment and the
consequent impoverishment have
become a distinctive feature of the
prevailing disparity and inequality.
This increasing feeling of injustice
fuels the dynamics of social and
economic polarization among the
youth.
Labour market disruptions themselves constitute a key factor for
youth exclusion. The private sector
is unable to create new jobs due to
declined internal investments. Besides, political instability is perhaps
one of the reasons behind investors’
reluctance to invest in Iraq.
Financing opportunities by banks
have improved and microfinance
arrangements have been developed.
However, these measures remain
insufficient to effect substantive
change. Legislation and controls
have not been changed to alleviate the impact of government bureaucracy on private businesses.
Government reform efforts must
therefore focus on improving the
business environment.
Social and cultural backgrounds
play an important role in entrepreneurship, as Iraq’s experience
shows. They are not governed by the
availability of funding, anticipated
revenues, or the risks involved.
Readiness for entrepreneurship,
especially among young people, is
an essential element for economic
progress. However, it is difficult
to get rid of the cultural obstacles
or the negative aspects of business
structures through entrepreneurship
education programmes. Although
such programmes are likely to improve individuals’ capacity, they do
not drastically change the impacts
of the cultural heritage of a rentier
state on people who have always
been taught to respect government
jobs and deem them their rights as
citizens.
○○ Unless the transition from a rentier
state is achieved, the youth will continue to be passive recipients, awaiting their maximized share of the
accruing revenues, which only enhances their dependency. The youth
will thus complement the rentier
production cycle, and inequality will
continue to prevail. Moreover, the
values ​​of work and productivity will
deteriorate. The established goals
can only be attained when economic
growth happens at a distance from
oil dependency. The oil economy
makes it difficult to improve young
people’s job opportunities and boost
their social participation parallel to
national economic growth. Indeed,
the structure of the economy should
be changed through developing its
productive capacities in agriculture,
industry, and other activities that are
removed from the realm of governance and crude oil.
4.Chapter 5 analyses cultural and social
challenges from the perspective of human development. An analysis of the
youth and family in a crisis- and conflict-ridden society such as Iraq’s is
highly important and can explain many
young people’s tendencies, undisclosed
by the HDI. The improvement or decline of any sub-indicator is not associated with what the family can offer to
its youth or what its presence means to
them, apart from its spending on their
health, education, and livelihood. Thus,
its role remains marginalized.
○○ The family and the community have
a role to play in empowering the
youth in their transition to adulthood, considering that the family,
the extended family, and the tribe
○○
○○
○○
○○
○○
○○
in a crisis situation are viewed as a
safety and protective umbrella for
their members. The values they inculcate in the youth may facilitate
their integration or, conversely, protect their exclusivity and deepen the
fragmentation of the national identity.
The values of family in Iraq appear
to be deep-seated despite the exceptional circumstances and radical changes the country has experienced in the past two decades. This
perseverance of the family is thanks
to the cultural and religious heritage
which supports its structure and increases its cohesion.
In spite of growing migration rates
from rural areas since the mid1900s, families’ cultural characteristics have not changed. The impact
of migrants on urban areas has been
great, and tribal bonds and values
which determine the behaviour of
individuals within their families
have been firmly grounded; however, this situation has hampered the
formation of an urban culture.
The development pattern in Iraq
has not achieved sufficient gains to
empower young people without reliance on the family. In other words,
the government has failed to provide other alternatives to integrate
or protect the youth.
Public education systems are no
longer sufficient or efficient, and
completing education means continued reliance on the family. Youth
independence is no longer possible
given the skyrocketing costs of living. Besides, no social protection
systems for young people or children are available, such as social
security, health insurance, or unemployment and social welfare grants.
Apart from the religious institution, there are no intermediary institutions among the state, family,
and tribe to embrace, integrate, or
protect young people; non-profit or
charitable social institutions are limited or non-existent.
Like other Arab societies, Iraqi society is characterized by a high degree
of dichotomy between traditions
and modernity, especially among
young people and teenagers who
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117
are caught in the middle of this conflict. The majority of youth share the
same worry, and it is even stronger
in the Kurdistan Region. This situation represents an unfavourable environment that impedes and delays
autonomy for young people. In the
context of globalization, this dichotomy deepens by virtue of the polarized nature of global and national
development at various levels, including the different responses to
the impacts and values of globalization.93
○○ The Iraqi family is an integration
mechanism for young men, but not
for young women. The exclusion of
young women is rooted in the family’s approach to raising children.
Some families adopt methods damaging to individuals’ psychological
growth, including neglect, a lack
of interest, a preference for boys
over girls – gender-based exclusion – and arbitrary practices such
as female genital mutilation in the
Kurdistan Region, or marriage of
minors and young girls, in addition
to other forms of domestic violence
regarded as a source of concern and
psychological problems for young
women. Young men and women are
also exposed to the risk of exclusion
when the empowerment mechanisms of education and labour later
fail to integrate them into the public
domain. Female exclusion, however, remains more rooted in the family.
5.There is a tendency toward expanding
educational opportunities as a tool for
youth empowerment. But these opportunities seem to be constrained by institutional and structural determinants that
require urgent reform. The education
system has not been able to:
○○ Address the problems of illiteracy,
school dropouts, and failure to provide equal educational opportunities at all levels between male and
female students, between urban and
rural areas, and among governorates.
○○ Achieve the desired interaction with
the demographic and economic
infrastructure to realize development goals, such as raising the level
of economic participation for the
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working-age population, particularly the youth, in addition to increasing labour productivity and achieving a knowledge-based economy
and society.
○○ Respond to or change the nature of
the social structure to achieve the
social integration of young people
on the one hand, and change the system of values in line with what the
transition to democracy requires of
cultural, intellectual, or behavioural
transformations (most important is
citizenship education) on the other.
○○ Achieve the goals aspired to by
young people. The education system in Iraq seems to have failed
to achieve youth goals due to several problems and qualitative and
quantitative shortages. Few students have been offered the opportunity to acquire the knowledge or
skills needed to secure a decent job.
Therefore, increasing numbers of
graduates have become unemployed
and poor. In this sense, education
has lost its function as an effective
empowerment tool. These shortages have become, or the education system itself has become as a
result of these shortages, an indirect
means for social exclusion of young
groups.
In its addressing of education as a right
and an opportunity for empowerment and
integration, Chapter 6 reveals the following facts:
• The education system must be reformed
to eliminate illiteracy, cover all people
up to the end of the primary stage as a
minimum, and encourage families and
juveniles to at least finish middle school
so as to complete no less than nine years
of schooling.
• School curricula, especially for post-basic education levels, do not teach practical knowledge and the skills necessary
to help young people have a smooth
transition to the later stages of their
lives. In addition, the education system, including technical and vocational
education, does not enable graduates to
work; hands-on skills are not gained,
and educated youth avoid manual labour. Therefore, advanced educational
levels are characterized by a lack of
practical skills, leading to the problem
of unemployed graduates (the demand
for manpower in various fields is connected to very specific skill sets).
• The aggravated youth unemployment is
an indication of a split between education outputs and labour market inputs,
which undermines the importance ​​of
science, education, and knowledge, as
well as the status and role of educational institutions in the minds of young
people.
6.Although the youth differ in terms of
the loyalties, attitudes, and political perceptions which direct their behaviour in
the public domain, and their positions
vis-à-vis the political conflicts in which
ethnic, religious, or sectarian identities
play a key role, they share and advocate
the same perception of being neglected
when formulating public policies, having no voice in decision making, and
having no influence in political institutions such as political parties. While
the new political setting is encouraging
participation and civil activities among
youth, sectarian conflict has damaged
National loyalty and left behind enhancing citizenship, which is the core
of building a democratic state.
Democracy institutions have ample
space for young people’s participation
and large opportunities for their integration. However, participation alone is not
the only crucial element in determining
the scope, nature, and effectiveness of the
future role played by the youth. Removal
of the limitations and obstacles that prevent them from unleashing their potential,
engaging in their activities, and playing
their various roles is a major requisite.
Towards a Youthempowering Environment
There is an inevitable correlation between
social structure and economics, with interplay between a society’s economic
life and its social movements. Although
the youth look forward to the type of development that prioritizes and brings together democracy, good governance, social justice, and decent job opportunities
(as we have seen in the ‘youth views’),
a successful transition in this context is
not certain. Such a transition depends not
only on understanding the youth’s views
but also on moving towards a better political and economic track and presenting it
as a project to resume comprehensive, in-
clusive development for the youth themselves.
General Orientations
Achieving advanced human development that all social groups, especially
the youth, contribute to and benefit from,
requires the necessary ingredients. Most
prominently, this includes laying out a
development strategy that focuses on
integrating political, economic, social,
cultural, and environmental components,
and that abides by a developmental orientation towards midterm and long-term
goals, using policies and other means of
action. Generally speaking, this means:
• Ensuring security and peace and establishing the prerequisites of democratic
and good governance
• Developing and adopting macro and
sectoral economic policies that attain
inclusive economic development
• Setting policies that achieve social justice and eradicate all aspects of human
rights inequalities
• Empowering women and fighting all
manner of discrimination and violence
against them
• Working on improving cognition
through teaching, training, and promoting critical thinking, in addition
to building the culture of citizenship,
peace, and development at all levels
• Exploiting natural resources in a rationalized and sustainable manner, and
ensuring a healthy environment for all
As shown in this report, young people
must be a core and active party in developing, implementing, and benefiting from
these orientations. The report indicates
that this youth role must be part and parcel of the social context itself, affecting it
and affected by it. Approaching youth issues in isolation from the social context
and the general developmental prerequisites only leads to deficient knowledge,
work, and developmental outcomes.
A Human Developmentsponsoring State
After identifying procedurally feasible action mechanisms, the state can employ its
resources towards creating a society that
respects human rights, reduces poverty,
and generates decent job opportunities.
This is indispensable for inclusive and
sustainable economic growth and is con-
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
119
ditioned on the pioneering, efficient role
of the private sector.
The imbalances of the labour market
are a main factor in youth exclusion. The
private sector is currently unable to generate new job opportunities due to decreased investment. Political instability
may be a reason for investors’ wariness
of investing in Iraq. The orientation of
Iraqi economic policy towards the market
economy has meanwhile paved the way
for unconditional imports from different countries, leading to the dumping of
cheap commodities on the Iraqi market.
This has limited the capability of the private sector to compete, in terms of both
price and quality.
Investment of resources and turning their diverse forms into elements of
growth in a society that respects human
rights, reduces poverty, and generates
decent jobs are indispensable actions for
sustainable and all-inclusive economic
development and are conditional on an
effective and leading role by the private
sector. The following are the Iraqi state’s
top tasks based on the work mechanisms
and tasks the 2013 International Human
Development Report identifies for a developmental state:
1.Getting policy priorities right in order
to empower the youth and promote
their opportunities while protecting
them against downside risks resulting
from destabilized socio-economic conditions.
2.Investing in youth capabilities as a top
development priority towards economic
growth. The human development approach entails that the state should expand the scope of education, health, and
public services. The exploitation of oil
revenues in these sectors is a source not
only for producing human capital, but
also for creating jobs –’employment
multiplier effect’– and expanding the
market –’income multiplier effect’.
3.Investment in infrastructure, health, and
education is the way towards achieving and sustaining human development
while committing to equal opportunities (economic growth supports social
policies, which in turn support development).Appropriate social policies are
therefore important.
4.Greater priority to job creation. Policies
can enhance the relationship between
economic growth and human develop-
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Iraq Human Development Report 2014
ment. Increased employment opportunities do not imply increased productivity and incomes in an oil-rich country,
considering that income growth sources
are generated from oil and from the
public sector rather than from the private sector or agriculture. They are also
not associated with a tangible rise in
economic activity, especially for women. Moreover, economic participation
is not associated with more numerous
paid or protected jobs, or jobs in diverse
productive sectors. It is necessary to
examine the nature of growth and employment intensity in growth-driving
sectors.
5. Integration between the state and the
market. The rapid and sudden opening
up to global markets in 2003 led to the
closure of public economic institutions
without setting up new private industrial activities to attract investment.
The successful experiences in China
(the private economic zones) and India
(abolition of licensing regulations and
deregulation) have not been used to attract more investments.
Policy Recommendations
The Economic Policy
Many countries in the south achieved rapid development, so we must learn lessons
from them when setting our development
policy:
• Under the conditions of generalized
poverty and high and rising unemployment, social safety nets, employmentoriented social funds for development,
and other redistributive social welfare
schemes are not sufficient. More intrusive state-led macroeconomic management is required to enlarge public investment and create a wider fiscal space
for development expenditure, which is
crucial for accelerating job creation and
poverty reduction.94
• Inclusive economic development and
general economic growth cannot be
achieved without a regulatory framework at the national level. In fact,
contrary to the neoliberal economic
theories, the assumption that the market
and other economic mechanisms can
actually work without a regulatory legal framework, institutions, or non-economic regulations is a false premise that
goes against the entire economic history
of humankind. In the case of Iraq, the
correlation between national regulation
and economic growth is even stronger
given its heritage of totalitarianism and
conflict and their impact on the national economy. This economy has to rise
again in accordance with new rules and
under a globalized economic system,
which is inappropriate for developing
countries given its bias towards large,
globalized economic forces, under
which countries have lost a great deal of
freedom in economic decision making.
Eradicate poverty.
Given the prevailing poverty circumstances and the increasing unemployment
rate, social safety nets, social funds, and
other welfare schemes that rely on redistribution plans are not sustainable solutions. Hence, it is necessary for the state
to manage macroeconomics and intervene
to maximize the volume of public investment and provide greater financial space
in order to fund development expenditures and minimize related economic and
social costs.95 At the same time, policies
are equally as important.
Increase economic growth away
from crude oil.
It is difficult to improve the youth’s job
opportunities and chances of successful social participation without enhancing the national economy and changing
its structure by improving its production
capacities in agriculture and industry and
moving away from the current core activities of crude oil export and government
management. Young people could then
be employed in a way that contributes to
the national well-being and sustainable
growth; these sectors have wages that are
proportional to productivity and involve
technological modernization.
Activate the private sector and
widen the scope of its business
By minimizing those areas the state intervenes in directly (especially the banking sector)and by enacting laws which
will help create new investment opportunities and jobs for the youth – most importantly, the customs tariff law, labour
law, and social insurance law. These actions should be based on national interests, striking a balance between economic
and social goals, and also balancing the
interests of all social groups in harmony
with development goals.
Initiate institutional reforms.
Delaying reform may lead to a failure
to deliver the long-awaited improvements
in infrastructure and public services. Furthermore, increasing and mobilizing financial resources for public spending is
not the same thing as efficiency, which is
a prerequisite for progress. While investment allocations have been increased,
the current situation in the construction
sector and the habitual ways of awarding, implementing, and receiving investment projects are not encouraging. There
might be a quantum leap forward if the
bodies responsible for managing projects
are restructured and the construction sector is promoted. This would ensure more
job opportunities for young people in the
private sector and encourage their entrepreneurship.
• Increase the efficiency of public spending. Government spending is undoubtedly the engine for the entire Iraqi
economy; the GDP and family income
mainly depend on the volume and components of government spending. Increased spending and oil resources have
become the basis for sustaining the
economy in Iraq, and consequently the
social and political cohesion. The 2013
budget serves this issue in particular.
• Improve the efficiency of the budget.
Given that the general budget constitutes the most important tool of economic policy, it is necessary to quickly
improve data collection and prepare
analytical methodologies that show detailed correlations between the data and
various aspects of the national economy. Improving financial management
by controlling costs and studying performance is also important, in addition
to improving accounting and inspection
activities in all their phases and purposes.
• Changing the budgeting pattern: A
major objective of economic reform is
pushing for the adoption of a new pattern of public budget so as to convert
it into an executive, procedural, and
institutional programme that allows for
analysing the expenditure failures of the
budget (a budget designed to be a budget of programmes and performance
rather than one of total aggregate items
whose allocations are made on a sectoral basis). This procedure is likely to
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
121
promote young people in various fields
and allow for addressing the failures of
government programmes developed for
this purpose. The implementation of the
poverty alleviation strategy programme
is a successful model that can be adopted to implement youth empowerment
programmes by stakeholders, including
ministries, local governments, the private sector, CSOs, and youth organizations.
Efficient and Fair Employment
Policy
Improved employment is a major goal
of economic policy. The improvement
of the youth’s social environment largely
depends on economic restructuring that
moves towards a more productive society.
In such a society, work and professional
relations play an essential role in shaping
young people’s character and improving
their social status.
While unemployment is both a cause
and a result of a lack of empowerment, the
poverty resulting from it has come to embody disparity and inequality. A growing
sense of injustice among the youth further
complicates the impoverishment- and exclusion-generating dynamics of this social
and economic polarization.
Youth unemployment and poverty restrict their political freedom, which ideally would allow them to create and increase
opportunities. Hence, the gravest forms of
youth exclusion and marginalization are
related to their economic and livelihood
status. This reality is shared by all young
people, regardless of their level of education, place of residence, or age group.
Box 8.1
Jobs Needed in the Next Phase
Despite an improved Iraqi labour market due to
the entry of a quality-based local workforce after
opening up to the world after 2003, this market is
still suffering as a result of decades of isolation from
the outside world, no training for new entrants, unenforced labour legislation, increased informal
markets, etc. However, the labour market, sooner
or later, will join global labour markets, and its structure will change due to the quality of entrants, who
will require high quality education and training. Perhaps the skills in high demand will be those related
to communications engineering, computers, and
network security. And should Iraq’s banking sector
experience an opening up, demand would be also
high for experienced accountants and business administration professionals, as well as oil sector technicians, technical experts, and supportive mid-level
cadres in the fields of industry and health.
Efficient Training Policy
Training: The Missing Link
Increased unemployment rates are a major concern for the government, which has
sought to address this calamity in a serious manner since 2003, including through
employment and training centres under
the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. The training at the centres is linked
to soft loans. These centres have managed
to find a number of job opportunities for
unemployed males and females, but this
success seems to be rather limited, as the
culture of employment through the centres has not yet spread widely. Therefore,
these centres must be reactivated.
• Social responsibility: enhancing the
role of the youth as drivers for socioeconomic development through inclusion and participation in local development planning and frameworks at
the grass-roots level through the capac122
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
ity development of youth associations/
CBOs.
• Business/communities linkages: empowering the youth with the necessary
skills and competencies to increase
their employability through the formation of youth community service centres that link youth up with businesses.
• Establishing business start-up programmes to support the growth of small
and medium-sized enterprises, in addition to apprenticeship programmes that
build youth employability and handin-hand with credit programmes with a
specific focus on young women.
With regards to education, the following points are also suggested:
• There is a need to link the market demand with the university/education
sector outputs in order to bridge the
gap between demand and supply in the
market. It is thus recommended to in-
troduce business management courses
as a minor’ programme in all university
faculties to enable youth to acquire education and management skills.
• There is also a need to enhance the vocational training for unskilled labour
through introducing new technologies
to the vocational training centres and
even initiating twinning techniques in
partnership with European technical institutions, and in south/south cooperation to upgrade the training level. Access should be increased to technical,
vocational, and entrepreneurial skills
training, with a special emphasis on
information and communications technology.
• Furthermore, the establishment of business development centres and business
incubators inside Universities and Vocational Institutes will help youth to
start up their businesses, manage their
small projects, and shift from being job
seekers to being job creators.
Box 8.2
Relevant recommendations:
• Increase the number of training centres
all over Iraq.
• Promote the quality of training programmes to include training on modern
agricultural systems and modern handicrafts in order to empower rural youth
and build their capacities in these areas.
• Create special training centres for women and adopt non-traditional training
programmes (e.g. sewing, cooking, and
hairdressing).
• Engage the private sector and civil society organizations in training activities
in order to prepare young people for
working in the private sector.
• Adopt both material and intangible
incentive systems to increase young
people’s interaction with training programmes.
• Adapt training systems and programmes
to the high-tech skills the labour market
requires.
• Link vocational and university education with training, in accordance with
the job description system.
Innovative Project to Train the Youth
As part of its participatory governance programme in Iraq, UNDP is working on a Training Needs
Assessment project to address some major challenges faced by Iraqi youth through providing them
with the knowledge and skills they currently need.
In April 2013, the project published an online membership registration form and created a group on
Facebook called ‘Youth Café’:https://www.facebook.com/#!/groups/youthcafee/?fref=ts
The group aims to introduce young activists from
all over Iraq. Through the online form, nearly 1,000
subscribers have registered. The number of ‘Youth
Café’ Face book members at present is 1,524, from
all over Iraq. This page has become a means of
communication, and it will continue to keep up with
the project implementation. ‘Youth Café’ has become a space for young people to share informa-
The Social Policy
tion and opportunities and follow up on the project
implementation and assessment procedure.
In addition, five regional meetings were held – in
Baghdad on May 18, Babil on June 7, Maysan on
June 8, Sulaymaniya on June 21, and Kirkuk on June
22– assisted by communication via the ‘Youth Café’
website with young people. A committee comprised of young UN officers chose 80 young activists
(29 percent women and 71 percent men) from different governorates to participate in the meetings.
The Training Needs Assessment Report was developed as a basis for a training programme for young
activists. About 70 young men and women will participate in a training camp by the end of August
2013. The programme will include training of trainers,
project management, and youth mobilization.
(currently at 4 percent). Family plays an
important role in youth life, but they lack
Social Policy Reforms
social support system apart from the Food
To ensure high quality health services,
higher levels of public expenditure are
needed for the upgrade and increase of
these services. There is a need for a medical insurance scheme, as household expenditure on health services has increased
Ration Card, which is far from being
considered as an empowerment measurement.
The youth also lack comprehensive protection and social security systems.
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
123
Young Women’s Empowerment
Women’s empowerment and bridging the
gender gap at different levels is a priority in Iraq for the realization of development goals, starting with enhancing good
governance and democratization; then
building peace, security, and stability; and
finally achieving economic, social, and
environmental goals. Further, the status of
women is an extremely telling indicator
in the assessment of progress towards the
required cultural transformation.
The following are the three most important priorities related to young women, as
detailed in this report:
• Increasing women’s economic activity
rate, which would not only decrease
the level of dependency and increase
household income, but also redistribute income and wealth. In addition,
progress in this regard would improve
women’s social status.
• Improving the post-primary education
enrolment rate for females and thereby
bridging the gender gap in education.
This is extremely important since this
gap in Iraq has widened in recent times,
going against earlier trends in Iraq and
the current trend in neighbouring countries.
• Addressing some negative social phenomena which have re-emerged in Iraq
in domestic and personal life, particularly early and forced marriage and domestic violence against women. These
issues had subsided earlier, but have
thrived again due to violence, conflict,
and the fragile state and national identity.
Education as an Empowerment
Mechanism
Developing education and transforming
it into a youth empowerment mechanism
requires developing a reform policy that
looks at all levels of education and the
system of production and dissemination of skills, knowledge, values, and
behaviour. The reforms must help Iraq
gain access to information and development. The education system in Iraq faces
multidimensional challenges; some are
conventional, fundamental, and quantitative, while others are qualitative. Both the
National Employment Plan and National
Youth Strategy involve these concepts in
their outputs, outcomes, and purposes.
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Iraq Human Development Report 2014
This report identifies the following
challenges:
• Addressing the problems of illiteracy
and dropping out and achieving equal
access to education at all levels between
males and females, rural and urban
youth, and all governorates
• Achieving the necessary interaction
with the demographic and economic
structure in order to attain developmental goals, such as increasing the working-age population’s economic activity rate (youth in particular);increasing
labour productivity; and establishing a
knowledge-based economy and society
• Responding to the requirements of the
transition to democracy – including
cultural, intellectual, and behavioural
transformation – to achieve the social
integration of the youth
• Reforming government funding for the
education sector. The rationalization of
government spending requires developing mechanisms to link education with
the labour market to ensure the parallel and balanced progress of the macro
economy. Financial planning for the education system should involve careful
budgeting to identify the ideal amount
of spending to promote education and
improve its quality. Too large a budget
(a surplus) results in the waste of financial resources; too small a budget (a
deficit) wastes human resources.
• Removing imbalances in the education budget and striking a balance between current and capital spending in
order to rehabilitate the infrastructure
of the education system; and getting rid
of the major imbalance where salaries
and wages account for the majority of
the current budget at the expense of the
other items, the funding of which could
reform the sector
• Understanding that formal education as
a process and a system – school, textbook, and teacher – is no longer the
only source of knowledge; the diversity
of information sources and tools in the
age of the information revolution requires creating new tools to meet the
needs of not only school youth, but also
female, rural, and poor dropouts
• Selecting flexible education systems
with numerous choices for students
regarding majors, specializations, and
modules, including, for example, the
credit hour system instead of the annual
system, as well as open learning and
distance education
Policies for Youth
Participation in Political
Stability
As the previous chapters of the report indicate, there have been some dangerous
gaps in the state-building process over
the past decade, and the state has failed
to overcome many external and internal – as well as objective and subjective
–challenges that contribute to fragmentation and the reproduction of rentier characteristics in different areas. While the
transformation from a totalitarian and extremely centralized state to a democratic
and development-oriented one is a difficult, complicated, long, and gradual process, extended stagnation and a failure to
achieve gradual and irreversible progress
frustrates young people and makes them
despair of this democratic transformation
–they then realign themselves according
to sub-national identities instead of the
unifying national identity.
The post-2003 events constituted an important turning point at the political, economic, and social levels. This change was
accompanied by an armed conflict and a
political dispute that is ongoing and could
take a turn for the worse at any time.
Furthermore, migration, displacement,
and security, economic, social, and psychological threats (particularly to young
people, women, and children) have grave
social consequences. Some young people
and teenagers now believe that disorder,
destruction, and violence are normal patterns of life.
Building a Culture of Peace and
Security and Safeguarding Social
Cohesion
Three decades of wars, conflicts, and
embargo have reduced the quantity and
quality of public services, particularly
education and health, and have wasted
development gains. The lack of social justice and growing frustration among young
people have affected social cohesion.
Therefore, a long-term process seeking to build social cohesion depends on
establishing a new social, cultural, and
political setting that acknowledges the
basic rights of individuals, social groups,
and communities as a core component of
citizenship. This transformation must also
be institutional, economic, and cognitive.
From a developmental perspective, youth
empowerment through education and the
reform of the education system is the realization of lifelong learning. Furthermore,
the development of content, curricula,
teaching and training methodologies, and
value systems is an indispensable part of
social transformation towards sustainable
human development.
• Enhancing youth visibility and knowledge of their civic rights/obligations and the political system through awareness campaigns in partnership with
youth community-based organizations to be formulated at the local level.
• Improving the youth’s effective participation in decision-making processes
through offering mechanisms to access
information, as well as facilitating experience and knowledge sharing with
regards to youth policy. This can be
strengthened through working towards
the activation of the role of the Youth
Parliament. • Social accountability: empowering
youth as partners in enforcing social accountability and rule of law at the local
level to enhance transparency, social
justice, and equal opportunities through
youth-sensitive skills training in monitoring and evaluation.
• Social stability: improving the image
of young people by involving them in
reconstruction and community development programmes.
• Rehabilitation programmes and integration of ex-combatants will enable youth
that were previously involved in militias to change their approach and play
vital positive, creative, and nonviolent
roles in their communities.
Civil Society and Youth
Democracy is not only about politics and
the state, but also about civil society and
the activities of communities. Civil society is the cornerstone of the state. Building and maintaining a democratic state
must involve the engagement of citizens
in their communities.
• The 2003 change in Iraq caused a
boom in mass media, which has indirectly contributed to promoting a modern social and political culture among
young people, raising their awareness
of diversity and the plurality of visions
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
125
and points of view and enabling them
to think critically and make their own
choices.
• The education model and system have
not raised the youth’s collective awareness; rather, it is technology that has
played a key role in formulating the
youth’s thoughts and establishing them
as a distinct social group. The mass media and telecommunications have offered the youth a new culture that has
brought young people together regardless of their social or economic class or
regional affiliation. The differences in
opinions and aspirations of young men
and women between Kurdistan region
and the other governorates are only significant when income differences are
considered.
• Youth participation in social projects
and charities is on the rise, while partnerships and groups are increasing. The
youth seem to be losing confidence in
top-down bureaucratic solutions and
increasingly gaining confidence in
bottom-up innovations. For example,
after losing faith in the government’s
security measures, young people living
in residential areas at the heart of the
political conflict have installed closedcircuit television to monitor their alleys
and identify violators.
• Ensuring that young people participate
in the internal transformations necessary to entrench democracy and build
political institutions and the rule of law
• Replacing state-dominated, top-down
programmes with wide partnerships
that include civil society organizations,
especially youth institutions
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Iraq Human Development Report 2014
• Promoting the culture of citizenship, as
a true democracy is not possible without
democratic citizens who understand the
responsibility and meaning of citizenship and believe in democratic norms
and values
• Spreading the culture of democracy
• Promoting a civil national culture to
address the thorny issues of traditional
culture, religion, race, and ethnicity
• Enhancing the youth’s democratic standards, skills, and aspirations
Civil society organizations offer young
people a chance to practice the values of
trust and cooperation in their daily lives,
engage in reconciliation and trust building, and replace the ideology of hate with
an ethical vision based on national identity.
Although this report focuses on young
people, these ideals apply to society as a
whole. Ultimately, development requires
a strong and efficient state capable of
planning and managing the development
process successfully. Such a state must be
built on the established standards of good
governance, as a modern, institutionalized
state within situations that abide by the
law, enjoying a great deal of impartiality
towards the existent political variations in
the regime and society, and working in accordance with established, clear rules that
are within the law. Above all, as a result
it must be a state capable of continuously
ensuring security and stability. It must
gain its legitimacy through the acceptance
of different social groups, despite the
fragmentations that have occurred in Iraq.
Annex I
Statistical Tables
Table 1
Human Development Index (HDI) and its componets
GNI Index
Non-income HDI
GNI per capita rank minus
HDI rank c
23825
Education Index
2012
14
Expected Mean Years of
Schooling Index
2011
7.8
Mean Years of Schooling
Index
2011
72
Life Expectancy at Birth
Index (LEBI)
2011
Gross national income
(GNI) per capita
Expected mean years of
schooling (years)
0.764
Mean years of schooling
(years)
Sulaymaniyah
Life expectancy at birth
(years)
HDI b
Governorate a
rank by HDI a
1
0.813
0.592
0.788
0.699
0.784
0.754
0
2
Erbil
0.751
71
8.0
13
23521
0.800
0.614
0.713
0.677
0.782
0.736
0
3
Duhouk
0.726
69
7.7
13
19780
0.773
0.674
0.604
0.655
0.757
0.711
0
4
Baghdad
0.716
71
8.8
11
12738
0.811
0.586
0.700
0.652
0.694
0.727
2
5
Kirkuk
0.687
67
7.6
11
14838
0.745
0.581
0.568
0.608
0.716
0.673
-1
6
Najaf
0.686
70
7.7
10
13125
0.782
0.589
0.565
0.590
0.699
0.679
-1
7
Basra
0.681
69
8.1
10
11075
0.780
0.578
0.612
0.600
0.674
0.684
4
8
Kerbala
0.680
70
7.6
10
11230
0.792
0.621
0.570
0.588
0.676
0.682
2
9
Wasit
0.679
71
7.9
9
10972
0.808
0.569
0.578
0.576
0.673
0.682
4
10
Anbar
0.677
70
7.5
10
11069
0.784
0.579
0.557
0.586
0.674
0.678
2
11
Diyala
0.675
67
8.0
11
11260
0.740
0.604
0.526
0.615
0.677
0.674
-2
12
Salah al-Din
0.673
69
7.6
10
12065
0.767
0.615
0.560
0.581
0.686
0.667
-5
13
Babel
0.669
67
7.5
10
11968
0.745
0.609
0.594
0.587
0.685
0.661
-5
14
Thi Qar
0.669
70
7.8
10
8562
0.788
0.571
0.577
0.596
0.637
0.685
1
15
Qadisiya
0.662
68
8.1
10
7844
0.762
0.592
0.574
0.608
0.625
0.681
1
0.655
67
7.5
10
9004
0.748
0.566
0.476
0.583
0.645
0.661
-2
Muthana
0.643
71
6.8
9
7522
0.804
0.571
0.570
0.534
0.619
0.655
0
0
16
17
18
Misssan
0.639
71
7.4
9
7216
0.804
0.521
0.524
0.530
0.613
0.653
Kurdistan
Region
0.750
71
7.8
13
22738
0.798
0.598
0.740
0.680
0.777
0.737
Iraq
0.694
69
8.0
11
12738
0.780
0.609
0.599
0.618
0.694
0.694
Definitions
HDI: A composite statistic of the three dimensions of human development: life expectancy, education, and income.
Life expectancy at birth: The number of years a newborn is expected to live if the modes of mortality rates by age groups when
it is born remain the same throughout its life.
Mean years of schooling: Years that a 25-year-old person or older
has spent in schools.
Notes
a: The governorates have been sorted in ascending order according to the HDI .
b: The average of the calculated indices does not exactly match
the HDI due to rounding.
c: The positive numbers suggest that sorting the governorates by
the HDI is better than by GDP per capita while the negative numbers suggest the other way round.
Main sources of data
Column 1: Determined based on the HDI in column 2.
Column 2: Calculated based on the data mentioned in columns
7-11.
Columns 3 and 5: Calculated based on the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS4) 2011.
Column 4: Calculated based on the Iraq Knowledge Network
(IKN) Survey 2011.
Column 6: Given that there is no GDP per capita Index at the level
of the governorates, the GDP per capita at the level of Iraq has
been modified so as to include per capita spending in all the governorates to reach the above-mentioned index.
Column 7: Calculated based on the data in column 3.
Column 8: Calculated based on the data in column 4.
Column 9: Calculated based on the data in column 5.
Column 10: Calculated based on the data in columns 8 and 9.
Column 11: Calculated based on the data in column 6.
Column 12: Calculated based on the data in columns 3,4 and 5.
Column 13: Calculated based on the data in columns 2 and 6.
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
127
Table 2
Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI)
Governorate
Inequality-adjusted LEBI
(ILEBI)
IHDI
Inequality-adjusted
Education Index (IEI)
Inequality-adjusted
Income Index
Value
Total
difference (%)
Change in
rank
Value
Loss (%)
Value
Loss (%)
Value
Loss (%)
Gini
Coefficient
1
Sulaymaniyah
0.644
0.12
0
0.750
0.078
0.623
0.108
0.573
0.161
0.430
2
Erbil
0.628
0.12
0
0.744
0.069
0.593
0.123
0.561
0.176
0.418
3
Duhouk
0.605
0.13
1
0.723
0.064
0.575
0.122
0.534
0.187
0.369
4
Baghdad
0.612
0.10
-1
0.754
0.070
0.600
0.080
0.507
0.145
0.376
5
Kirkuk
0.593
0.09
0
0.689
0.075
0.562
0.076
0.539
0.124
0.340
6
Najaf
0.577
0.11
1
0.729
0.068
0.529
0.103
0.497
0.167
0.382
7
Basra
0.582
0.10
-1
0.729
0.065
0.550
0.083
0.491
0.144
0.354
8
Kerbala
0.571
0.11
4
0.742
0.063
0.534
0.091
0.469
0.184
0.324
9
Wasit
0.571
0.11
2
0.754
0.066
0.518
0.101
0.476
0.167
0.291
10
Anbar
0.574
0.11
0
0.742
0.054
0.525
0.105
0.485
0.155
0.362
11
Diyala
0.574
0.10
-2
0.689
0.069
0.560
0.090
0.491
0.146
0.413
12
Salah al-Din
0.575
0.10
-4
0.722
0.059
0.531
0.086
0.496
0.154
0.337
13
Babel
0.568
0.11
1
0.697
0.064
0.535
0.087
0.490
0.161
0.349
14
Thi Qar
0.569
0.10
-1
0.739
0.062
0.545
0.086
0.457
0.148
0.362
15
Qadisiya
0.542
0.13
2
0.712
0.066
0.548
0.099
0.408
0.221
0.363
16
0.545
0.12
-1
0.700
0.064
0.527
0.097
0.440
0.191
0.353
17
Muthana
0.543
0.10
-1
0.754
0.062
0.477
0.108
0.445
0.141
0.386
18
Misssan
0.538
0.11
0
0.756
0.060
0.481
0.093
0.429
0.162
0.331
Kurdistan Region
0.629
0.12
0.741
0.071
0.601
0.117
0.559
0.173
0.422
Iraq
0.579
0.12
0.727
0.067
0.559
0.095
0.477
0.197
0.396
Change in rank by IHDI.
Loss ratio = HDI - IHDI.
Definitions
IHDI: The HDI accounting for inequality in the three key dimensions
of human development index.
IEI: The Education Index accounting for unequal distribution of
years of schooling based on the data of the household surveys in
the main sources of data.
Inequality-adjusted Income Index: The Income Index accounting
for unequal distribution of income based on the data of the household surveys in the main sources of data.
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Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Main sources of data
Column 1: Determined based on the data in columns 7 and 11 in
Table 1.
Column 2: Calculated based on the geometric mean of the data
in columns 7, 9 and 11.
Column 4: Calculated based on the data in columns 2 and 3.
Column 5: Calculated based on the data in columns 2 and 4.
Table 3
Gender Inequality Index (GII)
Governorate
Maternal
mortality
ratio
GII
rank
Value
Adolescent
fertility rate
Seats in
governorate
councils
Population ages 25+
with at least secondary
education (%)
Labor force
participation rate (%)
Females
Males
Females
Males
Erbil
18
0.406
33
28
33
13
22
15
68
Duhouk
17
0.421
31
24
38
13
20
11
65
Sulaymaniyah
16
0.422
23
27
17
12
18
15
68
Wasit
15
0.466
40
62
32
16
29
19
74
Baghdad
14
0.478
35
57
28
26
37
15
73
Babel
13
0.483
33
71
27
14
27
17
71
Anbar
12
0.489
41
53
24
12
31
19
73
Najaf
11
0.497
26
89
25
14
31
18
75
Diyala
10
0.503
35
53
28
15
29
12
70
Thi Qar
9
0.529
33
54
26
13
23
10
69
Qadisiya
Kerbala
8
0.535
35
66
21
16
26
11
71
7
0.538
45
36
30
11
24
9
73
6
0.540
27
74
30
15
23
9
74
Missan
5
0.554
38
73
26
12
27
11
74
Kirkuk
4
0.561
40
60
15
11
25
13
73
Basra
3
0.566
32
82
20
18
28
10
72
Salah al-Din
2
0.578
45
71
14
9
28
15
71
Muthana
1
0.623
37
59
15
9
17
7
75
Kurdistan Region
0.410
29
25
27
13
20
14
67
Iraq
0.500
35
59
27
16
28
13
72
Notes
Column was prepared put the health of mothers tipping maternal
mortality National (35 per 100 000 live births) in terms of the health
status of mothers (the use of contraceptives, review the health
centers during pregnancy, birth under the supervision of health) in
the provinces (for details see the Technical Notes).
They include births supervised by health workers other than doctors, nurses and midwives.
Main sources of data
Column 2: Calculated based on the data in columns 3-10
Columns 3, 4: Calculated based on IPMM 2013.
Columns 8,9,10: Calculated based on MICS4-2011
Column 5: Calculated based on the data of the Council of Ministers in 2010.
Columns 6 , 7: Calculated based on the IKN-2011.
Definitions
GII: A composite measure reflecting inequality in achievements
between women and men in three dimensions: reproductive
health, empowerment and the labour market
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
129
Table 4
Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI)
Governorate
The proportion of
people who are
multidimensionally
poor
Deprivation in
per capita
expenditure
Adjusted
poverty rate
Geographical
distribution
of poverty
rank by MPI
2011
2011
2011
2011
1
Sulaymaniyah
0.014
0.408
0.006
0.53
2
Erbil
0.033
0.393
0.013
1.07
3
Baghdad
0.043
0.434
0.018
1.79
4
Kirkuk
0.062
0.426
0.026
2.16
3.18
5
Duhouk
0.084
0.414
0.035
6
Babel
0.099
0.436
0.043
3.33
7
Diyala
0.112
0.407
0.046
3.46
8
Kerbala
0.129
0.462
0.060
4.13
9
Najaf
0.140
0.463
0.065
4.38
10
Anbar
0.142
0.430
0.061
4.64
11
Salah al-Din
0.145
0.433
0.063
5.02
12
Basra
0.179
0.450
0.081
6.14
13
Muthana
0.192
0.430
0.082
6.44
14
Qadisiya
0.226
0.479
0.108
7.58
0.232
0.453
0.105
8.55
16
Thi Qar
0.298
0.448
0.134
9.86
17
Wasit
0.298
0.451
0.134
12.90
14.86
15
18
Missan
0.304
0.489
0.149
Kurdistan Region
0.038
0.407
0.015
3.78
Iraq
0.133
0.448
0.060
100.00
Notes
The MPI in Iraq is comprised of five dimensions: education, labour,
basic services, living standards, and health.
Definitions
The MPI uses different factors to determine poverty beyond income-based lists. It has replaced the previous Human Poverty
Index. The MPI is an index of acute multidimensional poverty. It
shows the number of people who are multidimensionally poor
(suffering deprivation in 33.33% of weighted indicators) and the
number of deprivations with which poor households typically contend. It reflects deprivations in very rudimentary services and core
human functioning. Countries are sorted in an alphabetical order
in two groups by the year of the survey used to estimate the MPI.
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Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Main sources of data
Column 1: The number of people with multidimensional poverty
divided by the total number of population.
Column 2: Deprivation in per capita expenditure.
Column 3: Prevalence of multidimensional poverty by deprivation
in per capita expenditure.
Column 4: People living under the national poverty line.
Table 5
Youth Development Index (YDI)
YDI
Governorate
Education Index
Employment Index
rank by YDI
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
1
Sulaymaniyah
0.764
0.649
0.724
0.795
0.785
0.791
0.848
0.508
0.734
2
Erbil
0.737
0.633
0.703
0.777
0.739
0.758
0.871
0.481
0.735
3
Babel
0.714
0.592
0.673
0.675
0.607
0.643
0.875
0.547
0.762
4
Baghdad
0.711
0.549
0.662
0.767
0.745
0.756
0.878
0.431
0.746
5
Dahuk
0.706
0.547
0.644
0.759
0.721
0.740
0.849
0.482
0.720
6
Kerbala
0.665
0.459
0.628
0.690
0.681
0.685
0.916
0.293
0.764
7
Kirkuk
0.650
0.532
0.622
0.748
0.682
0.716
0.891
0.504
0.775
8
Diyala
0.667
0.492
0.617
0.729
0.679
0.705
0.844
0.376
0.717
9
Salah al-Din
0.664
0.527
0.615
0.697
0.589
0.646
0.842
0.531
0.739
10
Qadisiya
0.715
0.336
0.609
0.666
0.587
0.628
0.843
0.324
0.696
11
Thi Qar
0.664
0.437
0.596
0.689
0.603
0.647
0.819
0.269
0.684
12
Basra
0.624
0.479
0.583
0.703
0.692
0.698
0.831
0.363
0.714
14
Wasit
0.617
0.498
0.583
0.658
0.578
0.622
0.904
0.615
0.796
13
0.673
0.383
0.582
0.667
0.568
0.621
0.876
0.321
0.741
15
Muthana
0.604
0.313
0.554
0.610
0.507
0.560
0.911
0.105
0.761
16
Missan
0.613
0.391
0.551
0.625
0.499
0.565
0.876
0.398
0.744
17
Najaf
0.648
0.384
0.545
0.676
0.627
0.653
0.913
0.510
0.793
18
Anbar
0.584
0.299
0.500
0.734
0.618
0.682
0.817
0.575
0.730
Kurdistan Region
0.748
0.631
0.706
0.780
0.755
0.767
0.857
0.496
0.732
Iraq
0.694
0.535
0.641
0.721
0.666
0.695
0.865
0.457
0.741
To be continued
Notes
a: The index is comprised of five sub-indices of education, labor,
health, participation and security index, and empowerment.
These indices have been calculated for both males and females,
in addition to the total indices.
b: For more information on each index indicators see : Table (6).
c: For more information on detailed calculations, please see the
Technical Note Annex.
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
131
Table 5
Youth Development Index (YDI)
Governorate
Health Index
Participation and Security Index
Freedom and Communication Index
rank by YDI
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
1
Sulaymaniyah
0.834
0.838
0.838
0.719
0.724
0.721
0.645
0.478
0.566
2
Erbil
0.789
0.828
0.809
0.589
0.626
0.608
0.691
0.552
0.625
3
Babel
0.804
0.864
0.835
0.694
0.698
0.715
0.565
0.363
0.471
4
Baghdad
0.798
0.850
0.822
0.647
0.573
0.625
0.521
0.320
0.438
5
Duhouk
0.723
0.788
0.761
0.618
0.451
0.536
0.610
0.396
0.509
6
Kerbala
0.802
0.824
0.809
0.551
0.557
0.604
0.466
0.222
0.383
7
Kirkuk
0.831
0.844
0.837
0.346
0.503
0.422
0.607
0.293
0.476
8
Diyala
0.822
0.858
0.839
0.702
0.661
0.688
0.373
0.199
0.307
9
Salah al-Din
0.785
0.819
0.800
0.579
0.538
0.562
0.483
0.296
0.410
10
Qadisiya
0.726
0.737
0.735
0.923
0.172
0.751
0.496
0.177
0.346
11
Thi Qar
0.812
0.826
0.820
0.800
0.666
0.738
0.352
0.179
0.280
12
Basra
0.787
0.827
0.806
0.397
0.334
0.372
0.518
0.364
0.452
14
Wasit
0.763
0.806
0.784
0.511
0.555
0.570
0.387
0.191
0.303
0.757
0.823
0.791
0.541
0.333
0.489
0.577
0.165
0.377
13
15
Muthana
0.705
0.754
0.723
0.581
0.538
0.571
0.354
0.139
0.297
16
Missan
0.760
0.844
0.791
0.457
0.378
0.426
0.457
0.143
0.358
17
Najaf
0.747
0.757
0.754
0.483
0.178
0.309
0.515
0.193
0.397
18
Anbar
0.781
0.818
0.800
0.298
0.043
0.222
0.485
0.191
0.355
Kurdistan Region
0.793
0.823
0.810
0.672
0.656
0.663
0.657
0.497
0.580
Iraq
0.788
0.829
0.808
0.623
0.558
0.600
0.527
0.312
0.433
continued
132
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Table 6
Youth Development Index
Domain
Indicator
Youth literacy rate 15 - 29 years
Education
Years of Schooling 25-29 years
Secondary School net attendance ratio
Value of indicator
Males
88.9
Females
80.3
Total
84.7
Males
8.4
Females
8.0
Total
8.2
Males
52.5
Females
44.6
Total
48.6
Percentage of households with distance from
school less than 5 km
Employment Rate
Employment
Labor Force Participation Rate
Ratio of youth earning to average earning of
employed
Percentage of discouraged unemployed
youth
Percentage of youth not suffering from chronic
disease>
Percentage of youth not smoking
Helath
Youth not suffering from Overweight or
Underweight
Self assessed health 15-19
Youth perceptions of public health service
quality
Percentage of households for which the
nearest Health Centre is less than 10 km
Index
Males
Females
Total
0.721
0.666
0.695
0.865
0.457
0.741
0.788
0.829
0.808
90.1
Males
84.5
females
66.7
Total
81.8
Males
63.4
Females
12.0
Total
38.4
Males
81.8
Females
76.6
Total
80.9
Males
2.3
Females
4.3
Total
3.2
Males
95.8
Females
96.6
Total
96.2
Males
73.9
Females
98.8
Total
85.0
Males
79.9
Females
77.5
Total
78.8
Males
98.4
Females
99.0
Total
98.7
Males
45.6
Females
46.8
Total
46.2
94.4
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
133
Table 6
Youth Development Index
Domain
Indicator
Percentage of youth considering that there is
role for youth in improving the security in Iraq
Participation and Security
Percentage of Youth Feeling Secure
Proportion of youth voting in elections
Proportion of youth volunteered in
community work
Freedom to choose husband/wife
Freedom & Communication
Have a hoppy
Have a cell phone
have a personal computer
Using internet
134
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Value of indicator
Index
Males
90.2
Females
90.0
Total
90.1
Males
86.8
Females
87.3
Total
87.0
Males
72.4
Females
60.1
Total
67.1
Males
6.5
Females
6.9
Total
6.7
Males
93.3
Femals
75.7
Total
85.6
Males
58.4
Femals
34.6
Total
47.8
Males
89.8
Femals
49.0
Total
71.6
Males
33.6
Femals
21.0
Total
28.0
Males
24.8
Femals
10.9
Total
18.6
Males
Females
Total
0.623
0.558
0.600
0.527
0.312
0.433
Table 7
Correlations Matrix between HDI; Consistent Significations;
Poverty Enhances Deprivation
Poverty rate
Average monthly
household expenditure
MDG’s achievement extent
HDI
GII
IHDI
MPI
Urban rate
Deprivation Index (DI)
-0.787
-0.723
-0.781
0.630
-0.828
0.561
-0.478
0.789
Average monthly
household
expenditure
-0.787
1
0.627
0.806
-0.710
0.778
-0.646
0.404
-0.574
MDG’s
achievement
extent
-0.723
0.627
1
0.835
-0.612
0.821
-0.466
0.690
-0.502
-0.633
Indicator
1
Poverty rate
HDI
-0.781
0.806
0.835
1
-0.803
0.971
-0.673
0.663
GII
0.630
-0.710
-0.612
-0.803
1
-0.718
0.497
-0.423
0.445
IHDI
-0.828
0.778
0.821
0.971
-0.718
1
-0.722
0.660
-0.702
MPI
0.561
-0.646
-0.466
-0.673
0.497
-0.722
1
-0.103
0.521
Urban rate
-0.478
0.404
0.690
0.663
-0.423
0.660
-0.103
1
-0.416
Deprivation Index
(DI)
0.789
-0.574
-0.502
-0.633
0.445
-0.702
0.521
-0.416
1
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
135
Table 8
Human Development Indicators
Indicator
Value
HDI
0.694
YDI
0.641
Life expectancy at birth (years)
69
Mean years of schooling (years)
8
Expected mean years of schooling (years)
11
GNI per capita (purchasing power parity in US dollars in 2005)
12738
LEBI
0.780
Mean Years of Schooling Index
0.609
Expected Mean Years of Schooling Index
0.599
Education Index
0.618
GNI Per Capita Index
0.694
Non-income HDI
0.694
IHDI
0.579
IHDI (total difference %)
0.121
ILEBI
0.727
ILEBI (loss ratio)
0.067
IEI
0.559
IEI (loss ratio)
0.095
Inequality-adjusted Income Index
0.477
Inequality-adjusted Income Index (loss ratio)
0.197
Gini Coefficient
0.396
GII
0.500
Maternal mortality rate
35
Adolescent fertility rate
59
Women’s seats in governorate councils
27
Females aged 25+ with secondary education or above (%)
16
Males aged 25+ with secondary education or above (%)
28
Women’s labor force participation rate (%)
13
Men’s labor force participation rate (%)
72
Contraceptive prevalence rate (% of married women aged 15-49)
52
At least one prenatal visit (%)
75
Births attended by skilled health personnel (%)
91
The proportion of people who are multidimensionally poor
0.133
Deprivation in per capita expenditure
0.448
The proportion of poor population
0.060
continue
136
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Table 8
Human Development Indicators
Indicator
Value
HDI
0.694
National income ( MTD )
151687818.9
GNP ( MTD )
169235526.9
GDP at current prices ( million )
167373588.9
GDP at current prices ( million dollars)
143054.3
GDP at constant prices ( MTD )
57931.8
Per capita national income ( thousand dinars )
4668.8
Per capita gross national product ( thousand dinars )
5208.9
Per capita GDP at current prices (thousand dinars)
5151.5
Per capita GDP at current prices (thousand dollars)
4.4
Per capita gross domestic product at constant prices (thousand dinars)
Public expenditure on education (% of GDP)
Public expenditure on health (% of GDP)
1783.1
4.6
3.1
continued
Main sources of data
IKN-2011
MICS4 2011
Directorate of National Accounts for the year 2010
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
137
Table 9
Millennium Development Goal Indicators
Goal
1st
goal
2nd
goal
3rd
goal
Eradicating Severe
poverty and
starvation
achieving universal
primary education
strengthening the
gender equality
4th
goal
5th
goal
6th
goal
7th
goal
reducing child
mortality rate
Improving the health
of mothers
Combating HIV / Aids,
malaria and other
diseases
Ensure the availability
of the reasons
for the survival of
environment
138
Sr.
Indicator
Baseline
no.
Baseline
year
Current
no.
Year
Targeted
for 2015
1
% of people spending less than $2.5 a day
13.9
2007
11.2
2012
6.9
2
Poverty gap rate (cases of poverty multiplied by poverty
severity) (%)
4.5
2007
4.1
2012
2.5
3
% of underweight children aged under five
9
1991
8.5
2011
4.5
4
%of the populationbelow the minimum level of dietary
energy consumption
20
1991
6
2011
10
5
% of the food-insecure population
11
2003
6
2011
5.5
6
Primary education net enrolment
90.8
1990
90.4
2011
100
7
% of students reaching the fifth grade
75.6
1990
93.3
2011
100
8
Literacy rate among people aged 15–24
78.6
1990
85.5
2011
100
1
9
Female-to-male ratio in basic education (%)
79.5
1990
94
2011
10
Female-to-male ratio in secondary education (%)
64.1
1990
85
2011
1
11
Female-to-male ratio in university education (%)
50.9
1990
87.5
2011
1
12
Female-to-male ratio in higher education (%)
25.3
1990
66
2011
1
13
Ratio of literate females to males aged 15–24
91.4
2004
91
2011
1
14
Women’s share of paid jobs in non-agricultural sectors
10.6
1990
14.7
2011
50
15
Women’s parliamentary representation
13.2
1990
25.2
2011
50
16
Number of deaths of children aged under 5 per 1,000live
births
62
1990
37.2
2011
27
17
Infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births
50
1990
31.9
2011
20
18
% of one-year old children immunized against measles
80
1990
75.4
2011
100
19
Maternal death rate per 100,000 live births
117
1990
84
2006
29
20
% of birthsattended by skilled health personnel
50
1990
90.9
2011
100
21
Condom use rate of the contraceptive prevalence rate
0.7
2000
1.8
2011
58
22
Number of malaria cases and deaths
5502
1995
6
2010
0
23
Tuberculosis prevalence and deaths per 100,000 people
2
2000
1.4
2011
0
24
% of tuberculosis cases detected and cured under
directly observed treatment short course
86
2006
94
2011
100
25
Percentage of wooded areas(%)
4
1990
3
2011
10
26
% of the population using solid fuels
35
2003
-
-
-
27
% of the population using improved drinking water
sources in urban and rural areas (%)
81.3
1990
91.4
2011
91.6
28
% of the population using an improved sanitation facility
71
1990
94
2011
87
29
% of households with access to secure tenure
60.8
1990
83.2
2011
88
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Table 9
Millennium Development Goal Indicators
Goal
Sr.
Baseline
no.
Indicator
Baseline
year
Total
(7.1)
30
8th
goal
developing a global
partnership for
development
Unemployment rates for people aged 15–24 by sex
Males
(7.2)
Current
no.
Year
Total
(18)
1990
Females
(6.3)
Males
(27)
Targeted
for 2015
Total
(3.6)
2011
Females
(17)
Males
(3.6)
Females
(3.2)
31
Number of landlines per 100 people
5.6
1990
5.1
2007
32
Number of mobile phones per 100 people
2.2
2004
94.3
2008
11.2
40
33
% of households with a PC
3.6
2004
17.2
2011
7.2
36
34
Number of PCs per 100 people
17.8
2007
17.2
2011
35
% of households with access to the Internet
31.8
2007
9
2011
64
36
Number of satellite dishes per 100 people
32
2004
96
2011
40
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
139
Table 10
Governorate
Population Trends
Population
1997
2012
Annual
Growth
1997 2012
Urban areas
(%)
Median
age
Total dependency ratio
(per 100 people
Ages 15–64)
Total fertility rate
(births
per woman)
1997
2012
2013
1997
2013
1997
2013
2042852
3353875
3.3
50.1
61.0
17
103.0
88
5.5
5.3
Kirkuk
753171
1432747
4.3
70.5
71.9
20
86.5
74
4.2
5.4
Diyala
1135223
1477684
1.8
42.2
48.2
19
90.5
75
4.6
4.0
Anbar
1023736
1598822
3.0
52.7
48.7
18
106.1
80
5.5
4.0
Baghdad
5423964
7255278
1.9
89.4
87.3
21
78.4
68
3.8
3.3
Babel
1181751
1864124
3.0
47.9
47.5
18
92.8
80
4.7
4.2
Kerbala
594235
1094281
4.1
66.0
66.7
19
90.6
77
4.8
3.9
Wasit
783614
1240935
3.1
53.2
58.2
18
93.5
82
4.9
4.9
Salah al-Din
904432
1441266
3.1
45.0
44.5
18
104.6
83
5.5
5.4
Najaf
775042
1319608
3.5
69.9
71.3
18
91.8
81
4.5
4.3
Qadisiya
751331
1162485
2.9
52.9
56.7
18
95.9
85
5.2
4.3
Muthana
436825
735905
3.5
44.8
44.0
17
106.0
86
5.5
4.4
Thi Qar
1184796
1883160
3.1
59.1
63.2
18
101.4
85
5.5
4.3
Missan
637126
997410
3.0
66.1
72.6
17
102.4
90
6.0
7.0
Basra
1556445
2601790
3.4
79.8
80.1
18
89.4
86
4.7
5.0
Erbil
1095992
1657684
2.8
77.4
83.3
21
*92
71
**4.7
3.8
Duhouk
402970
1158633
7.0
74.6
73.6
19
*92
78
**4.7
4.1
Sulaymaniyah
1362739
1931561
2.3
71.5
85.1
23
*92
61
**4.7
2.9
Kurdistan Region
2861701
4747878
3.4
74.2
81.7
21
*92
68.1
**4.7
3.5
Iraq
22046244
34207248
2.9
67.3
69.2
19
92.0
77.1
4.7
4.2
Notes
Sinc census has not be conducted in the region, dependency ratio was estimated the based on national average *
Sinc census has not be conducted in the region, total fertility was
estimated the based on national average *
Definitions
The annual growth rate of the population: the average annual
growth rate during a specified period.
Urban population: the total of people living in urban areas classified according to the criteria adopted in the country or region.
Median age: the age at which the outcome of dividing the distribution comes on two slices of equal population, so that it is 50
per cent of the population over this age and 50 per cent without.
Overall dependency ratio: the proportion of people aged 0-14
and 65 years and above of the total population of the age group
15-64.
The total fertility rate: the number of children born to each woman
aged (15-49 years).
140
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Main data sources
column 1،4،7،9: results of the 1997 population census Column 2.5: Report population estimates for the year 2012.
Column 3: Depending on the data contained in columns 2 and 1.
Column 6،8،10: Survey map of poverty and maternal mortality 2013
IPMM
Table 11
Health
Governorate
Duhouk
people with disability (%)
people with chronic diseases (%)
Assess individual health
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
6.4
5.6
6.0
13.1
16.1
14.6
96.9
97.0
97.0
6.2
3.7
4.9
8.7
6.2
7.5
96.8
96.9
96.9
Sulaymaniyah
3.7
2.9
3.3
7.4
12.9
10.2
95.7
93.7
94.7
Kirkuk
4.7
3.0
3.9
11.8
16.6
14.2
97.2
97.4
97.3
Erbil
6.0
4.3
5.2
11.8
15.6
13.7
96.7
96.5
96.6
Diyala
4.8
4.3
4.5
7.2
9.7
8.5
97.5
98.4
98.0
Anbar
4.7
2.6
3.7
7.0
8.2
7.6
98.6
98.7
98.7
Baghdad
3.6
3.1
3.3
12.8
14.1
13.5
97.4
97.6
97.5
Babel
5.5
2.8
4.1
10.3
13.5
11.9
97.6
97.5
97.6
Kerbala
3.7
3.0
3.4
11.5
13.1
12.3
96.6
96.9
96.8
Wasit
3.6
2.8
3.2
8.6
8.5
8.5
96.6
96.2
96.4
Salah al-Din
2.5
1.9
2.2
7.1
8.2
7.7
96.8
97.1
96.9
Najaf
2.8
3.9
3.4
16.9
18.5
17.7
96.8
96.0
96.4
Qadisiya
4.7
3.7
4.2
10.5
10.8
10.7
97.3
97.7
97.5
Muthana
4.9
1.9
3.4
8.3
8.4
8.3
97.4
98.2
97.8
Thi Qar
4.3
3.1
3.7
6.9
8.9
7.9
97.2
97.1
97.1
Missan
3.3
2.0
2.6
10.4
9.9
10.1
97.4
97.9
97.7
Basra
3.9
2.2
3.0
10.4
11.5
10.9
97.8
97.3
97.6
Kurdistan Region
5.2
4.0
4.6
10.3
14.6
12.5
96.3
95.5
95.9
Iraq
4.4
3.1
3.8
10.4
12.0
11.2
97.2
97.1
97.2
To be continued
Main sources of data
Columns 1and 2 Iraq Households socio-economic survey IHSES 2012.
Column 3 Iraq Knowleged network survey IKN 2011.
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
141
Table 11
Health
Governorate
Average time needed to arrive at a health center (min) (%)
individuals satisfied with medical services (%)
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Duhouk
16.6
18.2
17.5
87.2
87.0
87.1
24.0
25.3
24.6
82.4
90.3
86.9
Sulaymaniyah
23.5
23.6
23.6
91.2
82.2
86.8
Kirkuk
19.9
17.2
18.5
89.5
91.4
90.5
Erbil
19.2
21.5
20.5
68.3
76.4
72.3
Diyala
30.1
27.8
28.8
86.4
90.2
88.3
Anbar
14.2
14.3
14.3
82.5
79.1
80.8
Baghdad
19.5
17.9
18.7
89.0
89.1
89.0
Babel
23.4
26.5
24.9
96.1
96.0
96.1
Kerbala
21.8
22.4
22.1
82.4
73.6
78.0
Wasit
31.5
35.0
33.1
79.8
84.6
82.1
Salah al-Din
31.5
30.7
31.1
80.3
80.8
80.5
Najaf
18.8
19.9
19.4
72.9
78.3
75.6
Qadisiya
17.7
18.6
18.1
78.7
81.0
79.9
Muthana
18.0
19.4
18.7
79.2
80.0
79.6
Thi Qar
19.8
21.4
20.6
88.3
93.3
90.8
Missan
26.4
30.7
28.7
81.4
81.5
81.5
Basra
18.1
18.0
18.0
80.5
84.4
82.6
Kurdistan Region
20.3
21.6
21.0
82.1
81.4
81.8
Iraq
19.7
19.7
19.7
84.1
85.6
84.9
Main sources of data
Column 1 socio-economic survey of households in Iraq IHSES 2012.
Column 2 survey network know Iraq IKN 2011.
142
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Table 12
Education
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
7.1
6.5
6.8
78.0
56.3
66.8
6.4
5.4
5.9
83.5
64.9
74.3
Sulaymaniyah
7.7
7.5
7.6
84.3
64.5
74.5
Kirkuk
6.8
6.4
6.6
88.1
72.6
80.3
Males
22.0
Females
15.0
students aged 15+
who are satisfied with
education quality (%)
students aged 6+
who take 60 or more
minutes to arrive at
school or university
(%)
Student-teacher
ratio
The literacy rate for
(age 12+)
Mean years of
schooling for (age
25+)
Governorate
Males
Duhouk
Total
19.0
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
18.2
18.7
18.4
34.6
32.4
33.5
8.1
5.0
6.9
36.4
42.0
39.2
12.9
13.5
13.2
21.6
20.0
20.8
15.0
15.4
24.9
26.4
25.7
29.0
15.0
22.0
15.7
Erbil
7.3
6.5
6.9
81.9
60.2
70.9
23.8
19.2
21.8
26.8
27.1
27.0
Diyala
7.9
6.7
7.3
91.2
74.5
83.0
16.0
11.0
13.0
23.8
19.7
21.9
47.0
50.0
48.5
Anbar
6.8
5.4
6.1
89.5
71.7
80.7
14.0
16.0
15.0
15.8
13.6
14.9
30.9
27.7
29.3
Baghdad
7.6
7.4
7.5
91.8
83.2
87.4
27.0
10.0
16.0
29.7
29.7
29.7
29.4
31.3
30.4
Babel
6.8
6.0
6.4
89.5
74.6
82.0
18.0
10.0
14.0
25.8
24.9
25.4
44.3
48.9
46.5
Kerbala
6.3
6.1
6.2
85.2
70.6
77.9
17.0
11.0
14.0
30.2
23.5
27.3
36.8
34.2
35.4
Wasit
6.6
5.2
6.0
85.0
64.4
74.6
19.0
9.0
14.0
22.0
12.6
18.2
42.0
44.5
43.3
Salah al-Din
6.7
5.2
6.0
85.9
65.6
75.6
27.0
14.0
21.0
18.5
13.6
16.6
39.4
39.0
39.2
Najaf
6.3
5.8
6.1
81.0
69.7
75.3
24.0
11.0
17.0
30.4
36.7
33.3
35.2
38.1
36.7
Qadisiya
6.1
5.2
5.7
79.6
60.7
70.0
15.0
9.0
12.0
22.6
14.9
19.2
37.7
40.5
39.2
Muthana
5.6
4.2
4.9
76.8
54.2
65.2
31.0
18.0
24.0
15.7
18.0
16.6
44.1
45.3
44.7
Thi Qar
6.4
5.2
5.8
82.2
57.7
69.8
16.0
12.0
14.0
6.2
5.6
5.9
41.9
43.3
42.6
Missan
5.7
4.4
5.0
79.7
57.8
68.5
21.0
16.0
18.0
11.1
9.4
10.4
44.0
42.6
43.2
23.0
10.0
15.0
Basra
6.7
6.4
6.6
87.3
74.0
80.9
Kurdistan
Region
7.4
6.9
7.2
82.0
61.2
71.5
Iraq
6.9
6.2
6.6
86.3
70.1
78.2
21.0
Definitions
Youth literacy rate: The number of literates aged 15-29 divided by the total
number of literates and illiterates aged 15-29.
11.0
16.0
21.8
20.5
21.1
33.0
33.2
33.1
18.0
16.7
17.4
26.3
25.3
25.8
20.4
19.5
20.0
34.3
35.6
34.9
Main sources of data
Columns 1 and 2: IKN-2011.
Column 3: Reports of the Educational and Social Statistics.
Columns 3 and 4: IHSES 2012.
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
143
Table 13
Governorate
Economic activity for Age 15+
Economic activity rate
for (age 15+)
workers with
secured jobs (%)
Average weekly
working hours for age
15+
Unemployment
for age 15+ (%)
underemployed
Individuals
aged 15+ in (%)
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Duhouk
65.6
11.6
37.6
56.0
77.1
59.1
7.6
16.4
9.0
43.4
32.6
41.7
16.5
3.6
14.6
74.2
9.7
42.1
40.7
47.5
41.4
6.2
15.7
7.3
43.0
30.6
41.7
16.4
5.8
15.2
Sulaymaniyah
70.5
19.8
45.4
54.8
73.0
57.7
8.8
37.5
15.0
47.4
34.7
45.4
25.7
7.1
22.4
Kirkuk
73.4
12.6
42.8
46.6
45.4
46.5
2.3
3.4
2.5
41.2
27.5
39.3
4.5
3.0
4.3
Erbil
69.4
17.4
42.9
55.6
72.8
58.6
4.1
19.6
7.3
53.1
45.3
51.8
13.8
5.5
12.3
Diyala
71.0
12.6
42.3
45.2
69.5
48.0
11.9
33.0
15.0
41.2
29.9
40.0
17.1
3.2
15.1
Anbar
75.1
20.4
48.0
49.6
31.6
45.7
18.8
15.1
18.1
41.9
25.2
38.3
13.4
2.1
11.1
Baghdad
73.8
16.3
44.7
47.7
73.2
51.6
6.3
24.9
9.7
44.4
36.5
43.2
14.2
3.1
12.3
Babel
73.6
18.4
45.8
36.5
41.2
37.4
8.6
13.2
9.5
39.6
29.2
37.7
18.9
2.9
15.7
Kerbala
75.5
10.8
43.2
40.2
72.2
43.1
6.1
34.1
9.6
43.0
35.9
42.4
22.8
6.8
21.1
Wasit
74.6
19.3
46.8
39.8
35.2
38.8
9.6
9.9
9.7
39.4
31.6
37.8
13.8
2.7
11.5
12.9
Salah al-Din
71.8
15.3
43.1
46.7
30.0
43.5
13.5
7.4
12.4
45.0
32.4
42.6
15.4
1.6
Najaf
76.1
19.2
47.8
41.0
39.8
40.8
7.2
23.4
10.4
45.0
32.4
43.0
11.1
2.0
9.4
Qadisiya
71.9
12.6
41.8
43.2
75.9
47.8
12.3
21.2
13.7
44.2
32.6
42.6
18.5
3.2
16.3
Muthana
75.8
7.2
40.6
40.3
82.3
44.0
14.3
16.1
14.5
44.1
33.3
43.2
5.6
2.4
5.3
Thi Qar
71.1
10.4
40.5
42.6
63.0
45.1
18.7
24.4
19.4
47.2
37.4
46.0
20.8
2.6
18.6
Missan
76.1
11.9
43.2
46.2
54.9
47.4
15.3
16.1
15.4
41.6
26.2
39.5
23.2
9.5
21.4
Basra
74.6
10.1
43.6
41.1
75.4
44.8
9.9
13.2
10.3
43.3
31.9
42.1
24.4
4.3
22.2
Kurdistan Region
69.0
17.0
42.7
55.3
73.7
58.3
7.0
27.8
11.1
48.3
37.9
46.7
19.6
5.9
17.2
Iraq
73.0
14.7
43.8
45.6
58.6
47.6
9.2
20.7
11.1
43.9
33.1
42.3
16.6
3.8
14.6
Definitions
Adjusted EAR is the number of economically active people aged 15+ divided by the number of population aged 15+.
Economically active people: The working people and the unemployed jobseekers aged 15+.
Unemployment rate: The number of job-seekers aged 15+ divided by the
number of economically active people aged 15+.
Insecure jobs: The jobs workers are expected to lose in case of any crisis or
a problem in the labour market (the following have been taken into consideration when calculating this variable: work sector, practical situation and
work nature - oral or written contract as well as permanent, temporary or
seasonal).
144
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Main sources of data
Columns 1-5: IKN-2011.
Table 14
Indicators of the standard of living of the Iraqi individual for the year 2012
Monthly expenditure
per capita (1000 ID)
Governorate
Dahuk
Monthly income
per capita (1000 ID)
POVERTY
(of total population %)
Urban
Rural
Urban and Rural
Urban
Rural
Urban and Rural
Urban
Rural
Urban and Rural
415
303
384
300
193
271
4.1
10.5
5.8
191
151
175
186
168
179
28.0
49.0
35.8
Sulaymaniyah
482
368
463
435
253
404
1.4
4.8
2.0
Kirkuk
331
198
288
317
182
274
6.1
15.4
9.1
Arbil
483
330
457
419
234
387
2.5
10.9
4.5
Diyala
242
197
219
222
153
186
15.2
25.2
20.5
Anbar
233
198
215
221
174
197
12.4
18.2
15.4
Baghdad
257
178
247
292
162
275
10.1
25.4
12.0
Babel
288
184
232
268
158
209
9.7
18.7
14.5
Kerbala
231
193
218
256
182
231
12.3
12.5
12.4
Wasit
229
191
213
220
110
174
21.3
32.8
26.1
Salah al-Din
263
210
234
216
150
180
11.1
21.1
16.6
Najaf
290
180
255
294
164
252
6.4
20.0
10.8
Qadisiya
178
119
152
179
114
151
32.0
60.2
44.1
Muthana
177
122
146
196
115
151
38.2
63.7
52.5
Dhi Qar
199
116
166
210
116
173
27.8
61.0
40.9
Maysan
160
95
140
202
104
172
29.1
73.0
42.3
Basra
220
198
215
227
191
220
13.7
19.6
14.9
Kurdistan Region
468
334
442
400
227
366
2.3
8.1
3.5
Iraq
276
185
247
274
159
237
13.5
30.7
18.9
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
145
Table 15
Environmental Sustainability
Governorate
People deprived from
sewer systems
(%)
People deprived from
improved drinking water
(%)
People deprived from
shelter
(%)
Individuals who consider that
preserving the environment is
one of their duties as citizens
(%)
2011
2011
2011
2009
Duhouk
1.9
2.0
2.0
28.0
2.6
16.5
0.8
4.9
Sulaymaniyah
2.3
2.5
0.3
29.6
Kirkuk
12.7
9.7
0.3
16.7
Erbil
2.6
0.7
0.7
19.9
Diyala
10.8
27.8
0.8
20.1
Anbar
1.5
18.1
0.6
11.3
Baghdad
7.5
17.3
0.5
11.5
Babel
5.8
29.8
0.4
13.9
Kerbala
6.1
40.2
0.8
12.3
Wasit
4.4
21.8
2.6
10.7
Salah al-Din
2.4
20.8
0.9
11.0
Najaf
5.4
76.3
0.8
30.7
Qadisiya
7.5
39.8
0.7
24.9
Muthana
0.3
74.0
0.4
16.1
Thi Qar
7.2
67.0
0.9
16.1
Missan
14.2
95.4
6.9
16.3
Basra
10.7
99.3
1.9
14.0
Kurdistan Region
2.3
3.9
2.9
25.8
Iraq
6.0
33.0
1.0
15.5
Definitions
Deprivation of improved sewer systems means no public pipeline, no facilities, as well as common facilities or facilities outside the housing unit (out in
the open), etc.
Improved drinking water is water conveyed through the public network or
protected well.
People deprived of shelter are those who live in a tent, caravan, etc.
146
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Main sources of data
Columns 1-3: IKN-2011.
Column 4: National Youth and Adolescence Survey 2009.
Table 16
Youth Health
Governorate
Gouth with disability (%)
Youth with chronic diseases (%)
Youth who have inhaled solvents or
taken sedatives, drugs or marijuana (%)
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Duhouk
6.4
3.0
4.7
8.7
8.9
8.8
15.4
0.2
8.0
6.3
1.2
3.4
5.0
0.6
2.5
18.7
1.7
11.3
Sulaymaniyah
3.0
0.4
1.8
1.7
3.7
2.7
8.9
0.9
5.0
Kirkuk
4.1
2.6
3.3
5.4
6.7
6.0
13.3
1.0
7.3
Erbil
5.5
2.1
3.8
2.7
4.3
3.5
8.1
1.3
4.7
Diyala
4.0
3.7
3.9
1.8
1.4
1.6
5.3
0.0
3.2
Anbar
3.6
1.6
2.6
1.1
1.3
1.2
16.4
0.5
10.6
Baghdad
2.1
1.2
1.7
4.9
4.3
4.6
14.4
0.0
7.8
Babel
2.8
0.0
1.4
3.7
1.8
2.8
6.5
0.2
3.7
Kerbala
0.6
0.0
0.3
4.9
5.3
5.1
6.5
0.0
3.7
Wasit
1.4
1.3
1.3
3.6
1.3
2.5
9.9
0.5
5.9
Salah al-Din
1.7
1.6
1.7
2.8
3.4
3.1
6.1
0.1
3.2
Najaf
1.3
1.8
1.5
11.0
5.9
8.4
14.4
0.0
7.6
Qadisiya
3.6
1.9
2.7
5.6
4.3
4.9
9.8
0.1
5.1
Muthana
3.8
1.0
2.3
4.7
3.0
3.8
2.7
0.0
1.4
Thi Qar
2.5
3.4
3.0
3.1
2.4
2.8
13.2
0.3
7.5
Missan
1.6
0.3
0.9
2.1
1.7
1.9
4.5
0.0
2.5
Basra
4.8
0.8
2.7
3.0
2.4
2.7
4.2
0.0
2.3
Kurdistan Region
4.5
4.6
3.0
4.0
5.4
4.7
9.8
0.9
5.4
Iraq
3.3
1.5
2.4
4.2
3.4
3.8
11.1
0.0
6.2
To be continued
Main sources of data
Columns 1, 2 IKN 2011
Column 3 NYS 2009
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
147
Table 16
Youth Health
Governorate
Youth who say they have
a good health (%)
Average time needed to arrive at
a health center (min)
Youth satisfied with
medical services
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Duhouk
98.8
98.7
98.7
16.7
20.0
18.4
46.8
43.7
45.2
98.0
98.3
98.1
21.1
21.2
21.2
38.8
45.2
41.9
Sulaymaniyah
98.2
98.0
98.1
20.3
23.2
22.0
57.8
48.8
53.2
Kirkuk
98.8
99.1
99.0
14.3
15.4
14.9
49.8
53.8
51.8
Erbil
98.2
99.3
98.8
20.3
18.7
19.4
39.8
42.8
41.3
Diyala
99.0
99.1
99.1
29.8
27.0
28.0
51.9
56.7
54.3
Anbar
99.0
99.4
99.2
12.7
14.7
13.8
42.2
39.3
40.8
Baghdad
98.6
99.2
98.9
18.4
18.1
18.3
48.2
49.6
48.9
Babel
98.4
99.4
98.9
23.1
23.9
23.6
53.0
56.3
54.6
Kerbala
96.7
99.5
98.1
19.1
21.5
20.4
42.7
38.9
40.7
Wasit
97.1
98.1
97.6
27.0
34.4
30.2
44.8
46.9
45.9
Salah al-Din
98.1
98.9
98.5
26.4
29.3
28.2
44.9
46.4
45.7
Najaf
99.1
99.1
99.1
16.8
23.2
19.7
39.1
40.8
40.0
Qadisiya
98.3
98.9
98.6
19.0
18.5
18.7
41.7
43.1
42.5
Muthana
98.6
99.7
99.2
16.4
17.5
17.0
42.3
44.8
43.6
Thi Qar
98.0
99.1
98.5
25.8
23.0
24.2
45.0
47.6
46.3
Missan
98.4
98.7
98.6
16.5
15.7
16.1
44.5
44.3
44.4
Basra
98.8
99.1
99.0
19.0
18.5
18.7
41.8
43.6
42.7
Kurdistan Region
98.3
98.6
98.5
19.4
20.9
20.2
48.7
45.5
47.1
Iraq
98.4
99.0
98.7
18.6
19.2
19.0
45.6
46.8
46.2
continued
Main sources of data
Column 1 IKN 2011
Columns 2, 3 IHSES 2012
148
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Table 17
Youth Education
Governorate
Duhouk
Mean years of schooling
for youth
Youth literacy rate
Youth who take 60 or more
minutes to arrive at school or
university (%)
Youth satisfied with education
quality (%)
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
86.6
73.2
79.7
5.9
3.6
4.7
36.2
51.5
42.7
62.6
60.2
61.4
86.0
73.4
79.9
7.3
4.6
5.9
36.7
30.5
34.8
71.2
78.3
75.2
Sulaymaniyah
94.2
86.9
90.7
6.1
4.0
5.0
24.2
25.3
24.7
41.7
42.3
42.0
Kirkuk
92.7
85.1
89.0
7.4
4.9
6.1
36.4
41.0
38.2
43.2
43.8
43.5
Erbil
88.5
76.4
82.3
6.6
4.0
5.3
43.7
41.0
42.5
47.5
48.9
48.2
Diyala
95.4
88.9
92.4
8.1
5.3
6.7
55.2
51.9
53.8
76.9
75.8
76.3
Anbar
92.4
82.5
87.6
7.9
4.7
6.3
43.9
44.2
44.0
59.3
52.4
55.9
Baghdad
93.4
90.3
91.9
8.9
7.2
8.1
49.4
54.4
51.7
45.8
52.6
49.2
Babel
90.5
85.0
87.9
7.9
5.4
6.6
44.8
52.8
48.2
76.5
81.1
78.8
Kerbala
86.0
80.1
83.1
7.2
5.3
6.3
56.6
39.9
52.5
60.2
60.9
60.5
Wasit
87.0
73.1
80.5
7.7
4.8
6.2
50.0
39.1
46.2
68.2
75.5
71.8
Salah al-Din
87.6
75.5
81.7
7.7
4.3
5.9
40.8
26.6
35.5
66.3
63.9
65.1
Najaf
79.3
76.6
78.0
7.7
5.3
6.4
58.3
78.2
66.6
53.7
68.4
61.0
Qadisiya
79.1
67.4
73.3
7.2
4.9
6.0
60.3
52.9
57.7
68.5
72.1
70.4
Muthana
83.6
64.8
74.1
5.6
3.4
4.5
34.1
60.0
41.2
78.2
77.4
77.8
Thi Qar
82.8
68.3
75.6
7.1
4.0
5.6
20.1
21.2
20.6
82.2
80.1
81.2
Missan
81.9
63.1
72.2
6.9
4.3
5.6
33.4
49.9
37.0
79.5
76.5
77.9
Basra
87.3
82.4
85.0
7.9
5.8
6.9
57.9
63.2
60.3
61.5
58.3
59.8
Kurdistan Region
90.3
79.8
85.1
6.2
3.9
5.0
34.1
37.6
35.5
49.0
49.2
49.1
Iraq
88.9
80.3
84.7
7.7
5.3
6.4
43.6
46.2
44.6
59.5
62.3
60.9
Definitions
Youth literacy rate: The number of literates aged 15-29 divided by
the total number of literates and illiterates aged 15-29.
Main sources of data
Columns 1 and 2: IKN-2011
Columns 3 and 4: IHSES 2012
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
149
Table 18
Governorate
Economic activity for youth
Economic activity for youth
Youth labor force
participation to total labor
force participation
youth employment (%)
Youth unemployment (%)
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Duhouk
51.6
12.4
31.5
78.7
107.6
83.7
57.1
6.8
32.2
10.7
26.6
13.9
66.8
7.3
38.2
90.0
75.0
90.6
52.4
2.9
28.0
10.2
29.3
12.0
Sulaymaniyah
57.0
16.9
38.0
80.8
85.5
83.7
59.7
9.2
35.3
12.3
46.6
19.5
Kirkuk
62.1
11.7
37.9
84.7
93.0
88.6
66.3
14.5
39.4
5.6
8.6
6.0
Erbil
56.0
14.7
34.9
80.8
84.4
81.4
56.4
10.9
34.5
6.7
33.2
12.4
Diyala
61.5
10.3
37.3
86.6
81.6
88.1
51.7
3.2
27.1
17.7
52.8
22.3
Anbar
66.6
18.9
43.6
88.6
92.8
90.8
60.6
3.7
33.5
31.2
25.3
29.9
Baghdad
64.2
12.0
38.4
87.0
73.7
86.0
51.9
5.9
29.3
12.0
45.3
17.1
Babel
64.9
15.4
40.9
88.1
83.9
89.4
63.7
16.4
40.5
13.2
24.0
15.2
Kerbala
69.4
7.8
39.0
91.9
71.9
90.3
58.7
1.1
31.7
9.3
57.9
14.0
Wasit
64.8
21.0
44.2
86.8
108.5
94.5
54.7
5.1
30.4
13.7
13.2
13.6
Salah al-Din
62.8
14.4
39.3
87.5
93.9
91.2
55.8
6.7
31.9
20.6
10.7
18.8
Najaf
68.0
16.4
43.7
89.4
85.7
91.6
65.6
5.3
36.5
11.0
31.6
14.6
Qadisiya
62.0
8.1
35.5
86.2
64.5
84.9
44.5
8.8
26.8
20.3
41.5
22.6
Muthana
71.7
5.9
38.5
94.6
82.6
94.8
57.1
3.8
29.3
19.8
31.8
20.8
Thi Qar
63.4
7.2
35.6
89.1
69.4
88.0
45.1
2.9
24.4
30.8
50.5
32.8
Missan
69.2
8.1
37.8
91.0
68.0
87.5
53.4
4.2
29.0
26.1
18.3
25.2
Basra
62.8
8.2
37.3
84.1
81.7
85.6
58.1
2.5
30.0
20.8
31.2
21.9
Kurdistan Region
55.3
15.0
35.3
80.2
88.0
82.6
57.9
9.2
34.3
10.1
37.6
15.9
Iraq
63.4
12.0
38.4
86.7
82.2
87.7
55.6
6.2
31.3
15.5
33.3
18.2
To be continued
Definitions
Youth labor force participation to total labor force participation
is youth Economic activity rate divided by the Economic activity
rate of age 15+. Some rates exceed 100 percent because youth
EAR is larger than total the Economic activity rate.
150
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Main sources of data
Column 3: IHSES 2012
Columns 1, 2 and 4: IKN-2011
Table 18
Governorate
Economic activity for youth
Youth unemployment to total
unemployment (%)
Average weekly wage young
workers to average weekly
wage of all workers (%)
Average number of weekly
working hours of young
workers
underemployed young
workers (%)
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Duhouk
140.4
161.9
154.4
89.3
83.2
88.3
42.9
35.7
41.6
18.5
2.1
15.5
165.3
186.8
164.6
79.5
80.0
78.5
44.1
36.4
43.6
18.6
4.5
17.5
Sulaymaniyah
139.4
124.4
130.1
82.1
85.9
82.8
46.3
35.9
44.9
30.7
6.3
26.5
Kirkuk
238.3
255.2
241.7
82.1
84.0
82.9
42.6
25.3
40.2
7.7
4.2
7.1
Erbil
165.2
170.0
171.0
91.6
71.0
87.4
52.4
52.1
52.3
15.6
6.3
13.9
Diyala
148.8
160.4
148.8
77.2
68.0
76.0
41.4
30.2
40.5
20.9
3.0
18.6
Anbar
165.5
167.1
165.8
75.5
77.7
75.2
41.7
23.8
37.8
14.0
1.3
11.4
Baghdad
190.7
181.9
176.2
81.5
72.3
80.4
45.0
37.7
44.3
16.3
2.2
14.5
Babel
153.7
181.2
159.2
79.7
85.2
78.6
39.3
26.5
37.2
22.1
3.2
18.8
Kerbala
152.3
169.6
146.6
86.1
65.6
84.1
42.1
36.4
41.9
25.7
3.4
24.1
Wasit
141.8
133.7
140.0
93.6
91.8
92.7
40.2
29.4
37.8
13.4
1.2
10.7
Salah al-Din
152.8
144.0
152.1
79.4
75.6
79.0
46.6
36.1
44.6
17.0
2.9
14.5
Najaf
153.7
135.1
140.7
86.8
66.7
85.7
45.0
31.7
43.2
13.5
3.5
11.8
Qadisiya
164.6
195.7
165.7
79.2
66.8
76.3
45.2
33.9
44.3
23.6
2.8
21.5
Muthana
138.7
197.5
143.5
90.4
83.3
90.0
43.6
33.0
42.9
6.5
7.0
6.5
Thi Qar
165.1
207.4
169.0
81.4
59.9
79.8
48.7
41.1
48.1
22.2
0.0
20.3
Missan
170.3
113.8
163.6
87.9
108.1
90.2
40.9
27.7
39.3
25.7
12.5
24.3
Basra
209.8
236.6
212.8
73.3
74.3
73.2
41.6
32.5
40.8
33.1
11.0
30.9
Kurdistan Region
144.7
135.4
142.4
87.2
80.1
85.7
47.4
40.7
46.4
22.8
5.2
19.6
Iraq
168.5
161.0
163.7
81.8
76.6
80.9
44.1
33.4
42.8
19.4
3.7
17.2
To be continued
Definitions
The proportion of youth unemployment rate to total unemployment rate is youth unemployment rate divided by total unemployment rate of age group 15+. Some rates exceed 100 percent
because youth unemployment rate is higher than the total unemployment rate.
Main sources of data
Columns 1-4: IKN-2011.
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
151
Table 18
Economic activity for youth
Workplace
underemployed youth by workplace (%)
Males
Females
Urban
Rural
Total
Factory, office, institution and plant
15.0
19.5
16.9
11.8
15.1
27.9
Work site and construction workshop
28.3
7.3
28.2
27.2
Kiosk
5.9
8.0
7.3
3.3
5.9
street Mobile places
41.3
20.7
43.0
36.7
40.8
Farm and agricultural land
6.5
17.5
0.8
17.9
6.7
Family house
0.7
23.1
1.2
1.1
1.2
A building adjacent to the family house
1.2
0.6
1.5
0.5
1.2
Another house
(The house of the client or the employer)
0.3
1.3
0.3
0.4
0.3
Others
0.9
2.0
0.8
1.0
0.9
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Total
continued
Main data sources
Column 1 IKN 2011
152
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Table 19
Living Conditions for Youth
Youth deprived from
food security (%)
Governorate
Duhouk
Poor youth
breadwinners
(%)
Dependency
rate
Overcrowded
families (%)
4.6
15.2
Males
Females
Total
24.1
24.7
24.4
1.7
Youth satisfied with their life
as a whole (%)
Males
Females
Total
88.6
91.1
89.8
18.9
19.8
19.3
26.3
4.4
21.6
67.3
72.8
70.2
Sulaymaniyah
9.7
10.2
9.9
0.0
3.6
8.7
88.7
90.0
89.3
Kirkuk
15.7
16.0
15.9
2.6
3.8
4.8
81.9
79.9
80.9
Erbil
11.0
10.4
10.7
3.0
3.9
15.3
80.4
83.2
81.8
Diyala
16.7
16.4
16.5
18.7
4.0
10.9
87.0
87.6
87.3
Anbar
11.1
11.6
11.3
13.6
3.8
11.0
73.6
70.5
72.1
Baghdad
15.4
14.3
14.8
7.1
3.7
13.6
69.9
70.3
70.1
Babel
13.5
14.8
14.1
10.6
4.0
18.3
82.5
87.9
85.2
Kerbala
12.0
11.5
11.7
28.8
4.1
17.1
75.9
79.5
77.8
Wasit
24.4
23.9
24.2
32.0
3.8
14.6
81.6
82.6
82.1
Salah al-Din
12.9
12.7
12.8
14.5
4.2
18.0
77.5
78.6
78.1
Najaf
18.1
18.0
18.0
7.2
3.7
20.2
86.2
88.3
87.3
Qadisiya
18.5
19.3
18.9
35.9
4.3
22.9
70.2
69.8
70.0
Muthana
12.5
13.3
12.9
40.1
4.5
22.3
79.5
77.9
78.6
Thi Qar
21.4
21.2
21.3
28.5
4.7
20.8
71.5
69.8
70.6
Missan
14.6
15.8
15.2
35.7
4.4
31.5
78.7
79.6
79.2
Basra
27.6
26.9
27.3
14.5
4.1
17.8
70.8
74.4
72.7
Kurdistan Region
13.8
14.0
13.9
1.0
3.9
12.2
85.8
87.9
86.8
Iraq
16.8
16.7
16.7
13.6
4.0
16.6
78.6
79.6
79.1
Definitions
Dependency rate: The population divided by the economically
active people aged 15+.
Main sources of data
Columns 1, 3, and 4: IKN-2011.
Column 2: IHSES 2007.
Column 5: IHSES 2012.
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
153
Table 20
Political Participation for Youth
Governorate
Youth aged 15-29 who are volunteers in
community activities. (%)
Youth aged (18-29)
who are engaged in political action
through signing a petition, participating
in demonstrations, etc. (%)
Youth aged (15-29) who do not know
what the main goal of their life is. (%)
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Duhouk
4.7
2.2
3.3
21.6
12.1
16.2
1.2
11.5
6.5
4.0
5.3
4.7
19.9
7.4
13.2
3.2
15.4
8.4
Sulaymaniyah
11.6
11.5
11.5
32.2
26.5
29.3
2.3
7.9
5.6
Kirkuk
5.4
7.5
6.5
31.0
17.8
24.3
0.9
2.5
1.7
Erbil
4.4
4.9
4.7
25.5
16.3
20.5
2.6
6.6
5.0
Diyala
10.4
10.7
10.5
13.2
15.1
14.3
2.8
4.2
3.4
Anbar
1.2
0.9
1.0
17.8
10.9
14.3
4.6
14.4
8.0
Baghdad
7.3
8.2
7.8
26.6
19.3
22.6
1.6
4.5
3.0
Babel
8.3
13.6
11.1
15.9
8.6
12.0
2.5
9.6
5.5
Kerbala
6.1
14.2
10.4
25.2
15.7
20.1
1.6
9.2
4.9
Wasit
3.7
8.9
6.6
24.7
26.3
25.6
5.6
11.9
8.3
Salah al-Din
4.2
4.1
4.1
10.5
8.4
9.4
3.3
9.4
6.1
Najaf
2.3
0.0
1.1
10.9
8.3
9.6
3.2
7.6
5.4
Qadisiya
22.4
20.6
21.5
29.8
18.1
23.8
1.6
6.1
3.8
Muthana
4.0
4.0
4.0
12.8
10.6
11.7
2.8
12.2
7.3
Thi Qar
12.7
8.2
10.3
23.7
5.1
13.8
1.0
7.4
3.9
Missan
2.4
2.0
2.2
13.1
8.6
10.7
5.6
23.4
14.0
Basra
2.8
2.4
2.6
9.3
6.0
7.8
1.1
8.4
4.5
Kurdistan Region
7.4
6.9
7.1
27.2
19.3
22.9
2.1
8.4
5.6
Total
6.5
6.9
6.7
21.1
14.6
17.7
2.4
8.4
5.3
Main sources of data
Columns 1-2: IKN-2011.
Column 3: National Youth and Adolescence Survey 2009.
154
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Table 21
Environmental sustainability of youth
Governorate
Youth who consider that preserving the environment is one of their duties as citizens (%).
Males
Females
Total
Duhouk
27.6
29.0
28.4
5.0
5.0
5.0
Sulaymaniyah
33.2
26.9
29.3
Kirkuk
15.4
18.6
17.1
Erbil
18.5
19.6
19.2
Diyala
21.3
18.9
20.4
Anbar
10.8
9.0
10.1
Baghdad
14.3
8.2
11.4
Babel
14.0
15.4
14.5
Kerbala
13.3
12.1
12.8
Wasit
7.9
12.7
10.0
Salah al-Din
9.5
11.0
10.2
Najaf
28.7
32.7
30.7
Qadisiya
23.1
28.1
25.6
Muthana
15.9
16.4
16.2
Thi Qar
17.8
12.5
15.4
Missan
16.3
16.0
16.1
Basra
12.3
16.5
14.2
Kurdistan Region
26.6
24.9
25.5
Iraq
15.3
15.4
15.3
Main sources of data
Column 1: National Youth and Adolescence Survey 2009.
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
155
Annex II
Youth Survey Tables
Table 1
Education
Governorate
Student
Dropout
Completed study
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
34.4
30.1
32.2
52.1
59.3
55.7
13.5
10.6
12.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
29.3
13.2
21.3
63.9
85.2
74.5
6.8
1.6
4.2
100.0
100.0
100.0
Sulaymaniyah
44.5
38.4
41.5
45.4
46.7
46.1
10.1
14.9
12.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kirkuk
41.5
27.8
35.5
49.6
63.9
55.8
8.9
8.4
8.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
Erbil
42.2
40.0
41.2
37.7
37.0
37.4
20.1
23.1
21.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
Diyala
38.8
19.5
31.2
49.7
69.4
57.4
11.5
11.2
11.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
Anbar
37.3
26.3
32.2
48.8
70.0
58.6
13.9
3.7
9.2
100.0
100.0
100.0
Baghdad
29.3
33.2
31.0
63.4
56.9
60.6
7.3
9.9
8.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
Babel
27.0
29.4
28.2
63.4
64.3
63.9
9.6
6.3
8.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kerbala
36.4
24.8
32.3
57.9
73.9
63.6
5.7
1.3
4.2
100.0
100.0
100.0
Duhouk
Wasit
37.4
20.5
29.7
54.2
78.0
64.9
8.4
1.5
5.3
100.0
100.0
100.0
Salah al-Din
43.2
25.5
35.8
46.8
69.8
56.4
10.0
4.7
7.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
Najaf
19.6
18.4
19.1
76.5
76.3
76.4
3.9
5.3
4.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
Qadisiya
42.2
33.6
37.5
55.4
59.9
57.9
2.4
6.5
4.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
Muthana
40.8
18.7
34.6
53.7
81.3
61.5
5.5
0.0
4.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Thi Qar
34.3
23.5
29.6
51.6
67.2
58.4
14.0
9.3
12.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Missan
25.0
22.4
24.1
57.5
70.2
61.9
17.6
7.4
14.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
Basra
30.1
22.9
27.0
61.7
72.7
66.5
8.2
4.4
6.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
Urban areas
34.8
32.6
33.8
54.6
57.3
55.8
10.6
10.1
10.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
Rural areas
31.4
14.2
23.5
62.0
83.4
71.8
6.6
2.4
4.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
15 - 19
61.6
48.6
55.4
38.0
51.0
44.2
0.4
0.4
0.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
20 - 24
25.6
19.4
23.0
65.0
70.2
67.2
9.4
10.3
9.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
25 - 29
6.3
2.4
4.6
71.1
80.9
75.4
22.6
16.7
20.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kurdistan Region
41.3
36.8
39.1
44.2
16.6
45.4
14.5
46.6
15.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
Iraq
33.9
27.1
30.9
56.6
65.0
60.4
9.5
7.8
8.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
Locality
Age group
156
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Table 2
Education
Governorate
Duhouk
Illiterate
Read only
Read and write
Elementary certificate
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
23.2
8.4
24.5
16.5
1.5
3.2
2.3
12.2
10.3
11.3
28.3
18.1
16.3
31.2
23.7
2.5
4.6
3.6
17.5
30.3
23.9
34.4
22.3
28.3
Sulaymaniyah
4.7
6.1
5.4
2.1
3.5
2.8
16.2
13.3
14.7
27.1
23.1
25.1
Kirkuk
10.2
12.6
11.2
0.4
9.9
4.6
13.8
15.7
14.6
37.4
24.1
31.6
Erbil
2.1
8.7
5.2
2.3
2.0
2.1
9.6
10.8
10.2
17.4
11.5
14.6
Diyala
9.4
11.4
10.2
0.9
3.6
2.0
10.1
13.6
11.5
33.8
32.4
33.2
Anbar
9.6
25.2
16.9
3.1
2.9
3.0
17.1
17.9
17.5
25.4
23.4
24.5
Baghdad
8.2
11.5
9.6
1.5
0.5
1.0
17.0
16.9
16.9
27.6
22.0
25.1
Babel
4.4
11.1
7.7
1.9
1.1
1.5
23.8
20.8
22.3
29.2
34.0
31.6
Kerbala
2.9
19.3
8.7
0.7
1.3
0.9
30.6
28.9
30.0
31.6
23.1
28.6
20.5
Wasit
12.6
30.8
20.8
3.5
7.5
5.3
24.6
22.9
23.8
25.6
14.2
Salah al-Din
3.6
14.4
8.1
1.8
1.7
1.7
11.2
11.9
11.5
36.0
47.4
40.7
Najaf
25.5
31.6
28.1
2.0
2.6
2.2
17.6
26.3
21.3
33.3
23.7
29.2
17.3
Qadisiya
21.3
26.6
24.2
1.6
2.0
1.8
8.3
19.5
14.4
28.0
8.3
Muthana
13.8
26.4
17.4
0.8
2.0
1.1
20.5
43.5
27.0
25.4
13.0
21.9
Thi Qar
5.3
11.2
7.9
1.4
0.6
1.1
12.0
19.5
15.3
23.6
31.1
26.8
Missan
9.3
22.6
13.9
2.1
3.8
2.7
14.7
11.7
13.6
26.3
24.0
25.5
Basra
13.4
16.7
14.9
1.2
0.6
0.9
19.6
23.5
21.3
25.1
26.5
25.7
Urban areas
8.4
12.4
10.2
1.7
2.4
2.0
15.9
16.3
16.0
27.7
23.3
25.8
Rural areas
12.4
29.3
20.2
1.7
3.0
2.3
18.5
26.5
22.2
30.7
24.3
27.7
15 - 19
7.9
14.7
11.1
1.3
2.3
1.8
14.3
18.9
16.5
33.2
23.8
28.7
20 - 24
10.7
17.8
13.7
2.5
2.0
2.3
17.2
18.5
17.7
25.4
22.6
24.2
25 - 29
10.2
21.3
15.0
1.1
3.6
2.2
19.1
20.9
19.9
26.3
24.5
25.5
Kurdistan Region
4.6
11.6
8.0
2.0
2.9
2.4
12.9
11.7
12.3
23.9
17.9
21.0
Iraq
9.5
17.4
13.0
1.7
2.5
2.1
16.6
19.3
17.8
28.5
23.6
26.3
Locality
Age group
To be continued
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
157
Table 2
Education
Governorate
Intermediate
High school
Diploma (Institute) or higher
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Duhouk
29.9
24.5
27.2
8.4
9.3
8.8
11.4
10.1
10.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
15.1
9.1
12.1
8.4
0.8
4.6
5.9
1.6
3.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
Sulaymaniyah
28.4
27.4
27.9
10.5
11.1
10.8
11.1
15.5
13.2
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kirkuk
18.3
23.0
20.4
11.0
6.3
8.9
8.9
8.4
8.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
Erbil
25.6
17.2
21.6
20.0
23.9
21.8
23.0
26.0
24.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
Diyala
24.1
25.5
24.7
10.1
2.2
7.0
11.5
11.2
11.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
Anbar
17.9
19.2
18.5
16.2
8.5
12.6
10.7
2.9
7.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
Baghdad
26.5
25.6
26.1
11.3
13.3
12.2
8.0
10.4
9.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
Babel
19.1
15.8
17.5
12.1
6.1
9.2
9.4
11.1
10.2
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kerbala
20.6
18.3
19.8
7.9
5.2
6.9
5.7
3.9
5.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
Wasit
22.3
16.6
19.7
1.7
5.0
3.2
9.7
3.0
6.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
Salah al-Din
28.9
9.8
21.0
7.6
9.3
8.3
10.9
5.5
8.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
Najaf
13.7
5.3
10.1
3.9
5.3
4.5
3.9
5.3
4.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
Qadisiya
30.1
27.8
28.9
7.5
9.3
8.5
3.2
6.5
5.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Muthana
25.9
13.0
22.3
8.0
2.0
6.3
5.5
0.0
4.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Thi Qar
29.8
21.1
26.0
13.8
9.9
12.1
14.2
6.7
10.9
100.0
100.0
100.0
Missan
23.7
18.7
22.0
7.5
13.4
9.5
16.4
5.8
12.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
Basra
24.3
22.7
23.6
7.9
5.7
7.0
8.4
4.4
6.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
Urban areas
24.7
24.1
24.4
11.1
10.8
11.0
10.6
10.7
10.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
Rural areas
21.5
10.2
16.3
7.9
4.2
6.2
7.2
2.7
5.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
15 - 19
36.0
32.7
34.4
6.9
6.9
6.9
0.4
0.7
0.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
20 - 24
19.0
13.0
16.5
15.8
14.2
15.1
9.3
11.9
10.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
25 - 29
13.1
8.7
11.2
7.0
4.9
6.0
23.2
16.2
20.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kurdistan Region
27.7
23.2
25.5
13.4
15.0
14.2
15.4
17.7
16.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
Iraq
23.8
20.0
22.1
10.2
8.8
9.6
9.7
8.3
9.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
Locality
Age group
Continued
158
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Table 3
Governorate
Duhouk
Education
Capabilities and skills of teachers
Provision of technology in schools
(computers, etc.)
Education meets the needs of the country
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
58.4
49.2
53.8
5.0
8.2
6.6
0.6
0.0
0.3
59.2
51.5
55.4
10.9
13.3
12.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
Sulaymaniyah
74.9
74.4
74.7
4.9
8.9
6.9
3.8
4.5
4.1
Kirkuk
37.0
38.2
37.5
33.7
17.8
26.8
2.4
3.1
2.7
Erbil
55.3
58.5
56.8
4.1
1.5
2.9
2.7
0.9
1.8
Diyala
68.0
57.0
63.7
11.5
5.1
9.0
4.2
2.9
3.7
Anbar
50.4
49.7
50.1
14.0
9.8
12.0
0.9
6.0
3.3
Baghdad
45.3
31.9
39.5
13.3
19.6
16.1
1.5
6.3
3.6
Babel
34.4
48.9
41.5
21.9
18.1
20.0
5.5
5.0
5.2
Kerbala
47.4
42.7
45.7
18.0
15.3
17.0
7.2
12.7
9.2
Wasit
61.1
51.7
56.9
17.5
14.4
16.1
3.3
8.2
5.5
Salah al-Din
61.6
58.5
60.3
8.2
9.3
8.7
5.4
3.4
4.6
Najaf
47.1
44.7
46.1
15.7
21.1
18.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Qadisiya
71.4
71.4
71.4
9.1
4.9
6.8
0.0
1.3
0.7
Muthana
61.6
60.5
61.3
13.3
8.4
11.9
0.8
6.7
2.5
Thi Qar
39.4
34.4
37.3
6.1
5.5
5.8
3.7
4.8
4.2
Missan
80.0
76.3
78.7
2.9
0.5
2.1
9.1
9.9
9.4
Basra
45.2
46.4
45.7
24.8
26.8
25.7
2.4
2.1
2.3
Urban areas
51.9
47.5
50.0
13.6
14.6
14.1
2.6
3.6
3.0
Rural areas
55.3
51.1
53.4
12.8
11.2
12.1
3.6
5.8
4.6
15 - 19
51.5
48.7
50.2
12.8
12.4
12.6
2.8
4.3
3.5
20 - 24
51.5
45.6
49.0
14.5
15.4
14.9
3.1
4.1
3.5
25 - 29
56.7
52.2
54.7
12.7
13.2
12.9
2.7
4.4
3.5
Kurdistan Region
64.0
62.7
63.4
4.6
6.2
5.4
2.6
2.1
2.4
Iraq
52.9
48.6
50.9
13.4
13.6
13.5
2.9
4.3
3.5
Locality
Age group
To be continued
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
159
Table 3
Education
Schools infrastructure (furniture, facilities,
classrooms, building, etc.)
Governorate
Duhouk
Family’s participation in education
Stimulating teaching methods
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
9.8
11.6
10.7
4.9
5.8
5.3
2.2
3.6
2.9
10.0
13.6
11.8
5.9
4.2
5.1
2.2
5.2
3.7
Sulaymaniyah
8.4
2.5
5.5
1.3
4.1
2.7
0.6
0.0
0.3
Kirkuk
8.1
7.3
7.8
2.0
8.4
4.8
2.0
2.6
2.3
Erbil
1.1
1.3
1.2
4.6
6.4
5.4
5.3
3.8
4.6
Diyala
3.3
13.6
7.3
0.9
3.6
2.0
1.4
3.6
2.3
Anbar
10.3
9.3
9.8
7.1
7.7
7.4
5.9
6.6
6.2
Baghdad
7.3
6.2
6.8
8.8
10.9
9.7
5.5
9.0
7.0
Babel
10.6
10.9
10.8
5.6
3.6
4.6
3.8
0.0
1.9
Kerbala
9.4
14.0
11.0
1.2
3.5
2.0
4.3
3.9
4.2
Wasit
4.9
6.6
5.7
3.0
2.9
3.0
1.0
0.8
0.9
Salah al-Din
6.3
7.6
6.8
4.6
5.1
4.8
2.4
2.5
2.5
Najaf
15.7
5.3
11.2
7.8
5.3
6.7
3.9
2.6
3.4
Qadisiya
4.8
7.6
6.3
0.8
6.9
4.1
4.3
2.9
3.5
Muthana
9.1
8.0
8.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Thi Qar
9.0
5.5
7.5
19.7
27.9
23.3
3.7
4.8
4.2
Missan
2.1
7.2
3.8
1.0
4.6
2.2
3.5
0.0
2.3
Basra
3.0
5.6
4.1
4.3
7.0
5.5
5.7
3.1
4.5
Urban areas
7.0
6.9
6.9
5.7
7.4
6.5
4.0
5.3
4.6
Rural areas
8.1
9.9
8.9
5.7
8.1
6.8
2.9
1.9
2.5
15 - 19
7.3
7.0
7.2
6.2
7.0
6.6
4.9
4.8
4.8
20 - 24
7.7
8.5
8.0
5.5
9.7
7.2
3.2
3.1
3.2
25 - 29
6.8
8.0
7.3
5.4
5.9
5.6
2.7
5.0
3.7
Kurdistan Region
6.1
4.4
5.3
3.3
5.3
4.3
2.7
2.2
2.4
Iraq
7.3
7.8
7.5
5.7
7.6
6.6
3.7
4.3
4.0
Locality
Age group
To be continued
160
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Table 3
Education
Governorate
Duhouk
Less students
System /creative teaching staff
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
7.9
12.6
10.2
1.4
0.3
0.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
7.6
6.3
6.9
0.8
2.1
1.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
Sulaymaniyah
1.7
3.3
2.5
2.0
0.6
1.3
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kirkuk
3.3
13.1
7.6
0.0
0.5
0.2
100.0
100.0
100.0
Erbil
10.2
14.0
12.0
11.8
10.2
11.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Diyala
7.0
11.9
8.9
1.4
0.7
1.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
Anbar
4.2
2.7
3.6
0.9
0.7
0.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
Baghdad
8.4
8.1
8.3
2.6
1.9
2.3
100.0
100.0
100.0
Babel
13.5
9.7
11.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kerbala
6.7
4.4
5.9
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Wasit
3.8
3.4
3.6
1.4
0.4
0.9
100.0
100.0
100.0
Salah al-Din
6.6
8.9
7.6
1.2
0.4
0.9
100.0
100.0
100.0
Najaf
2.0
0.0
1.1
2.0
2.6
2.2
100.0
100.0
100.0
Qadisiya
5.6
2.0
3.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Muthana
8.0
14.1
9.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Thi Qar
2.8
1.2
2.1
10.0
6.5
8.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
Missan
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Basra
4.3
3.4
3.9
0.0
0.3
0.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
Urban areas
6.6
7.0
6.8
2.2
2.1
2.2
100.0
100.0
100.0
Rural areas
5.5
6.1
5.8
2.2
0.9
1.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
15 - 19
8.0
8.2
8.1
1.7
1.7
1.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
20 - 24
5.6
5.2
5.4
3.2
2.0
2.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
25 - 29
5.0
6.3
5.6
1.4
1.7
1.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kurdistan Region
6.2
9.3
7.7
5.4
3.8
4.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
Iraq
6.3
6.7
6.5
2.2
1.8
2.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Locality
Age group
Continued
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
161
Table 4
Physical Health and Safety
Governorate
Weight gain or loss
A drug-addicted friend or relative
Awareness of HIV (AIDS)
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Duhouk
33.7
35.3
34.5
0.0
0.5
0.3
76.0
55.7
65.8
20.6
14.1
17.3
0.8
0.0
0.4
63.3
34.6
48.9
Sulaymaniyah
13.9
21.0
17.4
2.5
0.0
1.3
59.1
40.3
49.9
Kirkuk
22.4
26.2
24.0
2.4
0.0
1.4
38.2
44.0
40.7
Erbil
12.7
17.3
14.8
0.4
0.0
0.2
37.0
39.1
38.0
Diyala
11.2
21.4
15.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
68.7
61.3
65.8
Anbar
20.8
19.2
20.1
4.3
0.0
2.3
65.3
44.8
55.8
Baghdad
15.0
16.6
15.7
11.7
9.0
10.5
72.8
65.7
69.7
Babel
19.0
20.4
19.7
2.9
3.0
3.0
53.0
47.7
50.4
Kerbala
17.7
10.4
15.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
58.9
41.0
52.6
Wasit
29.8
30.5
30.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
36.9
26.7
32.3
Salah al-Din
21.8
23.0
22.3
0.9
0.9
0.9
43.9
30.2
38.2
Najaf
33.3
50.0
40.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
47.1
44.7
46.1
Qadisiya
39.7
54.2
47.6
5.1
0.0
2.3
46.4
48.6
47.6
Muthana
51.7
53.2
52.1
0.9
2.4
1.3
49.8
59.6
52.5
Thi Qar
8.7
25.4
16.0
0.0
0.6
0.3
54.3
31.6
44.4
Missan
31.6
6.9
23.1
0.8
0.0
0.6
42.4
42.5
42.4
Basra
17.7
21.4
19.3
4.6
0.0
2.5
33.3
22.9
28.7
Urban areas
21.4
23.0
22.1
4.8
3.0
4.0
57.4
50.3
54.3
Rural areas
16.9
21.3
18.9
1.4
0.2
0.9
53.0
33.2
43.9
19.5
21.0
20.2
3.9
1.5
2.8
48.2
42.4
45.5
Locality
Age group
15 - 19
20 - 24
18.3
22.3
20.0
3.8
3.1
3.5
59.6
48.4
54.8
25 - 29
23.7
25.1
24.3
3.9
2.1
3.1
62.7
45.9
55.3
Kurdistan
Region
18.1
23.3
20.7
1.1
0.1
0.6
55.1
43.8
49.6
Iraq
20.1
22.5
21.2
3.8
2.2
3.1
56.2
45.3
51.3
To be continued
162
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Table 4
Health and Physical Safety
Governorate
Average time to get to a public hospital or
the nearest health center (minutes)
Smoking
Males
Females
Total
Duhouk
46.9
2.2
24.4
22.9
3.4
13.1
13.7
Sulaymaniyah
27.1
1.0
14.3
17.6
Kirkuk
7.3
0.0
4.1
10.8
12.3
Erbil
25.6
1.7
14.4
18.0
Diyala
25.5
0.7
15.9
15.6
Anbar
28.9
1.7
16.2
12.8
Baghdad
30.3
0.5
17.3
22.4
Babel
30.9
1.1
16.4
19.0
Kerbala
13.9
0.0
9.0
17.7
Wasit
23.0
0.0
12.6
15.5
Salah al-Din
21.2
0.4
12.6
18.5
Najaf
23.5
0.0
13.5
14.4
Qadisiya
28.3
2.0
14.0
14.0
Muthana
29.0
0.0
20.7
18.0
Thi Qar
20.3
0.0
11.5
18.9
Missan
28.7
1.6
19.4
15.1
Basra
27.4
2.3
16.3
11.2
Urban areas
26.6
1.2
15.4
15.0
Rural areas
24.7
1.1
13.9
21.3
11.7
0.6
6.4
16.9
Locality
Age group
15 - 19
20 - 24
30.7
1.3
18.2
16.8
25 - 29
40.0
2.1
23.4
16.8
Kurdistan
Region
31.2
1.5
16.8
16.6
Iraq
26.1
1.2
15.0
16.8
Continued
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
163
Table 5
Employment
Youth by employment status (%)
Level of
disaggregation
Governorate
Employed
Employed and wants to
change jobs
Unemployed, a full-time
student, etc.
Frustrated unemployed
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Duhouk
53.5
9.4
31.3
5.2
1.4
3.3
31.6
75.6
53.7
1.8
7.0
4.4
39.8
2.5
21.2
18.7
0.0
9.3
22.2
87.8
55.1
6.3
7.1
6.7
Sulaymaniyah
45.8
12.1
29.3
10.2
2.1
6.2
27.9
43.7
35.6
3.0
9.2
6.0
Kirkuk
25.2
9.4
18.3
36.6
7.8
24.0
34.6
80.6
54.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
Erbil
39.7
17.4
29.2
7.1
0.4
4.0
26.1
45.2
35.1
7.0
11.2
9.0
Diyala
34.9
4.6
23.1
9.5
2.2
6.6
43.8
83.7
59.4
0.9
2.2
1.4
Anbar
35.2
3.0
20.3
15.0
0.4
8.3
32.1
87.8
57.9
2.2
0.0
1.2
Baghdad
34.3
6.6
22.2
19.1
0.5
11.0
27.1
82.4
51.2
1.9
0.9
1.5
Babel
52.8
5.4
29.7
13.3
5.4
9.4
21.4
76.7
48.4
0.9
0.0
0.4
Kerbala
30.9
0.0
20.0
28.4
3.5
19.6
31.8
95.2
54.3
1.9
1.3
1.7
Wasit
25.8
1.3
14.7
16.7
0.8
9.5
35.9
75.7
53.8
3.0
17.8
9.7
Salah al-Din
31.7
3.0
19.7
19.0
1.7
11.8
32.9
84.6
54.4
3.0
4.3
3.6
Najaf
27.5
0.0
15.7
31.4
0.0
18.0
19.6
78.9
44.9
0.0
2.6
1.1
Qadisiya
35.2
2.0
17.1
21.8
6.5
13.5
38.2
73.0
57.1
1.6
12.0
7.3
Muthana
27.2
6.0
21.2
28.9
0.0
20.8
38.4
94.0
54.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
Thi Qar
20.9
3.9
13.5
7.0
1.2
4.5
35.0
66.2
48.5
3.9
6.5
5.0
Missan
32.6
6.5
23.6
16.9
0.0
11.1
18.5
59.3
32.6
1.1
2.1
1.4
Basra
22.0
2.1
13.2
19.8
0.0
11.0
30.3
93.0
58.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Urban areas
33.6
6.0
21.4
16.7
1.2
9.8
30.0
75.7
50.2
2.1
4.8
3.3
Rural areas
35.6
4.5
21.3
20.3
2.6
12.1
27.9
81.8
52.6
2.9
3.2
3.0
13.6
1.4
7.9
11.2
1.1
6.4
55.8
87.6
70.8
2.7
2.7
2.7
Locality
Age group
15 - 19
20 - 24
36.7
4.6
23.1
20.6
2.2
12.8
21.1
75.2
44.0
2.5
4.4
3.3
25 - 29
59.5
13.7
39.4
22.8
1.5
13.5
3.7
64.2
30.2
1.5
6.8
3.9
Kurdistan Region
45.4
13.2
29.8
7.9
1.4
4.7
28.1
52.2
39.8
4.2
9.3
6.7
Iraq
34.2
5.6
21.4
17.7
1.6
10.5
29.4
77.5
50.9
2.3
4.3
3.2
To be continued
164
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Table 5
Employment
Youth by employment status (%)
Level of
disaggregation
Governorate
Duhouk
Studying and seeking for work
Males
Females
Total
Unemployed seeking for work
Males
Females
Total
Total
Males
Females
Total
1.4
1.1
1.2
6.5
5.6
6.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
1.4
0.0
0.7
11.5
2.5
7.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Sulaymaniyah
8.5
6.7
7.6
4.7
26.2
15.2
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kirkuk
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.7
2.1
3.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Erbil
11.4
10.5
11.0
8.6
15.2
11.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
Diyala
3.9
1.5
2.9
7.0
5.8
6.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
Anbar
5.2
0.0
2.8
10.2
8.8
9.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
Baghdad
0.8
1.4
1.0
17.0
8.2
13.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
Babel
0.0
2.2
1.1
11.6
10.4
11.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kerbala
2.9
0.0
1.9
4.1
0.0
2.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
Wasit
3.5
0.0
1.9
15.1
4.5
10.3
100.0
100.0
100.0
Salah al-Din
3.3
0.9
2.3
10.0
5.6
8.2
100.0
100.0
100.0
Najaf
0.0
2.6
1.1
21.6
15.8
19.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
Qadisiya
1.6
0.0
0.7
1.6
6.5
4.2
100.0
100.0
100.0
Muthana
0.9
0.0
0.7
4.5
0.0
3.2
100.0
100.0
100.0
Thi Qar
6.4
0.0
3.6
26.7
22.3
24.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
Missan
2.4
0.0
1.6
28.5
32.2
29.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
Basra
5.3
0.3
3.1
22.7
4.7
14.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
Urban areas
2.6
1.8
2.2
15.0
10.5
13.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Rural areas
4.3
1.2
2.9
9.1
6.8
8.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
5.0
2.2
3.7
11.7
5.0
8.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
Locality
Age group
15 - 19
20 - 24
2.8
1.6
2.3
16.2
12.1
14.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
25 - 29
0.7
0.8
0.7
11.8
13.0
12.3
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kurdistan Region
7.9
6.6
7.2
6.5
17.3
11.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
Iraq
3.1
1.6
2.4
13.4
9.4
11.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
Continued
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
165
Table 6
Employment
Youth by the economic sector of institution they work or wish to work in (%)
Level of
disaggregation
Governorate
Public sector
Private Sector
Other sectors
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Duhouk
52.5
92.2
58.7
45.0
4.9
38.8
2.5
2.9
2.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
29.5
0.0
28.3
65.2
..
66.7
5.3
0.0
5.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
Sulaymaniyah
54.1
60.3
55.3
42.9
37.0
41.7
3.0
2.7
3.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kirkuk
19.7
36.4
22.7
80.3
63.6
77.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Erbil
58.7
81.0
64.4
34.0
19.0
30.2
7.3
0.0
5.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
Diyala
27.0
89.3
32.6
73.0
10.7
67.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Anbar
40.9
51.8
41.5
56.9
36.2
55.8
2.1
12.1
2.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
Baghdad
37.2
53.3
38.7
62.1
46.7
60.7
0.7
0.0
0.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
Babel
60.7
66.7
61.5
38.0
25.0
36.2
1.3
8.3
2.2
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kerbala
44.5
37.3
44.3
55.5
62.7
55.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Wasit
43.6
40.0
43.5
56.4
60.0
56.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Salah al-Din
57.3
54.8
57.1
40.9
45.2
41.2
1.8
0.0
1.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
Najaf
40.0
0.0
40.0
60.0
0.0
60.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Qadisiya
48.2
15.9
43.3
51.8
84.1
56.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Muthana
42.6
0.0
40.9
56.0
..
57.8
1.4
0.0
1.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
Thi Qar
51.4
59.8
52.4
44.7
28.2
42.7
3.9
12.0
4.9
100.0
100.0
100.0
Missan
60.1
..
62.6
39.9
0.0
37.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Basra
60.0
..
61.5
34.2
0.0
32.9
5.8
0.0
5.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
Urban areas
46.0
65.6
48.0
52.2
33.8
50.3
1.8
0.6
1.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
Rural areas
38.8
40.3
38.9
58.6
54.5
58.2
2.6
5.2
2.9
100.0
100.0
100.0
Locality
Age group
15 - 19
27.6
37.6
28.4
70.9
57.5
69.7
1.6
5.0
1.9
100.0
100.0
100.0
20 - 24
37.0
52.2
38.2
60.9
46.7
59.7
2.1
1.1
2.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
25 - 29
57.4
67.4
58.6
40.5
30.9
39.3
2.1
1.7
2.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kurdistan Region
55.1
74.8
59.2
40.6
23.6
37.1
4.2
1.6
3.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
Iraq
43.8
58.2
45.2
54.2
39.8
52.7
2.0
2.0
2.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
166
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Table 7
Employment
Youth by how they have got their current job (%)
Level of
disaggregation
Governorate
Relations with politicians
Personal or family Relations
Work expertise
Technical or professional
training
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Duhouk
5.7
0.0
4.8
56.0
17.6
50.0
18.3
9.8
17.0
4.5
7.8
5.0
1.4
0.0
1.3
58.8
17.8
57.1
18.7
64.4
20.6
5.1
0.0
4.9
Sulaymaniyah
11.4
14.7
12.1
40.2
42.7
40.7
26.6
6.6
22.6
2.7
4.0
3.0
Kirkuk
0.0
0.0
0.0
86.8
63.6
82.7
9.2
0.0
7.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
Erbil
10.7
2.4
8.6
50.3
19.0
42.4
16.2
14.3
15.7
2.4
2.4
2.4
Diyala
0.0
0.0
0.0
54.0
21.4
51.1
23.2
0.0
21.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
Anbar
0.7
0.0
0.7
52.3
36.2
51.4
17.7
19.9
17.8
1.2
0.0
1.1
Baghdad
3.4
0.0
3.1
60.1
53.3
59.5
13.9
6.7
13.2
7.5
6.7
7.4
Babel
1.6
0.0
1.3
38.2
25.0
36.5
19.6
8.3
18.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
Kerbala
0.0
0.0
0.0
58.8
62.7
58.9
19.8
0.0
19.2
2.4
0.0
2.3
Wasit
2.9
0.0
2.8
32.3
0.0
31.0
29.0
20.0
28.6
4.6
0.0
4.4
Salah al-Din
5.3
0.0
5.0
28.0
45.2
29.1
32.1
18.0
31.2
7.2
0.0
6.7
Najaf
3.3
0.0
3.3
56.7
0.0
56.7
20.0
0.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
10.0
Qadisiya
0.0
0.0
0.0
53.2
68.2
55.5
26.6
15.9
25.0
2.8
0.0
2.4
Muthana
1.6
0.0
1.6
60.7
0.0
58.2
23.9
..
27.0
7.5
0.0
7.2
Thi Qar
1.7
9.7
2.8
52.0
9.7
45.7
25.7
0.0
22.0
1.7
0.0
1.4
Missan
1.7
0.0
1.6
38.9
25.0
38.0
26.1
0.0
24.4
15.9
50.0
18.1
Basra
0.5
0.0
0.5
61.2
0.0
59.0
9.0
0.0
8.6
1.9
0.0
1.9
Urban areas
3.4
3.2
3.4
53.5
35.2
51.6
17.3
10.2
16.6
5.6
4.9
5.5
Rural areas
2.0
1.1
2.0
55.9
40.9
54.4
22.4
12.4
21.4
2.3
0.6
2.1
1.2
0.0
1.1
69.9
48.7
68.0
14.2
14.0
14.2
2.1
0.0
1.9
Locality
Age group
15 - 19
20 - 24
2.1
5.7
2.4
55.0
44.0
54.1
22.7
7.8
21.5
3.4
1.9
3.3
25 - 29
4.6
1.6
4.2
46.8
29.4
44.6
17.1
11.8
16.4
6.8
5.7
6.7
Kurdistan Region
9.7
7.0
9.1
47.5
28.4
43.5
21.1
10.4
18.9
3.1
4.0
3.3
Iraq
3.0
2.6
2.9
54.2
36.8
52.5
18.9
10.9
18.0
4.6
3.7
4.5
To be continued
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
167
Table 7
Employment
Youth by how they have got their current job (%)
Level of
disaggregation
Educational attainment
Other
Governorate
Males
Females
Total
Duhouk
10.7
47.1
16.3
4.8
17.6
6.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
7.2
0.0
6.9
8.7
17.8
9.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
9.1
25.4
12.3
10.1
6.6
9.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
Sulaymaniyah
Males
Females
Total
Total
Males
Females
Total
Kirkuk
3.9
36.4
9.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Erbil
14.7
57.1
25.5
5.7
4.8
5.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
Diyala
14.4
78.6
20.2
8.4
0.0
7.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
Anbar
4.9
31.9
6.4
23.2
12.1
22.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
Baghdad
2.1
33.3
5.0
13.0
0.0
11.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
Babel
5.7
0.0
4.9
34.9
66.7
39.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kerbala
1.2
0.0
1.2
17.8
37.3
18.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
Wasit
12.9
0.0
12.4
18.4
80.0
20.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
Salah al-Din
4.2
18.4
5.1
23.2
18.4
22.9
100.0
100.0
100.0
Najaf
0.0
0.0
0.0
10.0
0.0
10.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Qadisiya
1.4
7.9
2.4
15.9
7.9
14.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
Muthana
4.9
0.0
4.7
1.4
0.0
1.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
Thi Qar
11.7
29.0
14.2
7.3
51.7
13.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
Missan
10.3
25.0
11.2
7.1
0.0
6.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
Basra
7.4
..
10.9
19.9
0.0
19.2
100.0
100.0
100.0
Locality
Urban areas
6.5
40.4
10.0
13.7
6.0
12.9
100.0
100.0
100.0
Rural areas
5.0
12.0
5.7
12.4
33.0
14.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
Age group
15 - 19
0.3
0.0
0.3
12.2
37.4
14.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
20 - 24
2.6
24.5
4.4
14.2
16.0
14.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
25 - 29
11.9
45.5
16.1
12.9
6.1
12.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kurdistan Region
11.3
42.4
17.7
7.3
7.9
7.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
Iraq
6.1
32.1
8.7
13.3
13.9
13.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
Continued
168
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Table 8
Employment
Youth who believe information on job opportunities is available/believe job opportunities are available/
registered in the MoLSA employment offices in order to find or change job
Level of
disaggregation
Governorate
Duhouk
Information on job opportunities is
available
Males
Females
Total
Job opportunities are available
Males
Females
Total
Registered in the MoLSA employment
offices
Males
Females
Total
30.9
21.2
27.4
14.6
7.1
11.9
39.1
14.1
29.9
36.7
32.2
36.3
29.0
50.0
30.6
16.1
32.2
17.4
Sulaymaniyah
48.8
40.5
44.2
26.9
18.2
22.0
19.3
23.1
21.5
Kirkuk
56.6
52.7
55.9
28.3
47.4
31.4
12.1
21.1
13.6
59.0
Erbil
74.0
81.8
77.6
22.7
16.6
19.8
53.6
65.2
Diyala
9.4
23.1
12.6
16.4
30.8
19.7
4.7
0.0
3.6
Anbar
31.1
9.7
26.9
34.0
14.6
30.2
6.7
0.0
5.4
Baghdad
48.1
54.9
49.2
27.2
54.9
31.9
5.0
14.7
6.6
Babel
26.7
40.4
32.1
19.9
28.7
23.3
19.9
0.0
12.1
Kerbala
17.6
37.3
18.7
51.1
..
53.6
2.0
0.0
1.9
Wasit
61.2
8.6
55.5
34.8
39.7
35.4
45.6
0.0
40.6
Salah al-Din
34.0
23.6
32.6
51.8
35.0
49.5
12.5
0.0
10.8
Najaf
11.1
57.1
20.6
18.5
57.1
26.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
Qadisiya
37.2
94.8
59.1
46.8
0.0
29.0
43.6
44.8
44.0
Muthana
69.7
0.0
69.7
58.7
0.0
58.7
25.6
0.0
25.6
Thi Qar
27.8
28.4
28.0
39.4
33.6
37.6
17.9
5.2
14.0
Missan
22.9
12.4
20.1
13.3
8.0
11.9
15.3
1.5
11.7
Basra
31.1
66.1
33.6
50.6
66.1
51.8
16.7
0.0
15.5
Urban areas
38.5
48.4
40.8
32.9
31.6
32.6
13.8
18.5
14.9
Rural areas
39.1
38.2
38.9
31.8
31.0
31.7
18.2
16.7
17.9
36.4
37.4
36.6
26.5
26.5
26.5
9.7
16.4
11.0
Locality
Age group
15 - 19
20 - 24
40.1
49.8
42.2
36.7
31.9
35.6
15.3
17.6
15.9
25 - 29
39.1
47.3
41.2
32.9
34.8
33.4
20.5
20.0
20.4
Kurdistan Region
57.5
54.9
56.2
23.3
16.7
20.0
37.4
38.4
37.9
Iraq
38.7
45.8
40.3
32.6
31.4
32.3
15.0
18.1
15.7
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
169
Table 9
Relationship with Parents
Youth by views on who makes important decisions in the family (%)
Level of disaggregation
Governorate
Father
Mother
Father and Mother
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Dahuk
45.1
31.2
38.1
2.4
2.9
2.7
12.2
13.7
13.0
43.1
36.4
39.8
3.6
7.7
5.7
18.1
16.8
17.5
Sulaymaniyah
34.2
33.8
34.0
9.2
4.7
7.0
12.0
13.5
12.8
Kirkuk
63.4
44.5
55.1
4.1
1.6
3.0
4.9
12.6
8.2
14.4
Arbil
43.1
35.4
39.5
9.3
7.6
8.5
14.3
14.5
Diyala
48.5
25.5
39.5
10.3
7.5
9.2
5.1
7.3
6.0
Anbar
26.5
25.4
26.0
4.0
1.1
2.7
21.9
29.1
25.2
Baghdad
50.9
46.5
49.0
7.7
8.0
7.8
11.0
13.7
12.2
Babel
27.5
20.4
24.1
11.5
5.9
8.8
4.3
14.7
9.4
Kerbala
57.5
47.1
53.8
0.0
3.5
1.2
6.5
15.7
9.7
Wasit
59.1
46.7
53.5
4.7
7.4
5.9
5.1
8.1
6.5
Salah al-Din
38.4
32.9
36.1
6.2
7.8
6.8
20.5
23.7
21.9
Najaf
39.2
31.6
36.0
7.8
21.1
13.5
19.6
21.1
20.2
Qadisiya
41.6
43.3
42.5
2.4
2.7
2.6
20.0
13.9
16.7
Muthana
47.3
55.9
49.7
10.6
0.0
7.6
17.3
8.7
14.9
Dhi Qar
49.0
40.5
45.3
2.5
9.8
5.7
12.6
19.4
15.6
Maysan
48.0
48.4
48.1
2.9
4.9
3.6
9.1
6.3
8.1
Basra
29.1
27.1
28.2
6.9
0.3
4.0
25.8
29.6
27.5
Urban areas
39.6
33.8
37.0
6.4
5.9
6.2
15.2
17.7
16.3
Rural areas
56.4
45.7
51.5
5.9
6.6
6.2
8.8
13.1
10.8
Locality
Age group
15 - 19
50.0
45.3
47.8
4.6
5.1
4.9
16.5
21.7
18.9
20 - 24
44.5
36.2
41.0
6.7
6.3
6.5
11.9
14.6
13.0
25 - 29
36.1
25.7
31.5
8.0
7.6
7.8
11.1
9.8
10.6
Kurdistan Region
40.0
33.7
36.9
7.7
5.2
6.5
12.9
13.9
13.4
Iraq
44.3
37.3
41.2
6.3
6.1
6.2
13.4
16.3
14.7
To be continued
170
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Table 9
Relationship with Parents
Youth by views on who makes important decisions in the family (%)
Level of disaggregation
Governorate
Family members
Relatives or undefined
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Duhouk
40.2
48.1
44.2
0.0
4.0
2.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
35.2
34.9
35.0
0.0
4.2
2.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
Sulaymaniyah
44.6
46.6
45.6
0.0
1.4
0.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kirkuk
27.6
41.4
33.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Erbil
32.5
42.4
37.2
0.8
0.0
0.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
Diyala
35.7
54.3
42.9
0.5
5.4
2.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
Anbar
46.2
40.4
43.5
1.4
4.0
2.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
Baghdad
29.6
26.5
28.3
0.7
5.3
2.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
Babel
53.7
49.8
51.8
3.1
9.1
6.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kerbala
33.9
26.6
31.3
2.2
7.0
3.9
100.0
100.0
100.0
Wasit
30.8
37.0
33.6
0.3
0.8
0.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
Salah al-Din
34.3
35.2
34.7
0.6
0.4
0.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
Najaf
33.3
23.7
29.2
0.0
2.6
1.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
Qadisiya
33.6
31.7
32.5
2.4
8.5
5.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
Muthana
23.8
35.5
27.1
0.9
0.0
0.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
Thi Qar
35.4
29.1
32.7
0.5
1.2
0.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
Missan
38.3
39.5
38.7
1.7
0.9
1.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
Basra
38.2
41.7
39.7
0.0
1.3
0.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
Locality
Urban areas
38.0
39.2
38.5
0.8
3.5
2.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Rural areas
28.4
30.6
29.4
0.5
3.9
2.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
Age group
15 - 19
28.2
26.4
27.4
0.7
1.5
1.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
20 - 24
36.1
40.2
37.8
1.0
2.7
1.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
25 - 29
44.3
48.7
46.2
0.5
8.2
3.9
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kurdistan Region
39.2
45.6
42.3
0.3
1.6
0.9
100.0
100.0
100.0
Iraq
35.3
36.7
35.9
0.7
3.6
2.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Continued
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
171
Table 10
Relationship with Parents
Youth by financial dependence on the family (%)
Level of
disaggregation
Governorate
Fully dependent
Partially dependent
Independent
Undefined
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Duhouk
41.4
68.8
55.2
29.6
19.4
24.5
29.0
11.9
20.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
41.8
97.0
69.5
23.6
2.5
13.0
34.6
0.5
17.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Sulaymaniyah
52.7
78.4
65.3
21.3
9.8
15.7
26.0
11.8
19.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kirkuk
40.2
86.4
60.4
43.9
11.0
29.5
15.9
2.6
10.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Erbil
56.9
81.7
68.6
16.9
7.7
12.5
26.2
10.6
18.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Diyala
51.0
82.7
63.4
25.2
10.5
19.5
23.8
6.8
17.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Anbar
44.4
94.3
67.4
28.0
0.8
15.5
27.6
4.8
17.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Baghdad
45.5
86.0
63.0
21.5
9.2
16.2
32.9
4.3
20.6
0.0
0.5
0.2
100.0
100.0
100.0
Babel
29.2
97.1
62.4
27.2
1.1
14.4
43.6
0.9
22.8
0.0
0.9
0.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kerbala
34.5
89.5
54.1
36.1
1.3
23.7
29.4
9.2
22.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Wasit
56.5
86.5
70.0
26.6
11.2
19.6
17.0
2.4
10.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Salah al-Din
53.8
77.6
63.7
26.8
13.5
21.3
19.4
8.9
15.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Najaf
37.3
97.4
62.9
25.5
2.6
15.7
37.3
0.0
21.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Qadisiya
43.8
86.8
67.2
17.6
7.6
12.2
38.6
5.6
20.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Muthana
46.2
100.0
61.4
9.9
0.0
7.1
43.0
0.0
30.9
0.9
0.0
0.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
Thi Qar
65.9
89.4
76.1
21.9
8.1
15.9
12.3
2.4
8.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Missan
40.1
80.9
54.1
22.3
13.3
19.2
37.7
5.8
26.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Basra
56.0
96.4
73.8
18.5
1.6
11.0
25.5
2.1
15.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Urban areas
47.6
87.7
65.3
21.4
7.0
15.0
31.0
5.2
19.6
0.0
0.1
0.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
Rural areas
45.4
88.6
65.2
30.4
7.6
19.9
24.3
3.5
14.8
0.0
0.2
0.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
72.1
94.6
82.7
19.8
3.2
12.0
7.9
2.0
5.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
100.0
100.0
100.0
Locality
Age group
15 - 19
20 - 24
41.2
89.1
61.4
28.5
6.8
19.3
30.4
4.2
19.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
25 - 29
19.6
75.8
44.2
23.2
14.2
19.3
57.1
9.7
36.4
0.0
0.2
0.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kurdistan Region
51.5
77.1
64.0
21.7
11.5
16.7
26.8
11.4
19.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Iraq
47.0
88.0
65.3
23.9
7.2
16.4
29.1
4.7
18.2
0.0
0.2
0.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
172
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Table 11
Youth Choices
Young people who are free to choose university/major/spouse (%)
Level of disaggregation
Governorate
Free to choose university/branch
Free to choose spouse
practising a certain hobby
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Duhouk
90.9
72.1
81.4
90.9
90.9
90.9
44.8
18.4
31.5
84.8
..
87.5
96.4
58.0
77.0
71.4
16.3
44.2
Sulaymaniyah
63.9
42.9
52.0
94.9
85.0
89.9
76.0
72.6
74.3
Kirkuk
64.4
..
76.8
85.9
67.6
78.0
72.0
40.9
58.4
Erbil
47.8
37.7
42.4
81.3
68.5
75.0
76.3
65.3
71.1
Diyala
90.6
82.7
88.3
93.0
68.0
83.4
32.5
18.7
27.1
Anbar
82.6
93.3
86.7
93.6
67.5
81.0
64.7
21.9
44.9
Baghdad
59.5
65.8
62.5
97.0
87.7
93.0
41.3
15.6
30.1
Babel
87.2
87.2
87.2
95.5
91.7
93.8
62.1
50.6
56.4
Kerbala
82.7
69.1
78.2
94.7
56.8
81.2
65.5
41.1
56.9
Wasit
72.9
76.2
74.4
87.8
74.8
81.9
55.5
38.0
47.6
Salah al-Din
69.1
79.4
72.9
87.6
75.8
82.8
68.0
45.8
58.7
Najaf
75.0
25.0
50.0
92.7
92.0
92.4
72.5
47.4
61.8
Qadisiya
91.1
..
97.3
83.4
47.8
63.9
88.5
65.1
75.8
Muthana
59.0
0.0
59.0
92.0
76.9
87.9
72.2
60.1
68.8
Thi Qar
87.3
84.2
86.3
93.6
69.8
83.8
59.1
30.6
46.7
Missan
79.0
..
82.3
90.8
78.9
86.8
56.2
12.7
41.2
Basra
64.5
62.0
63.6
96.0
82.0
90.2
49.7
43.7
47.0
Locality
Urban areas
70.9
66.3
68.8
93.1
75.9
85.7
59.7
38.4
50.3
Rural areas
71.1
73.9
71.9
93.7
75.1
85.4
55.2
25.6
41.6
Age group
15 - 19
67.3
78.6
73.7
90.7
73.0
82.4
67.3
36.6
52.8
20 - 24
68.6
66.8
67.8
92.3
75.8
85.3
57.7
34.7
48.0
25 - 29
74.5
62.8
70.0
96.0
77.2
87.8
46.9
31.3
40.1
Kurdistan Region
61.3
45.5
52.8
90.0
82.7
86.4
68.7
56.4
62.7
Iraq
71.0
67.1
69.3
93.3
75.7
85.6
58.4
34.6
47.8
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
173
Table 12
Security and Citizenship
Youth by hobbies and belief in the efficiency of security and citizenship
Believing in youth effective role in
improving public security
Governorate
Feeling secure in their neighborhoods
Feeling socially secure
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Duhouk
91.2
88.8
90.0
90.5
85.9
88.2
94.4
93.6
94.0
93.8
93.7
93.7
88.6
87.8
88.2
93.4
88.5
91.0
Sulaymaniyah
82.9
84.5
83.7
80.0
82.9
81.5
88.8
87.0
87.9
Kirkuk
71.9
86.9
78.5
93.9
98.4
95.9
95.9
95.3
95.7
Erbil
95.1
93.2
94.2
94.7
94.5
94.6
92.4
91.0
91.8
Diyala
95.6
95.6
95.6
69.0
61.5
66.0
75.0
65.1
71.2
Anbar
85.1
79.8
82.7
84.0
87.0
85.4
77.2
79.2
78.1
Baghdad
88.3
89.6
88.9
80.1
81.5
80.7
57.9
45.7
52.6
Babel
91.8
89.4
90.6
99.0
98.0
98.5
69.4
67.7
68.6
Kerbala
97.8
93.4
96.3
93.7
94.2
93.9
92.5
87.6
90.8
Wasit
89.5
86.6
88.2
85.4
86.4
85.9
89.6
90.7
90.1
Salah al-Din
92.5
87.7
90.5
83.5
81.5
82.6
77.6
75.9
76.9
Najaf
94.1
78.9
87.6
96.1
92.1
94.4
84.3
73.7
79.8
Qadisiya
98.4
98.0
98.2
95.7
98.7
97.3
45.7
36.7
40.8
Muthana
95.8
94.0
95.2
96.6
98.0
97.0
98.4
94.0
97.2
Thi Qar
94.0
93.5
93.8
94.9
94.5
94.7
93.4
82.4
88.6
Missan
86.8
86.8
86.8
72.5
76.5
73.8
80.7
80.2
80.5
Basra
90.1
93.8
91.7
92.3
90.5
91.5
86.1
85.6
85.9
Urban areas
89.1
89.6
89.3
88.0
88.6
88.3
79.4
72.3
76.3
Rural areas
93.1
91.1
92.2
83.7
84.4
84.0
78.9
77.1
78.0
89.3
89.6
89.4
87.5
85.5
86.5
80.7
72.1
76.7
Locality
Age group
15 - 19
20 - 24
90.4
90.0
90.2
86.6
89.1
87.6
78.9
74.3
77.0
25 - 29
91.5
90.8
91.2
86.2
88.0
87.0
77.6
75.5
76.7
Kurdistan Region
89.2
88.5
88.9
87.8
87.6
87.7
91.4
90.0
90.7
Iraq
90.2
90.0
90.1
86.8
87.3
87.0
79.3
73.7
76.8
174
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Table 13
Societal and Political Participation
Youth by Societal and political participation
Participation in the last
elections
Governorate
Affiliated to a party, assembly
Watching news and political
events
Participation in
demonstrations or sit-ins strike
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Females
Males
Females
Total
Duhouk
83.5
77.1
80.4
70.3
48.2
59.6
71.4
59.2
65.5
7.9
8.4
8.1
71.5
45.0
58.1
8.2
0.0
4.1
49.1
33.4
41.2
6.7
0.0
3.3
Sulaymaniyah
75.6
74.9
75.3
35.9
17.3
26.7
41.2
24.4
32.8
20.0
8.5
14.4
Kirkuk
46.2
52.0
48.7
20.3
5.4
13.9
53.3
49.3
51.6
6.6
0.0
3.8
Erbil
75.8
80.1
77.8
26.4
9.4
18.5
49.7
29.6
40.4
5.8
7.7
6.7
Diyala
76.6
71.5
74.6
6.8
8.0
7.3
71.2
59.0
66.5
1.2
0.0
0.7
Anbar
73.6
49.4
62.0
0.5
0.0
0.3
43.9
23.9
34.4
8.7
0.0
4.6
Baghdad
76.4
60.0
69.4
5.2
2.5
4.0
50.1
37.8
44.8
7.9
0.6
4.8
Babel
72.6
61.0
67.3
5.6
1.4
3.7
56.3
30.1
44.4
7.0
0.0
3.8
Kerbala
59.2
49.3
55.7
1.9
0.0
1.2
44.1
21.2
36.0
2.3
0.0
1.5
Wasit
70.2
56.2
63.9
2.9
0.0
1.6
47.9
25.3
37.5
7.3
0.0
3.9
Salah al-Din
80.8
74.6
78.3
2.1
1.9
2.1
54.5
27.8
43.8
5.1
2.5
4.1
Najaf
78.0
72.0
75.8
24.4
8.0
18.2
48.8
48.0
48.5
2.4
0.0
1.5
Qadisiya
74.0
42.0
56.5
3.1
0.9
1.9
58.4
57.1
57.7
5.5
0.0
2.5
Muthana
77.4
67.5
74.7
5.8
0.0
4.2
44.1
8.4
34.0
9.3
0.0
6.7
Thi Qar
76.6
69.1
73.6
3.4
8.6
5.5
36.2
33.8
35.2
1.3
0.0
0.8
Missan
82.3
66.1
76.9
3.5
2.0
3.0
54.2
21.5
43.3
10.3
0.0
6.9
Basra
56.0
50.5
53.7
3.2
0.4
2.1
35.0
31.7
33.7
6.9
0.4
4.2
Locality
Urban areas
70.3
59.0
65.4
12.0
5.9
9.4
48.6
34.7
42.6
6.9
1.7
4.6
Rural areas
77.9
62.9
71.3
5.5
3.2
4.5
52.2
37.8
45.9
6.7
0.5
4.0
Age group
15 - 19
22.6
21.1
21.9
8.8
2.4
5.9
34.7
30.8
32.9
7.4
0.9
4.4
20 - 24
81.6
64.9
74.5
8.8
5.7
7.5
48.9
33.7
42.5
5.3
1.7
3.8
25 - 29
87.9
78.3
83.7
12.8
6.1
9.9
59.1
41.1
51.2
8.7
1.2
5.4
Kurdistan Region
77.6
77.2
77.4
41.7
23.3
32.9
52.8
35.8
44.6
10.4
8.2
9.3
Iraq
72.4
60.1
67.1
10.2
5.1
8.0
49.6
35.6
43.5
6.8
1.4
4.4
To be continued
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
175
Table 13
Societal and Political Participation
Youth by Societal and political participation
Belonging to a civil society
organization
Governorate
Participating in media
activities
Participation in voluntary
works
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Duhouk
2.0
0.7
1.4
4.7
2.1
3.4
15.9
14.3
15.1
2.1
0.0
1.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
45.2
16.0
30.5
Sulaymaniyah
2.6
2.8
2.7
6.3
1.5
4.0
18.2
9.3
13.9
Kirkuk
0.0
2.7
1.2
0.5
0.0
0.3
0.5
2.7
1.4
11.0
Erbil
9.4
6.7
8.2
1.4
1.1
1.3
10.0
12.1
Diyala
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.0
0.0
1.8
4.8
0.0
2.9
Anbar
0.0
0.0
0.0
2.5
0.0
1.3
23.8
11.9
18.1
Baghdad
0.9
0.0
0.5
0.5
0.0
0.3
7.3
3.8
5.8
Babel
1.2
1.4
1.3
2.2
1.4
1.9
64.4
42.6
54.4
Kerbala
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.1
0.0
0.7
23.0
2.0
15.6
Wasit
4.3
0.6
2.6
6.2
0.0
3.4
11.6
2.9
7.6
Salah al-Din
3.8
0.0
2.3
3.8
0.0
2.3
22.2
6.3
15.8
Najaf
9.8
8.0
9.1
4.9
0.0
3.0
87.8
52.0
74.2
Qadisiya
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.0
0.0
0.5
2.1
0.0
0.9
Muthana
1.2
0.0
0.8
4.7
0.0
3.3
34.6
32.9
34.2
Thi Qar
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.6
0.9
0.8
21.1
9.8
16.5
Missan
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.0
0.0
2.0
11.0
0.0
7.3
Basra
0.5
0.0
0.3
6.7
1.8
4.7
19.1
6.6
14.0
Urban areas
2.1
1.2
1.7
2.8
0.7
1.9
19.7
9.2
15.1
Rural areas
1.0
0.5
0.8
1.7
0.1
1.0
25.4
14.9
20.8
0.7
0.6
0.7
1.3
0.5
0.9
16.0
8.5
12.5
Locality
Age group
15 - 19
20 - 24
1.5
0.4
1.0
2.5
0.4
1.6
23.3
10.3
17.8
25 - 29
2.8
2.0
2.5
3.0
0.6
2.0
21.6
13.0
17.8
Kurdistan Region
4.9
3.6
4.3
4.2
1.5
2.9
14.7
11.5
13.2
Iraq
1.8
1.0
1.4
2.5
0.5
1.6
21.3
10.8
16.7
continued
176
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Table 14
Information Technology
Youth by IT usage
Communicating
via social media
(Facebook,
Twitter, etc,)
Using Internet
Owning a
computer
Average
monthly
expenditure
on mobile
recharge
cards (IQD
Owning a
mobile phone
Males
Females
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Males
Females
21482
12230
17843
49.7
41.4
45.5
44.1
23.2
33.6
88.4
63.7
79.8
55.5
16382
8576
14714
38.1
11.1
24.6
27.8
4.9
16.3
21.5
4.1
12.8
Sulaymaniyah
95.7
66.1
81.2
15787
10983
13876
45.3
31.5
38.6
35.8
19.3
27.8
86.5
66.3
79.7
Kirkuk
93.1
44.5
71.9
13996
13883
13965
43.1
21.0
33.4
33.3
8.4
22.4
25.6
4.3
16.4
Erbil
92.0
72.6
82.9
22362
13981
18900
55.4
43.4
49.7
49.8
36.5
43.5
90.8
83.9
88.1
9.1
Total
Total
77.7
23.7
Total
Females
60.8
87.5
Duhouk
Total
Males
94.9
Governorate
Diyala
93.1
52.0
77.1
16619
12072
15421
16.0
8.0
12.9
16.0
5.8
12.0
11.7
5.1
Anbar
87.0
29.6
60.4
18350
11940
16893
33.1
18.7
26.4
15.4
3.1
9.7
11.4
1.8
6.9
Baghdad
90.0
60.3
77.0
20261
14254
18211
37.8
28.4
33.7
28.3
14.2
22.1
23.4
9.0
17.1
Babel
95.2
48.9
72.6
23150
12685
19708
40.9
26.0
33.6
25.0
10.8
18.0
19.7
3.9
12.0
Kerbala
88.5
37.4
70.4
13818
11685
13416
26.6
15.7
22.7
15.1
3.9
11.1
12.2
2.6
8.8
Wasit
82.6
35.3
61.3
16295
8842
14357
20.8
8.4
15.2
10.3
3.0
7.0
3.7
3.1
3.4
Salah al-Din
86.1
33.5
64.2
19335
13488
18066
26.9
22.1
24.9
19.0
8.9
14.8
13.9
4.2
9.9
Najaf
86.3
44.7
68.5
20443
12206
18148
25.5
5.3
16.9
24.5
2.6
14.9
17.6
0.0
10.1
Qadisiya
85.1
57.2
69.9
12217
14112
13061
23.2
7.1
14.5
20.6
1.3
10.1
17.4
0.7
8.3
Muthana
90.5
25.4
72.1
15260
9070
14644
14.3
4.3
11.5
6.4
0.0
4.6
5.5
0.0
4.0
Thi Qar
87.3
46.5
69.6
8920
8353
8755
16.7
5.1
11.7
6.7
3.7
5.4
5.6
3.0
4.5
Missan
93.4
41.6
75.6
13996
8064
12875
28.0
6.9
20.8
14.9
2.1
10.5
10.6
0.5
7.1
Basra
88.3
54.9
73.6
13178
9246
11884
32.2
22.6
28.0
27.4
14.4
21.6
24.2
9.5
17.8
Urban areas
91.1
57.8
76.4
17732
12518
15991
38.2
26.4
33.0
28.6
14.1
22.2
25.9
11.2
19.6
Rural areas
86.6
28.1
59.7
16013
10229
14767
22.0
8.1
15.6
14.9
3.4
9.6
11.2
1.5
6.8
Locality
Age group
15 - 19
78.5
31.6
56.3
13204
11126
12653
33.1
22.3
28.0
22.8
9.8
16.7
19.4
7.5
13.9
20 - 24
95.5
57.6
79.4
18706
12441
16782
36.1
20.9
29.7
27.0
13.5
21.3
24.4
9.7
18.3
25 - 29
97.9
66.0
84.0
19898
12558
17369
30.8
18.9
25.6
24.4
9.4
17.8
21.5
7.4
15.5
Kurdistan Region
94.2
67.0
80.9
19450
12371
16603
50.0
38.1
44.2
42.8
26.1
34.7
88.8
74.2
83.4
Iraq
89.8
49.0
71.6
17267
12132
15698
33.6
21.0
28.0
24.8
10.9
18.6
21.8
8.2
15.9
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
177
Table 15
Migration
Youth by current status of residence (%)
Displaced
Governorate
Migrant
Regular residence
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
15.7
17.4
16.5
3.6
3.7
3.7
80.3
77.0
78.7
2.1
4.1
3.1
2.1
2.0
2.0
95.9
93.9
94.9
Sulaymaniyah
7.0
5.2
6.1
3.9
3.7
3.8
83.1
84.5
83.8
Kirkuk
18.3
8.1
13.9
10.2
2.7
7.0
71.6
89.2
79.1
Erbil
0.5
1.1
0.8
1.4
0.6
1.0
86.8
88.8
87.7
Diyala
0.6
2.9
1.5
6.5
6.1
6.3
91.7
88.1
90.4
Anbar
5.3
3.8
4.6
0.5
0.6
0.5
94.2
95.6
94.9
Baghdad
4.4
3.9
4.2
1.9
3.2
2.4
92.7
92.3
92.5
Babel
4.4
1.2
3.0
0.0
3.8
1.7
94.6
91.4
93.1
Kerbala
5.3
2.0
4.1
1.9
0.0
1.2
90.6
95.9
92.5
Wasit
3.1
1.2
2.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
94.5
95.9
95.1
Salah al-Din
1.3
3.2
2.1
4.2
4.5
4.3
94.5
92.3
93.6
Najaf
2.4
4.0
3.0
0.0
4.0
1.5
97.6
92.0
95.5
Qadisiya
0.0
7.4
4.1
0.0
3.7
2.0
100.0
88.9
93.9
Muthana
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2.9
0.8
100.0
97.1
99.2
Thi Qar
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
93.6
98.1
95.4
Missan
0.0
2.0
0.7
2.0
4.0
2.7
87.0
80.0
84.7
Basra
3.9
1.4
2.9
1.2
0.8
1.0
94.9
97.8
96.1
Urban areas
4.2
4.6
4.4
2.3
2.8
2.5
90.8
90.1
90.5
Rural areas
3.9
2.2
3.1
2.0
2.0
2.0
93.6
94.9
94.1
15 - 19
4.5
3.9
4.2
2.2
3.9
2.9
90.8
89.8
90.4
20 - 24
4.2
3.7
4.0
2.9
1.2
2.2
90.5
93.1
91.6
25 - 29
3.7
4.2
3.9
1.2
3.5
2.2
93.5
90.3
92.1
Kurdistan Region
6.7
6.8
6.8
3.0
2.7
2.8
83.7
84.1
83.9
Iraq
4.1
3.9
4.0
2.2
2.6
2.4
91.6
91.5
91.5
Duhouk
Locality
Age group
178
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Table 16
Migration
Desire to immigration
Males
Females
Total
Duhouk
Governorate
21.1
14.3
17.8
26.7
1.0
13.7
Sulaymaniyah
42.3
36.8
39.7
Kirkuk
27.4
19.6
24.1
Erbil
53.8
29.8
42.7
Diyala
13.8
12.8
13.4
Anbar
19.0
9.9
14.6
Baghdad
40.9
17.1
30.8
Babel
19.4
12.0
16.0
Kerbala
27.9
9.6
21.4
Wasit
17.2
4.7
11.6
Salah al-Din
15.8
6.5
12.1
Najaf
22.0
12.0
18.2
Qadisiya
11.5
19.1
15.7
Muthana
12.4
0.0
8.9
Thi Qar
22.7
4.8
15.5
Missan
36.3
16.1
29.6
Basra
22.4
6.0
15.7
Urban areas
30.5
14.3
23.5
Rural areas
24.0
12.3
18.8
15 - 19
28.2
16.9
23.0
20 - 24
30.3
14.7
23.7
25 - 29
26.7
10.3
19.6
Kurdistan Region
41.4
28.9
35.5
Iraq
28.7
13.7
22.2
Locality
Age group
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
179
Table 17
Migration
Youth by reason of migration (%)
No job opportunities
Governorate
Duhouk
Sulaymaniyah
Likelihood of obtaining a
higher income or more job
opportunities
Study
No security or stability
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
14.9
15.5
15.1
14.1
11.5
13.1
25.6
17.5
22.4
21.1
33.1
25.8
32.4
0.0
31.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
9.8
0.0
9.5
30.8
..
33.4
36.8
18.9
28.8
12.6
6.1
9.7
11.6
33.8
21.5
19.1
22.3
20.6
Kirkuk
7.4
0.0
4.8
25.9
0.0
16.9
1.8
44.8
16.9
37.0
17.2
30.1
Erbil
39.0
35.3
37.8
15.5
6.7
12.7
8.5
22.3
12.9
11.1
9.3
10.5
Diyala
17.4
22.5
19.3
8.7
15.0
11.0
13.0
0.0
8.3
30.4
22.5
27.5
Anbar
13.1
14.6
13.6
16.5
5.5
13.0
42.5
23.6
36.4
9.6
47.2
21.8
Baghdad
13.0
11.9
12.8
51.8
31.8
47.1
2.3
7.5
3.5
11.7
18.7
13.3
Babel
10.5
30.6
17.3
11.6
0.0
7.6
6.3
12.3
8.3
23.2
47.0
31.3
Kerbala
4.0
0.0
3.4
31.1
0.0
26.1
4.0
64.1
13.6
24.4
35.9
26.3
Wasit
43.7
60.6
46.8
19.8
13.1
18.5
13.8
0.0
11.2
10.8
0.0
8.8
Salah al-Din
32.5
0.0
25.6
5.4
0.0
4.2
10.8
10.2
10.7
32.3
69.9
40.3
Najaf
33.3
66.7
41.7
11.1
0.0
8.3
11.1
0.0
8.3
0.0
33.3
8.3
Qadisiya
36.4
0.0
12.1
0.0
4.5
3.0
18.2
4.5
9.0
36.4
62.6
53.9
Muthana
8.1
0.0
8.1
18.9
0.0
18.9
63.5
0.0
63.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
Thi Qar
44.0
40.0
43.5
5.6
0.0
4.9
11.2
60.0
17.2
5.6
0.0
4.9
Missan
49.9
34.3
47.1
14.3
16.1
14.6
5.5
12.4
6.8
13.8
0.0
11.3
Basra
24.0
23.4
23.9
27.2
46.8
30.2
8.7
0.0
7.3
4.3
23.4
7.3
Urban areas
20.5
15.6
19.2
25.4
8.0
20.8
9.9
23.4
13.5
16.3
29.6
19.8
Rural areas
35.3
27.7
33.1
27.4
30.9
28.4
5.4
4.0
5.0
14.9
12.7
14.3
15 - 19
23.3
13.5
20.0
16.7
14.3
15.9
14.5
32.2
20.5
17.7
24.6
20.1
20 - 24
22.5
17.5
21.2
27.8
16.0
24.7
8.6
14.7
10.2
14.1
24.1
16.7
25 - 29
26.8
26.5
26.7
28.3
9.6
24.0
5.7
11.3
7.0
18.0
28.1
20.3
Kurdistan
Region
35.4
24.4
31.2
14.1
7.0
11.4
11.8
28.2
18.1
15.6
19.3
17.0
Iraq
24.0
18.7
22.6
25.9
13.9
22.7
8.8
18.4
11.4
16.0
25.2
18.5
Locality
Age group
To be continued
180
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Table 17
Migration
Youth by reason of migration (%)
Build a better future in
another country
Governorate
Duhouk
Join family or send Aids
to family
Undefined
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
16.2
7.8
12.9
8.1
14.7
10.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
23.1
0.0
22.2
3.8
0.0
3.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Sulaymaniyah
13.2
10.8
12.1
6.6
6.1
6.4
0.0
2.0
0.9
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kirkuk
27.8
37.9
31.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Erbil
22.4
19.0
21.3
3.5
7.4
4.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Diyala
13.0
40.1
23.0
17.4
0.0
11.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Anbar
18.2
9.1
15.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Baghdad
21.2
26.5
22.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.7
0.9
100.0
100.0
100.0
Babel
35.8
0.0
23.6
6.3
10.2
7.6
6.3
0.0
4.2
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kerbala
36.4
0.0
30.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Wasit
12.0
26.3
14.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Salah al-Din
10.8
19.9
12.8
8.1
0.0
6.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Najaf
0.0
0.0
0.0
44.4
0.0
33.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Qadisiya
9.1
28.4
22.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Muthana
9.5
0.0
9.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Thi Qar
33.6
0.0
29.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Missan
16.5
37.2
20.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Basra
27.2
0.0
22.9
0.0
6.3
1.0
8.7
0.0
7.3
100.0
100.0
100.0
Urban areas
22.7
18.1
21.5
4.0
3.5
3.9
1.0
1.8
1.3
100.0
100.0
100.0
Rural areas
16.3
21.8
17.9
0.7
2.8
1.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
15 - 19
25.0
9.3
19.7
2.7
2.4
2.6
0.0
3.7
1.3
100.0
100.0
100.0
20 - 24
20.0
22.7
20.7
5.3
4.3
5.0
1.6
0.8
1.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
25 - 29
20.9
22.2
21.2
0.2
2.3
0.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kurdistan
Region
17.8
13.4
16.1
5.3
7.7
6.2
0.0
0.1
0.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
Iraq
21.2
19.0
20.6
3.2
3.3
3.2
0.8
1.4
0.9
100.0
100.0
100.0
Locality
Age group
continued
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
181
Table 18
Youth future aspirations
Youth by future aspirations (%) (first priority)
Complete study
Governorate
Get job opportunities
Marriage
Migration
Buy a house
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Duhouk
42.4
36.2
39.3
12.7
10.8
11.7
5.5
8.1
6.8
2.2
0.6
1.4
20.9
24.7
22.9
24.3
16.4
20.3
32.6
1.3
16.9
8.3
9.6
9.0
9.7
3.1
6.4
14.4
22.8
18.7
Sulaymaniyah
40.1
40.3
40.2
24.2
15.9
20.1
8.5
4.3
6.4
1.7
1.8
1.7
6.8
12.5
9.6
Kirkuk
50.0
41.9
46.5
24.0
2.6
14.6
6.5
5.8
6.2
0.8
0.0
0.5
10.2
15.2
12.4
11.3
Erbil
36.0
38.3
37.1
21.4
18.5
20.0
4.8
5.5
5.1
5.3
1.3
3.4
12.0
10.6
Diyala
37.2
18.5
29.9
33.2
19.9
28.0
11.1
24.6
16.3
5.1
5.4
5.2
5.1
11.9
7.8
Anbar
38.8
28.8
34.2
25.8
10.8
18.8
18.0
21.6
19.7
0.6
0.8
0.7
7.1
11.5
9.2
Baghdad
25.3
25.1
25.2
23.6
5.7
15.8
8.6
14.2
11.0
12.5
2.8
8.3
11.1
18.1
14.1
Babel
23.8
32.3
27.9
29.9
5.7
18.1
15.7
9.9
12.9
7.7
0.9
4.4
13.0
23.1
17.9
Kerbala
35.2
28.7
32.9
23.3
1.3
15.5
26.0
32.8
28.4
0.0
2.2
0.8
12.0
14.8
13.0
14.5
Wasit
49.4
38.9
44.7
27.0
11.5
20.0
4.0
12.1
7.7
6.1
0.4
3.5
7.2
23.3
Salah al-Din
43.4
28.9
37.4
19.2
8.9
14.9
8.7
14.8
11.3
1.8
0.4
1.2
9.1
10.2
9.5
Najaf
15.7
13.2
14.6
51.0
28.9
41.6
13.7
13.2
13.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
13.7
21.1
16.9
Qadisiya
43.2
38.3
40.6
33.6
26.1
29.5
4.3
2.7
3.4
2.4
3.6
3.0
10.9
20.3
16.0
Muthana
44.6
27.1
39.7
28.4
2.3
21.0
10.9
18.1
12.9
3.3
2.3
3.0
6.6
31.1
13.5
Thi Qar
37.6
25.3
32.3
41.6
15.4
30.2
3.9
16.5
9.4
1.4
0.0
0.8
7.2
19.5
12.5
Missan
40.4
27.4
35.9
41.6
33.1
38.7
9.4
6.5
8.4
1.1
3.7
2.0
3.4
22.7
10.0
Basra
28.6
21.6
25.5
32.0
10.2
22.4
9.3
21.8
14.8
2.9
1.3
2.2
10.3
18.9
14.1
Urban areas
33.6
31.3
32.6
26.9
10.8
19.8
8.7
9.1
8.9
6.4
1.8
4.3
10.5
18.1
13.9
Rural areas
33.3
20.3
27.3
32.1
10.0
21.9
11.6
22.4
16.6
3.3
2.2
2.8
9.7
18.2
13.6
53.7
45.1
49.7
19.8
7.9
14.2
7.0
15.5
11.0
4.4
1.3
2.9
3.4
8.2
5.6
Locality
Age group
15 - 19
20 - 24
27.1
22.1
25.0
34.9
11.9
25.1
11.4
13.1
12.1
5.9
2.1
4.3
10.8
21.6
15.4
25 - 29
13.9
8.2
11.4
31.2
13.0
23.2
10.4
8.9
9.7
6.6
2.6
4.9
19.4
29.8
23.9
Kurdistan Region
39.2
38.6
38.9
20.5
15.5
18.0
6.4
5.7
6.1
3.1
1.3
2.2
12.0
15.0
13.4
Iraq
33.5
28.1
31.1
28.3
10.5
20.4
9.5
13.0
11.1
5.5
1.9
3.9
10.3
18.2
13.8
182
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Table 18
Youth future aspirations
Youth by future aspirations (%) (first priority)
Develop hobbies
Governorate
Safe life
Prosperity of Iraq
No aspirations
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Males
Females
Total
Duhouk
1.2
1.1
1.2
5.7
11.4
8.6
1.5
1.9
1.7
1.1
4.0
2.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
0.0
4.6
2.3
1.7
19.8
10.8
0.9
2.9
1.9
0.0
12.0
6.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Sulaymaniyah
1.1
9.2
5.1
2.1
4.9
3.4
1.5
2.1
1.8
5.8
3.3
4.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kirkuk
0.8
2.6
1.6
6.5
21.5
13.0
0.0
7.9
3.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Erbil
4.0
8.3
6.1
3.8
7.7
5.6
1.1
2.6
1.8
3.4
2.6
3.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Diyala
0.0
1.5
0.6
5.0
1.5
3.6
0.5
9.3
3.9
0.0
0.7
0.3
100.0
100.0
100.0
Anbar
0.4
3.3
1.7
2.4
9.2
5.5
0.7
4.5
2.5
1.7
6.0
3.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
Baghdad
0.4
0.5
0.4
5.1
12.3
8.3
3.7
2.4
3.1
3.3
17.5
9.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
Babel
0.0
1.1
0.5
1.9
10.4
6.0
2.7
4.1
3.4
0.0
11.6
5.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
Kerbala
0.0
2.6
0.9
0.7
15.3
5.9
1.4
0.0
0.9
1.4
2.2
1.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
Wasit
0.0
0.0
0.0
3.3
5.9
4.5
1.6
1.7
1.6
1.0
4.2
2.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
Salah al-Din
0.6
1.7
1.0
13.3
22.4
17.1
0.9
5.1
2.7
0.6
5.1
2.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
Najaf
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
10.5
4.5
2.0
5.3
3.4
0.0
7.9
3.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
Qadisiya
0.0
3.6
1.9
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.8
0.0
0.4
0.8
5.4
3.3
100.0
100.0
100.0
Muthana
2.8
6.7
3.9
0.0
2.3
0.7
0.9
8.0
2.9
0.0
0.0
0.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Thi Qar
2.3
3.9
3.0
3.6
11.4
7.0
0.0
3.9
1.7
1.4
4.2
2.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
Missan
1.1
0.0
0.7
1.3
0.9
1.2
0.8
0.0
0.6
0.0
1.9
0.7
100.0
100.0
100.0
Basra
2.4
4.4
3.3
0.8
9.1
4.5
2.1
6.2
3.9
4.3
5.1
4.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
Locality
Urban areas
1.0
3.5
2.1
3.4
10.9
6.7
1.9
3.6
2.7
2.3
8.6
5.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
Rural areas
0.5
1.8
1.1
3.8
11.5
7.3
1.1
3.3
2.1
0.7
6.7
3.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
Age group
15 - 19
0.9
1.6
1.2
3.6
7.5
5.4
0.9
3.0
1.9
2.1
8.9
5.3
100.0
100.0
100.0
20 - 24
1.0
3.3
2.0
2.0
12.1
6.3
1.8
4.4
2.9
1.7
6.6
3.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
25 - 29
0.7
4.8
2.5
5.6
15.7
10.0
2.8
3.1
2.9
1.7
8.5
4.7
100.0
100.0
Kurdistan Region
2.2
6.9
4.5
3.6
7.5
5.5
1.4
2.2
1.8
3.8
3.2
3.5
100.0
100.0
100.0
Iraq
0.9
3.0
1.8
3.5
11.1
6.9
1.7
3.5
2.5
1.9
8.0
4.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
continued
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
183
Annex III
Technical Notes Appendix
Introduction
The national effort in compiling the data
and indicators for the Iraq NHDR 2014
had some limitations and faced some
challenges. Iraq has not conducted a general census since the last conducted in
1997. Yet it succeeded in completing the
[enumeration and counting] of the General Census Project in 2009. This helped
overcome the problems of monitoring the
demographic and structural changes that
took place since the 1997 census.
Another challenge that the Central Statistics Organization (CSO) was successful
in overcoming was the continuous coordination with the Kurdistan Region Statistics Office (KRSO). This was important
for achieving true national coverage, in
addition to having access to the Human
Development indicators in the Kurdistan
Region.
The statistical efforts were successful in
two statistical analysis methodologies:
○○ The first is the analysis and production of the Human Development indicators on the basis of the annual
statistical data available and the recent field surveys implemented by
the official statistical offices.
○○ The second is the construction of
new statistical indicators on the
basis of the opinion polls namely
the Youth Opinion Survey in 2012,
which could be considered a quality contribution in constructing Human Development indicators for the
youth segment.
184
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
The implementation of a complete portfolio on the Youth Development Indicator
was a target that the CSO worked on for
more than two years. The Youth Opinion
Poll conducted in 2012 [box], in addition to the results of other surveys, have
provided the experimenting ground for
testing the methodologies related to constructing the new Youth Index. We think
that this indicator complements the four
main indicators, namely the Human Development Index, the Inequality-adjusted
Human Development Index, the Gender
Inequality Index, and the Multidimensional Poverty Index, and will be useful
for countries preparing NHDRs on youth.
This section presents the methodologies
used in computing the indicators for the
Iraq National Human Development 2013.
However, more information on the surveys used in this report could be obtained
by referring to the methodology details of
these surveys.
1 Implemented Surveys
Box A3
Sources used in computing the Human Development Index
Indicator
Title of Survey
Year
Size of Sample
Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN)
2011
28,875
UNDP
Human Development Index Multiple Indicator Cluster Sur(HDI), Inequality Adjusted Hu- vey
man Development Index (IHDI) Iraq Household Socioeconomic Survey, IHSES-II
2011
36,580
Ministry of Health,
UNICEF
2012
25,500
World Bank
Iraq Poverty and Maternal
Mortality Mapping (IPMM)
2013
311,411
UNFPA, World
Bank UNICEF,
WHO
Iraq Household Socioeconomic Survey, IHSES-II
2012
25,500
World Bank
Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN)
2011
28,875
UNDP
Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
2011
36,580
Ministry of Health,
UNICEF
Iraq Household Socioeconomic Survey, IHSES-I
2007
18,144
World Bank
Multidimensional Poverty Index Iraq Knowledge Network (IKN)
2011
28,875
UNDP
Gender Inequality Index (GII)
Youth Development Index
1.1 Iraq Knowledge Network
Survey (IKN-2011)
This survey was implemented jointly by
the CSO and the KRSO as part of the Socioeconomic Monitoring System project.
This project was implemented in partnership with a number of UN Agencies,
which include UNFPA, UNDP, and WFP.
The survey was planned to be implemented in two rounds. The first round
took place in 2011, in which the field researchers were able to cover 28,875 families in the 18 Iraqi governorates. The recorded data provided the statistical basis
for generating indicators on the national
and governorate levels, as well as district
level urban and rural areas.
1.2 Multiple Indicator Cluster
Survey (MICS4-2011)
This is a periodic survey that is implemented every 4 years, and provides data
on the status of children and women.
The fourth round of this survey was implemented in 2011 by the CSO and the
KRSO in partnership with the Ministry of
Health. The survey was based on a random sample of 18,800 families.
The importance of this survey stems
from the need to respond to the international agreements, mainly Millennium
Support Provided
Declaration and the MDGs adopted by
191 countries in September 2000, and the
World Fit for Children agenda endorsed
by 189 countries in May 2002. Both these
commitment are based on the International Community pledges in the World Summit for Children in 1990.
1.3 Iraq Household
Socioeconomic Survey II
(IHSES-2012)
This is another periodic survey that is implemented every 5 years. The first survey
was conducted in Iraq in the year 1971.
The results of this survey are the main
source for implementing the following:
• The update of the Poverty Measurement
and Analysis database and the monitoring of the implementation of the National Poverty Reduction Strategy that
was launched in 2009;
• Assessment of the socioeconomic status of the Iraqi family and the preparation of indicators to levels of Human
Development;
• Filling the gap in data needed for the
National Accounts indicators;
• Provision of detailed indicators on the
consumption expenditures and their
variations. This serves the policy making and planning that is related to pro-
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
185
duction, consumption, imports, and
exports. It also provides details on individual income and its sources.
• Computing the Consumer Price Index
IHSES 2012 represents the second
stage of the National Poverty Reduction
Strategy project implemented by the CSO
and the KRSO with support from the
World Bank. The World Bank financed
portions of the project and provided capacity building support through technical
experts and methodologies.
The sample frame covered 25,500 families in all 18 governorates. The sample
frame was structured in layers covering
the 118 districts in Iraq. The samples were
equal for each district, irrespective of its
population weight. The size of the sample
in each district was formed of 216 families using the [enumeration framework] of
the 2009 General Census project.
1.4 Iraq Poverty and Maternal
Mortality Mapping (IPMM-2013)
This survey was implemented by the CSO
and the KRSO in partnership with a number of UN Agencies that include UNFPA,
World Bank, UNICEF, and WHO. The
field work was implemented in the period
December 2012 to February 2013.
The size of the sample frame covered
311,411 families (about 2 million individuals) in all Iraqi governorates including
the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The sample
frame was based on the [enumeration
and] that was implemented in 2009. The
number of households in the urban areas
was 179,040 versus 132,372 families in
the rural areas.
This survey provided very detailed information on the level of the smallest
administrative unit in Iraq. These are the
sub districts (the Nahyia), which are 393
in Iraq in total. The aim of the survey is
to provide updated demographic statistics
and the identification of poverty pockets
to support better targeting of the poor in
projects included in the National Poverty
Reduction Strategy (Ministry of Planning,
2009). It also aims to support health policies needed to reduce maternal mortality
in Iraq.
1.5 National Youth and
Adolescent Survey (NYS-2009)
This survey was conducted by national
statistics teams and youth teams in part-
186
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
nership with UNFPA and the Pan Arab
Project for Family Health (PAPFAM).
The survey focused on aspects that are
important to youth in Iraq in the age group
of 15-30, with the aim to support the policies and programmes related to this age
group. The survey was implemented in
all 18 governorates and covered a random
sample of 6,730 families interviewing
15,080 youth individuals in the age group.
The objectives of this survey included:
• Studying the knowledge, attitudes, and
practices of youth in Iraq, with focus
on the political and social transformations that took place in Iraq since 2003.
This will help in formulating a national
youth strategy that addresses the needs
and aspirations of this age group;
• Developing a database on this age
group to assist decision makers in supporting the improvement of the knowledge, practices, and attitudes of the
youth and directing it for better physical, psychological, social, and cultural
achievements for the youth.
1.6 Youth Opinion Survey (YOS2012)
To complete the set of demographic and
health information needed by planners
and policy makers, and to prepare indicators that reflect the level of youth development in Iraq, the CSO implemented an
opinion poll on the status and aspirations
of youth in the year 2012. The sample
covered 2,478 families covering all Iraqi
governorates and interviewing 5,357
youths in the age group of 15-29. This
group includes a significant segment of
the population that also varies in categories and conditions.
The chosen age group includes individuals at school age, yet others who are
participating in the labour market. The
design of the sample aimed to provide
indicators that adequately represent the
governorates and the Kurdistan Region.
It also covers the rural and urban areas.
The detailed results of the survey could be
found in the report’s annex.
The objective of the opinion poll is to
assess the situation of youth and identify
their aspirations, with focus on the effects
of the transformations in Iraq that have
taken place since 2003 and the sectarian
events that took place in the period 20062008. The poll was also meant to support
the construction of the indicators needed
in the National Human Development Report and the computation of the composite Youth Development Index. This index
covers a wide gamut of indicators representing education, health, physical wellness, relationship with parents, uses of
free time, security, citizenship, social and
political participation, use of information
technologies, migration, and future vision. In short, the aims of the poll include:
• Assessment of the situation and aspirations of youth in the age group 15-29
• Assessment of the situation and aspirations of youth by gender and by geographic and environmental distributions
• Support to the construction of the Youth
Development Index for the year 2012
2. Calculation of the Human
Development Indicators:
the Methodology and the
Measurements
2.1 Human Development Index
(HDI)
The HDI has maintained the three dimensions of health, education, and income.
However, the new changes introduced in
2010 in the global Human Development
Report relate to the indicators used to
measure education and income, and the
method of compositing the indicators.
In new the education index, the mean
years of schooling has replaced adult literacy rates. Gross enrolment is now replaced by the expected years of schooling
for children at entering age. The number
of years of schooling that a child is expected to have has added a qualitative
aspect which many national and regional
human development reports have shown.
In the health dimension, life expectancy
at birth remains the best representation.
To measure the decent standard of living, the individual’s share of the Gross
National Income has replaced the share of
the Gross National Product.
The construction of the HDI starts with
the calculation of the three dimensions
through setting a maximum and minimum
value for each indicator. The maximum
value is set to the highest value of the indicator in the observation period, while
the minimum value is taken as the least
value needed to sustain life or zero (for
more details, please see the Statistical Annex Technical of the 2011 Human Devel-
opment Report).
However, it is necessary to mention the
sources of data used to compute the component indicators and the hence the main
index. In this report, the results of the surveys listed in the previous section enabled
the report’s statistical team to compute
the indicators for each of the Iraqi governorates, the Kurdistan Region, and the
national level indicators. The notes in the
bottom of tables in the Statistical Annex
show the sources of data used in computing the component indicators, namely
health, education, and income.
In view of the unavailability of individual’s share of the Gross National Income
indicators at the governorate level, this indicator was estimated as follows:
• The per capita income for the year 2012
was 6,578,930 Iraqi dinars.
• Using the purchasing power parity
(PPP) in Iraq of US$, the GNI per capita
was recalculated using the value 516 of
the 2011 International comparison program and was found to be 12738 US$,
• To provide an indicator at the governorate level, the mean monthly expenditure
is used as a weighing factor as follows:
Mean expenditure per capita in
governorate(i)
GNI per capita in governorate(i)
= GNI per capita x
__________________________
Mean expenditure per capita (national)
If the mean per capita expenditure in the
governorate is better than national mean,
then the weight will be more than 1, meaning that the per capita share is higher than
the national figure, and vice versa.
Differences between National and
International Computation
The 2010 global Human Development
Report has shown the differences between
national statistics and the statistics used
by the international agencies. This comes
within the framework of the harmonization criteria that render national statistics
of the different countries covered comparable. In cases where national statistics
are not available, the international agencies estimate based on the available information. In these cases, the series of the
internationally approved statistics do not
use the latest national data, which leads to
the differences between the international
and national figures (2010 HDR). This actually provides countries the opportunity
to update their statistics and indicators.
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
187
The Central Statistics Office in Iraq was
able to provide professional and independent statistical data depending on its good
capacity in the years 2010-2013. This was
largely supported by the World Bank and
the United Nations Agencies as illustrated
in the table of the surveys used to prepare
the report’s indicators. This paves the way
for the proper and transparent coordination between the national statistical offices and the international organizations
to use official national data that comply
with the organizations’ criteria.
Table 1 shows that the mean life expectancy at birth is 69 years with clear differences among the governorates. This
number is close to the number used in
the global HDR 2011. The mean years of
schooling was computed to be 8.0 years,
and is much higher than the number used
in the global report at 5.6 years. The mean
of the expected years of schooling was
found to be 10.8 years, again close to the
number used in the international report at
10.0 years.
However, the biggest difference between national and international estimates is found in the per capita share of
the Gross National Income. This mean
has doubled in the period 2005 to 2011.
Additionally the Purchasing Power Parity
related to the price levels in Iraq was low
and approached 516.
Gross Domestic Product and
Gross National Income in Iraq
The Central Statistics Organization
is the sole national institutions with the
mandate to provide National Accounts
data including the Gross Domestic Product and Gross National Income to international organization, including the United
Nations Agencies, ESCWA, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
The following table shows the Gross
Domestic Product data for three years
as published by the IMF in its expert’s
report titled “Iraq: 2013 Article IV Consultation”, page 28. The table additionally
shows Gross National Income data which
is not published in the report.
The table shows that the Gross National
Income is slightly lower than the Gross
Domestic Product. This is the result of the
negative value of the net foreign transfers
due to the compensations made to the
State of Kuwait. It is worth noting that
National Accounts data are revised periodically by the IMF and that these data
are highly reliable.
Year
2010
2011
2012
Gross Domestic Income (Billion
USD)
135.5
180.6
212.5
Gross National Income (Billion
USD)
129.9
170.7
193
Gross National Income (Trillion
IQD)
151.4
199.1
225
Population (Million)
32.5
33.3
34.2
xchange Rate 1 USD = 1,666 IQD
The box below shows the method of
calculating the mean per capita share of
the Gross National Income in the year
2012 adjusted by the Purchasing Power
188
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Parity:
2012 Mean per capita share of National Income by purchasing
power parity
Indicator
Mean per capita share
of national income, 2012
Value
Source
6,578,930.6 IQD
/
516 US$
=
12,738 US$
1. National Income,
Directorate of National
Accounts, Central Statistics
Organization
2. Iraq population, Directorate
of Population Statistics, Central
Statistics Organization
Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP, 2011)
Per capita share of
National Income
adjusted by purchasing
power parity
The closeness of the Gross National Income levels with those of the Gross Domestic Product levels shown in the IMF
report confirms the reliability of the data.
On the basis of the above, the authors of
this report feel that the per capita share of
Gross National Income adjusted by the
Purchasing Power Parity is a more realistic than the indicator shown in the global
Human Development Reports in a number of years, prior to the launch of Global
purchasing power parities and real expenditures (2011 international comparison
program),WB
2.2 Inequality Adjusted Human
Development Index (IHDI)
The IHDI represents a method to show
disparities among social groups and the
differences in distribution among the
population in each dimension of human
development. The HDI is an indicator
showing the overall development in the
country and does not reflect the status
of population segments for the dimensions of human development. The extent
of difference between the HDI and IHDI
Global purchasing power
parities and real expenditures
(2011 international
comparison program),WB.
Computed from above
show reflect the extent of disparities in the
society. In this respect, the IHDI is more
representative of the levels of human development.
The IHDI has two positive characteristics. The first is that this indicator treats
all social groups equally, and changes in
the development of a particular group are
reflected in the indicator even if the level
of the HDI remains the same. The second
characteristic is that this indicator is independent from any other, in the sense that
the order in which the data are collected
from the various groups does not affect
the result. There is no need for a specific sequence of data sources or a single
source of data. These characteristics allow the calculation of the indicator using
various sources from different countries.
Data related to inequality in life expectancy are taken from the mortality statistics that the countries prepare. Inequality
in education is taken from the countries’
living standards assessments. (For more
details on the methodology, please see the
Technical Notes annex in the global Human Development Report, 2011)
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
189
Multidimensional Poverty Method:
The AF methodology consists of two major steps; the
Identification step defining whether a household is
poor or not, and the Aggregation/Measurement
step reporting the prevalence and intensity of poverty. For Iraq these steps were defined as below:
Identification:
The household is considered at the unit of analysis
(i.e. deprivations are defined at the household level. The AF methodology makes use of a dual cutoff
identification system: first is a dimension specific cutoff; which identifies whether a household is deprived
with respect to that dimension, and the second
cutoff delineates how widely deprived a household
must be in order to be considered poor. In particular
the steps for Iraq the identification step are defined
as follows:
1) Identifying a set of indicators deemed relevant to
household poverty/wellbeing.
2) Setting a threshold for each indicator to identify
individuals who are deprived in each indicator (i.e.
household whose achievement in a given indicator
falls below the threshold).
3) Assigning weights to the different indicators that
reflect the relevance of each indicator with respect
to overall household poverty.
4) Calculating a weighted average of the number
of indicators in which the household is deprived (i.e.
weighted count of deprivations).
5) Comparing the weighted average of deprivations
to the poverty cutoff “k-value” (the minimum number of -weighted count of- deprivations a household
should suffer to be considered poor).
Aggregation/Measurement:
At the measurement stage we consider that household deprivations affect all household members
(i.e. individuals), hence we report the results of MP
for the population of individuals (rather than households) which is more intuitive and ease any comparison with income poverty or other socio-economics
measures.
Given that some of the indicators are ordinal (not
cardinal) the MP measures reported here are:
H (Poverty Headcount): The prevalence of multidimensional poverty (the number of individuals suffering from MP poverty divided by total population)
A (Average Deprivation Share): The average extent
of a poor-individual’ deprivations.
M0 (Adjusted Headcount Ration; M0= H*A): The
prevalence of MP poverty adjusted to the extent of
individual number of deprivations.
2.3 Gender Inequality Index
This index shows the challenges that
women face in the three dimensions of
reproductive health, empowerment, and
employment, whenever such data is available. The index captures the discrepancy
between men and women in development levels. Higher levels of equality are
achieved when the differences in the value
of this index with the HDI approaches 0.
A value of 1 indicates complete inequality in all dimensions of the index. More
details are available in the global HDR
2011.
In this report, a special approach was
used to provide an indicator for maternal mortality at the governorate level, as
these statistics are not reliable at this level. Consequently, the national figure of 35
for each 1000 live births was used and adjusted with a weighting factor representing the mean result achieved from three
variables: one prenatal visit to a health
centre, percentage of contraceptive use,
and percentage of births conducted in the
supervision of skilled medics.
2.4 Multidimensional Poverty
Index: Definition and
190
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
Measurement Method
Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI)
is an international measure of poverty,
advanced by Oxford Poverty and Human
Initiative, and recently used at a global
level in 2010 Human Development Report
replacing the Human Poverty Index. The
MPI complements income poverty and
the Millennium Development Goals measures by identifying the overlapping deprivations suffered by individuals in key
wellbeing indicators, such as standards
of living, essential services, health, and
education indicators. In simplified words;
multidimensional poverty accounts for
the individual achievement in a set of indicators, and then counts the number of
indicators in which the individual is deprived, finally an individual is considered
multidimensional poor if it’s deprived in
33 per cent of the indicators.
From the above we realize that three
key decisions should be made in order
to calculate MPI, these are: choosing the
set of dimensions and indicators along
with their respective deprivation’ threshold, weights, and the poverty cut off. For
Iraq these three decisions were selected in
consensus with CSO and KRSO and with
technical support from UNDP/IAU and
OPHI.
As a result of the iterative consultations; Iraq MPI encompasses five dimensions, each dimension in turn is captured
by a set of indicators (21 indicators in total). The dimensions and indicators were
set with two goals in mind: to reflect the
priorities of Iraq National Development
Plan, and to produce an indicator suitable
for measuring human development in Iraq
that will feed eventually into Iraq NHDR.
MP dimensions and Indicators
1. Education and Knowledge
• Illiteracy Male: A Household is deprived if no adult1 male member in the
household can read and write.
• Illiteracy Female: A Household is deprived if no adult female member in the
household can read and write.
• Educational Attainment Male: A
Household is deprived if no adult male
member in the household has completed primary education, which in this case
translates to 6 years of basic education.
• Educational Attainment Female: A
Household is deprived if no adult female member in the household has
completed primary education, which in
this case translates to 6 years of basic
education.
2. Basic Services
• Drinking water: The Household is deprived in drinking water if the source of
drinking water is not General Network
and close well-spring (MDGs definition).
• Sanitation: The Household is deprived
if the sanitation facility is not public
network, septic tank or covered canal
(Outside), or the sanitation facility is
shared with other households.
• Electricity: The Household is deprived
if the total connection to electricity
from the public network, community
generator and private generator is less
than 12 hours per day.
• Garbage collection: The Household is
deprived if the garbage is burnt out /
buried, thrown in open areas, and others (this indicator is calculated only for
urban areas).
3. Standard of Living
• Low Income Households: A Household
is deprived if the real per-capita expenditure (PCE) of household members is
less than the lowest expenditure quintile at the national level (equivalent to
91,116 ID per person per month)
• Housing unit: A Household is deprived
if the type of housing unit is clay house,
tent, caravan, and others, or if the exterior walls are made of blocks from the
turnkey construction, clay/stone and
clay, metal plates, wooden plates, and
others.
• Crowding: A Household is deprived if
more than three persons live per room
in the household or bedrooms are shared
with members from other households.
4. Nutrition and Health
• Balanced Diet: A household is considered as deprived in nutritional intake if
any one of its members does not consume enough of one of the three macro
nutrients (protein, carbohydrate, fat)
and one of the three micro nutrients
(iron, folic acid, and vitamin A) (FAO
methodology).
• Calories intake: The Household is deprived if the calorie intake of any of its
members is less than average required
level (2,330 cals/day).
• Quality of Health Services: The household is deprived if it perceives/assesses
the health services as bad or very bad.
• Distant Health Services: The household
is deprived if it needs more than 30
minutes to reach the closest health service among: Primary Health Care, Public Hospital, Clinic/Government Health
Centre, Clinic/Government Health
Centre Complex, and Pharmacy.
5. Employment
• Unemployment Male: A household is
deprived if any male member of the
household in the labour force is unemployed.
• Unemployment Female: A household is
deprived if any female member of the
household in the labour force is unemployed.
• Underemployment Male: A household
is deprived if any working male member of the household is underemployed.
• Underemployment Female: A household is deprived if any working female
member of the household is underemployed.
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
191
5.5 Job Security Male: A
household is deprived if no
employed male member of
the household works for the
government/public sector, or has
a secure job in the private sector
(work contract and job benefits).
• 5.6 Job Security Female: A household is
deprived if no employed female member of the household works for the government/public sector, or has a secure
job in the private sector (work contract
and job benefits).
2.5 Youth Development Index
The Youth Development Index YDI
aims at assessing development as a process of enlarging youth (15-29 years old)
choices and opportunities, and the extent
of inclusiveness of youth in development
gains. The index is disaggregated by gender to measure the gap in women gains
from development. The YDI measures the
average achievement in five dimensions
of human development.
Levels of Presentation
The index is presented at the governorates level, and is presented by gender.
Method of Calculation
The YDI is geometric mean of the
normalized indices of the domains, cal-
culated for males, females, and for both.
The domain indicators themselves are the
geometric mean of the indicators representing the domain. The construction of
the indicators does not differ from that of
the HDI.
The calculation methodology
could be summarized in the
following:
To convert values to indicators the minimum and maximum values were incorporated and three directions were used to
identify the minimum and maximum values as follows. The indicators are normalized to scale ratios between 0% and 100%,
e.g. percentage of education, minimum
value – maximum value observed for
youth across the governorates and across
gender. It was noticed that the rate of participation in labor force of youth is 6%
lower in Muthana governorate, whereas
it is the highest in the Muthana governorate. This is done by normalizing the level
of the indicator with respect to the target
level of the indicator. The minimum and
maximum values for the years of education, which are the same minimum and
maximum values observed across the
governorates used in measuring the HDI
in the year 2011.
Table A-1
shows the details of the domains, the indicators, and the minimum –
maximum values.
After identifying the minimum and maximum values, the indicators are computed as
follows:
X(i) = 192
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
(actual
value – minimum value)
____________________________
(maximum value – minimum value)
tal youth, and then for male and female
youth. This produces the following indicators
Aggregating indices to construct
the domain indicators
The domain indicator is the geometric
mean of the normalized indices for toEducation Indicator
YEDUI
Male youth education indicator
YEDUIm
Female youth education indicator
YEDUIf
Youth employment indicator
YEMPLI
Male youth employment indicator
YEMPLIm
Female youth employment indicator
YEMPLIf
Youth health indicator
YHI
Male youth health indicator
YHIm
Female youth health indicator
YHIf
Youth participation and security indicator
YPSI
Male youth participation and security indicator
YPSIm
Female youth participation and security indicator
YPSIf
Youth freedom and communication
YEMPOI
Male youth freedom and communication
YEMPOIm
Female youth freedom and communication
YEMPOIf
Calculate the YDI as a geometric mean of
the domains indices;
Male youth: YDIm=(YEDUIm * YEMPLIm * YHIm * YPSIm *YEMPOIm)1/5
Female Youth:YDIf=(YEDUIf * YEMPLIf * YHIf * YPSIf *YEMPOIf)1/5
Youth in General:YDI =(YEDUI * YEMPLI * YHI * YPSI *YEMPOI)1/5
Domain
Sources of Data
• Youth Opinion Survey 2012
• Iraq Socioeconomic Household Survey
2012
• Iraq Knowledge Network 2011
• Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey,
MICS 2011
• Iraq Socioeconomic Household Survey
2007
Indicator
Literacy
Average years of schooling for ages 25-29 years
Education
Employment
Year
Minimum
Value
Maximum
Value
IKN
2011
0%
100%
IKN
2011
0 years
13.1 years
Percentage of families by distance less than 5
Km to school
IHSES
2007
0%
100%
Net enrolment in secondary school
MICS
2011
0%
100%
Youth employment rate
IKN
2011
0%
100%
Youth economic activity rate
IKN
2011
6%
75%
Average wage for youth total middle level
wages
IKN
2011
0%
100%
Discouraged unemployed youth rate
YS
2012
0%
100%
IHSES
2012
0%
100%
Percentage of non-smoking youth
YS
2012
0%
100%
Percentage of youth who do not suffer from
obesity or malnutrition
YS
2012
0%
100%
Percentage health evaluation of youth
individuals
IKN
2011
0%
100%
IHSES
2012
0%
100%
Percentage of youth not suffering from chronic
disease
Health
Source
Percentage of families who are less than 10 Km
away from health centre
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
193
Percentage of youth who are satisfied with the
quality of medical services
Participation
and Security
Freedom and
Communication
IHSES
2012
0%
100%
Percentage of youth who think that there is a
role for youth to develop the society in Iraq
YS
2012
0%
100%
Percentage of youth who feel secure
YS
2012
0%
100%
Percentage of youth who voted in the
elections
YS
2012
42%
84%
Percentage of youth who volunteered in social
activity
IKN
2011
1%
22%
Percentage of youth who have the freedom to
choose spouse
YS
2012
0%
100%
Percentage of youth who engage in a specific
hobby
YS
2012
0%
100%
Percentage of youth who have a cell phone
YS
2012
0%
100%
Percentage of youth who own a computer
YS
2012
0%
100%
Percentage of youth who use the internet
YS
2012
0%
100%
• <?> 2 15 Years and more
194
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
NHDR Research papers
1
Mehdi Al Alaq
Youth from the perspective of HD: Measurement and Analysis
2
Wafa Al Mehdawi
Youth Empowerment
3
Kareem Hamza
From Social Exclusion to Citizenship
4
Emad Abdullateef
Conceptual Framework
5
Yusif Hama Saleh
From social exclusion to citizenship
6
Haider Saeed
Participation and Citizenship
7
Heja Al Sindi
Youth and Culture
NHDR Background papers
1
Mudher Mohamed Saleh
Youth Migration to Digital Societies
2
Ahmed Ibrehi
Social and Political Challenges to Development and Youth Opportunities
3
Ali Al Zubaidy
The Right to Education
4
Abdul Hakeem Jawzal
Youth and the State
5
Harith Al Garawi
Youth and National and sub national Identity
6
Usama Al Anni
Youth and Elections
7
Hassan Latif
Demographic Characteristics and Youth life Pattern
8
Omro Hesham
From study to work: Facilitating the Transition
9
Adnan Yassin
Analysis of Focus Group Meeting Reports
10
Ahmed Yassine
Demographic Characteristics of Youth
11
Qassim Enaiat
Role of Public Investment in Building Sustainable Development
12
Shaima Abdul Asis
Youth and Value
13
Badr Khan Al Sindi
Youth and Knowledge
14
Hazim Al Nuami
University Students Attitudes Toward General Elections
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
195
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Notes
1 Adib Nehme, Human Development: A
Present Work Approach and a Future
Vision, Conceptual Chapter.
2 Human Development Report 2010 –
The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways
to Human Development, 20th Anniversary Edition. Introduction by Amartya
Sen, UNDP, New York, 2010, p. vi.
3 Ibid, p. 1.
4 Ban Ki-Moon, Realizing the Future We
Want for All. The UN Task Team on
the Post-2015 Development Agenda,
New York, June 2012.
5 The workshops were held in preparation for the Arab Forum titled Post2015 MDGs Arab Voices, held in Amman on 11-12 April 2013.
6 Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, ‘The Intellectual
Journey Continues: Today’s Global
Agenda and New Frontiers of Human
Development’. In Pioneering the Human Development Revolution: An
Intellectual Biography of Mahbub ul
Haq, edited by Khadija Haq and Richard Jolly, with a foreword by Amartya
Sen, Oxford, 2008.
7 Realizing the Future We Want for All,
para. 49.
8 Adib Nehme, Human Development: A
Present Work Approach and a Future
Vision, Conceptual Chapter, p. 12.
9 Anthony Giddens, Sociology.
10Kareem Muhammad Hamza, ‘Social
Exclusion: An Exploratory Review of
Concepts’, Social Science Magazine,
Issue 4, Baghdad, 2012.
11The preliminary results of the latest
survey in 2013 shows further decline
to 22 and 27 successively
12GNI per capita index used in calculating income index for the purpose of
HDI has followed the method of equating it with purchasing power parity
(see the Technical Notes Appendix)
13What should be highlighted is the big
increase in GNP per capita after the
embargo on oil exports was lifted in
mid-2003, jumping from 1300 US
Dollars in 2004 t0 6300 US Dollars in
2012, due to increased oil production
and export and high, stable oil prices.
See IMF, Iraq consultation Report,
April 2013, p5.
14World Bank, World Development Report , 2012, Atlas method
15Real increase approached 21% onlybecause inflation rate rose by 40% between 2007 and 2012. CSO, Iraq
16This will be discussed further in relevant chapters
172011HDR, pp 62-63 Arabic version
18
The 2012 Youth Survey, IHSES2,
IKN2011, MICS42011, and IHSES1
2007 (the statistical report). Appendix
() describes the YDI measurement approach in detail.
19Several resources and tools to improve
national indicators were used(The
World Youth Report 2005, about
adopting the Brazilian YDI as a policy
development instrument, and the Youth
Policy Formulation Manual produced
by ESCWA in 2012)while setting the
data of the baseline, which is a standard for measuring the changes during
a certain period that result from implementing development programmes.
20IPMM 2013
21I-WISH 2011
22I-WISH 2011
23This is before Anbar governorate crises
in 2013
24CSO
25A study estimated that in 2000 there
were over 91,000 Iraqi migrants in
the USA, 32,000 in the UK, 17,500 in
Denmark, 14,700 in Norway, nearly
9,000 in Turkey, 3,000 in Finland, and
around 5,000 in New Zealand.
26According to the 2009 HDR, the number of Iraqi refugees in 2007 amounted
to 2.28 million or 16 percent of the
refugees in the world. The majority of
Iraqi refugees are in North America,
followed by Europe
27IOM numbers
28Iraq Knowledge Network, 2011, Table
4-33.
29According to the ILO definition: Visible underemployment refers to persons
who are in employment of less than 35
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
199
hours a week and who wish to work additional hours in their same job, have
an additional job, or change their current job, while invisible underemployment refers to persons who are in employment of less than 35 hours a week
and who wish to work additional hours
in their same job, have an additional
job, or change their current job due to
low income, low number of working
hours, or underutilization of skill, or
because their current job is seasonal,
temporary, or casual (Iraq Knowledge
Network, 2011).
30The National Committee for Demographic Policies and UNFPA, Analysis
of the Demographic Situation in Iraq,
2012, Baghdad, p.118.
31CSO, Iraq Household Socio-Economic
Survey 2007.
32Rentier Economy: A situation where
the economy relies on a substantial
external rent – and therefore does not
require a strong domestic productive sector. Only a small proportion
of the working population is actually
involved in the generation of the rent.
Perhaps most importantly, the state’s
government is the principal recipient
of the external rent. See:
Beblawi, Hazem Al and Luciani, Giacomo, 1990, The Rentier State in the
Arab World, in Luciani, G., The Arab
State, London, Routledge, p.87-88
33Madhar Mohammed Saleh, The Rentier State: From Economic Centralization to Market Democracy, Bayt Alhikma, 2010.
34Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey 2012.
35Studies of 38 countries show that onethird of the population spent half of
their income increase on food (Strauss).
36Alderman.
37The highest share of the operating expenditures was in the 2009 budget with
78 percent, while the lowest shares
were in 2008 and 2012 with 67 percent
and 68.4 percent respectively (Iraq Gazette, Laws of the Federal Budget during 2007–2012).
38
Benedict Clements, Sanjeev Gupta,
Izabela Karpowicz, and Shamsuddin
Tareq, Evaluating Government Employment and Compensation, International Monetary Fund, September
200
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
2010, p. 12.
39Farzaneh Roudi, Youth Population and
Employment in the Middle East and
North Africa: Opportunity or Challenge, United Nations Expert Group
Meeting on Adolescents, Youth, and
Development, 2011.
40Graham E. Fuller, The Youth Crisis in
Middle Eastern Society, The Institute
for Social Policy and Understanding,
Michigan, 2004.
41
National Development Plan 20132017.
42Translator: I believe this should be
‘2013-2017’
Adeeb Nehmeh, Youth Research’s
43
Problems and Future Proposals, Beirut,
2012, p.16–17.
44Halim Barakat, Arab Society in the
20th Century, Beirut, Center of Arab
Unity Studies, 2000, p.362.
45Hisham Shurabi, Parental System, Nelson Publishing House, undated, p.31.
46Halim Barakat, Arab Society in the
20th Century, Beirut, Center of Arab
Unity Studies, 2000, p.376 and following.
47Ibid., Table 10-7, p.233.
48Central Statistics Organization et al.,
The Results of the 2011 I-WISH: Summary Report, March 2012, p.22.
49Youssef Hemmeh Saleh, From Social
Exclusion to Citizenship, background
paper.
50I-WISH, p. 40.
51CSO, ‘Women and Children Conditions Monitoring’, MICS42011, p. 45.
52I-WISH p. 28.
53The National Committee for Demographic Policies and UNFPA, Analysis of the Demographic Situation in
Iraq,2012, Baghdad, p. 61.
54CSO, MICS4 2011.
55CSO ‘Women and Children Conditions
Monitoring’, MICS4 2011, p. 42.
56I-WISH 2011, p. 61.
57
National Committee for Population
Policies, Population Situation Analysis
in Iraq 2012, UNFPA, June 2012, p.95.
58Gaston Bouthoul, War.
59This is particularly evident in education. Although education is free, some
teachers and school administrations
demand illegal contributions from
students’ families, especially the poor
ones, which leads to the students dropping out.
60Ali Wardi, Social Glimpses of Modern
Iraqi History, Part 5,
61
Islamic Book Publications, 2005,
p.301.
62The Iraqi Poverty Alleviation Policy Supreme Committee, Addressing Poverty in Iraq, an analytical report on the
Iraqi people’s living conditions, World
Bank, 2012.
63Ministry of Youth and Sports, the analytical report of the national survey.
64Iraq Knowledge Network, 2011.
65Official statistics of the Ministry of
Education and the Ministry of Higher
Education, Directorate of Social and
Educational Statistics / Central Statistics Organization
66Ibid.
67
Arab Labour Organization, ALO’s
First Report Summary on Employment
and Unemployment in the Arab Countries, July 2008, p.13.
68Central Statistics Organization, Parallel Education in Iraq 2012-2013, page
2
69Central Statistics Organization, Parallel Education in Iraq 2012-2013, page
7
70Arab Labour Organization, Summary
of the First Report of the Arab Labour
Organization on Employment in Arab
Countries, July 2008, page 13
71
Central Statistical Organization and
Ministry of Planning, The Technical
and University Education Report in
Iraq 2009–2010, Iraq, 2011, p.3.
72AECOM International Development,
Finance and Banking Education in
Iraq: A Skills Gap Analysis and the
Way Forward, report summary, USAID Iraq, 2011, p.19.
73The 2009 Youth and Adolescent Survey, detailed report, October 2009,
Table 3–14, p.76.
74
UNESCO, Arab Knowledge Report
2009, p. 25.
75The 2009 Youth and Adolescent Survey, p. 269–271.
76Nicola Ansell, Children, Youth and Development, Routledge, London, 2005.
77The Key to a Peaceful Iraq: Educating
and Enfranchising Iraqi Youth, Columbia University Center for International
Conflict Resolution, New York, 2009.
78Ibid.
79Will Kymlicka, ‘Modernity and National Identity’, Ethnic Challenges to
the Modern Nation State, Yoav Peled
and Alberto Spektorowski Shlomo
Ben-Ami, eds., Macmillan Press LTD,
New York, 2000, p. 11–41.
80The well-known definition of democracy developed by American economist Joseph Schumpeter in his Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942),
which makes competitive elections a
fundamental pillar of democracy.
81Hashem Rabea Amr, ed., Encyclopedia
of Parliamentary and Electoral Concepts and Terminology, Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies,
Cairo, 2009.
82The 2009 National Youth and Adolescent Survey considers youth those aged
10–30 – a wider group than the age
group adopted by the UN and its affiliated organizations (15–24)and then
the one adopted in this report (15–29).
In general, there are only slight differences between the results of the two
standards presented here.
83Ministry of Youth and Sports, Central
Statistical Organization, Kurdistan
Ministry of Youth and Sports, Kurdistan Region Statistics Office, The
2009 National Youth and Adolescent
Survey(Summary Report),UNFPA Iraq
Office and the Arab League Pan Arab
Project for Family Health, Baghdad,
2010, p.28.
84Hazem Abdulhamid Nu’ami, University Youth Attitudes on Participation
in Public Election, field poll, unpublished, p.12.
85The 2009 National Youth and Adolescent Survey(Summary Report), p.vii.
86Ibid.
87Bertelsmann Foundation, The Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2008, Gulf
Research Center, 2009.
88Columbia University Center for International Conflict Resolution, The
Key to a Peaceful Iraq: Educating and
Enfranchising Iraqi Youth, New York,
2009.
Iraq Human Development Report 2014
201
89Barry R. Posen, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, Survival, Vol.
35, No. 1, p. 27–47.
Jurgen Habermas, The Structural
90
Transformation of the Public Sphere:
An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society,1962, translated into
English in 1989.
91P. Kollock and A. Marc, Communities in Cyberspace, Rutledge, London,
1999, p. 3–25.
92Ibrahim Al-Marashi, The Dynamics
of Iraq’s Media: Ethno-Sectarian Violence, Political Islam, Public Advocacy
and Globalization, Budapest, Open Society Institute, 2007.
93AdibNehme, Research Problems in the
Field of Youth and Future Proposals,
Beirut, 2012, pp. 16-17
94UNDP and the Arab League, Development Challenges for the Arab Region:
A Human Development Approach,
Volume I, March 2009.
95UNDP, League of Arab States, Development Challenges in the Arab Countries, Human Development Approach,
Part I, March, 2009.
202
Iraq Human Development Report 2014