1. Art and Diseño

Harmattan School 2014. Oduro. Building Strong Structures for Accountable Governance
Building Strong Structures for Accountable Governance
Dr. Franklin Oduro1
Head of Research and Programs/Deputy Director
Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana)
1
Research for this paper was done by Isaac Debrah, Research/Program Officer at CDD-Ghana
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Harmattan School 2014. Oduro. Building Strong Structures for Accountable Governance
This years’ Harmattan School, with the theme ‘Accountable Governance - A Key to National
Development’, could not have come at a better time. Public discourse is currently saturated with the
demand for a meaningful and effective system of governmental accountability and the need to
control official corruption. Against this background, the objective of the 2014 Harmattan School,
which principally seeks to discuss the effects of accountable governance on the socio-economic
development of Ghana and Northern Ghana in particular, is commendable.
The history of Ghana’s political, economic and social development is littered with tales of
unaccountable governance. Abhorrence for the lack of accountability by officialdom and widespread
corruption, with associated impunity, can be seen as one of the core reasons for military
interventions in our post-independence political history. Indeed, the last of the military interventions
under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) made ‘probity and accountability’ a slogan for
administration. It could not, however, provide a cure for the malaise.
Unfortunately, many years after the PNDC military regime, we continue to discuss and
search for ways to make our governance system accountable because, as much as we all
acknowledge that accountable governance is fundamental to national development, little
has been done to achieve it. It must be added that discourse on accountable governance
has been especially prevalent in the period of enduring democratic governance since 1992.
This is hardly a coincidence, given that accountability is one of the important goals and
cornerstones of democratic governance. Ghana’s current efforts toward democratic
development and good governance can only be described as successful if it is able to make
governance more accountable (Gyimah-Boadi, 2006).
The topic of this paper is ‘Building Strong Structures for Accountable Governance’. I first
discuss, briefly, the notion of accountability, and indeed what is meant by ‘accountable
governance’. This discussion is intended to enable readers to appreciate the enabling and
strong structures required for accountable governance. This will be followed by an
examination of existing structures for accountable governance in Ghana. In this I will
attempt to evaluate the successes, challenges, and deficits in these structures. The paper
concludes by proffering recommendations for building strong structures for accountable
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Harmattan School 2014. Oduro. Building Strong Structures for Accountable Governance
governance in Ghana. I hope that these thoughts contribute to setting the tone for a
meaningful discussion on the theme for this year’s school.
Accountability and Accountable Governance: Conceptual Clarifications
My discussion of the notion of accountability will be brief. Suffice it to note that the notion
of accountability is broad and amorphous, and that makes it difficult to define. An apt
definition depends on the topic being covered. In the context of this paper, the notion of
accountability, broadly speaking, suggests an existing relationship where an individual or
body (institution), and the performance of tasks or functions by that individual or body, are
subject to another’s oversight, direction or request that they provide information or
justification for their actions. The concept of accountability involves the two distinct
elements of answerability and enforcement (Stapenhurst & O’Brien, n.d.). The former
refers to the obligation of the government, its agencies and public officials to provide
information about their decisions and actions and to justify them to the public and those
institutions of accountability tasked with providing oversight. Enforcement, on the other
hand, suggests that the public or the institution responsible for accountability can sanction
the offending party or remedy the contravening behaviour.
Put differently, the notion of accountability has both supply and demand aspects.
Individuals and bodies entrusted with public duties and positions of trust are expected to
account for their stewardship at all times. In the same vein, citizens who willingly surrender
their will to be governed by their representatives have the right to demand accountability
from their governors, be they individuals or institutions. The notion of accountability is thus
at the core of a social contract, which essentially suggests that the state’s duty is to serve
the will of the people and forms the foundation of accountable and effective governance.
One of the major features of good governance is therefore accountability of stewardship. I
must emphasize that accountability should not only be confined to governmental
institutions. The private sector and civil society organizations must all be accountable to
the public and to their respective institutional stakeholders.
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Harmattan School 2014. Oduro. Building Strong Structures for Accountable Governance
Accountable governance assures that corruption is curtailed or minimized; that the views of
minorities are taken into account in making decisions; that the voices of the most
marginalized and vulnerable in society are catered for in decision-making processes, and
that governors are responsive to the present and future needs of society. Accountable
governance would make citizens not only appreciate the social contract (Rousseau, 1762)
with our leaders, but also feel that the democratic principle (Hobbes, 1651) ―which is the
process by which we elect the individuals and assemblies that represent us ― to which we
have collectively surrendered our will to be governed is accountable to us. If this
democratic principle (the ‘Leviathan’) does not appreciate the nature of the covenant, then,
that can in itself be a travesty to our collective will. It creates the unpleasant impression
that social contracts do not represent the will of the people.
There are two fundamental variants of accountability: horizontal and vertical
accountability.
a) Horizontal Accountability: Horizontal accountability is the capacity of state
institutions to check abuses by other public agencies and branches of government.
These institutions of accountability (such as Parliament and the Judiciary) provide
what is commonly termed horizontal accountability, or the capacity of a network of
relatively autonomous powers (i.e., other institutions) to call into question, and
eventually punish, improper ways of discharging the responsibilities of a given
official (Cavill & Sohail, 2004).
b) Vertical Accountability: In contrast, vertical accountability is the means through
which citizens, mass media and civil society seek to enforce standards of good
performance by officials. Elections are by far the most popular means through
which to advance vertical accountability. While Parliament is typically considered as
a key institution in constructs of horizontal accountability, it is also important in
vertical accountability. Citizens and civil society groups can seek the support of
elected representatives to redress grievances and intervene in the case of
inappropriate or inadequate action by government. In addition, through the use of
public hearings, committee investigations and public petitioning, Parliament can
provide a vehicle for public voice and a means through which citizens and civic
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Harmattan School 2014. Oduro. Building Strong Structures for Accountable Governance
groups can question government and seek parliamentary sanctioning where
appropriate.
Having outlined what accountability is and what accountable governance seeks to achieve, I
now proceed to examine the existing structures for accountable governance in Ghana.
Before I proceed any further, I would like to state that by structures of accountable
governance, I mean constitutional and legal arrangements embodied in institutions, laws,
rules and regulations, as well as other formal and informal systems and practices that are
encapsulated in the principles of democracy and good governance that allow for effective
accountable governance to thrive.
Structures of Accountable Governance in Ghana
To my mind, the 1992 Constitution of Ghana is the foundation upon which accountable
governance in this country rests. It is the fundamental basis for building structures of
accountable governance and provides both the supply and demand elements necessary to
promote it. The Constitution provides the framework for promoting the distinct elements
of accountability, which are answerability and enforcement, and it also advances horizontal
and vertical accountability. Article one of the 1992 Constitution gives full expression to
citizens’ power over the state: ‘The sovereignty of Ghana resides in the people of Ghana in
whose name and for whose welfare the powers of government are to be exercised in the
manner and within the limits laid down in this Constitution.’ This provision represents a
social contract and therefore calls for accountable governance. Furthermore, under the
Directive Principles of State Policy, chapter 6, article 35 (3) states ‘the state shall promote
just and reasonable access by all citizens to public facilities and services in accordance with
the law.’ These two provisions contained in the 1992 Constitution are synonymous with
social responsibility and responsible stewardship, which deals with accountability.
Clearly the state has an obligation to the citizenry. The state must exist to ensure the
welfare of its citizens and ensure proper accountability. While these two provisions provide
the framework for ensuring accountable governance at the national level, the Constitution
goes further in Chapter 5 to lay out a specific framework for accountable governance at the
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local level through decentralization and local government. In addition to these, there is a
plethora of constitutional provisions that guarantee freedom and independence of the
media, the creation of public institutions for the supply side of accountable governance and
to promote horizontal accountability. Through the institutions of Parliament, Judiciary,
agencies under the executive, and other bodies such as the Commission on Human Rights
and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) and the National Media Commission (NMC), structures
for promoting accountable governance have been provided for in the 1992 Constitution.
In addition to these constitutional provisions, successive parliaments have enacted various
legislations such as the Asset Declaration Law, the Whistle-blower’s Act and the
Procurement Act to provide the enabling institutions and environment for advancing both
the supply and demand sides of accountable governance. Indeed, for the demand element,
existing structures, such as routine elections, the district assembly concept, media freedom,
and provisions of various rights and opportunities for the participation of all citizens in
public policy matters promote vertical accountability.
In sum, I argue that, in theory, the current structures we have to promote accountable
governance, despite weakness in some, are generally adequate. If they are properly
implemented and enforced, ensuring accountable governance in Ghana should not be an
issue that continues to dominate our public discourse and endanger governance in the
Fourth Republic.
To be sure, however, it is one thing having all these nice laws, institutions and structures in
place and another ensuring that they perform well to advance accountable governance. It
is true that Ghana has made progress over the years in its democratic development since
the re-introduction of multi-party democracy in 1992. These gains have won Ghana several
accolades among the community of nations, especially in Africa, and the general donor
community. Though our practice of democratic accountability has rarely been perfect,
Ghana is generally seen as a bastion of good governance within the troubled West African
sub-region. Nonetheless, it could be perceived that issues of accountability still hamper
different dimensions of human progress in our young but thriving democracy. The
perception is still rife that the social contract with our leaders has yet to be consciously
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Harmattan School 2014. Oduro. Building Strong Structures for Accountable Governance
appreciated. It seems to some that here is a lack of adherence to any form of social
contract by some public officeholders and institutions, and that is where the fundamental
issue of accountable governance lies.
Successes, Challenges and Deficits in Existing Structures of Accountable Governance
Over the last 20 years, the history of Ghana’s quest for accountable governance from both
the supply and demand side has been a chequered one. While numerous structures have
been put in place to foster accountable governance, in practice this has generally been
problematic. To my mind, the lack of governmental accountability is the greatest
governance challenge we face today. While the constitution establishes a system of checks
and balances among the three branches of government, the executive branch is dominant,
thereby undermining the oversight role of Parliament, for example. The prevailing system
of executive-legislative fusion where the President must appoint the majority of his cabinet
from Parliament (Article 78) has rendered ineffectual Parliament’s oversight of the
Executive. Indeed, some have argued that Parliament has effectively been co-opted as part
of the Executive (Gyimah-Boadi, 2010).
The problem is that parliamentarians who are also ministers find it difficult to balance their
loyalty to the executive and to Parliament, thereby undermining the independence of the
Legislature. Although there was a recommendation by the Constitutional Review
Commission to remedy the situation, I find the recommendation questionable. The
Government white paper on the work of the Commission provides that ‘government
accepts the recommendation that the President should be given a free hand to appoint
Ministers from within or without Parliament.’ It is not clear to me that simply removing the
clause ‘majority’ from the existing provision requiring the president to appoint ministers
from Parliament really solves the problem at hand.
There is generally insufficient regulation of presidential discretionary authority, and a lack
of legislative oversight of the president. The constitution, laws, and conventions enable the
president to side-step Parliament in law-making. The executive, through its parliamentary
majority, is able to use a combination of incentives and threats to pass even the most
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unpopular measures through Parliament. It is true to suggest that Parliament has continued
to perform its oversight functions, especially the work of the Public Accounts Committee, in
the recent past, which has raised public confidence in the ability of Parliament to exercise
control over the budgetary processes. Nonetheless, the committee remains unassertive in
scrutinizing executive powers and is unable to move forward to the next stage of
implementing its recommendations due to the lack of power to prosecute or enforce its
recommendations. In effect, the robustness normally expected of legislative oversight to
promote accountable governance at the national level is almost lost.
Besides the weak oversight role of Parliament over the executive, another area of concern
regarding ensuring accountable governance has to do with vertical accountability through
elections. To start with, while we can commend ourselves for ensuring that general
elections are held every four years to foster vertical accountability (to allow for leaders to
render account), we cannot confidently say so for the local government elections. Indeed,
for general elections we can predict that every four years in December Ghanaians will go to
the polls, but for local government elections the same cannot be said, and the uncertainty
surrounding their conduct when the time comes makes them unattractive. The unit
committee structures seek to bring good and accountable governance nearer to citizens.
However, with our inability to institute credible unit committee elections we have failed to
effectively institute this structure in our governance system.
Furthermore, while citizens’ participation at the national elections, in terms of voter turnout, indicates enthusiasm, the same cannot be said for local government elections. Indeed,
the situation at the decentralized level is worrying, particularly as the district assemblies
serve as pillars for national development. Not only is vertical accountability weak because
of the nature of appointments to the executive position, which tends to foster upward
accountability which, of course, is inimical to the virtues of decentralization, citizens’
participation in local decision making processes has over the years been a challenge.
The institutional instruments intended to promote vertical accountability at the district
level include competitive and reasonably clean elections, the opportunity to recall or pass a
vote of no confidence in non-performing or misbehaving representatives, active popular
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civil society and media vigilance over and engagement with both the political and
administrative leadership and an effective public complaint and redress mechanism. There
is also regular interaction between Municipal/Metropolitan/District Chief Executives
(M/M/DCEs) and the electorate through durbars and some type of forums that promote
avenues for some type of ‘Question Time’, where the M/M/DCEs and other key executive
officials of the Assembly can respond to questions from the grassroots, and a regime and
culture of providing information (Gyimah-Boadi, 2006). However, these elements of good
accountable governance are missing in many of our decentralized units. When it comes to
providing needed information on assembly programs, which is fundamental to accountable
governance, there is a huge deficit. A study recently conducted by CDD-Ghana (2012) on its
Social Accountability project in 17 district assemblies selected in Ghana revealed that seven
out of ten individuals were not aware of the processes used by their
Municipal/Metropolitan/District Assemblies (M/M/DAs) to determine rates to be paid for
landed properties, licenses, fees, and fines.
Yet another issue that is frustrating efforts at attaining accountable governance is official
corruption. The lessons from our historic failures on the anti-corruption battlefront have
been compelling. Throughout this nation’s political history there has been a growing
perception of the need to tackle corruption urgently. Various governments have pursued
anti-corruption initiatives in a piecemeal manner. Successive governments’ actions have
centred on setting up commissions of enquiry, criminal prosecutions and moral crusades,
among other activities. As a country, we seem to be aware of the effect of corruption on
national development, and yet we have been unable to deal with it. Over the past two
decades, the country has enacted a number of pieces of legislation as well as set up
institutions to deal with corruption in the public domain. These laws, including the Asset
Declaration Law, the Whistle-blower’s Act and the Procurement Act, and institutions, such
as the Internal Audit Service, Public Procurement Authority, Economic and Organized Crime
Office (EOCO) and Central Tender Board, although some do have weaknesses, appear to
generally have teeth to promote some levels of accountable governance.
It therefore seems that existing legal structures and institutions do not present a credible
threat to persons involved in corruption. A real threat of arrest seems to be lacking
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Harmattan School 2014. Oduro. Building Strong Structures for Accountable Governance
especially when highly placed public figures are involved in the act. Accordingly, perception
that officials are engaged in corruption remains high among Ghanaians. In the recent
Afrobarometer survey (2012), the majority of Ghanaians perceive corruption to be
committed by ‘some’ officials in the presidency (58%), Parliament (58%) and government
(56%). In the same study, the majority of citizens (54%) resented the way government was
fighting corruption. The reason why so many anti-corruption initiatives have failed is
difficult to comprehend. Perhaps our politicians and public office holders are not interested
in making progress towards national development. What is striking is that Ghanaian
political leaders are quick to ratify all the international anti-corruption conventions and
formulate impressive pieces of anti-corruption legislation, yet do not implement them. As
of now, Parliament is yet to endorse the newly designed National Anti-Corruption Action
Plan.
On the whole, while the legal framework for addressing corruption exists, there remain
significant gaps in it. Governments have failed to make any structural and institutional
reforms for preventing corruption and improving transparency. Credible legislation that can
contribute to public accountability, such as the Freedom of Information law, is yet to be
enacted. In the past, various branches of government played political football with
transparency-promoting legislative initiatives, kicking them back and forth between the
sector ministries, cabinet, Parliament, and the attorney general’s department.
Furthermore, anti-corruption efforts are hampered by poor funding to some of the
institutions created to effectively promote the supply side of accountable governance.
The demand side of accountable governance is also critical. Certainly, the process of
promoting accountable governance is a wide agenda that involves citizen groups
demanding accountability from officialdom. This demand aspect has not been given
sufficient attention in this country, except for occasional and episodic events. There are two
sides to this issue. First, citizens’ ability to engage with officials towards accountable
governance depends on them receiving a free flow of high quality information. Several
studies have demonstrated that citizens, particularly those in the rural areas, lack the
needed information to enable them to engage effectively with public officials. For example,
a study by CDD-Ghana revealed that two-thirds of the populace are not aware of the
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regulation that demands district assemblies seek the inputs of citizens and the district
assembly complaints committees when preparing district development plans (CDD-Ghana/
European Union, 2013).
The overall effect is that a considerable section of citizens seldom take local elected leaders
to task. As revealed in the CDD-Ghana Afrobarometer survey (2012), few Ghanaians contact
their elected and government officials. A large majority of citizens reported ‘never’
contacting any officials of government (89%), Member of Parliament (86%), political
officials, or local government council (68%) in the past year. In the same vein, close to four
out of ten Ghanaians (38%) reportedly joined other citizens to raise an issue ‘once’, ‘twice’,
‘several times’ or ‘often’ in the past year (i.e. 2011). Thus, a majority of citizens (62%)
never join others to raise any issue at all. Indeed, 83% of Ghanaians report that they would
never attend a protest march or demonstration. These findings are slightly worrying as they
indicate that citizens will do very little on their own, although legitimate structures are
available, to demand accountable governance.
The second issue relating to weak citizens’ engagement and demand for accountable
governance has to do with the quality and clarity of information they receive. We do know
that Ghanaians are generally interested and seek to participate in public affairs. For
example, CDD-Ghana conducted another study in eight constituencies in four regions
(Central, Greater Accra, Western and Eastern) in 2012 as part of its ‘I AM AWARE’ project
on citizens empowerment to hold those in authority accountable for the delivery of public
goods and services. In this survey, the majority of citizens (69%) claimed to be interested in
public affairs, although only 52% of citizens occasionally discussed them with one another.
Citizens tended to seek news on political and governance matters from the radio and
television, and the majority of citizens (74%) claimed discussion on these matters was
sometimes complicated and confusing. What was interesting was that although the
majority of citizens (69%) claimed to be interested in public affairs, only 52% occasionally
discussed them with one another.
These results may explain why citizens seldom act, either to join others to protest, or on
their own act to demand for accountability. This may be because citizens are often not clear
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in their minds what the main issues to act upon are. The argument here is that the ability of
citizens to demand accountability from public officials will depend on the nature, quality
and credibility of information they receive. The current practice where political
commentators, government, opposing and party communication persons take to radio
platforms every morning to discuss similar issues often from partisan perspectives seems to
dilute issues and confuse listeners. Many of these party spokespeople are not firmly
grounded on the issues to be discussed. As a result, they muddy critical debates with their
uninformed, possibly uneducated understanding of the issues pertinent to national
development. Because they want to appeal to their party rank and file as the foremost
defender of the party, many of them deliver information of questionable veracity on radio
and the various electronic media platforms. Such growing practices are deeply worrying
and do not help improve the clarity and credibility of information that citizens receive.
Building Strong Structures for Accountable Governance
With this background of a mixed experience with accountable governance over the past
years, what can we suggest as a way forward in building strong structures for accountable
governance in Ghana? Before I proffer my recommendations, I want to reiterate that
currently we do have adequate laws, institutions and structures (although there are
significant weaknesses in some) to promote accountable governance, if there is the political
will for it. It is also critical that we acknowledge that any meaningful effort to advance
accountable governance requires both the demand and supply sides of the equation.
Ghanaians are demonstrating a demand for accountable governance. The recent
Afrobarometer survey (2012) reveals that poplar demand for official accountability is strong
and growing. The 2012 Afrobarometer study, in comparison with the 2005 and 2008
studies, shows that Ghanaians are increasingly beginning to accept their responsibility to
demand job performance from elected officials. Specifically, the study found that the
overwhelming majority of Ghanaians (92%) prefers their leaders to be selected through
elections. Similarly, the majority (70%) support parliamentary oversight of the presidency;
72% demand presidential compliance with the laws of the country and judicial decisions
and 68% support media exposure of government mistakes and corruption. To my mind
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Harmattan School 2014. Oduro. Building Strong Structures for Accountable Governance
these revelations indicate a positive outlook for scaling up accountable governance in
Ghana.
While these findings indicate that there may be reasonable hope that citizens’ demand for
governmental accountability will increase, the same cannot be said for official
responsiveness. The Afrobarometer survey (2012) also reveals that citizens feel that most
national and local officials are not sufficiently responsive to their needs and concerns: the
majority of Ghanaians feel that their parliamentarians (63%) and local councillors (52%)
‘never’ try to listen to them.
On the basis of the above findings and current governance challenges, I proffer my
recommendations for building strong structures for accountable governance.
To start with, there is the need for an enhanced supply of accountable governance. Public
officials, including Members of Parliament, should be proactive and create the necessary
dialogue to regularly interact with their constituencies. It is by creating such platforms that
meaning can be brought to the established social contract and deepen the notion of
representation. The supply side of accountable institutions must be proactive rather than
reactive. We often see public officials respond whenever there has been a news report in
the newspapers or on radio about possible malfeasance or broken promises. Such a
reactionary approach deepens the perception that such agencies need the prodding of an
‘unseen hand’ before they act, and even if they act, their motives are always questionable;
especially if the accountability problem they seek to address is not solved. Being proactive
would make accountability institutions appear genuine.
Furthermore, state and independent constitutional bodies mandated to promote
accountable governance via the horizontal accountability channel should be truly
independent of ruling parties, taking their mandate from the constitution, and the
leadership of these institutions should uphold the ethical values that go with the positions
they occupy. The appointment process to leadership positions in horizontal accountability
institutions should be made bi-partisan to bring credibility and respect to these institutions,
which then enables the leadership to take decisive efforts and measures to promote
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accountability. Horizontal accountability institutions, such as CHRAJ, EOCO, the Judiciary,
Parliament and Auditor General should be protected from being captured by political party
leaders and other sectarian interests. Perhaps it is about time that we take the debate
regarding the decoupling of the office of Attorney General and the Minister of Justice more
seriously. The appointment of an Independent State Prosecutor with secured tenure of
office may be a prudent policy measure to consider. Most critical, these institutions should
be adequately resourced and their funding guaranteed at all times to help strengthen and
deepen accountable governance.
Similarly, our political leaders must demonstrate the political will and courage to allow anticorruption agencies to work independently of any partisan influence and pulling of strings
from behind the scenes. We should make the various pieces of anti-corruption legislation
bite irrespective of the person they implicate. There is no point enacting these laws if we
are not ready to enforce them. Strict enforcement would also blur the crucial distinction
between corruptible acts of members of incumbent government and those of the previous
government. It would also be a spectacular proof that the system works and those culprits
often do get caught regardless of their political affiliations or connections.
While I make the case that credible anti-corruption legislation presently exists, there is also
the need to take a second look at some of these laws, such as those on asset declaration
and whistle blowers, in order to strengthen them and make them effective. The loopholes
in these laws undermine any credible prospects for transparent and accountable
governance.
There is also the urgent need to address the problem of executive dominance, in particular
over Parliament. Our legislative body can perform better and play its oversight role
effectively if it can assert itself. To my mind, the nation has to find ways of ensuring that
Parliament asserts itself and become the centre of accountable governance in Ghana, as is
the practice in all established democracies.
Besides the supply side, the demand side of accountable governance is also critical. There is
the need to sustain public interest in public affairs between elections, and particularly to
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strengthen citizen participation in community affairs by monitoring performance of
government and state institutions beyond elections. I think that if we want to promote
accountable governance for both local and national development, the country must make
the bold decision to completely devolve power from central government to local authorities
by requiring that M/M/DCEs are elected. The situation where the presidency still has a role
in the appointment process is unsustainable and unhelpful to good governance.
Scaling up citizens’ demands for accountable governance also requires expanding
opportunities for inclusion in representation, participation and enjoyment of the dividends
of economic and social development as well as democracy. Building strong structures for
accountable governance requires strengthening grassroots demand for government/public
official and state institutional transparency, accountability, responsiveness and
performance. In this context, I recommend that we continue to support social
accountability mechanisms: an approach towards building accountability that relies on civic
engagement. Empowering ordinary citizens and/or civil society organizations to participate
directly or indirectly in exacting accountability is critical to ensuring accountable
governance (Arroyo & Sirker, 2005; Goetz & Gaventa, 2001).
To be sure, using social accountability mechanisms would require citizens’ groups to
actively demand accountability as opposed to simply talking about it. For example, it has to
do with Parent Teacher Associations understanding the nature of funds transfers and grants
and school infrastructure developments from the common fund and GETFUND. It also has
to do with the media, for example, addressing issues of social and public accountability
surrounding investments that are pledged and investments that are actually made in the
budget process, and how they are implemented. It also includes citizens’ engagement with
Parliament, working closely with the public accounts committee, for example, to ensure
that the voices of the poor in particular and of citizens in general are heard when the more
technocratic discussions and reviews of the audit report are being conducted.
In order to scale up citizens’ demands for accountable governance as outlined above, there
must be enhanced civic education as well as civic competence and democratic citizenship.
This will also require an adequate and credible flow of information, and that community
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advocates are given an opportunity to access information about government agencies that
would normally be limited to the horizontal axis. Certainly, citizens are able to demand
accountable governance if credible information is made readily available to them. Citizens
should be able to walk into any government department to request information.
Information flow should not only be on the demand side, but also on the supply side.
Government agencies must be able to provide adequate information on accountability
processes within their jurisdiction. This is a reason that citizens and civil society
organizations must continue to engage with and advocate for the swift passage of the
freedom of information bill into a credible and implementable law.
Furthermore, the quality of information made available to the citizenry is worrying and
deserves some attention. Ideally, the National Commission for Civic Education must be seen
to provide undiluted information to citizens on pertinent national issues. But, of course, just
like other governance institutions, the body is faced with resource constraints. In the
interim, the media, particularly radio and TV, can assist in addressing this growing worrying
trend of misinformation by bringing to their platforms credible resource persons rather
than party communicators.
Conclusion
We all share a common vision of a corruption free and accountable Ghana. Achieving
complete democratic accountability really is a tall order. However, our duty bearers must
realize that our social contract does not expire after they have won political power. Indeed,
that is when the social contract begins, because by giving them political power, we (the
citizens) have surrendered our collective will to them and they must be accountable to us.
We do have the legal and institutional structures and framework for accountable
governance; our challenge is implementing, enforcing and strengthening them, and also
equipping our institutions with the necessary tools to function effectively.
When we as a nation sincerely recognize that good governance requires placing
transparency and accountability at the centre of the exercise of political, economic and
administrative authority, we can harness our potential to achieve national transformation.
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This will necessitate empowering both state and non-state actors and citizens generally to
participate actively and objectively in national development processes, and to ensure that
political, economic and administrative authority is exercised in a way that guarantees that
public resources are managed efficiently and with integrity, addressing the critical needs of
the people. This will also require strengthening the active and increased participation of all,
including the marginalized and vulnerable (women, youth, and the disabled) in the
democratic space. Certainly, when we talk about strong structures of accountable
governance, we are, invariably, talking about expanded participation of both state and nonstate actors.
References
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Cavill, S. & Sohail, M. (2004) Strengthening Accountability for Urban Services. Environment and
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