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COMMENTARY
Ethnic Militancy in Assam
Whom to Blame?
h srikanth
The killing of over 70 adivasis in
Assam by one faction of the Bodo
militants is part of a pattern
which has become normalised in
Assam and its neighbouring
states. This article places the
present killings in the historical
context of the rise of ethnic
militancy and underlines, yet
again, the futility of such acts.
H Srikanth ([email protected]) teaches at the
North Eastern Hill University, Shillong.
Economic & Political Weekly
EPW
JANUARY 31, 2015
You are concerned about infiltrators and not
your own people ...they must go back, they
are robbing the youths of India of their livelihood – Narendra Modi’s electoral speech in
May 2014, referring to Assam Chief Minister,
Tarun Gogoi and West Bengal Chief Minister,
Mamata Banerjee.
What has happened is no small incident of militancy. This is a brazen act of terror and will be
dealt with as an act of terror should be. There
will be zero tolerance and operations will be intensified against those behind the bloodbath –
Union Home Minister, Rajnath Singh’s address
in Guwahati on 25 December, 2014 condemning the militant attack on adivasis.
I
n May 2014 more than 30 Bengali
Muslims were gunned down by the
Bodo militants in Bodoland Territorial Area District (BTAD). Six months
after the incident, in December, the
vol l no 5
ultras targeted the adivasis, killing
nearly 70 persons – including 21 women
and 18 children dead, and forcing more
than 70,000 people to take shelter in
relief camps. Various political parties,
students and youth organisations, and
non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
in the state criticised the deadly attacks
on unarmed adivasis and demanded
that the government take action against
the Songbijit faction of the National
Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-S)
indulging in terrorist activities.
Rise of Militancy
Militancy is not something new to northeast India, but the militants resorting to
terrorist acts to achieve their political
goals is indeed a recent phenomenon.
The Nagas and the Mizos took to insurgency in 1950s and 1960s in pursuit of
their demand for independent homelands. The 1970s saw the rise of militancy
in the valley areas of Manipur and Assam.
Till the 1970s militant groups leading
the insurgencies in the north-eastern
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COMMENTARY
states mainly targeted the police, the
army and the paramilitary forces, who
were identified as representatives of the
“colonial” Indian state. No doubt, nonindigenous peoples, living in the insurgency-prone areas, were subjected to
illegal “taxation”, extortion and “curfews” by some militant groups, but
large-scale killings, looting and forcible
eviction of the migrant population were
almost unknown till the 1980s.
The situation changed during the
Assam agitation directed against the socalled foreigners in the period between
1979 and 1985. It was during this supposedly peaceful “Gandhian nationalist
movement” that Assam witnessed the
ghastly Nellie massacre in 1983, in
which over 2,000 Bengali Muslims were
killed. What was then considered a
spontaneous outburst, or even an aberration, has, since the 1990s, become a
regular feature of the politics of Assam
and other north-eastern states. In the
name of fighting for independence, ethnic
integration or separate state status,
different militant outfits have started
attacking people belonging to other
communities, killing unarmed civilians
– including women and children, torching
their houses and crops, and forcing tens
of thousands of people to flee from their
villages into refugee camps which
change the demography of the region.
Although almost all states in the NorthEast have experienced such acts of terrorism, Bodo militancy gets greater
attention in national media, partly because of the frequency and intensity of
the militant attacks.
Trajectory of Bodo Politics
The Bodos, one of the tribes inhabiting
the plains of Assam, have been fighting
for a separate state. It is true that the
Bodos view the Bengali Muslim peasants
and the adivasis, who were encouraged
or forced to migrate to Assam during the
colonial period, as encroachers of their
ancestral land and other resources.
What needs to be remembered is that
the Bodo movement that took off in the
1960s was political and non-violent. In
fact it was mainly directed against the
Assam government. The Bodos then
asserted their separate identity and
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opposed the official linguistic policy that
aimed at an Assamisation of the state.
That Bodo movement held the state government responsible for the neglect,
economic underdevelopment and educational backwardness of the Bodos.
Yet during the Assam agitation (197985) the Bodos identified themselves with
the Assamese, who invoked Assamese
nationalism to fight against the “threat”
of “illegal Bangladeshi settlers”. However,
almost immediately after the Assam agitation, the Bodo leaders fell apart and
began to reassert their separate identity
by launching a militant political movement under the guidance of the All Bodo
Students’ Union (ABSU) and the Bodo
Peoples’ Action Committee (BPAC).
While the Bodo leaders attributed the
break to the “big-brother” attitude of the
Assamese leadership, the latter alleged
that Bodo militancy was encouraged
and sponsored by the Congress government at the centre with the intention of
countering the growth of the Asom Gana
Parishad (AGP).
In 1993 ABSU-BPAC entered into a
bipartite accord that resulted in the formation of the Bodoland Autonomous
Council (BAC). But the limited powers
granted to BAC did not satisfy the Bodo
militants aspiring for a separate state.
Their dissatisfaction facilitated the rise
of armed militant outfits – the NDFB
and the Bodo Liberation Tigers Force
(BLTF). These militant groups virtually
hijacked the political agenda of the
Bodos and took to arms to achieve their
political objectives. More than fighting
against the government agencies, they
started indulging in ethnic cleansing
campaigns to achieve their goals. Their
first violent assault in 1993-94 was directed against the Bengali Muslims. Later in 1996 and then in 1998 they targeted the adivasis – the descendants of tribals from east-central India brought to
work in the tea estates during the 19th
century – killing hundreds of people and
displacing over two lakh adivasis from
their villages.
However, Bengali Muslim peasants
continued to be their prime targets. Despite the fact that the Bodos constitute
only 30% of the population in the areas
they claim to be their own, they demanded a separate state defined by their
ethnic status. After a hard bargain, in
2003 the BLTF and the ABSU agreed to
the formation of the Bodo Territorial
Council (BTC), comprising the newly
carved out territorial area districts of
Kokhrajhar, Baksa, Udalguri and Chirang.
The BLTF gave up arms and its leaders
even contested and won the BTC elections. But the NDFB rejected the BTC
formula and continued its militant activities in pursuit of its demand for a sovereign Bodoland. After the 2008 serial
bomb blasts in Guwahati and other
places in Assam, the NDFB encountered
splits, first in 2008 and then in 2012.
When Ranjan Diamary, who earlier
headed the Bodo Security Force and
then the NDFB for over two decades,
agreed to hold talks with the centre, the
breakaway faction led by I K Songbijit
opposed the talks and started violent
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JANUARY 31, 2015
vol l no 5
EPW
Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENTARY
acts against the non-Bodos in the name
of the Bodo nation.
The Oxygen Supply
Following the violent assaults on the
adivasis in December 2014, state and
central governments came under tremendous pressure to suppress the activities of NDFB-S. The union home minister flew to Guwahati and ordered intensification of anti-insurgency operations
against the banned outfit. After the usual
initial blame game, both state and central governments agreed to cooperate
with each other. Several suggestions
have been made to prevent the recurrence of such attacks. These include a
revamp of its intelligence establishment,
strengthening of police patrol and civil
administration in sensitive villages, improvement in road connectivity and
communication set-up in border villages, identification and arrest of those involved in violent crimes, seizure of illegal
arms from militants and ex-militants,
negotiations with neighbouring countries to step up offensive against the
militants’ hideouts in there and ensuring effective coordination between the
centre and state agencies while undertaking counter-insurgency operations.
To some extent such measures may
help in reducing the intensity and frequency of militant attacks. But ethnic
militancy is a multi-headed hydra which
cannot be put down without striking at
the sources that sustain and strengthen
its presence.
Apart from operational difficulties,
what comes in the way of tackling ethnic
insurgents in north-east India is lack of
political will. It is difficult to take a firm
stand against ethnic militants, for most
politicians and ruling parties need them
for electoral gains. That there is no consistent anti-militant policy becomes clear
when one takes a look at the utterances
of national leaders. In May 2014 when
the NDFB orchestrated riots, Narendra
Modi, the then prime ministerial aspirant campaigning in Guwahati did not utter a word against the Bodo militants.
Instead he made a wild allegation that
rhinos are killed in Assam to make way
for illegal Bangladeshi settlers. Taking cue
from his speeches, many intellectuals
Economic & Political Weekly
EPW
JANUARY 31, 2015
wedded to the Sangh Parivar started
writing blogs depicting all Bengali
Muslims, even those settled in Assam
before Independence, as Bangladeshis
and holding them responsible for the
ethnic clashes.
These people, however, started responding differently when the same militant group attacked the adivasis in
December 2014. Such inconsistencies are
the hallmarks of the state leaders as
well. So much has been said and written
about the link between politicians and
militants in north-east India. The leaders’ response to militancy depends not
so much on the nature of crimes committed, but on their political relations
with the perpetrators or the victims of
such crimes. Some political parties
and associations in the North-East are
ideologically and ethnically so close to
certain militant outfits that it is inconceivable to think of any hard-line policy
against the extremists. They may at
best be critical of militant outfits of
other communities, but tend to be soft
towards “their own” militant outfits
that claim to be fighting for their community interests.
Militants exercise considerable hold
over local police and government officials too, particularly at the local levels.
In May 2014 it was reported that 10 exmilitants who were employed as forest
guards by the BTAD government were
instrumental in killing several Bengali
Muslims. In times of ethnic tensions, it is
difficult for politicians, political parties,
administrators, police and mass organisations, who are themselves under the
influence of ethnic ideologies, to remain
neutral and impartial. Sometimes pragmatic considerations to weaken the militant groups also compel the state and
central governments to appease the
militant leaders and overlook all the
crimes committed against the civilians
in the name of the greater good of
the state.
No Conclusion
While pointing out the weaknesses of
politicians and officials in combating
ethnic militancy, one should not forget
that ethnic militancy does not end by
neutralising particular militant groups.
vol l no 5
As long as ethnic ideologies and identity
politics continue to influence the minds
and actions of people, there will always
be someone waiting to take to ethnic
militancy. The history of Bodo militancy
shows that every time a militant outfit
gives up arms, a new faction emerges
from within to carry on militant activities. While criticising their violent and
sectarian activities, one should not lose
sight of the fact that ethnic thinking is
fostered not only by ethnic militants,
but also by governments, politicians,
NGOs and intellectuals of different hues
and colours.
Unable to offer solutions to the problems of poverty, unemployment, landlessness and underdevelopment in tribal
areas, over the years many, including
the mainstream leftist parties, have contributed to the illusion that all problems
of native communities can be resolved
by conceding political autonomy to
them, or by granting scheduled tribe
(ST) status to all communities claiming
to be indigenous. Consequently, not only
in Assam, but in other north-eastern
states too different communities have
began competing with one another seeking ST status and demanding autonomous districts or separate states for
themselves. The radicals among them
take to ethnic militancy to achieve the
goals, without realising that, far from
achieving their declared goals their
activities only facilitate the rise of militant outfits in the communities they
have started targeting.
Without an understanding of the
dynamics of capitalist market economy
and the divisive politics of the ruling
classes in India, every community continues to see the others as its enemies
and indulges in a zero-sum game where
neither the communities claiming to be
indigenous nor the communities branded
as outsiders/illegal Bangladeshi settlers
could live and progress in peace. It is
only by involving all oppressed classes
and communities of people in the region
in alternative militant movements against
underdevelopment and politics of divide
and rule that one could think of putting
an end to ethnic militancy. Unfortunately,
it does not seem that politics in the
region is yet ripe for that change.
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